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Mark Andrews
2003-03-06 20:40:48 +00:00
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doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-renewal-mode-02.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-renewal-mode-03.txt
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
DNSEXT Working Group Yuji Kamite DNSEXT Working Group Yuji Kamite
INTERNET-DRAFT NTT Communications INTERNET-DRAFT NTT Communications
<draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-renewal-mode-02.txt> Masaya Nakayama <draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-renewal-mode-03.txt> Masaya Nakayama
Expires: Mar. 24, 2003 The University of Tokyo Expires: Sep. 3, 2003 The University of Tokyo
Sep. 24, 2002 Mar. 3, 2003
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Abstract
Kamite, et. al. [Page 1] Kamite, et. al. [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002 INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
Table of Contents Table of Contents
@@ -75,22 +75,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
2.4 Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4 Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.1 Query for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.1 Query for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.2 Response for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.4.2 Response for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Keying Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.5 Keying Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.1 DH Exchange for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5.1 DH Exchange for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.2 Server Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5.2 Server Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.3 Resolver Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . 13 2.5.3 Resolver Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.6 Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Secret Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3 Secret Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Compulsory Key Revocation by Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 Compulsory Key Revocation by Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Special Considerations for Two Servers' Case . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 Special Considerations for Two Servers' Case . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1 To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1 To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests . . . . . . . . . 16
6 Key Name Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6 Key Name Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7 Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7 Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Kamite, et. al. [Page 2] Kamite, et. al. [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002 INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
@@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
which is defined within the framework of TKEY, and it is called "TKEY which is defined within the framework of TKEY, and it is called "TKEY
Secret Key Renewal Mode". Secret Key Renewal Mode".
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY" and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC 2119]. [RFC2119].
1.1. Defined Words 1.1. Defined Words
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Kamite, et. al. [Page 3] Kamite, et. al. [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002 INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
and must be updated. It must be between Inception Time and Expiry and must be updated. It must be between Inception Time and Expiry
@@ -219,15 +219,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
It always checks if the present time is within the range of usage It always checks if the present time is within the range of usage
duration it considers safe. If it is judged that the key is too old, duration it considers safe. If it is judged that the key is too old,
i.e., after Partial Revocation Time, the server comes to be in i.e., after Partial Revocation Time, the server comes to be in
Partial Revocation state about the key. Partial Revocation state about the key, and this key is called
Kamite, et. al. [Page 4] Kamite, et. al. [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002 INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
partially revoked.
In this state, whenever a client sends a normal query (e.g., question In this state, whenever a client sends a normal query (e.g., question
about A RR) other than TKEY Renewal request with TSIG signed with the about A RR) other than TKEY Renewal request with TSIG signed with the
old key, the server returns an error message to notify that the time old key, the server returns an error message to notify that the time
@@ -236,11 +238,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
The client which got this error is able to notice that it is The client which got this error is able to notice that it is
necessary to refresh the secret. To make a new shared secret, it necessary to refresh the secret. To make a new shared secret, it
sends a TKEY Renewal request, in which several keying methods are sends a TKEY Renewal request, in which several keying methods are
available. After new secret establishment, the client sends a TKEY available. It can make use of TSIG authentication signed with the
Adoption request. If this is admitted by the server, the new key is partially revoked key mentioned above.
formally adopted, and at the same time the corresponding old secret
is invalidated. Then the client can send the first query again signed After new secret establishment, the client sends a TKEY Adoption
with the new key. request for renewal confirmation. This can also be authenticated with
the partially revoked key. If this is admitted by the server, the new
key is formally adopted, and at the same time the corresponding old
secret is invalidated. Then the client can send the first query again
signed with the new key.
Key renewal procedure is executed based on two-phase commit Key renewal procedure is executed based on two-phase commit
mechanism. The first phase is the TKEY Renewal request and its mechanism. The first phase is the TKEY Renewal request and its
@@ -270,20 +276,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
verify TSIG with the key, and server acts the same way as when no verify TSIG with the key, and server acts the same way as when no
valid key is found, following [RFC2845]. valid key is found, following [RFC2845].
Kamite, et. al. [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
When the present time is equal to Inception Time, or between When the present time is equal to Inception Time, or between
Inception Time and Partial Revocation Time, the behavior of the Inception Time and Partial Revocation Time, the behavior of the
server is the same as when a valid key is found, required in server is the same as when a valid key is found, required in
[RFC2845]. [RFC2845].
When the present time is the same as the Partial Revocation Time, or When the present time is the same as the Partial Revocation Time, or
Kamite, et. al. [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
between the Partial Revocation Time and Expiry Limit, the server between the Partial Revocation Time and Expiry Limit, the server
comes to be in Partial Revocation state about the TSIG key and comes to be in Partial Revocation state about the TSIG key and
behaves according to the next section. behaves according to the next section.
@@ -298,11 +304,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
In Partial Revocation state, we say the server has partially revoked In Partial Revocation state, we say the server has partially revoked
the key and the key has become a "partially revoked key". the key and the key has become a "partially revoked key".
Server which has received queries signed with the partially revoked If server has received a query signed with the partially revoked key
key MUST NOT answer them except when they are Renewal requests (See for TKEY Renewal request (See section 2.3.) or "key adoption" request
section 2.3.) or "key adoption" requests (See section 2.4.). Instead, (See section 2.4.), then server does proper process following each
it returns TSIG error messages whose error codes are "PartialRevoke" specification.
(See section 9.)
If server receives other types of query signed with the partially
revoked key and the corresponding MAC is verified, then server SHOULD
return TSIG error message for response whose error code is
"PartialRevoke" (See section 9.). However, if it is for TKEY key
deletion request ([RFC2930] 4.2), server MAY process usual deletion
operation defined therein.
PartialRevoke error messages have the role to inform clients of the PartialRevoke error messages have the role to inform clients of the
keys' partial revocation and urge them to send TKEY Renewal requests. keys' partial revocation and urge them to send TKEY Renewal requests.
@@ -320,6 +332,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
If a client has received a PartialRevoke error and authenticated the If a client has received a PartialRevoke error and authenticated the
response based on TSIG MAC, it sends a TKEY query for Key Renewal (in response based on TSIG MAC, it sends a TKEY query for Key Renewal (in
Kamite, et. al. [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
this document, we call it Renewal request, too.) to the server. The this document, we call it Renewal request, too.) to the server. The
request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) [RFC2931] for request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) [RFC2931] for
authentication. If TSIG is selected, the client can sign it with the authentication. If TSIG is selected, the client can sign it with the
@@ -332,20 +352,12 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
The server which has received Key Renewal request first tries to The server which has received Key Renewal request first tries to
verify TSIG or SIG(0) accompanying it. If the TSIG is signed and verify TSIG or SIG(0) accompanying it. If the TSIG is signed and
verified with the partially revoked key, the request MUST be verified with the partially revoked key, the request MUST be
Kamite, et. al. [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
authenticated. authenticated.
After authentication, server must check existing old key's validity. After authentication, server must check existing old key's validity.
If the partially revoked key indicated in the request TKEY's OldName If the partially revoked key indicated in the request TKEY's OldName
and OldAlgorithm field (See section 2.3.1.) does not really exist at and OldAlgorithm field (See section 2.3.1.) does not really exist at
the server, "BADKEY" [RFC 2845] is given in Error field for response. the server, "BADKEY" [RFC2845] is given in Error field for response.
If any other error happens, server returns appropriate error messages If any other error happens, server returns appropriate error messages
following the specification described in section 2.5. If there are no following the specification described in section 2.5. If there are no
errors, server returns a Key Renewal answer. This answer MUST be errors, server returns a Key Renewal answer. This answer MUST be
@@ -376,6 +388,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Note: Note:
Even after the response is returned to client, possibly server Even after the response is returned to client, possibly server
sometimes receives another Renewal TKEY request whose OldName sometimes receives another Renewal TKEY request whose OldName
Kamite, et. al. [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
indicates the same partial revoked key. Mostly such messages indicates the same partial revoked key. Mostly such messages
originate in client's resending or rollback because of some kinds originate in client's resending or rollback because of some kinds
of errors. In this case, the server processes keying again and of errors. In this case, the server processes keying again and
@@ -388,14 +408,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Even if client sends Key Renewal request though the key described Even if client sends Key Renewal request though the key described
in OldName has not been partially revoked yet, server must do in OldName has not been partially revoked yet, server must do
Kamite, et. al. [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
renewal processes. But at the moment when the server accepts such renewal processes. But at the moment when the server accepts such
requests with valid authentication, it MUST forcibly consider the requests with valid authentication, it MUST forcibly consider the
key is already partially revoked, that is, the key's Partial key is already partially revoked, that is, the key's Partial
@@ -431,6 +443,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Other Data: newly defined: see description below Other Data: newly defined: see description below
Kamite, et. al. [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
For "NAME" field, both non-root and root name are allowed. It may For "NAME" field, both non-root and root name are allowed. It may
be used for a new key's name in the same manner as [RFC2930] 2.1. be used for a new key's name in the same manner as [RFC2930] 2.1.
@@ -444,14 +465,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
"Key Data" has different meanings according to keying schemes. "Key Data" has different meanings according to keying schemes.
"Mode" field stores the value in accordance with the keying method, "Mode" field stores the value in accordance with the keying method,
Kamite, et. al. [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
and see section 2.5. Servers and clients supporting TKEY Renewal and see section 2.5. Servers and clients supporting TKEY Renewal
method MUST implement "Diffie-Hellman exchange for key renewal" method MUST implement "Diffie-Hellman exchange for key renewal"
scheme. All other modes are OPTIONAL. scheme. All other modes are OPTIONAL.
@@ -486,9 +499,18 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
filed of TKEY written below. In additional section, there is one TKEY filed of TKEY written below. In additional section, there is one TKEY
RR that has the structure and values described below. RR that has the structure and values described below.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 9]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
"NAME" field is the new key's name to be adopted which was already "NAME" field is the new key's name to be adopted which was already
generated by Renewal message exchange. "Algorithm" is its algorithm generated by Renewal message exchange. "Algorithm" is its algo-
name. "Inception" means the key's Inception Time, and "Expiration" rithm. "Inception" means the key's Inception Time, and "Expiration"
means Expiry Limit. means Expiry Limit.
"Mode" field is the value of "key adoption". See section 9. "Mode" field is the value of "key adoption". See section 9.
@@ -500,14 +522,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Key Adoption request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) for Key Adoption request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) for
authentication. The client can sign TSIG with the previous key. Note authentication. The client can sign TSIG with the previous key. Note
that until Adoption is finished, the new key is treated as invalid, that until Adoption is finished, the new key is treated as invalid,
Kamite, et. al. [Page 9]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
thus it cannot be used for authentication immediately. thus it cannot be used for authentication immediately.
@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
revoked key and can be verified, the message MUST be authenticated. revoked key and can be verified, the message MUST be authenticated.
If the next new key indicated by the request TKEY's "NAME" is not If the next new key indicated by the request TKEY's "NAME" is not
really present at the server, BADNAME [RFC 2845] is given in Error really present at the server, BADNAME [RFC2845] is given in Error
field and the error message is returned. field and the error message is returned.
If the next key really exists and it has not been adopted formally If the next key really exists and it has not been adopted formally
@@ -542,6 +556,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Client will probably retry Adoption request; however, the request Client will probably retry Adoption request; however, the request
will be refused in the form of TSIG "BADKEY" error because the will be refused in the form of TSIG "BADKEY" error because the
previous key was already revoked. In this case, client should previous key was already revoked. In this case, client should
Kamite, et. al. [Page 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
retransmit Adoption request signed with the next key, and expect a retransmit Adoption request signed with the next key, and expect a
response which has null "Other Data" for confirming the completion of response which has null "Other Data" for confirming the completion of
renewal. renewal.
@@ -558,12 +580,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
other future documents can make extensions defining other methods. other future documents can make extensions defining other methods.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
2.5.1. DH Exchange for Key Renewal 2.5.1. DH Exchange for Key Renewal
This scheme is defined as an extended method of [RFC2930] 4.1. This This scheme is defined as an extended method of [RFC2930] 4.1. This
@@ -592,10 +608,18 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or
SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is
checked, following section 2.3. If any incompatible DH key is checked, following section 2.3. If any incompatible DH key is
found in the request, "BADKEY" [RFC 2845] is given in Error field found in the request, "BADKEY" [RFC2845] is given in Error field
for response. "FORMERR" is given if the query included no DH KEY. for response. "FORMERR" is given if the query included no DH KEY.
If there are no errors, the server processes a response according If there are no errors, the server processes a response according
Kamite, et. al. [Page 11]
INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
to Diffie-Hellman algorithm and returns the answer. In this to Diffie-Hellman algorithm and returns the answer. In this
answer, there is one TKEY RR in answer section and KEY RR(s) in answer, there is one TKEY RR in answer section and KEY RR(s) in
additional section. additional section.
@@ -613,13 +637,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the
server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit. server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 11]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
TKEY "Key Data" is used as an additional nonce, following TKEY "Key Data" is used as an additional nonce, following
[RFC2930] 4.1. [RFC2930] 4.1.
@@ -652,6 +669,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
TKEY "Key Data" is provided following the specification of TKEY "Key Data" is provided following the specification of
[RFC2930] 4.4. [RFC2930] 4.4.
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Response Response
The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or
SIG(0). Resolver KEY RR is also authenticated by means of SIG(0). Resolver KEY RR is also authenticated by means of
@@ -668,14 +692,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced
key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new
Kamite, et. al. [Page 12]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be
regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the
server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit. server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit.
@@ -709,6 +725,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
TKEY "Key Data" is the encrypted keying material. TKEY "Key Data" is the encrypted keying material.
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Response Response
The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or
SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is
@@ -724,14 +747,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
produced key which the client will have to use. produced key which the client will have to use.
TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced
Kamite, et. al. [Page 13]
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key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new
key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be
regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the
@@ -763,6 +778,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
read by others. If possible, they should be stored in encrypted form. read by others. If possible, they should be stored in encrypted form.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 14]
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4. Compulsory Key Revocation by Server 4. Compulsory Key Revocation by Server
There is a rare but possible case that although servers have already There is a rare but possible case that although servers have already
@@ -781,13 +806,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Time, perhaps clients might not be able to notice their keys' Partial Time, perhaps clients might not be able to notice their keys' Partial
Revocation by getting "PartialRevoke" errors. Revocation by getting "PartialRevoke" errors.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 14]
INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Therefore, servers should set proper Expiry Limit to their keys, Therefore, servers should set proper Expiry Limit to their keys,
considering both their keys' safety, and enough time for clients to considering both their keys' safety, and enough time for clients to
send requests and process renewal. send requests and process renewal.
@@ -800,7 +818,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
A client and a server start SIG(0) authentication at first, to A client and a server start SIG(0) authentication at first, to
establish TSIG shared keys by means of "Query for Diffie-Hellman establish TSIG shared keys by means of "Query for Diffie-Hellman
Exchanged Keying" as described in [RFC 2930] 4.1. Once they get Exchanged Keying" as described in [RFC2930] 4.1. Once they get
shared secret, they keep using TSIG for usual queries and shared secret, they keep using TSIG for usual queries and
responses. After a while the server returns a "ParitalRevoke" error responses. After a while the server returns a "ParitalRevoke" error
and they begin a key renewal process. Both TSIG signed with and they begin a key renewal process. Both TSIG signed with
@@ -815,6 +833,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Exchanged Keying" with SIG(0) to make a new shared key again. Exchanged Keying" with SIG(0) to make a new shared key again.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 15]
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5. Special Considerations for Two servers' Case 5. Special Considerations for Two servers' Case
This section refers to the case where both two hosts are DNS servers This section refers to the case where both two hosts are DNS servers
@@ -838,12 +867,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
renewal timing. renewal timing.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 15]
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5.1. To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests 5.1. To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests
At least one of two hosts which use Key Renewal must know their key At least one of two hosts which use Key Renewal must know their key
@@ -871,6 +894,12 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
requests now for themselves. requests now for themselves.
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6. Key Name Considerations 6. Key Name Considerations
Since both servers and clients have only to distinguish new secrets Since both servers and clients have only to distinguish new secrets
@@ -894,12 +923,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
refreshed. refreshed.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 16]
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7. Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode 7. Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode
This is an example of Renewal mode usage where a Server, This is an example of Renewal mode usage where a Server,
@@ -926,6 +949,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
with "00.client.example.com.server.example.com", and its Error Code with "00.client.example.com.server.example.com", and its Error Code
indicates PartialRevoke. indicates PartialRevoke.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 17]
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(5) At 9:01. Client sends a Renewal request to Server. This request (5) At 9:01. Client sends a Renewal request to Server. This request
is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It
includes data such as: includes data such as:
@@ -948,14 +978,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
(6) As soon as Server receives this request, it verifies TSIG. It (6) As soon as Server receives this request, it verifies TSIG. It
is signed with the partially revoked key is signed with the partially revoked key
"00.client.example.com.server.example.com". and Server accepts the "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". and Server accepts the
Kamite, et. al. [Page 17]
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request. It creates a new key by Diffie-Hellman calculation and request. It creates a new key by Diffie-Hellman calculation and
returns an answer which includes data such as: returns an answer which includes data such as:
@@ -981,6 +1003,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Diffie-Hellman. It will get a new key, and it has been named Diffie-Hellman. It will get a new key, and it has been named
"01.client.example.com.server.example.com" by Server. "01.client.example.com.server.example.com" by Server.
Kamite, et. al. [Page 18]
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(8) At 9:02. Client sends an Adoption request to Server. This (8) At 9:02. Client sends an Adoption request to Server. This
request is signed with the previous key request is signed with the previous key
"00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It includes: "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It includes:
@@ -1004,14 +1035,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
previous key and authenticated. It returns a response whose TKEY RR previous key and authenticated. It returns a response whose TKEY RR
is the same as the request's one. The response is signed with key is the same as the request's one. The response is signed with key
"00.client.example.com.server.example.com.". As soon as the "00.client.example.com.server.example.com.". As soon as the
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response is sent, Server revokes and removes the previous key. At response is sent, Server revokes and removes the previous key. At
the same time, key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." is the same time, key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." is
validated. validated.
@@ -1037,6 +1060,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
refreshment is a fundamental security practice that helps against refreshment is a fundamental security practice that helps against
potential weaknesses of the function and keys, and limits the damage potential weaknesses of the function and keys, and limits the damage
of an exposed key. TKEY Secret Key Renewal provides the method of of an exposed key. TKEY Secret Key Renewal provides the method of
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periodical key refreshment. periodical key refreshment.
TKEY Secret Key Renewal forbids clients to send queries as long as TKEY Secret Key Renewal forbids clients to send queries as long as
@@ -1060,14 +1091,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
out, normal renewal process described in this document cannot be done out, normal renewal process described in this document cannot be done
any more as far as the key is concerned. But, after such accidents any more as far as the key is concerned. But, after such accidents
happened, the two hosts are able to establish secret keys and begin happened, the two hosts are able to establish secret keys and begin
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renewal procedure only if they have other (non-compromised) shared renewal procedure only if they have other (non-compromised) shared
TSIG keys or safe SIG(0) keys for the authentication of initial TSIG keys or safe SIG(0) keys for the authentication of initial
secret establishment such as Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying. secret establishment such as Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying.
@@ -1092,6 +1115,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC2539] [RFC2539]
D. Eastlake 3rd, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name D. Eastlake 3rd, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999. System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.
@@ -1119,9 +1151,33 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002
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INTERNET-DRAFT Sep. 2002 INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
@@ -1175,5 +1231,5 @@ Authors' Addresses
Kamite, et. al. [Page 21] Kamite, et. al. [Page 22]