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The role of the DNS, as viewed by the IAB chair
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INTERNET-DRAFT John C. Klensin
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November 10, 2000
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Expires May 2001
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Role of the Domain Name System
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draft-klensin-dns-role-00.txt
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Status of this Memo
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This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
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all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
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The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
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This document represents a summary of the personal opinions of the
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author on the subject covered and is not intended to evolve into a
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standard of any kind.
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
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0. Abstract
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The original function and purpose of the DNS is reviewed, and
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contrasted with some of the functions into which it is being forced
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today and some of the newer demands being placed upon it or suggested
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for it. A framework for an alternative to placing these additional
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stresses on the DNS is then outlined. This document and that
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framework are not a proposed solution, only a strong suggestion that
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the time has come to begin thinking more broadly about the problems
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we are encountering and possible approaches to solving them.
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1. History
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Several of the comments that follow are somewhat revisionist. Good
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design and engineering often requires a level of intuition by the
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designers about things that will be necessary in the future; the
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reasons for some of these design decisions are not made explicit at
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the time because no one is able to articulate them. The discussion
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below reconstructs some of the decisions about the Internet's primary
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namespace in the light of subsequent development and experience. In
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addition, the historical reasons for particular decisions about the
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Internet were often severely underdocumented contemporaneously and,
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not surprisingly, different participants have different recollections
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about what happened and what was considered important. Consequently,
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the quasi-historical story below is just one story. There may be
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(indeed, almost certainly are) other stories about how we got to
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where we are today, but they probably don't, of themselves,
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invalidate the inferences and conclusions.
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1.1 Context for DNS development
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During the entire life of the ARPANET and nearly the first decade or
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so of operation of the Internet, the list of host names and their
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mapping to and from addresses was maintained in a frequently-updated
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"host table" [RFC625, 811, 952]. This table was just a list in an
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agreed-upon format; sites were expected to frequently obtain copies
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of, and install, new versions. The host tables themselves were
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introduced to
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* Eliminate the requirement for people to remember host numbers
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(addresses). Despite apparent experience to the contrary in the
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conventional telephone system, numeric numbering systems, including
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the numeric host number strategy, did not (and do not) work well for
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more than a (large) handful of hosts.
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* Provide stability when addresses changed. Since addresses --to
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some degree in the ARPANET and more importantly in the contemporary
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Internet-- are a function of network topology and routing, they
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often had to be changed when connectivity or topology changed. The
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names could be kept stable even as addresses changed.
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* Some hosts (so-called "multihomed" ones) needed multiple
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addresses to reflect different types of connectivity and topology.
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Again, the names were very useful for avoiding the requirement that
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would otherwise exist for users and other hosts to track these
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multiple host numbers and addresses.
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Toward the end of that long (in network time) period, the community
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concluded that the host table model did not scale adequately and that
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it would not adequately support new service variations. A working
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group was created, and the DNS was the result of that effort. The
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role of the DNS was to preserve the capabilities of the host table
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arrangements (especially unique, unambiguous, host names), provide
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for addition of additional services (e.g., the special record types
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for electronic mail routing which rather quickly followed
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introduction of the DNS), and to do so on the base of a robust,
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hierarchical, distributed, name lookup system. That system also
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permitted distribution of name administration, rather than requiring
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that each host be entered into a single, central, table by a central
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administration.
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1.2 Review of the DNS
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The DNS was designed primarily to identify network resources.
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Although there was speculation about including, e.g., personal names
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and email addresses, it was not designed primarily to identify
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people, brands, etc. At the same time, the system was designed with
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the flexibility to accomodate new data types and structures through
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the addition of new record types to the initial "INternet" class.
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Since the appropriate identifiers and content of those future
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extensions could not be anticipated, the design provided that these
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fields could contain any (binary) information, not just the
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restricted text forms of the host table.
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However, the DNS as-used is intimately tied to the applications and
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application protocols that utilize it, often at a fairly low level.
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In particular, despite the ability of the protocols and data
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structures themselves to accomodate any binary representation, DNS
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names as used are historically not [even] ASCII, but a very
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restricted subset of it, a subset that derives primarily from the
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original host table naming rules. Selection of that subset was
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driven in part by human factors considerations, including a desire to
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eliminate possible ambiguities in an international context. Hence
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character codes that had international variations in interpretation
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were excluded, the underscore character and case distinctions were
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eliminated as being confusing (in the underscore's case, with the
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hyphen character) when written or read by people, and so on. These
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considerations appear to be very similar to those that resulted in
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similarly restricted character sets being used as protocol elements
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in many ITU and ISO protocols (cf. X.9, X.29).
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Another assumption was that there would be a high ratio of physical
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hosts to second level domains and, more generally, that the system
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would be deeply hierarchical, with most systems (and names) at the
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third level or below and a large ratio of names representing physical
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hosts to total names. There are domains that follow this model: many
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university and corporate domains use fairly deep hierarchies, as do a
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few country code TLDs (".US" is an excellent example). However, the
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RIPE hostcount list is now showing a count of SOA records that is
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approaching (and may have passed) the number of distinct hosts.
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While recent experience has shown that the DNS is robust enough
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--given contemporary machines as servers and current bandwidth
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norms-- to be able to continue to operate reasonably well when those
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historical assumptions are not met (e.g., with a huge, flat,
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structure under ".COM"), it is still useful to remember that the
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system could have been designed to work optimally with a flat
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structure (and very large zones) rather than a deeply hierarchical
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one, and was not.
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Similarly, despite some early speculation about entering people's
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names and email addresses into the DNS directly, with the sole
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exception (at least in the "IN" class) of one field of the SOA
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record, electronic mail addresses in the Internet have preserved the
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original, pre-DNS, "user at location" conceptual format rather than a
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flatter one. Location, in that instance, is a reference to a host.
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Both the DNS architecture itself and the two-level provisions for
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email and similar functions (e.g., see the finger protocol), also
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anticipated a relatively high ratio of users to actual hosts. It was
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never clear that the DNS was intended to, or could, scale to the
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order of magnitude of number of users (or, more recently, products or
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document objects), rather than that of physical hosts.
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Like the host table before it, the DNS has provided criticial
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uniqueness for names and universal accessibility to them as part of
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overall "single internet" and "end to end" models (cf [RFC2826]).
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However, there are many signs that, as new uses evolve and original
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assmumptions are abused, the system is being stretched to, or beyond,
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its practical limits.
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1.3 The web and user-visible domain names
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>From the standpoint of the integrity of the domain name system --and
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scaling of the Internet, including optimal accessibility to content--
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the design decision to use "A record" domain names, rather than some
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system of indirection, has proven to be a serious mistake in several
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respects. Convenience of typing, and the desire to make domain names
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out of easily-remembered product names, has led to a flattening of
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the DNS, with many people now perceiving that second-level names
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under COM (or in some countries, second- or third-level names under
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the relevant ccTLD) are all that is meaningful (this perception has
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been reinforced by some domain name registrars who have been anxious
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to "sell" additional names). And, of course, the perception that one
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needs a top-level domain per product, rather than a (usually
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organizational) collection of network resources has led to a rapid
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acceleration in the number of names being registered, a phenonenum
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that has clearly benefited registrars charging on a per-name basis,
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"cybersquatters", and others in the business of "selling" names, but
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has not obviously benefitted the Internet as a whole.
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The emphasis on second-level domain names has also created a problem
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for the trademark community. Since the Internet is international,
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and names are being populated in a flat and unqualified space,
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similarly-named entities are in conflict even if there would
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ordinarily be no chance of confusing them in the marketplace. The
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problem appears to be unsolvable except by a choice between draconian
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measures --possibly including significant changes to the underlying
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legislation and conventions-- and a situation in which the "rights"
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to a name are typically not settled using the subtle and traditional
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product (or industry) type and geopolitical scope rules of the
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trademark system but by depending largely on main force, e.g., the
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organization with the greatest resources to invest in defending (or
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attacking) names will ultimately win out. The latter raises not only
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important issues of equity, but the risk of backlash as the numerous
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small players are forced to relinquish names they find attractive and
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to adopt less-desirable naming conventions.
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Independent of these sociopolitical problems, content distribution
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issues have made it clear that it should be possible for an
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organization to have copies of data it wishes to make available
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distributed around the network, with a user who asks for the
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information by name getting the topologically-closest copy. This is
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not possible with simple, as-designed, use of the DNS: DNS names
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identify target resources or, in the case of email "MX" records, a
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preferentially-ordered list of resources "closest" to a target (not
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the source/user). Several technologies (and, in some cases,
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corresponding business models) have arisen to work around these
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problems, including intercepting and altering DNS requests so as to
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point to other locations,
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While additional implications are still being discovered and
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seriously evaluated, it appears, not surprisingly, that rewriting DNS
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names in the middle of the network, or trying to give them different
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values or interpretations depending on the topological location of
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the user trying to resolve the name interferes with end-to-end
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applications in the general case. These problems occur even if the
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rewriting machinery is accompanied by additional workarounds for
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particular applications: security associations and applications that
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need to identify "the same host" as the applications for which these
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tools have been designed often run into one problem or another.
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1.4 A pessimistic history of the evolution of Internet applications
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protocols.
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At the applications level, few of the protocols in active, widespread
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use on the Internet reflect the either contemporary knowledge in
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computer science or human factors or experience accumulated through
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deployment and use. Instead, protocols tend to be deployed at a
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just-past-prototype level, typically including the types of expedient
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compromises typical with prototypes. If they prove useful, the
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nature of the network permit very rapid dissemination (i.e., they
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fill a vacuum, even if one that no one previously knew existed).
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But, once the vacuum is filled, the installed base provides its own
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inertia: unless the design is so seriously faulty as to prevent
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effective use (or there is a widely-perceived sense of impending
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disaster unless the protocol is replaced), future developments must
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maintain backward compatibility and workarounds for problematic
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characteristics rather than benefiting from redesign in the light of
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experience. Applications that are "almost good enough" prevent
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development and deployment of high-quality replacements.
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2. Signs of DNS overloading
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Parts of the historical discussion above identify areas in which it
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is becoming clear that the DNS is becoming overloaded (semantically
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if not in the mechanical ability to resolve names). While we seem to
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still be well within the "just about good enough" range -- current
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mechanisms and proposals to deal with these problems are all focused
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on patching or working around limitations within the DNS rather than
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dramatic rethinking -- the number of these issues that are arising
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at the same time may argue for rethinging mechanisms and
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relationships, not just more patches and kludges. For example:
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o While technical approaches such as larger and higher-powered servers
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and more bandwidth, and legal/political mechanisms such as dispute
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resolution policies have arguably kept the problems from becoming
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critical, the DNS has not proven adequately responsive to business
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and individual needs to describe or identify things (such as product
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names and names of individuals) other than strict network resources.
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o While stacks have been modified to better handle multiple addresses
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on a physical interface and some protocols have been extended to
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include DNS names for determining context, the DNS doesn't deal
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especially well with high-multiple names per host (needed for web
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hosting facilities with multiple domains on a server).
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o Efforts to add names deriving from languages or character sets
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based on other than simple ASCII and English-like names (see below),
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or even to utilize complex company or product names without the use
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of hierarchy have created apparent requirements names (labels) that
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are over 63 octets long. This requirement will undoubtedly increase
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over time; while there are workarounds to accomodate longer names,
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they impose their own restrictions and cause their own problems.
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o Increasing commercialization of the Internet, and visibility of
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domain names that are assumed to match names of companies or
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products, has turned the DNS and DNS names into a trademark
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battleground. The traditional trademark system in (at least) most
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countries makes careful distinctions about fields of applicability.
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When the space is flattened, without differentiators by either
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geography or industry sector, not only are there likely conflicts
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between "Joe's Pizza" (of Boston) and "Joe's Pizza" (of San Francisco)
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but between both and "Joe's Auto Repair" (of Los Angeles): all three
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would like to control "Joes.com" and may claim trademark rights to do
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so, even though conflict or confusion would not occcur with
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traditional trademarks.
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o Many organizations wish to have different web sites under the same
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URL and domain name. Sometimes this is to create local variations
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--the Widget Company might want to present different material to a UK
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user relative to a US one-- and sometimes it is to provide higher
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performance by supplying information from the server topologically
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closest to the user. Arguably, the name resolution mechanism should
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provide information about multiple sites that can provide information
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associated with the same name and sufficient attributes associated
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with each of those sites to permit applications to make sensible
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choices, or should accept client-site attributes and utilize them in
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the search process.
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o Many existing and proposed systems for "finding things on the
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Internet" require a true search capability in which near matches can
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be reported to the user and queries may be slightly ambiguous or
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fuzzy. The DNS can accomodate only one set of (quite rigid) matching
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rules. Current proposals to permit different rules in different
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localities help to identify the problem, but, if applied directly to
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the DNS either don't provide the level of flexibility that would be
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desirable or tend to isolate different parts of the Internet from
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each other (or both). Fuzzy or ambiguous searches are desirable for
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(at least) resolution of business names that might have spelling
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variations and for names that can be resolved into different sets of
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glyphs depending on context. This goes beyond "mere"
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canonicalization differences (different ways of representing the same
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character) and into such relationships as the use of different
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alphabets for the same language, Kanji-Hiragana relationships, etc.
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o The historical DNS and applications that make assumptions about how
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it works impose significant risk (or forces technical kludges and
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consequent odd restrictions), when one considers adding mechanisms
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for use with various multi-character-set and multilingual
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"internationalization" systems. Cf RFC 2825.
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o In order to provide proper functionality to the Internet, the DNS
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must have a single unique root (see RFC 2826 for a discussion of this
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issue). There are many desires for local treatment of names or
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character sets that cannot be accomodated without either multiple
|
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roots (e.g., a separate root for multilingual names) or mechanisms
|
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that would have similar effects in terms of Internet fragmentation
|
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and isolation.
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In each of these cases, it is, or might be, possible to devise ways
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to trick the DNS system into supporting mechanisms that were not
|
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designed into it. Several ingenious solutions have been proposed in
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many of these areas already, and some have been successfully deployed
|
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into the marketplace.
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Several of the above problems are addressed well by a good directory
|
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system (supported by the LDAP protocol or otherwise) or searching
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environment (such as common web search engines) although not by the
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DNS. Given the difficulty of deploying new applications discussed
|
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above, an important question is whether the kludges are bad enough,
|
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or will scale up to bad enough, that new solutions are needed and can
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be deployed.
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3. The directory story.
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3.1 Overview
|
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The constraints of the DNS argue for introducing an intermediate
|
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protocol mechanism, referred to here as a "directory layer".
|
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Directory layer proposals would use a two-stage lookup, not unlike
|
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several of the IDN proposals, but would do the first lookup in a
|
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directory system, rather than in the DNS itself. This would permit
|
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us to relax several constraints and produce a more comprehensive
|
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system.
|
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Ultimately, many of the issues with domain names arise as the result
|
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of people attempting to use the DNS as a directory. While there
|
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hasn't been enough pressure/demand to justify a change to date, it
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has already been quite clear that, as a directory system, the DNS is
|
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a good deal less than ideal. This document suggests that there
|
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actually is a requirement for a directory system, and that the right
|
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solution to a directory requirement is a directory, not a series of
|
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DNS patches, kludges, or workarounds.
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In particular...
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* A directory system would not require imposition of particular
|
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length limits on names.
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* A directory system could permit explicit association of attributes
|
||||
of, e.g., language and country, with a name, without having to
|
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utilize trick encodings to incorporate that information in DNS labels
|
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(or creating artificial hierarchy for doing so).
|
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|
||||
* There is considerable experience in doing fuzzy and "sonex"
|
||||
(similar-sounding) matching in directory systems. Moreover, it is
|
||||
plausible to think about different matching rules for different areas
|
||||
and sets of names so that these can be adapted to local cultural
|
||||
requirements. Specifically, it might be possible to have a single
|
||||
form of a name in a directory, but to have great flexibility about
|
||||
what queries matched that name (and even have different variations in
|
||||
different areas). Of course, the more flexibility one provides, the
|
||||
greater the possibility of real or imagined trademark conflicts, but
|
||||
we would have the opportunity to design a directory structure that
|
||||
dealt with those issues in an intelligent way, while DNS constraints
|
||||
arguably make a general and equitable DNS-only solution impossible.
|
||||
|
||||
* If a directory system is used to translate to DNS names, and then
|
||||
DNS names are looked up in the normal fashion, it may be possible to
|
||||
relax several of the constraints that have been traditional (and
|
||||
perhaps necessary) with the DNS. For example, reverse-mapping of
|
||||
addresses to directory names may not be a requirement, since the DNS
|
||||
name(s) would (continue to) uniquely identify the host.
|
||||
|
||||
* Solutions to multilingual transcription problems that are common in
|
||||
"normal life" (e.g., two-sided business cards to be sure that a
|
||||
recipient trying to contact a person can access romanized spellings
|
||||
and numbers when the original language may not be comprehensible to
|
||||
that recipient) can be easily handled in a directory system by
|
||||
inserting both sets of entries.
|
||||
|
||||
* One can easily imagine a directory system that would return, not a
|
||||
single name, but a set of names paired with network-locational
|
||||
information or other context-establishing attributes. This type of
|
||||
information might be of considerable use in resolving the "nearest
|
||||
(or best) server for a particular named resource" problems that are a
|
||||
significant concern for organizations hosting web and other sites
|
||||
that are accessed from a wide range of locations and subnets.
|
||||
|
||||
* Names bound to countries and languages might help to manage
|
||||
trademark realities, while use of the DNS in trademark-significant
|
||||
areas tends to require worldwide "flattening" of the trademark
|
||||
system.
|
||||
3.2 Some details and comments.
|
||||
|
||||
As several proposals have noted, almost any i18n proposal for names
|
||||
that are in, or map into, the DNS will require changing DNS resolver
|
||||
API calls ("gethostbyname" or equivalent or adding some
|
||||
pre-resolution preparation mechanism) in almost all Internet
|
||||
applications -- whether to cause the API to take a different
|
||||
character set, to accept or return more arguments with qualifying or
|
||||
identifying information, or otherwise. Once applications must be
|
||||
opened to make such changes, it is a relatively small matter to
|
||||
switch from calling into the DNS to calling a directory service and
|
||||
then the DNS (in many situations, both actions could be accomplished
|
||||
in a single API call).
|
||||
|
||||
A directory approach can be consistent both with "flat" stories and
|
||||
multi-attribute ones. The DNS requires strict hierarchies, limiting
|
||||
its ability to handle differentiation among names by their
|
||||
properties. By contrast, modern directories can utilize
|
||||
independently-searched attributes and other structured schema to
|
||||
provide flexibilities not present in a strictly hierarchical system.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a strong argument for a single directory structure (implying
|
||||
a need for mechanisms for registration, delegation, etc.). But it is
|
||||
not a strict requirement, especially if in-depth case analysis and
|
||||
design work leads to the conclusion that reverse-mapping to directory
|
||||
names is not a requirement (see section 4).
|
||||
|
||||
While the discussion above includes very general comments about
|
||||
attributes, it appears that only a very small number of attributes
|
||||
would be needed. The list would almost certainly include country and
|
||||
language for IDN purposes and might require "charset" if we cannot
|
||||
agree on a character set and encoding. Trademark issues might
|
||||
motivate "commercial" and "non-commercial" (or other) attributes if
|
||||
they would be helpful in bypassing trademark problems. And applications to
|
||||
resource location might argue for a few other attributes (as outlined
|
||||
above).
|
||||
|
||||
4. The Controversies
|
||||
|
||||
4.1. One directory or many
|
||||
|
||||
As suggested in some of the text above, it is an open question as to
|
||||
whether the needs of the community would be best served by a single
|
||||
directory with universal applicability, a single directory but
|
||||
locally-tailored search (and, most important, matching) functions, or
|
||||
multiple, locally-determined, directories. Each has its attractions.
|
||||
Any but the first would essentially prevent reverse-mapping
|
||||
(determination of the user-visible name of the host or resource from
|
||||
target information such as an address or DNS name). But reverse
|
||||
mapping has become less useful over the years --at least to users--
|
||||
as we have assigned more and more names per host address.
|
||||
Locally-tailored search and mappings would permit national variations
|
||||
on interpretation of which strings matched which other ones, an
|
||||
arrangement that is especially important when different localities
|
||||
apply different rules to, e.g., matching of characters with and
|
||||
without diacriticals. But, of course, this implies that a URL may
|
||||
evaluate properly or not depending on either settings on a client
|
||||
machine or the network connectivity of the user, which is not, in
|
||||
general, a desirable situation.
|
||||
|
||||
And, of course, completely separate directories would permit
|
||||
translation and transliteration functions to be embedded in the
|
||||
directory, given much of the Internet a different appearance
|
||||
depending on which directory was chosen. The attractions of this are
|
||||
obvious, but, unless things were very carefully designed to preserve
|
||||
uniqueness and precise identities at the right points (which may or
|
||||
may not be possible), such a system would have many of the
|
||||
difficulties associated with multiple roots.
|
||||
|
||||
4.2 Why not a proposal?
|
||||
|
||||
As this document has gone through various preliminary drafts and
|
||||
reviews, the question has been raised as to whether it should contain
|
||||
a specific proposal: a specific directory mechanism, schema, and so
|
||||
on. It deliberately does not take that step. It has been difficult
|
||||
to get directory systems deployed in significant ways in the Internet
|
||||
infrastructure, partially because we have a surplus of options.
|
||||
There are also some approaches that could be used to implement the
|
||||
general concepts described here, such as the Common Name Resolution
|
||||
Protocol [RFC2972], which some would not consider directory protocols
|
||||
at all. Consequently, it appeared better to present the general
|
||||
concepts and arguments here and leave the specifics to other sources,
|
||||
documents, and proposals.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Security Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
The set of proposals implied by this document suggests an interesting
|
||||
set of security issues (i.e., nothing important is ever easy). A
|
||||
directory system used for this purpose would presumably need to be as
|
||||
carefully protected against unauthorized changes as the DNS itself.
|
||||
There also might be new opportunities for problems in the two-layer
|
||||
arrangement; but those problems are not more severe than a two-stage
|
||||
lookup in the DNS.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
6. References
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 625 On-line hostnames service. M.D. Kudlick, E.J. Feinler.
|
||||
Mar-07-1974.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 811 Hostnames Server. K. Harrenstien, V. White, E.J. Feinler.
|
||||
Mar-01-1982.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 952 DoD Internet host table specification. K. Harrenstien, M.K.
|
||||
Stahl, E.J. Feinler. Oct-01-1985.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 882 Domain names: Concepts and facilities. P.V. Mockapetris.
|
||||
Nov-01-1983.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 883 Domain names: Implementation specification. P.V. Mockapetris.
|
||||
Nov-01-1983.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 1035 Domain names - implementation and specification. P.V.
|
||||
Mockapetris. Nov-01-1987.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 1591 Domain Name System Structure and Delegation. J. Postel.
|
||||
March 1994.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 2825 A Tangled Web: Issues of I18N, Domain Names, and the Other
|
||||
Internet protocols. IAB, L. Daigle, ed.. May 2000.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root. IAB. May 2000.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 2972 Context and Goals for Common Name Resolution. N. Popp, M.
|
||||
Mealling, L. Masinter, K. Sollins. October 2000.
|
||||
|
||||
ITU Recommendation X.9
|
||||
|
||||
ITU Recommendation X.25
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
7. Culprit address
|
||||
|
||||
John Klensin
|
||||
AT&T Labs
|
||||
99 Bedford Street
|
||||
Boston, MA 02111
|
||||
klensin@research.att.com
|
||||
|
||||
Expires May 2001
|
Loading…
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user