In commit rev 2127, backported from trunk, a bit of C++ish style code
leaked in, the use of a bool variable. This is problematic for pure C
code. This commit converts the bool to an int and adjusts the true and
false keywords to their corresponding macros as defined in parser.h.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
backport of dev commit 2510
v3: fix freeing of filename when undefined
v2: address tyhicks feedback
refactor to have a common write routine
fix issue with set profile load being done even if !kernel_load
Profile loads from cache files that contain multiple profiles can
result in multiple reloads of the same profile or error messages about
failure to load profiles if the --add option is used. eg.
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_load"
name="/usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/apache2" pid=8631
comm="apparmor_parser"
<sth0R> [82932.058388] type=1400 audit(1395415826.937:616):
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_load" name="DEFAULT_URI" pid=8631
comm="apparmor_parser"
<sth0R> [82932.058391] type=1400 audit(1395415826.937:617):
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_load"
name="HANDLING_UNTRUSTED_INPUT" pid=8631 comm="apparmor_parser"
<sth0R> [82932.058394] type=1400 audit(1395415826.937:618):
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_load" name="phpsysinfo" pid=8631
comm="apparmor_parser"
<sth0R> [82932.059058] type=1400 audit(1395415826.937:619):
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_replace" info="profile can not be
replaced" error=-17
name="/usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/apache2//DEFAULT_URI" pid=8631
comm="apparmor_parser"
<sth0R> [82932.059574] type=1400 audit(1395415826.937:620):
apparmor="STATUS" operation="profile_replace" info="profile can not be
replaced" error=-17
name="/usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/apache2//HANDLING_UNTRUSTED_INPUT"
pid=8631 comm="apparmor_parser"
The reason this happens is that the cache file is a container that
can contain multiple profiles in sequential order
profile1
profile2
profile3
The parser loads the entire cache file to memory and the writes the
whole file to the kernel interface. It then skips foward in the file
to the next profile and reloads the file from that profile into
the kernel.
eg. First load
profile1
profile2
profile3
advance to profile2, do second load
profile2
profile3
advance to profile3, do third load
profile3
With older kernels the interface would stop after the first profile and
return that it had processed the whole file, thus while wasting compute
resources copying extra data no errors occurred. However newer kernels
now support atomic loading of multipe profiles, so that all the profiles
passed in to the interface get processed.
This means on newer kernels the current parser load behavior results
in multiple loads/replacements when a cache file contains more than
one profile (note: loads from a compile do not have this problem).
To fix this, detect if the kernel supports atomic set loads, and load
the cache file once. If it doesn't only load one profile section
from a cache file at a time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
policydb is the new matching format, that combines the matching portions
of different rules into a single dfa/hfa. This patch only lays some ground
work it does not add encoding of any rules into the policydb
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The ability to set capabilities from a profile has been removed from the
kernel for several releases. Remove it from the parser as well.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The module interface calls for names with namespaces to be in the format of
:namespace:profile or :namespace://profile
but the parser was generating
namespace:profile
causing profile lookup to fail, or removal of the wrong profile as it was
done against the current namespace, instead of the specified namespace
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
thing again. Fix to use the kernel's definition of AF_MAX in
linux/socket.h if it's larger than glibc's AF_MAX definition in
sys/socket.h and add a wrapper function so that we don't have include
af_names.h everywhere.
Also, fix memory leaks around the handling of network entries of
policies.
removing profiles, as the list is unstable after additions or removals.
- Add the ability to loaded precompiled policy by specifying the -B
option, which can be combined with --add or --replace
key words. Deny is also used to subtract permissions from the
profiles permission set.
the audit key word can be prepended to any file, network, or capability
rule, to force a selective audit when that rule is matched. Audit
permissions accumulate just like standard permissions.
eg.
audit /bin/foo rw,
will force an audit message when the file /bin/foo is opened for
read or write.
audit /etc/shadow w,
/etc/shadow r,
will force an audit message when /etc/shadow is opened for writing.
The audit message is per permission bit so only opening the file
for read access will not, force an audit message.
audit can also be used in block form instead of prepending audit
to every rule.
audit {
/bin/foo rw,
/etc/shadow w,
}
/etc/shadow r, # don't audit r access to /etc/shadow
the deny key word can be prepended to file, network and capability
rules, to result in a denial of permissions when matching that rule.
The deny rule specifically does 3 things
- it gives AppArmor the ability to remember what has been denied
so that the tools don't prompt for what has been denied in
previous profiling sessions.
- it subtracts globally from the allowed permissions. Deny permissions
accumulate in the the deny set just as allow permissions accumulate
then, the deny set is subtracted from the allow set.
- it quiets known rejects. The default audit behavior of deny rules
is to quiet known rejects so that audit logs are not flooded
with already known rejects. To have known rejects logged prepend
the audit keyword to the deny rule. Deny rules do not have a
block form.
eg.
deny /foo/bar rw,
audit deny /etc/shadow w,
audit {
deny owner /blah w,
deny other /foo w,
deny /etc/shadow w,
}
