Add Audit control to AppArmor through, the use of audit and deny

key words.  Deny is also used to subtract permissions from the
profiles permission set.

the audit key word can be prepended to any file, network, or capability
rule, to force a selective audit when that rule is matched.  Audit
permissions accumulate just like standard permissions.

  eg.
  audit /bin/foo rw,

  will force an audit message when the file /bin/foo is opened for
  read or write.

  audit /etc/shadow w,
  /etc/shadow r,
  will force an audit message when /etc/shadow is opened for writing.
  The audit message is per permission bit so only opening the file
  for read access will not, force an audit message.

  audit can also be used in block form instead of prepending audit
  to every rule.

  audit {
    /bin/foo rw,
    /etc/shadow w,
  }
  /etc/shadow r,	# don't audit r access to /etc/shadow


the deny key word can be prepended to file, network and capability
rules, to result in a denial of permissions when matching that rule.
The deny rule specifically does 3 things
- it gives AppArmor the ability to remember what has been denied
  so that the tools don't prompt for what has been denied in
  previous profiling sessions.
- it subtracts globally from the allowed permissions.  Deny permissions
  accumulate in the the deny set just as allow permissions accumulate
  then, the deny set is subtracted from the allow set.
- it quiets known rejects.  The default audit behavior of deny rules
  is to quiet known rejects so that audit logs are not flooded
  with already known rejects.  To have known rejects logged prepend
  the audit keyword to the deny rule.  Deny rules do not have a
  block form.

eg.
  deny /foo/bar rw,
  audit deny /etc/shadow w,

  audit {
     deny owner /blah w,
     deny other /foo w,
     deny /etc/shadow w,
  }

parser/parser_interface.c

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 #define SD_STR_LEN (sizeof(u16))
 
 #define SUBDOMAIN_INTERFACE_VERSION 2
-#define SUBDOMAIN_INTERFACE_DFA_VERSION 3
+#define SUBDOMAIN_INTERFACE_DFA_VERSION 4
 
 int sd_serialize_codomain(int option, struct codomain *cod);
 
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ struct __sdserialize {
 
 sd_serialize *alloc_sd_serial(void)
 {
-	sd_serialize *p = malloc(sizeof(sd_serialize));
+	sd_serialize *p = calloc(1, sizeof(sd_serialize));
 	if (!p)
 		return NULL;
 	p->buffer = malloc(BUFFERINC);
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ int sd_serialize_profile(sd_serialize *p, struct codomain *profile,
 			 int flattened)
 {
 	struct cod_entry *entry;
+	u32 allowed_caps;
 
 	if (!sd_write_struct(p, "profile"))
 		return 0;
@@ -560,7 +561,12 @@ int sd_serialize_profile(sd_serialize *p, struct codomain *profile,
 		return 0;
 	if (!sd_write_structend(p))
 		return 0;
-	if (!sd_write32(p, profile->capabilities))
+	allowed_caps = profile->capabilities & ~profile->deny_caps;
+	if (!sd_write32(p, allowed_caps))
+		return 0;
+	if (!sd_write32(p, allowed_caps & profile->audit_caps))
+		return 0;
+	if (!sd_write32(p, profile->deny_caps & profile->quiet_caps))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (profile->network_allowed) {
@@ -568,7 +574,13 @@ int sd_serialize_profile(sd_serialize *p, struct codomain *profile,
 		if (!sd_write_array(p, "net_allowed_af", AF_MAX))
 			return 0;
 		for (i = 0; i < AF_MAX; i++) {
-			if (!sd_write16(p, profile->network_allowed[i]))
+		    u16 allowed = profile->network_allowed[i] &
+			~profile->deny_network[i];
+			if (!sd_write16(p, allowed))
+				return 0;
+			if (!sd_write16(p, allowed & profile->audit_network[i]))
+				return 0;
+			if (!sd_write16(p, profile->deny_network[i] & profile->quiet_network[i]))
 				return 0;
 		}
 		if (!sd_write_arrayend(p))