From 96117a56791ec80302ea97b51ab8bc9843278c54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Andrews Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2008 23:08:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] new draft --- ...draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06.txt} | 294 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-) rename doc/draft/{draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03.txt => draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06.txt} (57%) diff --git a/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03.txt b/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06.txt similarity index 57% rename from doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03.txt rename to doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06.txt index 606fb33f58..1dc90708bc 100644 --- a/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03.txt +++ b/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06.txt @@ -3,12 +3,13 @@ DNS Extensions working group J. Jansen Internet-Draft NLnet Labs -Expires: August 19, 2008 February 16, 2008 +Intended status: Standards Track October 23, 2008 +Expires: April 26, 2009 Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC - draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03 + draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-06 Status of this Memo @@ -33,11 +34,7 @@ Status of this Memo The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2008. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2009. Abstract @@ -52,9 +49,12 @@ Abstract -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 1] + + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 1] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 Table of Contents @@ -65,11 +65,12 @@ Table of Contents 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.1. Support for SHA-2 signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource @@ -107,19 +108,19 @@ Table of Contents - -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 2] +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 2] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 1. Introduction The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed - database for Internet Addressing. The DNS has been extended to use + database for Internet Naming. The DNS has been extended to use cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the - integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [1], RFC 4034 [2], and RFC 4035 [3] - describe these DNS Security Extensions, called DNSSEC. + authenticity and integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034 + [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security + Extensions, called DNSSEC. RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records, and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This @@ -127,8 +128,8 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 SHA-512, and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms. - Familiarity with DNSSEC, RSA [7] and the SHA-2 [5] family of - algorithms is assumed in this document. + Familiarity with DNSSEC, RSA and the SHA-2 [FIPS.180-2.2002] family + of algorithms is assumed in this document. To refer to both SHA-256 and SHA-512, this document will use the name SHA-2. This is done to improve readability. When a part of text is @@ -139,66 +140,73 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 2. DNSKEY Resource Records - The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [2] and RFC 3110 - [6]. + The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034], RFC + 3110 [RFC3110] describes the use of RSA/SHA-1 for DNSSEC signatures. 2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-256 are stored in DNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA1}. - For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-256 will be - {TBA2}. + For use with NSEC3 [RFC5155], the algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256 + will be {TBA2}. The use of a different algorithm number to + differentiate between the use of NSEC and NSEC3 is in keeping with + the approach adopted in RFC5155. - The key size for RSA/SHA-256 keys MUST NOT be less than 512 bits, and - MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits. + For interoperability, as in RFC 3110 [RFC3110], the key size of RSA/ + SHA-256 keys MUST NOT be less than 512 bits, and MUST NOT be more + than 4096 bits. 2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-512 are stored in DNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA3}. - For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-512 will be - {TBA4}. - - -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 3] +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 3] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 - The key size for RSA/SHA-512 keys MUST NOT be less than 1024 bits, - and MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits. + For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number for RSA/SHA-512 will be + {TBA4}. The use of a different algorithm number to differentiate + between the use of NSEC and NSEC3 is in keeping with the approach + adopted in RFC5155. + + The key size of RSA/SHA-512 keys MUST NOT be less than 1024 bits, and + MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits. 3. RRSIG Resource Records - The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follow the RSASSA- + The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows the RSASSA- PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, and is calculated as follows. The values for the RDATA fields that precede the signature data are - specified in RFC 4034 [2]. + specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. hash = SHA-XXX(data) - Where XXX is either 256 or 512, depending on the algorithm used. + Here XXX is either 256 or 512, depending on the algorithm used, as + specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 [FIPS.180-2.2002], and "data" is the wire + format data of the resource record set that is signed, as specified + in RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. signature = ( 00 | 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash ) ** e (mod n) - Where SHA-XXX is the message digest algorithm as specified in FIPS - PUB 180-2 [5], "|" is concatenation, "00", "01", "FF" and "00" are - fixed octets of corresponding hexadecimal value, "e" is the private - exponent of the signing RSA key, and "n" is the public modulus of the - signing key. The FF octet MUST be repeated the maximum number of - times so that the total length of the signature equals the length of - the modulus of the signer's public key ("n"). "data" is the data of - the resource record set that is signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [2]. + Here "|" is concatenation, "00", "01", "FF" and "00" are fixed octets + of corresponding hexadecimal value, "e" is the private exponent of + the signing RSA key, and "n" is the public modulus of the signing + key. The FF octet MUST be repeated the exact number of times so that + the total length of the concatenated term in parentheses equals the + length of the modulus of the signer's public key ("n"). The "prefix" is intended to make the use of standard cryptographic libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly from the - specification of EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2 - [4]. The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified below. + specifications of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 8.2 + [RFC3447], and EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding in PKCS #1 v2.1 section 9.2 + [RFC3447]. The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified + below. 3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records @@ -207,7 +215,15 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 {TBA2} for use with NSEC3. The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix as - specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]: + specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [RFC3447]: + + + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 + hex 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 @@ -217,16 +233,8 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA3} for use with NSEC, or {TBA4} for use with NSEC3. - - - -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 4] - -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 - - The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix as - specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]: + specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [RFC3447]: hex 30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40 @@ -235,59 +243,53 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 4.1. Key Sizes - Apart from prohibiting RSA/SHA-512 signatures smaller than 1024 - bytes, this document will not specify what size of keys to use. That - is more an operational issue and depends largely on the environment - and intended use. Some good starting points might be DNSSEC - Operational Practises [9], section 3.5, and NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 - [10] and Part 3 [11]. + Apart from the restrictions specified in section 2, this document + will not specify what size of keys to use. That is an operational + issue and depends largely on the environment and intended use. A + good starting point for more information would be NIST SP 800-57 + [NIST800-57]. 4.2. Signature Sizes In this family of signing algorithms, the size of signatures is related to the size of the key, and not the hashing algorithm used in the signing process. Therefore, RRSIG resource records produced with - RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512 shall have the same size as those produced + RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512 will have the same size as those produced with RSA/SHA1, if the keys have the same length. 5. Implementation Considerations +5.1. Support for SHA-2 signatures + DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG resource records with the RSA/SHA-2 algorithms. - If both RSA/SHA-2 and RSA/SHA-1 RRSIG resource records are available - for a certain RRset, with a secure path to their keys, the validator - SHOULD ignore the SHA-1 signature. If the RSA/SHA-2 signature does - not verify the data, and the RSA/SHA-1 signature does, the validator - SHOULD mark the data with the security status from the RSA/SHA-2 - signature. - 6. IANA Considerations - IANA has not yet assigned an algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256 and - RSA/SHA-512. + IANA has assigned DNS Security Algorithm Numbers {TBA1} for RSA/ + SHA-256 with NSEC, {TBA2} for RSA/SHA-256 with NSEC3, {TBA3} for RSA/ + SHA-512 with NSEC, and {TBA4} for RSA/SHA-512 with NSEC3. - The algorithm list from RFC 4034 Appendix A.1 [2] is extended with - the following entries: + The algorithm list from RFC 4034 Appendix A.1 [RFC4034] is extended - - -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 5] +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 5] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 - Zone - Value Algorithm [Mnemonic] Signing References Status - ----- ----------- ----------- ------- ----------- -------- - {TBA1} RSA/SHA-256 RSASHA256 y {this memo} OPTIONAL - {TBA2} RSA/SHA-256-NSEC3 RSASHA256NSEC3 y {this memo} OPTIONAL - {TBA3} RSA/SHA-512 RSASHA512 y {this memo} OPTIONAL - {TBA4} RSA/SHA-512-NSEC3 RSASHA512NSEC3 y {this memo} OPTIONAL + with the following entries: + + Zone + Value Algorithm [Mnemonic] Signing References + {TBA1} RSA/SHA-256 RSASHA256 y {this memo} + {TBA2} RSA/SHA-256-NSEC3 RSASHA256NSEC3 y {this memo} + {TBA3} RSA/SHA-512 RSASHA512 y {this memo} + {TBA4} RSA/SHA-512-NSEC3 RSASHA512NSEC3 y {this memo} + 7. Security Considerations @@ -312,89 +314,83 @@ Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 7.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks - Since each RRset MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the - DNSKEY RRset at the zone apex (see [3] Section 2.2), a malicious - party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the validator - to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone. - Together with the implementation considerations from Section 5 of - this document, this provides resilience against algorithm downgrade + Since each RRSet MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the + DNSKEY RRSet at the zone apex (see [RFC4035] Section 2.2), a + malicious party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the + validator to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the + zone. This should provide resilience against algorithm downgrade attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2. 8. Acknowledgments - This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [2]. Also, we try to - follow the documents RFC 3110 [6] and RFC 4509 [8] for consistency. - The authors of and contributors to these documents are gratefully - acknowledged for their hard work. + This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Also, we + try to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110] and RFC 4509 [RFC4509] + for consistency. The authors of and contributors to these documents + are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work. + + + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 + The following people provided additional feedback and text: Jaap - - - -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 6] - -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 - - - Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Rob Austein, Miek Gieben, Alfred Hoenes, - Michael St. Johns, Scott Rose and Wouter Wijngaards. + Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Rob Austein, Francis Dupont, Miek Gieben, + Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Peter Koch, Michael St. Johns, Scott + Rose and Wouter Wijngaards. 9. References 9.1. Normative References - [1] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, - March 2005. + [FIPS.180-2.2002] + National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure + Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002. - [2] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, - March 2005. + [RFC3110] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain + Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. - [3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", - RFC 4035, March 2005. + [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", + RFC 4033, March 2005. - [4] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards - (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", - RFC 3447, February 2003. + [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", + RFC 4034, March 2005. - [5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash - Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002. - - [6] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name - System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. + [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security + Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. 9.2. Informative References - [7] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols, - algorithms, and source code in C", Wiley and Sons , ISBN 0-471- - 11709-9, 1996. + [NIST800-57] + Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid, + "Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57, + March 2007. - [8] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) - Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. + [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography + Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications + Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. - [9] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices", - RFC 4641, September 2006. + [RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer + (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. - [10] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid, - "Recommendations for Key Management Part 1: General", NIST - SP 800-57 Part 1, March 2007. - - [11] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Jones, A., Polk, W., Smid, - M., and S. Rose, "Recommendations for Key Management Part 3: + [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS + Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of + Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008. -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 7] + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 7] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 - - - Application-Specific Key Guidance", NIST SP 800-57 Part 3, - March 2007. +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 Author's Address @@ -444,9 +440,13 @@ Author's Address -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 8] + + + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 8] -Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 February 2008 +Internet-Draft DNSSEC RSA/SHA-2 October 2008 Full Copyright Statement @@ -491,14 +491,14 @@ Intellectual Property ietf-ipr@ietf.org. -Acknowledgment - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF - Administrative Support Activity (IASA). -Jansen Expires August 19, 2008 [Page 9] + + + + +Jansen Expires April 26, 2009 [Page 9]