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IPSECKEY WG M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
Expires: September 28, 2003 March 30, 2003
A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS.
draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-00.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2003.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes a new resource record for DNS. This record
may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems.
This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
Resource Record, which has been proposed to be obsoleted by RFC3445
[9].
Richardson Expires September 28, 2003 [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Storage formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 RDATA format - precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5 RDATA format - RSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6 RDATA format - DSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key
that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name. This
can be the public key of a host, network, or application (in the case
of per-port keying).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [5].
An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be authenticated DNSSEC resource
record.
It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource
records at the same terminal node. This will be due to the presence
of multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys.
This resource record is class independent.
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2. Storage formats
The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD.
2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format
The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public
key (and algorithm type), and an optional gateway address.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| precedence | algorithm | gateway |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
~ gateway ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
2.2 RDATA format - precedence
This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in
the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of
RFC1035 [2].
2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type
aThe algorithm type field indicates the type of key that is present
in the public key field. A positive number, larger than 0 identifies
an algorithm type. The following values, which have been previously
defined by IANA are useful (see RFC2535 [6]).
A value of 0 indicates that no key is present.
The following values defined by IANA are useful:
3 A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [7]
5 A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [8]
2.4 RDATA format - gateway
The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be
created in order to reach the entity holding this resource record.
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The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name (section 3.3
of RFC1035 [2]).
If no gateway is to be represented, then a null domain name MUST be
present.
It is a simple fully qualified domain name (FQDN). IP version 4 and
IP version 6 addresses may be represented using the reverse name
format, from in-addr.arpa. and ip6.arpa.
For instance, the IP version 4 address 192.0.1.2 is represented as
the domain name 2.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa.
2.5 RDATA format - RSA public key
If the algorithm type has the value 5 then public key portion
contains an RSA public key, encoded as described in secion 2 of
RFC3110 [8].
RFC2065 limited the exponent and modulus to 2552 bits in length, and
RFC3110 to 4096 bits. No such limit is specified here for the
purposes of encoding and decoding.
The length in octets of the public exponent length is represented as
one octet if it is in the range of 1 to 255 and by a zero octet
followed by a two octet unsigned length if it is longer than 255
bytes. The public key modulus field is a multiprecision unsigned
integer. The length of the modulus can be determined from the
RDLENGTH and the preceding RDATA fields including the exponent.
Leading zero bytes are prohibited in the exponent and modulus.
2.6 RDATA format - DSA public key
If the algorithm type has the value 3, then public key portion
contains an DSA public key, encoded as described in RFC2536 [7].
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3. Presentation formats
3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs
IPSECKEY RRs may appear as lines in a zone data master file. The
precedence, algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. There base64
encoded public key block is OPTIONAL.
If no gateway is to be indicated, then the root (".") SHOULD be used.
3.2 Examples
An example of a node 192.2.0.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its
own behalf.
38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5
38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.2.0.38 that has published its key only.
38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5
.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.2.0.38 that has delegated authority to the
node 192.2.3.5.
38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5
5.3.2.192.in-addr.arpa.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
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fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.1.0.38 that has delegated authority to the
node with the identity "mygateway.example.com".
38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5
mygateway.example.com.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
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4. Security Considerations
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5. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign a resource record type number from the normal
resource record number space.
The algorithm field does not require any IANA action, as it is
inherited from DNS KEY algorithm values.
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6. Acknowledgments
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Normative references
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[3] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[4] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.
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Non-normative references
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[6] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[7] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[8] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[9] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002.
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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IPSECKEY WG M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
Expires: November 26, 2003 May 28, 2003
A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS.
draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-03.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2003.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes a new resource record for DNS. This record
may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems.
This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445.
Richardson Expires November 26, 2003 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ipsecrr May 2003
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Storage formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 RDATA format - precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4 RDATA format - gateway type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6 RDATA format - RSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.7 RDATA format - DSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD.
1.1 Overview
The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key
that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use
with the IPsec protocol suite. This can be the public key of a
host, network, or application (in the case of per-port keying).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6].
An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC
unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource
record is available.
It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource
records at the same node. This will be due to the presence of
multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys.
This resource record is class independent.
Richardson Expires November 26, 2003 [Page 3]
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2. Storage formats
2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format
The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public
key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway address.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ +
~ gateway ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
2.2 RDATA format - precedence
This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in
the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of
RFC1035 [2].
Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records records with lower precedence
are to be attempted first. Where there is a tie in precedence, they
order should be non-deterministic.
2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type
The algorithm field indicates the type of key that is present in the
public key field. A positive number larger than 0 identifies an
algorithm type. The following values, which have been previously
defined by IANA, are useful (see RFC2535 [8]).
A value of 0 indicates that no key is present.
The following values defined by IANA are useful:
3 A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [9]
5 A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [10]
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2.4 RDATA format - gateway type
The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that
is stored in the gateway field.
The following values are defined:
0 No gateway is present
1 A 4-byte IPv4 address is present
2 A 16-byte IPv6 address is present
3 A wire-encoded domain name is present. The wire-encoded format is
self-describing, so the length is implicit. The domain name MUST
NOT be compressed.
2.5 RDATA format - gateway
The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be
created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record.
There are three formats:
A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field. The data
portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of RFC1035
[2]. This is a 32-bit number in network byte order.
A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. The data
portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 3.2 of RFC1886
[5]. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order.
The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described
in section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2].
2.6 RDATA format - RSA public key
If the algorithm type has the value 5, then public key portion
contains an RSA public key, encoded as described in section 2 of
RFC3110 [10].
RFC2065 limited the exponent and modulus to 2552 bits in length, and
RFC3110 limits them to 4096 bits. No such limit is specified here
for the purposes of encoding and decoding.
The length in octets of the public exponent length is represented as
one octet if it is in the range of 1 to 255, and by a zero octet
Richardson Expires November 26, 2003 [Page 5]
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followed by a two octet unsigned length if it is longer than 255
bytes. The public key modulus field is a multiprecision unsigned
integer. The length of the modulus can be determined from the
RDLENGTH and the preceding RDATA fields including the exponent.
Leading zero bytes are prohibited in the exponent and modulus.
2.7 RDATA format - DSA public key
If the algorithm type has the value 3, then public key portion
contains an DSA public key, encoded as described in RFC2536 [9].
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3. Presentation formats
3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs
IPSECKEY RRs may appears in a zone data master file. The precedence,
gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. There
base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, then the
public key field of the resource record MUST be contrued being zero
octets in length.
If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST be
zero, and the gateway field MUST be "."
IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm
gateway base64-encoded-public-key )
3.2 Examples
An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its
own behalf.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 5
192.0.2.38
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 5
.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the
node 192.0.2.3.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 5
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192.0.2.3
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the
node with the identity "mygateway.example.com".
38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 5
mygateway.example.com.
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has
delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1
$ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.int.
0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 5
2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1
AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ
Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La
9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1
49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC
MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8
cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3
fejrfi1H )
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4. Security Considerations
This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material
for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) [7].
The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be
communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e. free
from modification. The form of this channel is up to the consumer of
the data - there must be a trust relationship between the end
consumer of this resource record and the server. This relationship
may be end-to-end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to
another secure source, a secure local channel on the host, or some
combination of the above.
The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not
sensitive to passive attacks. The keying material may be freely
disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties
of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense
against both active and passive attacks.
Any use of this resource record MUST carefully document their trust
model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is
the secure channel used.
4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records
This section deals with active attacks against the DNS. These
attacks require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and
changed. DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind.
The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the
keying material with either a key under its control, or with garbage.
If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent man-in-the-middle
attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the public key, then
this will result in a denial of service, as the authenticator used by
IKE would fail.
If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS
and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on
IKE and IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position
to compromise the resulting IPsec channel. Note that an attacker
must be able to perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE
negotiation in order for this to succeed.
The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker
replaces the the gateway address to point to a node under the
attacker's control. The attacker can then either replace the public
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key or remove it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to
match the gateway address.
This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker
can then create a second tunnel to the real destination. Note that,
as before, this requires that the attacker also mount an active
attack against the responder.
Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext
packets to the original destination. While the destination may be
willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, the
sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext.
Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides.
Note that the danger here only applies to cases where the gateway
field of the IPSECKEY RR indicates a different entity than the owner
name of the IPSECKEY RR. In cases where the end-to-end integrity of
the IPSECKEY RR is suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use of
the IPSECKEY RR to cases where the RR owner name matches the content
of the gateway field.
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5. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign a resource record type number from the normal
resource record number space.
The algorithm field does not require any IANA action, as it is
inherited from DNS KEY algorithm values.
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6. Acknowledgments
My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, and Olafur
Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully. Additional thanks
to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference implementation.
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Normative references
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[3] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[4] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.
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Non-normative references
[5] Thomson, S. and C. Huitema, "DNS Extensions to support IP
version 6", RFC 1886, December 1995.
[6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[7] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[8] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[9] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[10] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[11] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002.
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
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Full Copyright Statement
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