From c92d09320bf7b35647b7ad77e12f5eb0b6f35dff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 10:53:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Remove the OpenSSL PKCS#11 patches - not really needed now --- bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zh-patch | 15909 ----------------------------- bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.0t-patch | 15889 ---------------------------- bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch | 15791 ---------------------------- bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch | 15818 ---------------------------- 4 files changed, 63407 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zh-patch delete mode 100644 bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.0t-patch delete mode 100644 bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch delete mode 100644 bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zh-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zh-patch deleted file mode 100644 index d41feaf544..0000000000 --- a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-0.9.8zh-patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15909 +0,0 @@ -Index: openssl/Configure -diff -u openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.8.2.2 ---- openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1 Thu Jul 3 12:12:31 2014 -+++ openssl/Configure Thu Jul 3 12:31:57 2014 -@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ - - # see INSTALL for instructions. - --my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; -+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; - - # Options: - # -@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ - # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can - # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". - # -+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. -+# (No default) -+# -+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only -+# (No default) -+# - # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected - # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in - # include/. A value is required. -@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@ - "linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - #### IA-32 targets... - "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}", - #### - "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@ - "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - #### SPARC Linux setups - # Ray Miller has patiently - # assisted with debugging of following two configs. -@@ -591,6 +597,10 @@ - my $idx_ranlib = $idx++; - my $idx_arflags = $idx++; - -+# PKCS#11 engine patch -+my $pk11_libname=""; -+my $pk11_flavor=""; -+ - my $prefix=""; - my $libdir=""; - my $openssldir=""; -@@ -829,6 +839,14 @@ - { - $flags.=$_." "; - } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_libname=$1; -+ } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_flavor=$1; -+ } - elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) - { - $prefix=$1; -@@ -964,6 +982,22 @@ - exit 0; - } - -+if (! $pk11_libname) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ -+if (! $pk11_flavor -+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; -+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ - if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { - $target = "Cygwin".$1; - } -@@ -1079,6 +1113,25 @@ - print "\n"; - } - -+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ } -+else -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+} -+ - my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; - - $IsMK1MF=1 if ($target eq "mingw" && $^O ne "cygwin" && !is_msys()); -@@ -1130,6 +1183,8 @@ - if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } - else { $no_user_cflags=1; } - -+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; -+ - # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through - # the script "config" or manually. - if (!$no_krb5) -@@ -1493,6 +1548,7 @@ - s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; - s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; - s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; -+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; - s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; -Index: openssl/Makefile.org -diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.2.2 ---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:02:57 2015 -+++ openssl/Makefile.org Wed Dec 23 16:44:50 2015 -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ - INSTALL_PREFIX= - INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl - -+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. -+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= -+ - # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! - OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl - -Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 -diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.6.4.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015 -+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ -+ISC modified -+============ -+ -+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. -+ -+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and -+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the -+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second -+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful -+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device -+protected key store and key loading). -+ -+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, -+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example -+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. -+ -+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in -+config/Configure. -+ -+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. -+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared -+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine -+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). -+ -+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l -+========================================= -+ -+[Nov 19, 2009] -+ -+Contents: -+ -+Overview -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+FAQs -+Feedback -+ -+Overview -+======== -+ -+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 -+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against -+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system -+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the -+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. -+ -+Patch can be applied like this: -+ -+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris -+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz -+ # now download the patch to the current directory -+ # ... -+ cd openssl-0.9.8l -+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) -+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 -+ -+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the -+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share -+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. -+ -+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support -+following mechanisms: -+ -+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, -+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, -+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, -+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 -+ -+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP -+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may -+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an -+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety -+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). -+ -+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the -+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the -+config script: -+ -+ $ ./config -+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 -+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc -+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. -+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. -+ -+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run -+configure script like this: -+ -+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so -+ -+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run -+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the -+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary -+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. -+ -+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against -+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and -+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project -+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more -+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the -+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself -+and has functional PKCS#11 library. -+ -+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are -+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. -+ -+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, -+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more -+information). -+ -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+======================================= -+ -+2009-11-19 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l -+ -+- bugs and RFEs: -+ -+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores -+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split -+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2009-03-11 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j -+ -+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a -+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. -+ -+- fixed bugs: -+ -+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-12-02 -+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) -+ -+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine -+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true -+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean -+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take -+ it seriously -+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean -+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 -+ engine code -+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-08-01 -+- fixed bug -+ -+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers -+ and digests -+ -+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic -+ -+2008-07-29 -+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version -+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: -+ -+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users -+ -+- fixed bugs in the engine code: -+ -+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for -+ asymmetric key operations -+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called -+ atomically -+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys -+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners -+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in -+ suboptimal way -+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more -+ resilient to destroy failures -+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() -+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys -+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine -+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size -+ of big numbers leading to failures -+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of -+ -1 -+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references -+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not -+ checked -+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to -+ structure reuse -+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of -+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} -+ defines but fails miserably -+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss -+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing -+ generate_params parameter -+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes -+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() -+ -+- new features and enhancements: -+ -+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 -+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes -+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric -+ ciphers and digests -+ -+2007-10-15 -+- update for 0.9.8f version -+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+ -+2007-10-02 -+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" -+ -+2007-09-26 -+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes -+ significant performance drop -+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2007-05-25 -+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers -+ -+2007-05-19 -+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code -+ -+FAQs -+==== -+ -+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: -+ -+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': -+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring -+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by -+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the -+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: -+ -+Configured for linux-elf. -+ -+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), -+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. -+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With -+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after -+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: -+ -+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... -+ -+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for -+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 -+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. -+ -+ -+Feedback -+======== -+ -+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was -+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. -+ -+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. -+ -Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5 ---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:34 2012 -+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Fri Sep 4 10:43:21 2009 -@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ - - #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS -+# define OPENSSL_THREADS -+#endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - #endif -@@ -79,6 +82,8 @@ - # endif - #endif - -+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ -+ - /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ - - #ifdef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND -@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ - * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word - * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. - */ --#undef RC4_CHUNK -+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long - #endif - #endif - -@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@ - /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a - * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ - #ifndef DES_LONG --#define DES_LONG unsigned long -+#define DES_LONG unsigned int - #endif - #endif - -@@ -162,9 +167,9 @@ - /* The prime number generation stuff may not work when - * EIGHT_BIT but I don't care since I've only used this mode - * for debuging the bignum libraries */ --#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG -+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG - #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT --#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT -+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT - #undef SIXTEEN_BIT - #undef EIGHT_BIT - #endif -@@ -178,7 +183,7 @@ - - #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) - #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H --#undef BF_PTR -+#define BF_PTR2 - #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ - - #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) -@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ - /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. - * Very mucy CPU dependant */ - #ifndef DES_UNROLL --#undef DES_UNROLL -+#define DES_UNROLL - #endif - - /* These default values were supplied by -Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.2.1 ---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:19 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 16:45:10 2015 -@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ - if ((file = fopen(filename, mode)) == NULL) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); -- if (errno == ENOENT) -+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES))) - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); - else - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:35 2012 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Mon Jun 13 14:25:19 2011 -@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ - eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ - tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ - tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \ -- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c -+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \ -+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c - LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ - eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ - tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ - tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \ -- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o -+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \ -+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o - - SRC= $(LIBSRC) - -@@ -288,6 +290,102 @@ - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h - eng_table.o: eng_table.c -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11.c -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so_pub.c - tb_cipher.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h - tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h - tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ -+/* -+ * CDDL HEADER START -+ * -+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the -+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only -+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance -+ * with the License. -+ * -+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE -+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions -+ * and limitations under the License. -+ * -+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each -+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. -+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the -+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying -+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] -+ * -+ * CDDL HEADER END -+ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H -+#define _CRYPTOKI_H -+ -+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_PTR -+#define CK_PTR * -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION -+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#include /* For NULL */ -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint -+ */ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE 1 -+#endif /* TRUE */ -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE 0 -+#endif /* FALSE */ -+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+ -+/* Solaris specific functions */ -+ -+#include -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all -+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of -+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given -+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); -+ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.2.2 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:42 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Dec 23 16:45:32 2015 -@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ - # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV) - ENGINE_load_cryptodev(); - # endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); -+# endif -+# endif - #endif - } - -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.2.2 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:44 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 16:45:34 2015 -@@ -403,6 +403,12 @@ - void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); - void ENGINE_load_padlock(void); - void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); -+# endif - - /* - * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.26.4.4 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+/* -+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither -+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, -+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then -+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's -+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. -+ */ -+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* -+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine -+ * initialization. -+ */ -+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; -+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; -+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel -+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. -+ */ -+static int *hw_cnids; -+static int *hw_dnids; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); -+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -+#else -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); -+#endif -+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len); -+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, -+ size_t count); -+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids); -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, -+ int *local_digest_nids); -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, -+ int id); -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -+enum pk11_cipher_id { -+ PK11_DES_CBC, -+ PK11_DES3_CBC, -+ PK11_DES_ECB, -+ PK11_DES3_ECB, -+ PK11_RC4, -+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, -+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX -+}; -+ -+/* Index for the supported digests */ -+enum pk11_digest_id { -+ PK11_MD5, -+ PK11_SHA1, -+ PK11_SHA224, -+ PK11_SHA256, -+ PK11_SHA384, -+ PK11_SHA512, -+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX -+}; -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+static int cipher_count = 0; -+static int digest_count = 0; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; -+ int nid; -+ int iv_len; -+ int min_key_len; -+ int max_key_len; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_CIPHER; -+ -+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = -+ { -+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, -+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, -+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ -+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ }; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_digest_id id; -+ int nid; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_DIGEST; -+ -+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = -+ { -+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, -+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, -+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, -+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, -+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, -+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, -+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in -+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 -+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; -+ -+ -+/* -+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets -+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. -+ * -+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. -+ */ -+ -+/* DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_cbc, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ecb, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_cbc, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_cbc, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_cbc, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ecb, -+ 16, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ecb, -+ 16, 24, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ecb, -+ 16, 32, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* -+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are -+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures -+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. -+ */ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_bf_cbc, -+ 8, 16, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = -+ { -+ NID_rc4, -+ 1, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = -+ { -+ NID_md5, -+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, -+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ MD5_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = -+ { -+ NID_sha1, -+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = -+ { -+ NID_sha224, -+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = -+ { -+ NID_sha256, -+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = -+ { -+ NID_sha384, -+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = -+ { -+ NID_sha512, -+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = -+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; -+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || -+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) -+ return (0); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+/* -+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup -+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp -+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. -+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. -+ */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; -+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* -+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all -+ * NIDs there. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since -+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function -+ */ -+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ -+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) -+ != CKR_OK) { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " -+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ digest_count = 0; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ myslot = SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. -+ * -+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure -+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ -+ -+static int -+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) -+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) -+ return (ciphers[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (cipher_count > 0) -+ *nids = cipher_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (cipher_count); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (digest_count > 0) -+ *nids = digest_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (digest_count); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. -+ */ -+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, -+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and -+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before -+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. -+ */ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); -+ /* -+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, -+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 -+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the -+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can -+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via -+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. -+ */ -+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; -+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ } -+ else -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ { -+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; -+ /* -+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the -+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our -+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From -+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a -+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key -+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this -+ * code serves as a sanity check. -+ * -+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be -+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs -+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES -+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || -+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || -+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ -+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ -+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); -+ -+ /* -+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then -+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the -+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && -+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ state->sp = sp; -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object -+ * needs to be created. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( -+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to -+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a -+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session -+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so -+ * that it needs not be recreated. -+ * -+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this -+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return -+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good -+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix -+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient -+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. -+ */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) -+#else -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) -+#endif -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long outl = inl; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; -+ -+ if (!inl) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always -+ * the same size of input. -+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with -+ * correctly aligned buffers. -+ */ -+ if (inl != outl) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() -+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's -+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but -+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't -+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with -+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, -+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used -+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; -+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get -+ * rid of the context. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with -+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the -+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!cipher) -+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_bf_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_rc4: -+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; -+ break; -+ default: -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* -+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs -+ * here are not constants. -+ */ -+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; -+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; -+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; -+ else -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ *cipher = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*cipher != NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!digest) -+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_md5: -+ *digest = &pk11_md5; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha1: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha224: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha256: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha384: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha512: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *digest = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*digest != NULL); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; -+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions -+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: -+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. -+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. -+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with -+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES -+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and -+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session -+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key -+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to -+ * terminate the active operation. -+ */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); -+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; -+ } -+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Save the key information used in this session. -+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+err: -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+static int -+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) -+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) -+ return (digests[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ pdp = &digests[index]; -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ -+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ -+ if (count == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, -+ count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long len; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session -+ * to the pool -+ */ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ -+ /* The copy-from state */ -+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) -+ goto err; -+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; -+ -+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (ul_state_len == 0) -+ { -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); -+ if (pstate == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, -+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, -+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ if (pstate != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -+static int -+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; -+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not -+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory -+ * that might have been allocated in the token when -+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() -+ * will return the session to the cache. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key -+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key -+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for -+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first -+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same -+ * prefix. -+ */ -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len) -+ { -+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || -+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) -+ { -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The secret key object is created in the -+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * CKM_DSA -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_DES3_CBC -+ * CKM_DES_CBC -+ * CKM_AES_CBC -+ * CKM_DES3_ECB -+ * CKM_DES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_CTR -+ * CKM_RC4 -+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC -+ * -+ * Digests optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_MD5 -+ * CKM_SHA_1 -+ * CKM_SHA224 -+ * CKM_SHA256 -+ * CKM_SHA384 -+ * CKM_SHA512 -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int slot_n_digest = 0; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ -+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, -+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) -+ { -+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, -+ &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and -+ * derivation. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) -+ { -+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && -+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; -+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; -+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); -+ -+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_cipher); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_digest); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than -+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, -+ * otherwise leave it where it is. -+ */ -+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > -+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; -+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; -+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; -+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, -+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, -+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = -+ ciphers[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = -+ digests[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ -+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) -+ { -+ ASN1_OBJECT *o; -+ int nid; -+ -+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", -+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) -+ { -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* will return NID_undef on error */ -+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o); -+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); -+ -+ return (nid); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we -+ * have to help ourselves here. -+ */ -+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) -+ { -+ /* are we already set? */ -+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just -+ * follow the format of those that exist. -+ */ -+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; -+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; -+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, -+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, -+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, -+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library -+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation -+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code -+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the -+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some -+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a -+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, -+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the -+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte -+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products -+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression -+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the -+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. -+ * -+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for -+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same -+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 -+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without -+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use -+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since -+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said -+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with -+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code -+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for -+ * asymmetric operations. -+ * -+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what -+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can -+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be -+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, -+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. -+ * -+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find -+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric -+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table -+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays -+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the -+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token -+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more -+ * information. -+ * -+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined -+ * the code won't be used. -+ */ -+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#else -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, -+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware -+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. -+ */ -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ void *handle; -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; -+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ /* this means empty tables */ -+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also -+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the -+ * search. -+ */ -+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; -+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; -+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef -+ * is zero now. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are -+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. -+ */ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); -+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by -+ * dlclose(3C). -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ (void) dlclose(handle); -+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; -+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); -+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., -+ * non-existent). -+ */ -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) -+ { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new -+ * table. -+ */ -+ if (nid_table == NULL) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one -+ * NID_undef. -+ */ -+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) -+ { -+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.4.10.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 21:52:40 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= -+{ -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+ -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= -+{ -+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, -+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, -+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, -+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, -+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, -+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, -+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, -+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, -+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, -+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, -+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ -+ -+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; -+static int pk11_error_init = 1; -+ -+static void -+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ -+ if (pk11_error_init) -+ { -+ pk11_error_init = 0; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ pk11_error_init = 1; -+ } -+} -+ -+void -+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) -+{ -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); -+} -+ -+void -+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) -+{ -+ char tmp_buf[20]; -+ -+ PK11err(function, reason); -+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); -+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); -+} -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.9.10.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H -+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H -+ -+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); -+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); -+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) -+ -+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ -+ -+/* Function codes. */ -+ -+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 -+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 -+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 -+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 -+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 -+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 -+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 -+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 -+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 -+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 -+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 -+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 -+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 -+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 -+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 -+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 -+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 -+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 -+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 -+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 -+ -+/* Reason codes. */ -+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 -+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 -+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 -+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 -+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 -+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 -+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 -+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 -+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 -+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 -+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 -+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 -+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 -+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 -+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 -+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 -+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 -+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 -+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 -+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 -+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 -+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 -+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 -+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 -+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 -+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 -+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 -+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 -+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 -+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 -+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 -+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 -+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 -+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 -+ -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 -+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 -+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 -+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 -+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 -+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 -+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 -+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 -+ -+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ -+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 -+ -+#ifdef NOPTHREADS -+/* -+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the -+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global -+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. -+ * -+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as -+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but -+ * it's safe. -+ */ -+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 -+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the -+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation -+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. -+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object -+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. -+ * -+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list -+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request -+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION -+ { -+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ -+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ -+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ -+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ -+ union -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ -+ } u_RSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ -+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ -+ } u_DSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ -+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ -+ } u_DH; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ -+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ -+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ -+ } u_cipher; -+ } opdata_u; -+ } PK11_SESSION; -+ -+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub -+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv -+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num -+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num -+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num -+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num -+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key -+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh -+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num -+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key -+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key -+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len -+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt -+ -+/* -+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: -+ * 1) asymmetric operations -+ * 2) random operations -+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations -+ * -+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware -+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware -+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support -+ * only a single group of operations. -+ * -+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have -+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from -+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. -+ * -+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are -+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. -+ */ -+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM -+ { -+ OP_RAND, -+ OP_RSA, -+ OP_DSA, -+ OP_DH, -+ OP_CIPHER, -+ OP_DIGEST, -+ OP_MAX -+ } PK11_OPTYPE; -+ -+/* -+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches -+ * and locks associated with the lists. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *head; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; -+#endif -+ } PK11_CACHE; -+ -+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ -+typedef struct PK11_active_st -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; -+ unsigned int refcnt; -+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; -+ struct PK11_active_st *next; -+ } PK11_active; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; -+#endif -+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; -+/* -+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See -+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. -+ */ -+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#else -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#endif -+ -+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; -+ -+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.32.4.7 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DSA stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); -+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, -+ DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, -+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DH stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); -+#endif -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", -+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ -+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ -+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ -+ }; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", -+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ -+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL /* app_data */ -+ }; -+ -+DSA_METHOD * -+PK11_DSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* -+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for -+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but -+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by -+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be -+ * enough. -+ */ -+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 -+ -+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DH method", -+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ -+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ NULL /* generate_params */ -+ }; -+ -+DH_METHOD * -+PK11_DH(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dh); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ -+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 -+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* -+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to -+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not -+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. -+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors -+ * should be catched in the padding functions -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* make data into a big number */ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. -+ */ -+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) -+ if (buf[j] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + j; -+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); -+ if (buf == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's here -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) -+ if (buf[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + i; -+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and -+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_encrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and -+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, -+ rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ retval = ul_sig_len; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and -+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit -+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, -+ p_mech, h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, -+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need -+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum -+ * structures. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#endif -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, -+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* The DSA function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+static DSA_SIG * -+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int i; -+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ -+ /* -+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, -+ * each is 20 bytes long -+ */ -+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ -+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || -+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ dsa_sig->r = r; -+ dsa_sig->s = s; -+ -+ret: -+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) -+ { -+ if (r != NULL) -+ BN_free(r); -+ if (s != NULL) -+ BN_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (dsa_sig); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, -+ DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int retval = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ -+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could -+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need -+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. -+ */ -+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - -+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ retval = 1; -+ret: -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. -+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure -+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* The DH function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Generate DH key-pair. -+ * -+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key -+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key -+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard -+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem -+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. -+ */ -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ CK_RV rv, rv1; -+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; -+ -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that -+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of -+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. -+ */ -+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting -+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are -+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. -+ */ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ pub_key_template, -+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_pub_key, -+ &h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory -+ * should be sufficient for reuse. -+ */ -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || -+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) -+ { -+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); -+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, -+ DH *dh) -+ { -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG seclen; -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = -1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; -+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); -+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); -+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); -+ -+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); -+ -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = -+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, -+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ h_key, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); -+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same -+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key -+ */ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip -+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, -+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The -+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was -+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading -+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the -+ * pre-master secret. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) -+ { -+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); -+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (mechanism.pParameter) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); -+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, -+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; -+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ -+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); -+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dh; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) -+ { -+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); -+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ * -+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh -+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key -+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached -+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.2.4.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.3.4.3 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ if (optype == OP_RSA) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.2.4.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11so_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.2.4.6 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; -+ -+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); -+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; -+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; -+ } -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ -+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ -+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by -+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These -+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them -+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend -+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also -+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or -+ * dynamically). -+ * -+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention -+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki -+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte -+ * aligned. -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following -+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+ * -+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using -+ * the following preprocessor directive before including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(1) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might -+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. -+ * -+ * -+ * Now for the macros: -+ * -+ * -+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an -+ * object. It can be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR far * -+ * -+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * -+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in -+ * a Cryptoki library: -+ * -+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ) -+ * { -+ * ... -+ * } -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion: -+ * -+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ); -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro -+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or -+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a -+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function -+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. -+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); -+ * -+ * or -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a -+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning -+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type -+ * // funcPtrType. -+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); -+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access -+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might -+ * be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of -+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. -+ * It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); -+ * -+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback -+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also -+ * be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); -+ * myCallbackType myCallback; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 -+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. -+ * -+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), -+ * this should best be defined by -+ * -+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR -+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 -+ * #endif -+ */ -+ -+ -+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the -+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ -+#include "pkcs11t.h" -+ -+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for -+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is -+ * a pointer to that kind of function. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST -+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version -+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in -+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in -+ * pkcs11t.h. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; -+ -+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { -+ -+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ -+ -+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+}; -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+#undef __PASTE -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ -+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ -+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ -+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ -+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ -+/* should not be altered. */ -+ -+/* General-purpose */ -+ -+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets -+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR -+ * and dereferenced */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the -+ * Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to -+ * function list */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Slot and token management */ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in -+ * the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ -+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token -+ * in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types -+ * supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular -+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Session management */ -+ -+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ -+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation -+ * in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic -+ * operation in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Object management */ -+ -+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the -+ * copy. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object -+ * attributes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object -+ * attributes */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object -+ * handles. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session -+ * objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Encryption and decryption */ -+ -+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Message digesting */ -+ -+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting -+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of -+ * the data already digested. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Signing and MACing */ -+ -+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) -+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to -+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the -+ *signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single -+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the -+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * returning the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where -+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the -+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ -+ -+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the -+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, -+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, checking the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ -+ -+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting -+ * and encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and -+ * encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * verify operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Key management */ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, -+ * creating new key objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session -+ * handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen -+ * mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for pub. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for priv. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. -+ * key -+ * handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets -+ * priv. key -+ * handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new -+ * key object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Random number generation */ -+ -+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's -+ * random number generator. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Parallel function management */ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an -+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an -+ * application. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function -+ * running in parallel. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ -+ -+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, -+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ -+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that -+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that -+ * must be set before including this file. */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ -+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 -+ -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 -+ -+#define CK_TRUE 1 -+#define CK_FALSE 0 -+ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE CK_FALSE -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE CK_TRUE -+#endif -+#endif -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ -+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; -+ -+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; -+ -+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; -+ -+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ -+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; -+ -+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ -+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef long int CK_LONG; -+ -+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; -+ -+ -+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ -+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) -+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; -+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; -+ -+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ -+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ -+/* handle or object handle */ -+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_VERSION { -+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ -+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ -+} CK_VERSION; -+ -+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_INFO { -+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ -+ -+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ -+} CK_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that -+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; -+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 -+ -+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ -+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { -+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+} CK_SLOT_INFO; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ -+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ -+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ -+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { -+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, -+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been -+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ -+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # -+ * generator */ -+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is -+ * write- -+ * protected */ -+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must -+ * login */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's -+ * PIN is set */ -+ -+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, -+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic -+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys -+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ -+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means -+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that -+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ -+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 -+ -+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is -+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login -+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ -+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 -+ -+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, -+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform -+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and -+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt -+ * and sign) */ -+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an -+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. -+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause -+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 -+ -+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is -+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for -+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and -+ onwards. */ -+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once -+ * since the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not -+ * possible. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since -+ * the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO -+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. -+ */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 -+ -+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that -+ * identifies a session */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; -+/* Security Officer */ -+#define CKU_SO 0 -+/* Normal user */ -+#define CKU_USER 1 -+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ -+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 -+ -+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ -+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; -+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 -+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 -+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 -+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 -+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ -+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; -+ CK_STATE state; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ -+} CK_SESSION_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined in the following table: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ -+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an -+ * object */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or -+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined -+ * as follows: */ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; -+ -+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ -+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ -+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 -+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 -+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 -+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 -+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 -+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 -+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 -+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 -+ -+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 -+ -+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a -+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object -+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ -+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 -+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 -+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 -+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following key types are defined: */ -+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 -+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 -+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ -+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 -+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 -+ -+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 -+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 -+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 -+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 -+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 -+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 -+ -+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 -+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 -+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 -+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A -+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B -+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C -+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D -+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E -+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 -+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 -+ -+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 -+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 -+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 -+ -+ -+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate -+ * type */ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ -+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 -+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 -+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 -+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute -+ * type */ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which -+ consists of an array of values. */ -+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 -+ -+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ -+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 -+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 -+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 -+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 -+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 -+ -+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 -+ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 -+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 -+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 -+ -+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new -+ * for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 -+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 -+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 -+ -+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 -+ -+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... -+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 -+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 -+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B -+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 -+ -+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 -+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 -+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 -+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 -+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 -+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 -+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 -+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 -+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 -+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 -+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A -+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B -+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C -+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 -+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 -+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 -+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 -+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 -+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 -+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 -+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 -+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 -+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 -+ -+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 -+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS -+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ -+ -+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 -+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 -+ -+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, -+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, -+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 -+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 -+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 -+ -+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 -+ -+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 -+ -+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ -+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+ -+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 -+ -+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, -+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ -+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 -+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 -+ -+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... -+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 -+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) -+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) -+ -+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ -+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 -+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 -+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 -+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D -+ -+ -+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET -+ * are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 -+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 -+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 -+ -+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 -+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 -+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 -+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 -+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 -+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 -+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 -+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 -+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 -+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 -+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 -+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 -+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 -+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 -+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) -+ -+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length -+ * and value of an attribute */ -+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ -+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; -+ -+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ -+typedef struct CK_DATE{ -+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ -+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ -+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ -+} CK_DATE; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism -+ * type */ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 -+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 -+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS -+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ -+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 -+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 -+ -+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 -+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 -+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 -+ -+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for -+ * v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 -+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 -+ -+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 -+ -+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 -+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 -+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 -+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 -+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 -+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 -+ -+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 -+ -+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 -+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 -+ -+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, -+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 -+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 -+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 -+ -+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 -+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 -+ -+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 -+ -+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, -+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, -+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 -+ -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 -+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 -+ -+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 -+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 -+ -+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 -+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 -+ -+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 -+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 -+ -+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ -+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ -+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 -+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 -+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 -+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 -+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 -+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 -+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 -+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 -+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 -+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 -+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 -+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 -+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 -+ -+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 -+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 -+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 -+ -+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 -+ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 -+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 -+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 -+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 -+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 -+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 -+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 -+ -+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 -+ -+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB -+ -+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 -+ -+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 -+ -+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 -+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 -+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 -+ -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 -+ -+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 -+ -+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 -+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 -+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 -+ -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 -+ -+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 -+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 -+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 -+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 -+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 -+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 -+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ -+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+ -+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 -+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE -+ * are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 -+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 -+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 -+ -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 -+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 -+ -+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, -+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are -+ * new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 -+ -+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 -+ -+ -+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 -+ -+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; -+ -+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_MECHANISM; -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { -+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ -+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ -+ -+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, -+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, -+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, -+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not -+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ -+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 -+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 -+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 -+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 -+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 -+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 -+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 -+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, -+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They -+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism -+ * information. */ -+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 -+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 -+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 -+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 -+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 -+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 -+ -+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a -+ * Cryptoki function */ -+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; -+ -+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 -+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 -+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 -+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, -+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 -+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 -+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 -+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A -+ -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 -+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 -+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 -+ -+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 -+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, -+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, -+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 -+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 -+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 -+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 -+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 -+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A -+ -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 -+ -+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID -+ * were removed for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 -+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 -+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 -+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 -+ -+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 -+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 -+ -+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 -+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 -+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 -+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 -+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 -+ -+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and -+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 -+ -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 -+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 -+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 -+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 -+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES -+ * are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 -+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 -+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.11 */ -+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 -+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 -+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 -+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 -+ -+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 -+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 -+ -+/* This is new to v2.20 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 -+ -+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec -+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the -+ * Cryptoki functions */ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a -+ * mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to -+ * C_Initialize */ -+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { -+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; -+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; -+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; -+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; -+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 -+ -+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ -+ -+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ -+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message -+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when -+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption -+ * scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following MGFs are defined */ -+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 -+ * are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source -+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block -+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ -+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_ULONG sLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ -+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, -+ * where each party contributes one key pair. -+ */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined -+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party -+ * contributes one key pair */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation -+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BBOOL isSender; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just -+ * holds the effective keysize */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { -+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ -+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ -+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block -+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of -+ * the MAC */ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; -+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ -+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; -+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG ulLen; -+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the -+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit -+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the -+ * derived key */ -+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to -+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate -+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 -+ -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the -+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 -+ * PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the -+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; -+ CK_ULONG iterations; -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; -+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; -+} CK_OTP_PARAM; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 -+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 -+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 -+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 -+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 -+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/util/libeay.num -diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.2.3 ---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 Wed Mar 4 13:46:38 2015 -+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Wed Mar 4 13:57:56 2015 -@@ -3731,4 +3731,6 @@ - pqueue_size 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION: - OPENSSL_uni2asc 4115 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION: - OPENSSL_asc2uni 4116 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION: -+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4117 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE -+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4117 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE - ASN1_TYPE_cmp 4428 EXIST::FUNCTION: -Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.2.1 ---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1 Wed Mar 4 13:46:38 2015 -+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Wed Mar 4 13:57:57 2015 -@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ - no-ecdh - No ECDH - no-engine - No engine - no-hw - No hw -+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor -+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor - nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm - nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare - nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare -@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@ - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; - $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt; - $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2; -@@ -316,6 +320,9 @@ - $dir=$val; - } - -+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") -+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} -+ - if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") - { $cflags .= " $val";} - -@@ -1295,6 +1302,8 @@ - "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh, - "no-engine" => \$no_engine, - "no-hw" => \$no_hw, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, - "just-ssl" => - [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, - \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh, -Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6 ---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:40 2012 -+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 14:25:25 2011 -@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ - # External "algorithms" - "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", - # Engines -- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", -+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", - # RFC3779 support - "RFC3779", - # TLS extension support -@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ - my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; - my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; - my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; my $no_camellia; -+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; - my $no_seed; - my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; - my $no_rfc3779; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; my $no_jpake; -@@ -214,6 +215,8 @@ - elsif (/^no-cms$/) { $no_cms=1; } - elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; } - elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } - } - - -@@ -1155,6 +1158,8 @@ - if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } -Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl -diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.2.2 ---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1 Thu Jul 3 12:12:38 2014 -+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Thu Jul 3 12:32:04 2014 -@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ - my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; - $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib - $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; -- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; -+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; - $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; - } - elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/) diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.0t-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.0t-patch deleted file mode 100644 index 03465fe0cd..0000000000 --- a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.0t-patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15889 +0,0 @@ -Index: openssl/Configure -diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.11.2.2 ---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Tue Jan 7 09:25:41 2014 -+++ openssl/Configure Tue Jan 7 09:28:47 2014 -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ - - # see INSTALL for instructions. - --my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; -+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; - - # Options: - # -@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ - # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can - # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". - # -+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. -+# (No default) -+# -+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only -+# (No default) -+# - # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected - # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in - # include/. A value is required. -@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@ - "linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - #### IA-32 targets... - "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", - #### - "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -@@ -352,7 +358,7 @@ - "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", - "linux-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", - #### SPARC Linux setups - # Ray Miller has patiently -@@ -623,6 +629,10 @@ - my $idx_arflags = $idx++; - my $idx_multilib = $idx++; - -+# PKCS#11 engine patch -+my $pk11_libname=""; -+my $pk11_flavor=""; -+ - my $prefix=""; - my $libdir=""; - my $openssldir=""; -@@ -825,6 +835,14 @@ - { - $flags.=$_." "; - } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_libname=$1; -+ } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_flavor=$1; -+ } - elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) - { - $prefix=$1; -@@ -962,6 +980,22 @@ - exit 0; - } - -+if (! $pk11_libname) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ -+if (! $pk11_flavor -+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; -+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ - if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { - $target = "Cygwin".$1; - } -@@ -1039,6 +1073,25 @@ - $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; - } - -+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ } -+else -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+} -+ - my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; - - $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); -@@ -1126,6 +1179,8 @@ - if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } - else { $no_user_cflags=1; } - -+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; -+ - # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through - # the script "config" or manually. - if (!$no_krb5) -@@ -1495,6 +1550,7 @@ - s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; - s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; - s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; -+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; - s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; -Index: openssl/Makefile.org -diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.6.2.1 ---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:07 2015 -+++ openssl/Makefile.org Wed Dec 23 17:43:50 2015 -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ - INSTALL_PREFIX= - INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl - -+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. -+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= -+ - # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! - OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl - -Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 -diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.7.4.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:10 2015 -+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ -+ISC modified -+============ -+ -+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. -+ -+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and -+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the -+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second -+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful -+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device -+protected key store and key loading). -+ -+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, -+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example -+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. -+ -+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in -+config/Configure. -+ -+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. -+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared -+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine -+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). -+ -+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l -+========================================= -+ -+[Nov 19, 2009] -+ -+Contents: -+ -+Overview -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+FAQs -+Feedback -+ -+Overview -+======== -+ -+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 -+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against -+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system -+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the -+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. -+ -+Patch can be applied like this: -+ -+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris -+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz -+ # now download the patch to the current directory -+ # ... -+ cd openssl-0.9.8l -+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) -+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 -+ -+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the -+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share -+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. -+ -+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support -+following mechanisms: -+ -+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, -+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, -+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, -+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 -+ -+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP -+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may -+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an -+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety -+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). -+ -+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the -+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the -+config script: -+ -+ $ ./config -+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 -+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc -+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. -+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. -+ -+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run -+configure script like this: -+ -+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so -+ -+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run -+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the -+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary -+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. -+ -+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against -+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and -+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project -+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more -+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the -+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself -+and has functional PKCS#11 library. -+ -+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are -+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. -+ -+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, -+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more -+information). -+ -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+======================================= -+ -+2009-11-19 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l -+ -+- bugs and RFEs: -+ -+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores -+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split -+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2009-03-11 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j -+ -+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a -+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. -+ -+- fixed bugs: -+ -+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-12-02 -+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) -+ -+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine -+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true -+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean -+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take -+ it seriously -+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean -+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 -+ engine code -+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-08-01 -+- fixed bug -+ -+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers -+ and digests -+ -+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic -+ -+2008-07-29 -+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version -+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: -+ -+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users -+ -+- fixed bugs in the engine code: -+ -+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for -+ asymmetric key operations -+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called -+ atomically -+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys -+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners -+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in -+ suboptimal way -+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more -+ resilient to destroy failures -+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() -+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys -+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine -+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size -+ of big numbers leading to failures -+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of -+ -1 -+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references -+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not -+ checked -+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to -+ structure reuse -+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of -+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} -+ defines but fails miserably -+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss -+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing -+ generate_params parameter -+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes -+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() -+ -+- new features and enhancements: -+ -+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 -+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes -+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric -+ ciphers and digests -+ -+2007-10-15 -+- update for 0.9.8f version -+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+ -+2007-10-02 -+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" -+ -+2007-09-26 -+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes -+ significant performance drop -+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2007-05-25 -+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers -+ -+2007-05-19 -+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code -+ -+FAQs -+==== -+ -+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: -+ -+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': -+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring -+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by -+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the -+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: -+ -+Configured for linux-elf. -+ -+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), -+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. -+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With -+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after -+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: -+ -+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... -+ -+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for -+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 -+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. -+ -+ -+Feedback -+======== -+ -+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was -+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. -+ -+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. -+ -Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.4.1 ---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:17 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:01 2015 -@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ - - #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS -+# define OPENSSL_THREADS -+#endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - #endif -@@ -61,6 +64,8 @@ - # endif - #endif - -+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ -+ - /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ - - /* Generate 80386 code? */ -@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ - * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word - * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. - */ --#undef RC4_CHUNK -+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long - #endif - #endif - -@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ - /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a - * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ - #ifndef DES_LONG --#define DES_LONG unsigned long -+#define DES_LONG unsigned int - #endif - #endif - -@@ -126,9 +131,9 @@ - /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ - - /* Only one for the following should be defined */ --#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG -+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG - #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT --#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT -+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT - #endif - - #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) -@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ - - #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) - #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H --#undef BF_PTR -+#define BF_PTR2 - #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ - - #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) -@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ - /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. - * Very mucy CPU dependant */ - #ifndef DES_UNROLL --#undef DES_UNROLL -+#define DES_UNROLL - #endif - - /* These default values were supplied by -Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.4.1 ---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:30 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:14 2015 -@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ - if (file == NULL) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); -- if (errno == ENOENT) -+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES))) - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); - else - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.4.1 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015 -@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ - eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ - tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ - tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ -- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c -+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ -+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c - LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ - eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ - tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ - tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ -- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o -+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ -+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o - - SRC= $(LIBSRC) - -@@ -266,6 +268,83 @@ - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h - eng_table.o: eng_table.c -+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c -+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h -+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h -+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ -+/* -+ * CDDL HEADER START -+ * -+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the -+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only -+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance -+ * with the License. -+ * -+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE -+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions -+ * and limitations under the License. -+ * -+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each -+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. -+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the -+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying -+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] -+ * -+ * CDDL HEADER END -+ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H -+#define _CRYPTOKI_H -+ -+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_PTR -+#define CK_PTR * -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION -+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#include /* For NULL */ -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint -+ */ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE 1 -+#endif /* TRUE */ -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE 0 -+#endif /* FALSE */ -+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+ -+/* Solaris specific functions */ -+ -+#include -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all -+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of -+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given -+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); -+ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.4.1 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015 -@@ -114,6 +114,14 @@ - # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) - ENGINE_load_capi(); - # endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); -+# endif -+# endif - #endif - } - -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.4.1 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:55 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:40 2015 -@@ -406,6 +406,12 @@ - # endif - void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); - void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); -+# endif - - /* - * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.30.4.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+/* -+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither -+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, -+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then -+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's -+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. -+ */ -+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* -+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine -+ * initialization. -+ */ -+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; -+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; -+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel -+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. -+ */ -+static int *hw_cnids; -+static int *hw_dnids; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); -+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -+#else -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); -+#endif -+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len); -+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, -+ size_t count); -+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids); -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, -+ int *local_digest_nids); -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, -+ int id); -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -+enum pk11_cipher_id { -+ PK11_DES_CBC, -+ PK11_DES3_CBC, -+ PK11_DES_ECB, -+ PK11_DES3_ECB, -+ PK11_RC4, -+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, -+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX -+}; -+ -+/* Index for the supported digests */ -+enum pk11_digest_id { -+ PK11_MD5, -+ PK11_SHA1, -+ PK11_SHA224, -+ PK11_SHA256, -+ PK11_SHA384, -+ PK11_SHA512, -+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX -+}; -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+static int cipher_count = 0; -+static int digest_count = 0; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; -+ int nid; -+ int iv_len; -+ int min_key_len; -+ int max_key_len; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_CIPHER; -+ -+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = -+ { -+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, -+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, -+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ -+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ }; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_digest_id id; -+ int nid; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_DIGEST; -+ -+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = -+ { -+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, -+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, -+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, -+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, -+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, -+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, -+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in -+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 -+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; -+ -+ -+/* -+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets -+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. -+ * -+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. -+ */ -+ -+/* DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_cbc, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ecb, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_cbc, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_cbc, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_cbc, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ecb, -+ 16, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ecb, -+ 16, 24, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ecb, -+ 16, 32, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* -+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are -+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures -+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. -+ */ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_undef, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_bf_cbc, -+ 8, 16, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = -+ { -+ NID_rc4, -+ 1, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = -+ { -+ NID_md5, -+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, -+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ MD5_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = -+ { -+ NID_sha1, -+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = -+ { -+ NID_sha224, -+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = -+ { -+ NID_sha256, -+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = -+ { -+ NID_sha384, -+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = -+ { -+ NID_sha512, -+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = -+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; -+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || -+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) -+ return (0); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+/* -+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup -+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp -+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. -+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. -+ */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; -+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* -+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all -+ * NIDs there. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since -+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function -+ */ -+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ -+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) -+ != CKR_OK) { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " -+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ digest_count = 0; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ myslot = SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. -+ * -+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure -+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ -+ -+static int -+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) -+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) -+ return (ciphers[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (cipher_count > 0) -+ *nids = cipher_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (cipher_count); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (digest_count > 0) -+ *nids = digest_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (digest_count); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. -+ */ -+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, -+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and -+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before -+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. -+ */ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); -+ /* -+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, -+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 -+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the -+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can -+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via -+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. -+ */ -+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; -+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ } -+ else -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ { -+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; -+ /* -+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the -+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our -+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From -+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a -+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key -+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this -+ * code serves as a sanity check. -+ * -+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be -+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs -+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES -+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || -+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || -+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ -+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ -+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); -+ -+ /* -+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then -+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the -+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && -+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ state->sp = sp; -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object -+ * needs to be created. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( -+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to -+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a -+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session -+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so -+ * that it needs not be recreated. -+ * -+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this -+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return -+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good -+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix -+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient -+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. -+ */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) -+#else -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) -+#endif -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long outl = inl; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; -+ -+ if (!inl) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always -+ * the same size of input. -+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with -+ * correctly aligned buffers. -+ */ -+ if (inl != outl) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() -+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's -+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but -+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't -+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with -+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, -+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used -+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; -+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get -+ * rid of the context. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with -+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the -+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!cipher) -+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_bf_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_rc4: -+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; -+ break; -+ default: -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+ /* -+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs -+ * here are not constants. -+ */ -+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; -+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; -+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; -+ else -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ *cipher = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*cipher != NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!digest) -+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_md5: -+ *digest = &pk11_md5; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha1: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha224: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha256: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha384: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha512: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *digest = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*digest != NULL); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; -+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions -+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: -+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. -+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. -+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with -+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES -+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and -+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session -+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key -+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to -+ * terminate the active operation. -+ */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); -+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; -+ } -+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Save the key information used in this session. -+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+err: -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+static int -+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) -+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) -+ return (digests[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ pdp = &digests[index]; -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ -+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ -+ if (count == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, -+ count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long len; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session -+ * to the pool -+ */ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ -+ /* The copy-from state */ -+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) -+ goto err; -+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; -+ -+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (ul_state_len == 0) -+ { -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); -+ if (pstate == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, -+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, -+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ if (pstate != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -+static int -+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; -+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not -+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory -+ * that might have been allocated in the token when -+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() -+ * will return the session to the cache. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key -+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key -+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for -+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first -+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same -+ * prefix. -+ */ -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len) -+ { -+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || -+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) -+ { -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The secret key object is created in the -+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * CKM_DSA -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_DES3_CBC -+ * CKM_DES_CBC -+ * CKM_AES_CBC -+ * CKM_DES3_ECB -+ * CKM_DES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_CTR -+ * CKM_RC4 -+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC -+ * -+ * Digests optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_MD5 -+ * CKM_SHA_1 -+ * CKM_SHA224 -+ * CKM_SHA256 -+ * CKM_SHA384 -+ * CKM_SHA512 -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int slot_n_digest = 0; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ -+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, -+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) -+ { -+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, -+ &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and -+ * derivation. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) -+ { -+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && -+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; -+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; -+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); -+ -+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_cipher); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_digest); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than -+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, -+ * otherwise leave it where it is. -+ */ -+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > -+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; -+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; -+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; -+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, -+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, -+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = -+ ciphers[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = -+ digests[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR -+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ -+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) -+ { -+ ASN1_OBJECT *o; -+ int nid; -+ -+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", -+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) -+ { -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* will return NID_undef on error */ -+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o); -+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); -+ -+ return (nid); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we -+ * have to help ourselves here. -+ */ -+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) -+ { -+ /* are we already set? */ -+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just -+ * follow the format of those that exist. -+ */ -+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; -+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; -+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == -+ NID_undef) -+ goto err; -+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ -+ -+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, -+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, -+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, -+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library -+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation -+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code -+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the -+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some -+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a -+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, -+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the -+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte -+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products -+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression -+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the -+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. -+ * -+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for -+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same -+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 -+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without -+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use -+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since -+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said -+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with -+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code -+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for -+ * asymmetric operations. -+ * -+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what -+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can -+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be -+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, -+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. -+ * -+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find -+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric -+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table -+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays -+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the -+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token -+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more -+ * information. -+ * -+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined -+ * the code won't be used. -+ */ -+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#else -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, -+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware -+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. -+ */ -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ void *handle; -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; -+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ /* this means empty tables */ -+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also -+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the -+ * search. -+ */ -+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; -+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; -+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef -+ * is zero now. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are -+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. -+ */ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); -+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by -+ * dlclose(3C). -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ (void) dlclose(handle); -+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; -+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); -+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., -+ * non-existent). -+ */ -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) -+ { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new -+ * table. -+ */ -+ if (nid_table == NULL) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one -+ * NID_undef. -+ */ -+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) -+ { -+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= -+{ -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+ -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= -+{ -+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, -+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, -+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, -+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, -+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, -+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, -+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, -+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, -+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, -+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, -+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ -+ -+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; -+static int pk11_error_init = 1; -+ -+static void -+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ -+ if (pk11_error_init) -+ { -+ pk11_error_init = 0; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ pk11_error_init = 1; -+ } -+} -+ -+void -+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) -+{ -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); -+} -+ -+void -+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) -+{ -+ char tmp_buf[20]; -+ -+ PK11err(function, reason); -+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); -+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); -+} -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.12.4.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H -+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H -+ -+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); -+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); -+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) -+ -+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ -+ -+/* Function codes. */ -+ -+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 -+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 -+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 -+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 -+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 -+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 -+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 -+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 -+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 -+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 -+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 -+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 -+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 -+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 -+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 -+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 -+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 -+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 -+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 -+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 -+ -+/* Reason codes. */ -+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 -+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 -+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 -+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 -+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 -+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 -+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 -+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 -+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 -+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 -+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 -+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 -+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 -+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 -+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 -+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 -+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 -+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 -+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 -+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 -+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 -+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 -+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 -+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 -+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 -+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 -+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 -+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 -+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 -+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 -+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 -+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 -+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 -+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 -+ -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 -+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 -+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 -+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 -+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 -+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 -+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 -+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 -+ -+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ -+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 -+ -+#ifdef NOPTHREADS -+/* -+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the -+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global -+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. -+ * -+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as -+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but -+ * it's safe. -+ */ -+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 -+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the -+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation -+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. -+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object -+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. -+ * -+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list -+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request -+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION -+ { -+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ -+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ -+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ -+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ -+ union -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ -+ } u_RSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ -+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ -+ } u_DSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ -+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ -+ } u_DH; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ -+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ -+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ -+ } u_cipher; -+ } opdata_u; -+ } PK11_SESSION; -+ -+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub -+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv -+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num -+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num -+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num -+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num -+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key -+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh -+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num -+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key -+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key -+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len -+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt -+ -+/* -+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: -+ * 1) asymmetric operations -+ * 2) random operations -+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations -+ * -+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware -+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware -+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support -+ * only a single group of operations. -+ * -+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have -+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from -+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. -+ * -+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are -+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. -+ */ -+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM -+ { -+ OP_RAND, -+ OP_RSA, -+ OP_DSA, -+ OP_DH, -+ OP_CIPHER, -+ OP_DIGEST, -+ OP_MAX -+ } PK11_OPTYPE; -+ -+/* -+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches -+ * and locks associated with the lists. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *head; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; -+#endif -+ } PK11_CACHE; -+ -+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ -+typedef struct PK11_active_st -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; -+ unsigned int refcnt; -+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; -+ struct PK11_active_st *next; -+ } PK11_active; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; -+#endif -+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; -+/* -+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See -+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. -+ */ -+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#else -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#endif -+ -+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; -+ -+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.38.2.3 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DSA stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); -+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, -+ DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, -+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DH stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); -+#endif -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", -+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ -+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ -+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ -+ }; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", -+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ -+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL /* app_data */ -+ }; -+ -+DSA_METHOD * -+PK11_DSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* -+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for -+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but -+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by -+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be -+ * enough. -+ */ -+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 -+ -+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DH method", -+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ -+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ NULL /* generate_params */ -+ }; -+ -+DH_METHOD * -+PK11_DH(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dh); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ -+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 -+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* -+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to -+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not -+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. -+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors -+ * should be catched in the padding functions -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* make data into a big number */ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. -+ */ -+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) -+ if (buf[j] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + j; -+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); -+ if (buf == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's here -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) -+ if (buf[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + i; -+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and -+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_encrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and -+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, -+ rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ retval = ul_sig_len; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and -+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit -+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, -+ p_mech, h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, -+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need -+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum -+ * structures. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#endif -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, -+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* The DSA function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+static DSA_SIG * -+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int i; -+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ -+ /* -+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, -+ * each is 20 bytes long -+ */ -+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ -+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || -+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ dsa_sig->r = r; -+ dsa_sig->s = s; -+ -+ret: -+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) -+ { -+ if (r != NULL) -+ BN_free(r); -+ if (s != NULL) -+ BN_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (dsa_sig); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, -+ DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int retval = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ -+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could -+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need -+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. -+ */ -+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - -+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ retval = 1; -+ret: -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. -+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure -+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* The DH function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Generate DH key-pair. -+ * -+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key -+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key -+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard -+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem -+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. -+ */ -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ CK_RV rv, rv1; -+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; -+ -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that -+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of -+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. -+ */ -+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting -+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are -+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. -+ */ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ pub_key_template, -+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_pub_key, -+ &h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory -+ * should be sufficient for reuse. -+ */ -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || -+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) -+ { -+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); -+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, -+ DH *dh) -+ { -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG seclen; -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = -1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; -+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); -+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); -+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); -+ -+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); -+ -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = -+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, -+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ h_key, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); -+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same -+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key -+ */ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip -+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, -+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The -+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was -+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading -+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the -+ * pre-master secret. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) -+ { -+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); -+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (mechanism.pParameter) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); -+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, -+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; -+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ -+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); -+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dh; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) -+ { -+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); -+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ * -+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh -+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key -+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached -+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.7.4.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ if (optype == OP_RSA) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11so_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.8.2.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; -+ -+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); -+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; -+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; -+ } -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ -+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ -+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by -+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These -+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them -+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend -+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also -+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or -+ * dynamically). -+ * -+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention -+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki -+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte -+ * aligned. -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following -+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+ * -+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using -+ * the following preprocessor directive before including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(1) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might -+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. -+ * -+ * -+ * Now for the macros: -+ * -+ * -+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an -+ * object. It can be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR far * -+ * -+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * -+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in -+ * a Cryptoki library: -+ * -+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ) -+ * { -+ * ... -+ * } -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion: -+ * -+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ); -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro -+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or -+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a -+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function -+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. -+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); -+ * -+ * or -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a -+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning -+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type -+ * // funcPtrType. -+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); -+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access -+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might -+ * be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of -+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. -+ * It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); -+ * -+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback -+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also -+ * be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); -+ * myCallbackType myCallback; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 -+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. -+ * -+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), -+ * this should best be defined by -+ * -+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR -+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 -+ * #endif -+ */ -+ -+ -+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the -+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ -+#include "pkcs11t.h" -+ -+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for -+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is -+ * a pointer to that kind of function. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST -+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version -+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in -+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in -+ * pkcs11t.h. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; -+ -+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { -+ -+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ -+ -+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+}; -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+#undef __PASTE -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ -+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ -+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ -+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ -+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ -+/* should not be altered. */ -+ -+/* General-purpose */ -+ -+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets -+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR -+ * and dereferenced */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the -+ * Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to -+ * function list */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Slot and token management */ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in -+ * the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ -+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token -+ * in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types -+ * supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular -+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Session management */ -+ -+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ -+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation -+ * in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic -+ * operation in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Object management */ -+ -+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the -+ * copy. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object -+ * attributes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object -+ * attributes */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object -+ * handles. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session -+ * objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Encryption and decryption */ -+ -+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Message digesting */ -+ -+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting -+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of -+ * the data already digested. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Signing and MACing */ -+ -+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) -+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to -+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the -+ *signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single -+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the -+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * returning the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where -+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the -+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ -+ -+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the -+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, -+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, checking the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ -+ -+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting -+ * and encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and -+ * encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * verify operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Key management */ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, -+ * creating new key objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session -+ * handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen -+ * mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for pub. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for priv. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. -+ * key -+ * handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets -+ * priv. key -+ * handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new -+ * key object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Random number generation */ -+ -+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's -+ * random number generator. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Parallel function management */ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an -+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an -+ * application. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function -+ * running in parallel. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ -+ -+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, -+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 ---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ -+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that -+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that -+ * must be set before including this file. */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ -+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 -+ -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 -+ -+#define CK_TRUE 1 -+#define CK_FALSE 0 -+ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE CK_FALSE -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE CK_TRUE -+#endif -+#endif -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ -+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; -+ -+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; -+ -+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; -+ -+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ -+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; -+ -+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ -+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef long int CK_LONG; -+ -+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; -+ -+ -+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ -+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) -+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; -+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; -+ -+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ -+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ -+/* handle or object handle */ -+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_VERSION { -+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ -+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ -+} CK_VERSION; -+ -+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_INFO { -+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ -+ -+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ -+} CK_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that -+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; -+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 -+ -+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ -+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { -+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+} CK_SLOT_INFO; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ -+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ -+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ -+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { -+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, -+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been -+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ -+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # -+ * generator */ -+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is -+ * write- -+ * protected */ -+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must -+ * login */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's -+ * PIN is set */ -+ -+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, -+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic -+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys -+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ -+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means -+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that -+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ -+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 -+ -+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is -+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login -+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ -+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 -+ -+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, -+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform -+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and -+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt -+ * and sign) */ -+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an -+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. -+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause -+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 -+ -+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is -+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for -+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and -+ onwards. */ -+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once -+ * since the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not -+ * possible. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since -+ * the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO -+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. -+ */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 -+ -+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that -+ * identifies a session */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; -+/* Security Officer */ -+#define CKU_SO 0 -+/* Normal user */ -+#define CKU_USER 1 -+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ -+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 -+ -+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ -+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; -+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 -+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 -+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 -+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 -+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ -+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; -+ CK_STATE state; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ -+} CK_SESSION_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined in the following table: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ -+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an -+ * object */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or -+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined -+ * as follows: */ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; -+ -+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ -+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ -+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 -+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 -+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 -+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 -+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 -+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 -+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 -+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 -+ -+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 -+ -+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a -+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object -+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ -+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 -+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 -+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 -+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following key types are defined: */ -+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 -+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 -+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ -+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 -+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 -+ -+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 -+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 -+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 -+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 -+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 -+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 -+ -+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 -+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 -+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 -+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A -+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B -+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C -+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D -+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E -+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 -+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 -+ -+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 -+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 -+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 -+ -+ -+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate -+ * type */ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ -+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 -+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 -+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 -+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute -+ * type */ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which -+ consists of an array of values. */ -+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 -+ -+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ -+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 -+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 -+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 -+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 -+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 -+ -+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 -+ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 -+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 -+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 -+ -+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new -+ * for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 -+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 -+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 -+ -+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 -+ -+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... -+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 -+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 -+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B -+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 -+ -+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 -+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 -+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 -+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 -+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 -+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 -+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 -+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 -+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 -+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 -+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A -+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B -+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C -+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 -+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 -+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 -+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 -+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 -+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 -+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 -+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 -+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 -+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 -+ -+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 -+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS -+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ -+ -+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 -+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 -+ -+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, -+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, -+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 -+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 -+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 -+ -+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 -+ -+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 -+ -+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ -+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+ -+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 -+ -+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, -+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ -+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 -+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 -+ -+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... -+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 -+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) -+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) -+ -+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ -+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 -+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 -+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 -+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D -+ -+ -+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET -+ * are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 -+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 -+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 -+ -+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 -+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 -+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 -+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 -+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 -+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 -+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 -+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 -+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 -+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 -+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 -+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 -+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 -+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 -+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) -+ -+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length -+ * and value of an attribute */ -+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ -+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; -+ -+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ -+typedef struct CK_DATE{ -+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ -+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ -+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ -+} CK_DATE; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism -+ * type */ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 -+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 -+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS -+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ -+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 -+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 -+ -+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 -+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 -+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 -+ -+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for -+ * v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 -+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 -+ -+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 -+ -+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 -+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 -+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 -+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 -+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 -+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 -+ -+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 -+ -+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 -+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 -+ -+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, -+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 -+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 -+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 -+ -+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 -+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 -+ -+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 -+ -+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, -+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, -+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 -+ -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 -+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 -+ -+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 -+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 -+ -+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 -+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 -+ -+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 -+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 -+ -+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ -+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ -+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 -+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 -+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 -+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 -+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 -+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 -+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 -+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 -+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 -+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 -+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 -+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 -+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 -+ -+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 -+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 -+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 -+ -+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 -+ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 -+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 -+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 -+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 -+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 -+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 -+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 -+ -+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 -+ -+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB -+ -+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 -+ -+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 -+ -+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 -+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 -+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 -+ -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 -+ -+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 -+ -+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 -+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 -+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 -+ -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 -+ -+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 -+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 -+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 -+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 -+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 -+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 -+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ -+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+ -+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 -+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE -+ * are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 -+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 -+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 -+ -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 -+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 -+ -+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, -+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are -+ * new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 -+ -+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 -+ -+ -+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 -+ -+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; -+ -+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_MECHANISM; -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { -+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ -+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ -+ -+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, -+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, -+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, -+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not -+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ -+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 -+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 -+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 -+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 -+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 -+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 -+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 -+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, -+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They -+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism -+ * information. */ -+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 -+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 -+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 -+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 -+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 -+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 -+ -+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a -+ * Cryptoki function */ -+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; -+ -+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 -+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 -+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 -+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, -+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 -+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 -+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 -+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A -+ -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 -+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 -+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 -+ -+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 -+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, -+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, -+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 -+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 -+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 -+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 -+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 -+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A -+ -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 -+ -+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID -+ * were removed for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 -+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 -+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 -+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 -+ -+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 -+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 -+ -+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 -+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 -+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 -+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 -+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 -+ -+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and -+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 -+ -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 -+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 -+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 -+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 -+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES -+ * are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 -+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 -+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.11 */ -+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 -+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 -+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 -+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 -+ -+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 -+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 -+ -+/* This is new to v2.20 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 -+ -+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec -+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the -+ * Cryptoki functions */ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a -+ * mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to -+ * C_Initialize */ -+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { -+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; -+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; -+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; -+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; -+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 -+ -+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ -+ -+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ -+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message -+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when -+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption -+ * scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following MGFs are defined */ -+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 -+ * are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source -+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block -+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ -+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_ULONG sLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ -+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, -+ * where each party contributes one key pair. -+ */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined -+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party -+ * contributes one key pair */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation -+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BBOOL isSender; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just -+ * holds the effective keysize */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { -+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ -+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ -+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block -+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of -+ * the MAC */ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; -+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ -+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; -+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG ulLen; -+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the -+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit -+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the -+ * derived key */ -+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to -+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate -+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 -+ -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the -+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 -+ * PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the -+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; -+ CK_ULONG iterations; -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; -+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; -+} CK_OTP_PARAM; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 -+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 -+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 -+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 -+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 -+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/util/libeay.num -diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.9.2.4 ---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:04 2015 -+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015 -@@ -4198,3 +4198,5 @@ - OPENSSL_strncasecmp 4566 EXIST::FUNCTION: - OPENSSL_gmtime 4567 EXIST::FUNCTION: - OPENSSL_gmtime_adj 4568 EXIST::FUNCTION: -+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE -+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE -Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.4.1 ---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 Wed Mar 4 14:03:25 2015 -+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Wed Mar 4 14:04:40 2015 -@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ - no-ecdh - No ECDH - no-engine - No engine - no-hw - No hw -+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor -+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor - nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm - nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare - nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare -@@ -270,6 +272,8 @@ - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; - $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt; - $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2; -@@ -335,6 +339,9 @@ - $dir=$val; - } - -+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") -+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} -+ - if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") - { $cflags .= " $val";} - -@@ -1061,6 +1068,8 @@ - "no-gost" => \$no_gost, - "no-engine" => \$no_engine, - "no-hw" => \$no_hw, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, - "just-ssl" => - [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, - \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh, -Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.8 ---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 Sun Jan 15 16:09:52 2012 -+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Sun Jan 15 16:30:10 2012 -@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ - # External "algorithms" - "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", - # Engines -- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", -+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", - # RFC3779 - "RFC3779", - # TLS -@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ - my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; - my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; - my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; -+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; - my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; - my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; - my $no_jpake; my $no_ssl2; -@@ -218,6 +219,8 @@ - elsif (/^no-ssl2$/) { $no_ssl2=1; } - elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; } - elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } - } - - -@@ -1165,6 +1168,8 @@ - if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } -Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl -diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.4.1 ---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:05 2015 -+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015 -@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ - my $f = $shlib?' /MD':' /MT'; - $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib - $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; -- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; -+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; - $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; - - *::perlasm_compile_target = sub { diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch deleted file mode 100644 index dfc262826c..0000000000 --- a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15791 +0,0 @@ -Index: openssl/Configure -diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.19 ---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:46 2016 -+++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ - - # see INSTALL for instructions. - --my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; -+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; - - # Options: - # -@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ - # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can - # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". - # -+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. -+# (No default) -+# -+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only -+# (No default) -+# - # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected - # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in - # include/. A value is required. -@@ -355,24 +361,23 @@ - #### - # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to - # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... --"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - # It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march. - # If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one! --"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - #### IA-32 targets... --"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", -+"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", - #### --"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", - #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs - # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see - # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of -@@ -668,6 +673,10 @@ - my $idx_arflags = $idx++; - my $idx_multilib = $idx++; - -+# PKCS#11 engine patch -+my $pk11_libname=""; -+my $pk11_flavor=""; -+ - my $prefix=""; - my $libdir=""; - my $openssldir=""; -@@ -895,6 +904,14 @@ - $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; - $flags.=$_." "; - } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_libname=$1; -+ } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_flavor=$1; -+ } - elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) - { - $prefix=$1; -@@ -1062,6 +1079,22 @@ - exit 0; - } - -+if (! $pk11_libname) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ -+if (! $pk11_flavor -+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; -+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ - if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { - $target = "Cygwin".$1; - } -@@ -1139,6 +1172,25 @@ - $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; - } - -+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ } -+else -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+} -+ - my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; - - $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); -@@ -1228,6 +1280,8 @@ - if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } - else { $no_user_cflags=1; } - -+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; -+ - # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through - # the script "config" or manually. - if (!$no_krb5) -@@ -1626,6 +1680,7 @@ - s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; - s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; - s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; -+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; - s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; -Index: openssl/Makefile.org -diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.12 ---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:47 2016 -+++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ - INSTALL_PREFIX= - INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl - -+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. -+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= -+ - # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! - OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl - -Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 -diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:28 2016 -+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ -+ISC modified -+============ -+ -+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. -+ -+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and -+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the -+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second -+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful -+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device -+protected key store and key loading). -+ -+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, -+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example -+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. -+ -+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in -+config/Configure. -+ -+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. -+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared -+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine -+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). -+ -+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l -+========================================= -+ -+[Nov 19, 2009] -+ -+Contents: -+ -+Overview -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+FAQs -+Feedback -+ -+Overview -+======== -+ -+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 -+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against -+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system -+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the -+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. -+ -+Patch can be applied like this: -+ -+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris -+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz -+ # now download the patch to the current directory -+ # ... -+ cd openssl-0.9.8l -+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) -+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 -+ -+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the -+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share -+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. -+ -+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support -+following mechanisms: -+ -+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, -+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, -+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, -+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 -+ -+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP -+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may -+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an -+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety -+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). -+ -+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the -+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the -+config script: -+ -+ $ ./config -+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 -+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc -+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. -+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. -+ -+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run -+configure script like this: -+ -+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so -+ -+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run -+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the -+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary -+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. -+ -+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against -+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and -+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project -+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more -+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the -+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself -+and has functional PKCS#11 library. -+ -+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are -+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. -+ -+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, -+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more -+information). -+ -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+======================================= -+ -+2009-11-19 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l -+ -+- bugs and RFEs: -+ -+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores -+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split -+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2009-03-11 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j -+ -+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a -+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. -+ -+- fixed bugs: -+ -+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-12-02 -+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) -+ -+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine -+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true -+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean -+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take -+ it seriously -+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean -+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 -+ engine code -+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-08-01 -+- fixed bug -+ -+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers -+ and digests -+ -+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic -+ -+2008-07-29 -+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version -+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: -+ -+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users -+ -+- fixed bugs in the engine code: -+ -+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for -+ asymmetric key operations -+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called -+ atomically -+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys -+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners -+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in -+ suboptimal way -+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more -+ resilient to destroy failures -+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() -+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys -+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine -+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size -+ of big numbers leading to failures -+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of -+ -1 -+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references -+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not -+ checked -+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to -+ structure reuse -+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of -+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} -+ defines but fails miserably -+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss -+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing -+ generate_params parameter -+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes -+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() -+ -+- new features and enhancements: -+ -+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 -+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes -+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric -+ ciphers and digests -+ -+2007-10-15 -+- update for 0.9.8f version -+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+ -+2007-10-02 -+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" -+ -+2007-09-26 -+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes -+ significant performance drop -+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2007-05-25 -+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers -+ -+2007-05-19 -+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code -+ -+FAQs -+==== -+ -+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: -+ -+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': -+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring -+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by -+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the -+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: -+ -+Configured for linux-elf. -+ -+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), -+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. -+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With -+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after -+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: -+ -+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... -+ -+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for -+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 -+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. -+ -+ -+Feedback -+======== -+ -+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was -+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. -+ -+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. -+ -Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.10 ---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:49 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:20:26 2016 -@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ - - #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS -+# define OPENSSL_THREADS -+#endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - #endif -@@ -94,6 +97,8 @@ - # endif - #endif - -+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ -+ - /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ - - /* Generate 80386 code? */ -@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ - * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word - * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. - */ --#undef RC4_CHUNK -+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long - #endif - #endif - -@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@ - /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a - * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ - #ifndef DES_LONG --#define DES_LONG unsigned long -+#define DES_LONG unsigned int - #endif - #endif - -@@ -159,9 +164,9 @@ - /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ - - /* Only one for the following should be defined */ --#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG -+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG - #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT --#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT -+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT - #endif - - #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) -@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ - - #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) - #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H --#undef BF_PTR -+#define BF_PTR2 - #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ - - #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) -@@ -203,7 +208,7 @@ - /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. - * Very mucy CPU dependant */ - #ifndef DES_UNROLL --#undef DES_UNROLL -+#define DES_UNROLL - #endif - - /* These default values were supplied by -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.10 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:29 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 18:27:10 2015 -@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ - tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ - tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ - eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ -- eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c -+ eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c \ -+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c - LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ - eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ - tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ - tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ - eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ -- eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o -+ eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o \ -+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o - - SRC= $(LIBSRC) - -@@ -296,6 +298,83 @@ - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h - eng_table.o: eng_table.c -+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c -+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h -+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h -+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ -+/* -+ * CDDL HEADER START -+ * -+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the -+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only -+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance -+ * with the License. -+ * -+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE -+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions -+ * and limitations under the License. -+ * -+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each -+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. -+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the -+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying -+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] -+ * -+ * CDDL HEADER END -+ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H -+#define _CRYPTOKI_H -+ -+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_PTR -+#define CK_PTR * -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION -+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#include /* For NULL */ -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint -+ */ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE 1 -+#endif /* TRUE */ -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE 0 -+#endif /* FALSE */ -+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+ -+/* Solaris specific functions */ -+ -+#include -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all -+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of -+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given -+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); -+ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.8 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:52 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:20:31 2016 -@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ - # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) - ENGINE_load_capi(); - # endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); -+# endif -+# endif - #endif - ENGINE_register_all_complete(); - } -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.7 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:30 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 18:27:11 2015 -@@ -416,6 +416,12 @@ - void ENGINE_load_rsax(void); - void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void); - void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); -+# endif -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); -+# endif - - /* - * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+/* -+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel -+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. -+ */ -+static int *hw_cnids; -+static int *hw_dnids; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -+#else -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); -+#endif -+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len); -+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, -+ size_t count); -+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids); -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, -+ int *local_digest_nids); -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, -+ int id); -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -+enum pk11_cipher_id { -+ PK11_DES_CBC, -+ PK11_DES3_CBC, -+ PK11_DES_ECB, -+ PK11_DES3_ECB, -+ PK11_RC4, -+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, -+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, -+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX -+}; -+ -+/* Index for the supported digests */ -+enum pk11_digest_id { -+ PK11_MD5, -+ PK11_SHA1, -+ PK11_SHA224, -+ PK11_SHA256, -+ PK11_SHA384, -+ PK11_SHA512, -+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX -+}; -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+static int cipher_count = 0; -+static int digest_count = 0; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; -+ int nid; -+ int iv_len; -+ int min_key_len; -+ int max_key_len; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_CIPHER; -+ -+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = -+ { -+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, -+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, -+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, -+ }; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_digest_id id; -+ int nid; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_DIGEST; -+ -+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = -+ { -+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, -+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, -+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, -+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, -+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, -+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, -+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in -+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 -+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; -+ -+ -+/* -+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets -+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. -+ * -+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. -+ */ -+ -+/* DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_cbc, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ecb, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_cbc, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_cbc, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_cbc, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ecb, -+ 16, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ecb, -+ 16, 24, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ecb, -+ 16, 32, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ctr, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ctr, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ctr, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_bf_cbc, -+ 8, 16, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = -+ { -+ NID_rc4, -+ 1, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = -+ { -+ NID_md5, -+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, -+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ MD5_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = -+ { -+ NID_sha1, -+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = -+ { -+ NID_sha224, -+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = -+ { -+ NID_sha256, -+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = -+ { -+ NID_sha384, -+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = -+ { -+ NID_sha512, -+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = -+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; -+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || -+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) -+ return (0); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+/* -+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup -+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp -+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. -+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. -+ */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; -+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since -+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function -+ */ -+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ -+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) -+ != CKR_OK) { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " -+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ digest_count = 0; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ myslot = SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. -+ * -+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure -+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ -+ -+static int -+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) -+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) -+ return (ciphers[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (cipher_count > 0) -+ *nids = cipher_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (cipher_count); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (digest_count > 0) -+ *nids = digest_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (digest_count); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. -+ */ -+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, -+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; -+ -+ /* -+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and -+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before -+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. -+ */ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); -+ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); -+ /* -+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, -+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 -+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the -+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can -+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via -+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. -+ */ -+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; -+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; -+ /* -+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the -+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our -+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From -+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a -+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key -+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this -+ * code serves as a sanity check. -+ * -+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be -+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs -+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES -+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || -+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || -+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ -+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ -+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); -+ -+ /* -+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then -+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the -+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && -+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ state->sp = sp; -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object -+ * needs to be created. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( -+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to -+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a -+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session -+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so -+ * that it needs not be recreated. -+ * -+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this -+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return -+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good -+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix -+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient -+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. -+ */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) -+#else -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) -+#endif -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long outl = inl; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; -+ -+ if (!inl) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always -+ * the same size of input. -+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with -+ * correctly aligned buffers. -+ */ -+ if (inl != outl) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() -+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's -+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but -+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't -+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with -+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, -+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used -+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; -+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get -+ * rid of the context. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with -+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the -+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!cipher) -+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_bf_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_rc4: -+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *cipher = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*cipher != NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!digest) -+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_md5: -+ *digest = &pk11_md5; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha1: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha224: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha256: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha384: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha512: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *digest = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*digest != NULL); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; -+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions -+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: -+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. -+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. -+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with -+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES -+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and -+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session -+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key -+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to -+ * terminate the active operation. -+ */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); -+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; -+ } -+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Save the key information used in this session. -+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+err: -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+static int -+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) -+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) -+ return (digests[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ pdp = &digests[index]; -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ -+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ -+ if (count == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, -+ count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long len; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session -+ * to the pool -+ */ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ -+ /* The copy-from state */ -+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) -+ goto err; -+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; -+ -+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (ul_state_len == 0) -+ { -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); -+ if (pstate == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, -+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, -+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ if (pstate != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -+static int -+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; -+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not -+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory -+ * that might have been allocated in the token when -+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() -+ * will return the session to the cache. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key -+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key -+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for -+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first -+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same -+ * prefix. -+ */ -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len) -+ { -+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || -+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) -+ { -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The secret key object is created in the -+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * CKM_DSA -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_DES3_CBC -+ * CKM_DES_CBC -+ * CKM_AES_CBC -+ * CKM_DES3_ECB -+ * CKM_DES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_CTR -+ * CKM_RC4 -+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC -+ * -+ * Digests optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_MD5 -+ * CKM_SHA_1 -+ * CKM_SHA224 -+ * CKM_SHA256 -+ * CKM_SHA384 -+ * CKM_SHA512 -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int slot_n_digest = 0; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ -+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, -+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) -+ { -+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, -+ &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and -+ * derivation. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) -+ { -+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && -+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; -+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; -+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); -+ -+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_cipher); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_digest); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than -+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, -+ * otherwise leave it where it is. -+ */ -+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > -+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; -+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; -+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; -+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, -+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, -+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = -+ ciphers[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = -+ digests[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, -+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, -+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, -+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library -+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation -+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code -+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the -+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some -+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a -+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, -+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the -+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte -+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products -+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression -+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the -+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. -+ * -+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for -+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same -+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 -+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without -+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use -+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since -+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said -+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with -+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code -+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for -+ * asymmetric operations. -+ * -+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what -+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can -+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be -+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, -+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. -+ * -+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find -+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric -+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table -+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays -+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the -+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token -+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more -+ * information. -+ * -+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined -+ * the code won't be used. -+ */ -+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#else -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, -+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware -+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. -+ */ -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ void *handle; -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; -+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ /* this means empty tables */ -+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also -+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the -+ * search. -+ */ -+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; -+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; -+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef -+ * is zero now. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are -+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. -+ */ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); -+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by -+ * dlclose(3C). -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ (void) dlclose(handle); -+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; -+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); -+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., -+ * non-existent). -+ */ -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) -+ { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new -+ * table. -+ */ -+ if (nid_table == NULL) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one -+ * NID_undef. -+ */ -+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) -+ { -+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= -+{ -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+ -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= -+{ -+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, -+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, -+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, -+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, -+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, -+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, -+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, -+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, -+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, -+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, -+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ -+ -+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; -+static int pk11_error_init = 1; -+ -+static void -+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ -+ if (pk11_error_init) -+ { -+ pk11_error_init = 0; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ pk11_error_init = 1; -+ } -+} -+ -+void -+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) -+{ -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); -+} -+ -+void -+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) -+{ -+ char tmp_buf[20]; -+ -+ PK11err(function, reason); -+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); -+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); -+} -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H -+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H -+ -+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); -+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); -+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) -+ -+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ -+ -+/* Function codes. */ -+ -+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 -+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 -+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 -+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 -+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 -+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 -+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 -+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 -+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 -+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 -+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 -+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 -+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 -+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 -+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 -+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 -+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 -+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 -+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 -+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 -+ -+/* Reason codes. */ -+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 -+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 -+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 -+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 -+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 -+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 -+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 -+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 -+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 -+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 -+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 -+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 -+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 -+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 -+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 -+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 -+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 -+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 -+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 -+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 -+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 -+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 -+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 -+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 -+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 -+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 -+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 -+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 -+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 -+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 -+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 -+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 -+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 -+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 -+ -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 -+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 -+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 -+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 -+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 -+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 -+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 -+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 -+ -+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ -+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 -+ -+#ifdef NOPTHREADS -+/* -+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the -+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global -+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. -+ * -+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as -+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but -+ * it's safe. -+ */ -+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 -+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the -+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation -+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. -+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object -+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. -+ * -+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list -+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request -+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION -+ { -+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ -+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ -+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ -+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ -+ union -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ -+ } u_RSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ -+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ -+ } u_DSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ -+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ -+ } u_DH; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ -+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ -+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ -+ } u_cipher; -+ } opdata_u; -+ } PK11_SESSION; -+ -+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub -+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv -+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num -+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num -+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num -+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num -+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key -+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh -+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num -+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key -+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key -+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len -+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt -+ -+/* -+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: -+ * 1) asymmetric operations -+ * 2) random operations -+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations -+ * -+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware -+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware -+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support -+ * only a single group of operations. -+ * -+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have -+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from -+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. -+ * -+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are -+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. -+ */ -+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM -+ { -+ OP_RAND, -+ OP_RSA, -+ OP_DSA, -+ OP_DH, -+ OP_CIPHER, -+ OP_DIGEST, -+ OP_MAX -+ } PK11_OPTYPE; -+ -+/* -+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches -+ * and locks associated with the lists. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *head; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; -+#endif -+ } PK11_CACHE; -+ -+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ -+typedef struct PK11_active_st -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; -+ unsigned int refcnt; -+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; -+ struct PK11_active_st *next; -+ } PK11_active; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; -+#endif -+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; -+/* -+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See -+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. -+ */ -+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#else -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#endif -+ -+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; -+ -+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DSA stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); -+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, -+ DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, -+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DH stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); -+#endif -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", -+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ -+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ -+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ -+ }; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", -+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ -+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL /* app_data */ -+ }; -+ -+DSA_METHOD * -+PK11_DSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* -+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for -+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but -+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by -+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be -+ * enough. -+ */ -+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 -+ -+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DH method", -+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ -+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ NULL /* generate_params */ -+ }; -+ -+DH_METHOD * -+PK11_DH(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dh); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ -+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 -+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* -+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to -+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not -+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. -+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors -+ * should be catched in the padding functions -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* make data into a big number */ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. -+ */ -+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) -+ if (buf[j] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + j; -+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); -+ if (buf == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's here -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) -+ if (buf[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + i; -+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and -+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_encrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and -+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, -+ rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ retval = ul_sig_len; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and -+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit -+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, -+ p_mech, h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, -+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need -+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum -+ * structures. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#endif -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, -+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* The DSA function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+static DSA_SIG * -+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int i; -+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ -+ /* -+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, -+ * each is 20 bytes long -+ */ -+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ -+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || -+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ dsa_sig->r = r; -+ dsa_sig->s = s; -+ -+ret: -+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) -+ { -+ if (r != NULL) -+ BN_free(r); -+ if (s != NULL) -+ BN_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (dsa_sig); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, -+ DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int retval = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ -+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could -+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need -+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. -+ */ -+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - -+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ retval = 1; -+ret: -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. -+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure -+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* The DH function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Generate DH key-pair. -+ * -+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key -+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key -+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard -+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem -+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. -+ */ -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ CK_RV rv, rv1; -+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; -+ -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that -+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of -+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. -+ */ -+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting -+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are -+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. -+ */ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ pub_key_template, -+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_pub_key, -+ &h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory -+ * should be sufficient for reuse. -+ */ -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || -+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) -+ { -+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); -+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, -+ DH *dh) -+ { -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG seclen; -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = -1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; -+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); -+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); -+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); -+ -+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); -+ -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = -+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, -+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ h_key, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); -+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same -+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key -+ */ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip -+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, -+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The -+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was -+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading -+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the -+ * pre-master secret. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) -+ { -+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); -+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (mechanism.pParameter) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); -+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, -+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; -+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ -+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); -+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dh; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) -+ { -+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); -+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ * -+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh -+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key -+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached -+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ if (optype == OP_RSA) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11so_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; -+ -+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); -+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; -+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; -+ } -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ -+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ -+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by -+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These -+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them -+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend -+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also -+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or -+ * dynamically). -+ * -+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention -+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki -+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte -+ * aligned. -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following -+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+ * -+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using -+ * the following preprocessor directive before including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(1) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might -+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. -+ * -+ * -+ * Now for the macros: -+ * -+ * -+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an -+ * object. It can be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR far * -+ * -+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * -+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in -+ * a Cryptoki library: -+ * -+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ) -+ * { -+ * ... -+ * } -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion: -+ * -+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ); -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro -+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or -+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a -+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function -+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. -+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); -+ * -+ * or -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a -+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning -+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type -+ * // funcPtrType. -+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); -+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access -+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might -+ * be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of -+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. -+ * It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); -+ * -+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback -+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also -+ * be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); -+ * myCallbackType myCallback; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 -+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. -+ * -+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), -+ * this should best be defined by -+ * -+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR -+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 -+ * #endif -+ */ -+ -+ -+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the -+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ -+#include "pkcs11t.h" -+ -+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for -+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is -+ * a pointer to that kind of function. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST -+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version -+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in -+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in -+ * pkcs11t.h. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; -+ -+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { -+ -+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ -+ -+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+}; -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+#undef __PASTE -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ -+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ -+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ -+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ -+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ -+/* should not be altered. */ -+ -+/* General-purpose */ -+ -+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets -+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR -+ * and dereferenced */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the -+ * Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to -+ * function list */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Slot and token management */ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in -+ * the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ -+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token -+ * in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types -+ * supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular -+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Session management */ -+ -+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ -+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation -+ * in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic -+ * operation in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Object management */ -+ -+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the -+ * copy. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object -+ * attributes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object -+ * attributes */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object -+ * handles. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session -+ * objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Encryption and decryption */ -+ -+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Message digesting */ -+ -+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting -+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of -+ * the data already digested. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Signing and MACing */ -+ -+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) -+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to -+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the -+ *signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single -+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the -+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * returning the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where -+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the -+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ -+ -+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the -+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, -+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, checking the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ -+ -+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting -+ * and encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and -+ * encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * verify operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Key management */ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, -+ * creating new key objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session -+ * handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen -+ * mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for pub. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for priv. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. -+ * key -+ * handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets -+ * priv. key -+ * handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new -+ * key object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Random number generation */ -+ -+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's -+ * random number generator. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Parallel function management */ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an -+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an -+ * application. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function -+ * running in parallel. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ -+ -+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, -+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ -+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that -+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that -+ * must be set before including this file. */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ -+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 -+ -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 -+ -+#define CK_TRUE 1 -+#define CK_FALSE 0 -+ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE CK_FALSE -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE CK_TRUE -+#endif -+#endif -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ -+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; -+ -+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; -+ -+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; -+ -+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ -+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; -+ -+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ -+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef long int CK_LONG; -+ -+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; -+ -+ -+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ -+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) -+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; -+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; -+ -+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ -+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ -+/* handle or object handle */ -+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_VERSION { -+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ -+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ -+} CK_VERSION; -+ -+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_INFO { -+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ -+ -+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ -+} CK_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that -+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; -+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 -+ -+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ -+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { -+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+} CK_SLOT_INFO; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ -+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ -+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ -+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { -+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, -+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been -+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ -+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # -+ * generator */ -+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is -+ * write- -+ * protected */ -+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must -+ * login */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's -+ * PIN is set */ -+ -+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, -+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic -+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys -+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ -+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means -+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that -+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ -+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 -+ -+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is -+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login -+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ -+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 -+ -+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, -+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform -+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and -+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt -+ * and sign) */ -+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an -+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. -+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause -+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 -+ -+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is -+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for -+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and -+ onwards. */ -+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once -+ * since the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not -+ * possible. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since -+ * the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO -+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. -+ */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 -+ -+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that -+ * identifies a session */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; -+/* Security Officer */ -+#define CKU_SO 0 -+/* Normal user */ -+#define CKU_USER 1 -+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ -+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 -+ -+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ -+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; -+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 -+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 -+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 -+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 -+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ -+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; -+ CK_STATE state; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ -+} CK_SESSION_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined in the following table: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ -+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an -+ * object */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or -+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined -+ * as follows: */ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; -+ -+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ -+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ -+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 -+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 -+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 -+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 -+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 -+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 -+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 -+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 -+ -+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 -+ -+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a -+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object -+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ -+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 -+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 -+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 -+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following key types are defined: */ -+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 -+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 -+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ -+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 -+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 -+ -+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 -+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 -+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 -+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 -+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 -+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 -+ -+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 -+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 -+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 -+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A -+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B -+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C -+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D -+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E -+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 -+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 -+ -+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 -+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 -+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 -+ -+ -+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate -+ * type */ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ -+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 -+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 -+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 -+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute -+ * type */ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which -+ consists of an array of values. */ -+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 -+ -+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ -+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 -+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 -+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 -+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 -+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 -+ -+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 -+ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 -+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 -+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 -+ -+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new -+ * for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 -+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 -+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 -+ -+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 -+ -+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... -+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 -+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 -+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B -+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 -+ -+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 -+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 -+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 -+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 -+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 -+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 -+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 -+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 -+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 -+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 -+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A -+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B -+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C -+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 -+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 -+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 -+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 -+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 -+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 -+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 -+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 -+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 -+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 -+ -+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 -+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS -+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ -+ -+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 -+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 -+ -+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, -+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, -+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 -+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 -+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 -+ -+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 -+ -+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 -+ -+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ -+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+ -+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 -+ -+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, -+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ -+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 -+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 -+ -+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... -+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 -+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) -+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) -+ -+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ -+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 -+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 -+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 -+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D -+ -+ -+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET -+ * are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 -+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 -+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 -+ -+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 -+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 -+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 -+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 -+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 -+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 -+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 -+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 -+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 -+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 -+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 -+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 -+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 -+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 -+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) -+ -+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length -+ * and value of an attribute */ -+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ -+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; -+ -+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ -+typedef struct CK_DATE{ -+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ -+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ -+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ -+} CK_DATE; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism -+ * type */ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 -+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 -+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS -+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ -+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 -+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 -+ -+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 -+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 -+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 -+ -+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for -+ * v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 -+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 -+ -+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 -+ -+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 -+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 -+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 -+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 -+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 -+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 -+ -+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 -+ -+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 -+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 -+ -+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, -+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 -+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 -+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 -+ -+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 -+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 -+ -+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 -+ -+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, -+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, -+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 -+ -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 -+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 -+ -+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 -+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 -+ -+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 -+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 -+ -+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 -+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 -+ -+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ -+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ -+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 -+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 -+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 -+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 -+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 -+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 -+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 -+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 -+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 -+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 -+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 -+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 -+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 -+ -+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 -+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 -+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 -+ -+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 -+ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 -+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 -+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 -+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 -+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 -+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 -+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 -+ -+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 -+ -+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB -+ -+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 -+ -+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 -+ -+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 -+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 -+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 -+ -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 -+ -+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 -+ -+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 -+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 -+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 -+ -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 -+ -+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 -+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 -+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 -+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 -+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 -+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 -+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ -+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+ -+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 -+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE -+ * are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 -+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 -+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 -+ -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 -+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 -+ -+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, -+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are -+ * new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 -+ -+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 -+ -+ -+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 -+ -+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; -+ -+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_MECHANISM; -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { -+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ -+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ -+ -+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, -+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, -+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, -+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not -+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ -+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 -+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 -+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 -+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 -+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 -+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 -+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 -+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, -+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They -+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism -+ * information. */ -+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 -+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 -+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 -+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 -+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 -+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 -+ -+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a -+ * Cryptoki function */ -+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; -+ -+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 -+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 -+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 -+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, -+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 -+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 -+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 -+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A -+ -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 -+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 -+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 -+ -+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 -+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, -+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, -+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 -+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 -+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 -+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 -+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 -+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A -+ -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 -+ -+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID -+ * were removed for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 -+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 -+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 -+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 -+ -+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 -+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 -+ -+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 -+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 -+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 -+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 -+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 -+ -+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and -+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 -+ -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 -+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 -+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 -+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 -+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES -+ * are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 -+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 -+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.11 */ -+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 -+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 -+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 -+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 -+ -+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 -+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 -+ -+/* This is new to v2.20 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 -+ -+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec -+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the -+ * Cryptoki functions */ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a -+ * mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to -+ * C_Initialize */ -+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { -+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; -+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; -+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; -+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; -+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 -+ -+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ -+ -+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ -+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message -+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when -+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption -+ * scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following MGFs are defined */ -+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 -+ * are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source -+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block -+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ -+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_ULONG sLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ -+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, -+ * where each party contributes one key pair. -+ */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined -+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party -+ * contributes one key pair */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation -+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BBOOL isSender; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just -+ * holds the effective keysize */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { -+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ -+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ -+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block -+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of -+ * the MAC */ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; -+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ -+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; -+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG ulLen; -+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the -+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit -+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the -+ * derived key */ -+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to -+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate -+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 -+ -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the -+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 -+ * PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the -+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; -+ CK_ULONG iterations; -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; -+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; -+} CK_OTP_PARAM; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 -+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 -+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 -+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 -+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 -+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/util/libeay.num -diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.15 ---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:04 2016 -+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 -@@ -4316,3 +4316,5 @@ - BIO_s_datagram_sctp 4680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP - BIO_dgram_is_sctp 4681 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP - BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb 4682 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP -+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE -+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE -Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.14 ---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 -+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 -@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ - no-ecdh - No ECDH - no-engine - No engine - no-hw - No hw -+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor -+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor - nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm - nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare - nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare -@@ -278,6 +280,8 @@ - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m; -@@ -347,6 +351,9 @@ - $dir=$val; - } - -+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") -+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} -+ - if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") - { $cflags .= " $val";} - -@@ -1136,6 +1143,8 @@ - "no-gost" => \$no_gost, - "no-engine" => \$no_engine, - "no-hw" => \$no_hw, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, - "no-rsax" => 0, - "just-ssl" => - [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, -Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.12 ---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 -+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 -@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ - # External "algorithms" - "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", - # Engines -- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", -+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", - # RFC3779 - "RFC3779", - # TLS -@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ - my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; - my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; - my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; -+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; - my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; - my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; - my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; -@@ -248,6 +249,8 @@ - elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; } - elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; } - elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } - } - - -@@ -1202,6 +1205,8 @@ - if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } -Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl -diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.12 ---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 -+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 -@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ - my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; - $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib - $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; -- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; -+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; - $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; - - *::perlasm_compile_target = sub { diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch deleted file mode 100644 index f3a55fd07e..0000000000 --- a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15818 +0,0 @@ -Index: openssl/Configure -diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.17.2.3 ---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016 -+++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:51:06 2016 -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ - - # see INSTALL for instructions. - --my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; -+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; - - # Options: - # -@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ - # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can - # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". - # -+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. -+# (No default) -+# -+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only -+# (No default) -+# - # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected - # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in - # include/. A value is required. -@@ -402,31 +408,30 @@ - # - # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8 - # --"linux-armv4", "gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", - # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support, - # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below - # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and - # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness. --"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", --"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", -+"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", - #### IA-32 targets... --"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", -+"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", - #### --"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::", -+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::", - "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", --"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"debug-linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", --"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32", --"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -+"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32", -+"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", - #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs - # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see - # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of -@@ -724,6 +729,10 @@ - my $idx_arflags = $idx++; - my $idx_multilib = $idx++; - -+# PKCS#11 engine patch -+my $pk11_libname=""; -+my $pk11_flavor=""; -+ - my $prefix=""; - my $libdir=""; - my $openssldir=""; -@@ -944,7 +953,15 @@ - } - elsif (/^[-+]/) - { -- if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) -+ if (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_libname=$1; -+ } -+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) -+ { -+ $pk11_flavor=$1; -+ } -+ elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) - { - $prefix=$1; - } -@@ -1115,6 +1132,22 @@ - exit 0; - } - -+if (! $pk11_libname) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ -+if (! $pk11_flavor -+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) -+ { -+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; -+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; -+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; -+ exit 1; -+ } -+ - if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { - $target = "Cygwin".$1; - } -@@ -1192,6 +1225,25 @@ - $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; - } - -+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; -+ } -+else -+ { -+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; -+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; -+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; -+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; -+} -+ - my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; - - $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); -@@ -1289,6 +1341,8 @@ - if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } - else { $no_user_cflags=1; } - -+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; -+ - # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through - # the script "config" or manually. - if (!$no_krb5) -@@ -1698,6 +1752,7 @@ - s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; - s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; - s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; -+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; - s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; - s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; -Index: openssl/Makefile.org -diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.10.2.3 ---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016 -+++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:51:08 2016 -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ - INSTALL_PREFIX= - INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl - -+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. -+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= -+ - # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! - OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl - -Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 -diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:24 2016 -+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ -+ISC modified -+============ -+ -+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. -+ -+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and -+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the -+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second -+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful -+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device -+protected key store and key loading). -+ -+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, -+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example -+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. -+ -+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in -+config/Configure. -+ -+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. -+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared -+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine -+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). -+ -+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l -+========================================= -+ -+[Nov 19, 2009] -+ -+Contents: -+ -+Overview -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+FAQs -+Feedback -+ -+Overview -+======== -+ -+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 -+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against -+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system -+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the -+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. -+ -+Patch can be applied like this: -+ -+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris -+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz -+ # now download the patch to the current directory -+ # ... -+ cd openssl-0.9.8l -+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) -+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 -+ -+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the -+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share -+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. -+ -+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support -+following mechanisms: -+ -+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, -+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, -+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, -+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 -+ -+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP -+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may -+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an -+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety -+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). -+ -+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the -+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the -+config script: -+ -+ $ ./config -+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 -+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc -+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. -+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. -+ -+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run -+configure script like this: -+ -+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so -+ -+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run -+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the -+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary -+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. -+ -+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against -+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and -+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project -+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more -+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the -+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself -+and has functional PKCS#11 library. -+ -+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are -+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. -+ -+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, -+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more -+information). -+ -+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch -+======================================= -+ -+2009-11-19 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l -+ -+- bugs and RFEs: -+ -+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores -+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split -+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2009-03-11 -+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j -+ -+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a -+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. -+ -+- fixed bugs: -+ -+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-12-02 -+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) -+ -+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine -+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true -+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean -+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take -+ it seriously -+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean -+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 -+ engine code -+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API -+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if -+ meta slot is disabled -+ -+2008-08-01 -+- fixed bug -+ -+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers -+ and digests -+ -+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic -+ -+2008-07-29 -+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version -+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: -+ -+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users -+ -+- fixed bugs in the engine code: -+ -+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for -+ asymmetric key operations -+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called -+ atomically -+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys -+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners -+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in -+ suboptimal way -+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more -+ resilient to destroy failures -+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() -+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys -+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine -+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size -+ of big numbers leading to failures -+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of -+ -1 -+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references -+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not -+ checked -+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to -+ structure reuse -+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of -+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} -+ defines but fails miserably -+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss -+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing -+ generate_params parameter -+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes -+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the -+ PKCS#11 engine -+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() -+ -+- new features and enhancements: -+ -+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 -+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes -+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric -+ ciphers and digests -+ -+2007-10-15 -+- update for 0.9.8f version -+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+ -+2007-10-02 -+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" -+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" -+ -+2007-09-26 -+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes -+ significant performance drop -+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine -+ -+2007-05-25 -+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers -+ -+2007-05-19 -+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code -+ -+FAQs -+==== -+ -+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: -+ -+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': -+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring -+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by -+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the -+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: -+ -+Configured for linux-elf. -+ -+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), -+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. -+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With -+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after -+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: -+ -+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... -+ -+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for -+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. -+ -+Answer: -+ -+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 -+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. -+ -+ -+Feedback -+======== -+ -+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was -+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. -+ -+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. -+ -Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.8.2.3 ---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:06 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:51:23 2016 -@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ - - #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS -+# define OPENSSL_THREADS -+#endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE - #endif -@@ -106,6 +109,8 @@ - # endif - #endif - -+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ -+ - /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ - - /* Generate 80386 code? */ -@@ -152,7 +157,7 @@ - * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word - * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. - */ --#undef RC4_CHUNK -+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long - #endif - #endif - -@@ -160,7 +165,7 @@ - /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a - * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ - #ifndef DES_LONG --#define DES_LONG unsigned long -+#define DES_LONG unsigned int - #endif - #endif - -@@ -171,9 +176,9 @@ - /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ - - /* Only one for the following should be defined */ --#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG -+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG - #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT --#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT -+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT - #endif - - #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) -@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ - - #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) - #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H --#undef BF_PTR -+#define BF_PTR2 - #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ - - #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) -@@ -215,7 +220,7 @@ - /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. - * Very mucy CPU dependant */ - #ifndef DES_UNROLL --#undef DES_UNROLL -+#define DES_UNROLL - #endif - - /* These default values were supplied by -Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.10.2 ---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 18:55:13 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 19:28:46 2015 -@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ - if (file == NULL) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); -- if (errno == ENOENT) -+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES))) - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); - else - BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.9.6.2 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 18:55:22 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 19:28:56 2015 -@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ - tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ - tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ - eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ -- eng_rdrand.c -+ eng_rdrand.c \ -+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c - LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ - eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ - tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ - tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ - eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ -- eng_rdrand.o -+ eng_rdrand.o \ -+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o - - SRC= $(LIBSRC) - -@@ -282,6 +284,83 @@ - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h - eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h - eng_table.o: eng_table.c -+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c -+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h -+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h -+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h -+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h -+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h - tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ -+/* -+ * CDDL HEADER START -+ * -+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the -+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only -+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance -+ * with the License. -+ * -+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE -+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions -+ * and limitations under the License. -+ * -+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each -+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. -+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the -+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying -+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] -+ * -+ * CDDL HEADER END -+ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H -+#define _CRYPTOKI_H -+ -+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_PTR -+#define CK_PTR * -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION -+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#include /* For NULL */ -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint -+ */ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE 1 -+#endif /* TRUE */ -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE 0 -+#endif /* FALSE */ -+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+ -+/* Solaris specific functions */ -+ -+#include -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all -+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of -+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); -+ -+/* -+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given -+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. -+ */ -+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); -+ -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.6.6.2 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:32 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:51:59 2016 -@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@ - # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) - ENGINE_load_capi(); - # endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); -+#endif -+#endif - #endif - ENGINE_register_all_complete(); - } -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h -diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.6.6.1 ---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1 Wed Mar 4 14:43:55 2015 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Mar 4 15:22:32 2015 -@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ - void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void); - void ENGINE_load_padlock(void); - void ENGINE_load_capi(void); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA -+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO -+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); -+#endif - # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP - void ENGINE_load_gmp(void); - # endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+/* -+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel -+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. -+ */ -+static int *hw_cnids; -+static int *hw_dnids; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+#endif -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -+#else -+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); -+#endif -+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len); -+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, -+ size_t count); -+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids); -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, -+ int *local_digest_nids); -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, -+ int id); -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -+enum pk11_cipher_id { -+ PK11_DES_CBC, -+ PK11_DES3_CBC, -+ PK11_DES_ECB, -+ PK11_DES3_ECB, -+ PK11_RC4, -+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, -+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, -+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, -+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, -+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, -+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX -+}; -+ -+/* Index for the supported digests */ -+enum pk11_digest_id { -+ PK11_MD5, -+ PK11_SHA1, -+ PK11_SHA224, -+ PK11_SHA256, -+ PK11_SHA384, -+ PK11_SHA512, -+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX -+}; -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+static int cipher_count = 0; -+static int digest_count = 0; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; -+ int nid; -+ int iv_len; -+ int min_key_len; -+ int max_key_len; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_CIPHER; -+ -+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = -+ { -+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, -+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, -+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, -+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, -+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, -+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, -+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, -+ }; -+ -+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st -+ { -+ enum pk11_digest_id id; -+ int nid; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ } PK11_DIGEST; -+ -+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = -+ { -+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, -+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, -+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, -+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, -+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, -+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, -+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in -+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 -+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; -+ -+ -+/* -+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets -+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. -+ * -+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. -+ */ -+ -+/* DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_cbc, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ecb, -+ 8, 8, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, -+ 8, 24, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_cbc, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_cbc, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_cbc, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and -+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. -+ */ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ecb, -+ 16, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ecb, -+ 16, 24, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ecb, -+ 16, 32, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_128_ctr, -+ 16, 16, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_192_ctr, -+ 16, 24, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = -+ { -+ NID_aes_256_ctr, -+ 16, 32, 16, -+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = -+ { -+ NID_bf_cbc, -+ 8, 16, 8, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, -+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = -+ { -+ NID_rc4, -+ 1, 16, 0, -+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, -+ pk11_cipher_init, -+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, -+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ NULL, -+ NULL, -+ NULL -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = -+ { -+ NID_md5, -+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, -+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ 0, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ MD5_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = -+ { -+ NID_sha1, -+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = -+ { -+ NID_sha224, -+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = -+ { -+ NID_sha256, -+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA256_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = -+ { -+ NID_sha384, -+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = -+ { -+ NID_sha512, -+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, -+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, -+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, -+ pk11_digest_init, -+ pk11_digest_update, -+ pk11_digest_final, -+ pk11_digest_copy, -+ pk11_digest_cleanup, -+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, -+ SHA512_CBLOCK, -+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = -+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); -+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; -+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || -+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) -+ return (0); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+/* -+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup -+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp -+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. -+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. -+ */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; -+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) -+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since -+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function -+ */ -+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ -+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) -+ != CKR_OK) { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " -+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ digest_count = 0; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+#endif -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) -+ goto err; -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ myslot = SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ case OP_RSA: -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ case OP_DSA: -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ case OP_DH: -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ break; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); -+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. -+ * -+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure -+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ -+ -+static int -+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) -+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) -+ return (ciphers[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (cipher_count > 0) -+ *nids = cipher_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (cipher_count); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) -+ { -+ if (digest_count > 0) -+ *nids = digest_nids; -+ else -+ *nids = NULL; -+ return (digest_count); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. -+ */ -+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, -+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; -+ -+ /* -+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and -+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before -+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. -+ */ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); -+ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || -+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); -+ /* -+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, -+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 -+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the -+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can -+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via -+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. -+ */ -+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; -+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) -+ { -+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; -+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, -+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; -+ /* -+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the -+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our -+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From -+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a -+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key -+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this -+ * code serves as a sanity check. -+ * -+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be -+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs -+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES -+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || -+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || -+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ -+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ -+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); -+ -+ /* -+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then -+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the -+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && -+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ state->sp = sp; -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object -+ * needs to be created. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( -+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to -+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ -+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a -+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session -+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so -+ * that it needs not be recreated. -+ * -+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this -+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return -+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good -+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix -+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient -+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. -+ */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) -+#else -+static int -+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, -+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) -+#endif -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long outl = inl; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; -+ -+ if (!inl) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ -+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always -+ * the same size of input. -+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with -+ * correctly aligned buffers. -+ */ -+ if (inl != outl) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() -+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's -+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but -+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't -+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with -+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, -+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used -+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; -+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get -+ * rid of the context. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->encrypt) -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ else -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( -+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with -+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the -+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!cipher) -+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_des_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; -+ break; -+ case NID_bf_cbc: -+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; -+ break; -+ case NID_rc4: -+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_128_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_192_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; -+ break; -+ case NID_aes_256_ctr: -+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *cipher = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*cipher != NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int -+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, -+ const int **nids, int nid) -+ { -+ if (!digest) -+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); -+ -+ switch (nid) -+ { -+ case NID_md5: -+ *digest = &pk11_md5; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha1: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha224: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha256: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha384: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; -+ break; -+ case NID_sha512: -+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; -+ break; -+ default: -+ *digest = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ return (*digest != NULL); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; -+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions -+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: -+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. -+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. -+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with -+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES -+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and -+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session -+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key -+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to -+ * terminate the active operation. -+ */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); -+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || -+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); -+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) -+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); -+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; -+ } -+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Save the key information used in this session. -+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; -+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); -+ } -+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); -+err: -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+static int -+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) -+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) -+ return (digests[i].id); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech; -+ int index; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); -+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) -+ return (0); -+ -+ pdp = &digests[index]; -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ -+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; -+ mech.pParameter = NULL; -+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ state->sp = sp; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ -+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ -+ if (count == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, -+ count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ unsigned long len; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; -+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; -+ -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session -+ * to the pool -+ */ -+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); -+ state->sp = NULL; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; -+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; -+ -+ /* The copy-from state */ -+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; -+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) -+ goto err; -+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; -+ -+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (ul_state_len == 0) -+ { -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); -+ if (pstate == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, -+ &ul_state_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, -+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, -+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ if (pstate != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -+static int -+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+ { -+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; -+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ -+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not -+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory -+ * that might have been allocated in the token when -+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() -+ * will return the session to the cache. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key -+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key -+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for -+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first -+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same -+ * prefix. -+ */ -+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, -+ int key_len) -+ { -+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || -+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) -+ { -+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; -+ } -+ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * The secret key object is created in the -+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+err: -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * CKM_DSA -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_DES3_CBC -+ * CKM_DES_CBC -+ * CKM_AES_CBC -+ * CKM_DES3_ECB -+ * CKM_DES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_ECB -+ * CKM_AES_CTR -+ * CKM_RC4 -+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC -+ * -+ * Digests optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_MD5 -+ * CKM_SHA_1 -+ * CKM_SHA224 -+ * CKM_SHA256 -+ * CKM_SHA384 -+ * CKM_SHA512 -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int slot_n_digest = 0; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ -+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, -+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) -+ { -+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and -+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, -+ &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) -+ { -+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and -+ * derivation. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, -+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) -+ { -+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && -+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; -+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; -+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; -+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; -+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); -+ -+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, -+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_cipher); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ current_slot_n_digest); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than -+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, -+ * otherwise leave it where it is. -+ */ -+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > -+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", -+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; -+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; -+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; -+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, -+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); -+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, -+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); -+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, -+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && -+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = -+ ciphers[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, -+ int id) -+ { -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) -+ { -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = -+ digests[id].nid; -+ } -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); -+ } -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, -+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, -+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) -+ { -+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, -+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -+/* -+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library -+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation -+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code -+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the -+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some -+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a -+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, -+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the -+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte -+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products -+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression -+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the -+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. -+ * -+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for -+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same -+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 -+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without -+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use -+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since -+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said -+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with -+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code -+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for -+ * asymmetric operations. -+ * -+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what -+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can -+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be -+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, -+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. -+ * -+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find -+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric -+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table -+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays -+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the -+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token -+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more -+ * information. -+ * -+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined -+ * the code won't be used. -+ */ -+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#else -+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, -+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware -+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. -+ */ -+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ void *handle; -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; -+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); -+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ /* this means empty tables */ -+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also -+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the -+ * search. -+ */ -+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; -+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; -+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef -+ * is zero now. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) -+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are -+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. -+ */ -+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); -+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], -+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by -+ * dlclose(3C). -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ (void) dlclose(handle); -+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; -+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); -+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., -+ * non-existent). -+ */ -+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) -+ { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new -+ * table. -+ */ -+ if (nid_table == NULL) -+ return (1); -+ -+ /* -+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one -+ * NID_undef. -+ */ -+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) -+ { -+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= -+{ -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, -+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+ -+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= -+{ -+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, -+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, -+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, -+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, -+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, -+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, -+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, -+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, -+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, -+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, -+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, -+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, -+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, -+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, -+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, -+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, -+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, -+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, -+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, -+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, -+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, -+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, -+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, -+{ 0, NULL} -+}; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ -+ -+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; -+static int pk11_error_init = 1; -+ -+static void -+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ -+ if (pk11_error_init) -+ { -+ pk11_error_init = 0; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) -+ { -+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); -+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -+#endif -+ pk11_error_init = 1; -+ } -+} -+ -+void -+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) -+{ -+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) -+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); -+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); -+} -+ -+void -+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) -+{ -+ char tmp_buf[20]; -+ -+ PK11err(function, reason); -+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); -+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); -+} -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H -+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H -+ -+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); -+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); -+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) -+ -+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ -+ -+/* Function codes. */ -+ -+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 -+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 -+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 -+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 -+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 -+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 -+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 -+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 -+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 -+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 -+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 -+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 -+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 -+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 -+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 -+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 -+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 -+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 -+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 -+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 -+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 -+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 -+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 -+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 -+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 -+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 -+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 -+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 -+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 -+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 -+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 -+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 -+ -+/* Reason codes. */ -+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 -+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 -+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 -+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 -+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 -+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 -+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 -+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 -+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 -+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 -+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 -+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 -+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 -+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 -+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 -+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 -+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 -+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 -+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 -+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 -+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 -+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 -+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 -+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 -+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 -+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 -+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 -+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 -+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 -+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 -+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 -+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 -+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 -+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 -+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 -+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 -+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 -+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 -+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 -+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 -+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 -+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 -+ -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 -+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 -+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 -+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 -+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 -+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 -+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 -+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 -+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 -+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 -+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 -+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 -+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 -+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 -+ -+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ -+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 -+ -+#ifdef NOPTHREADS -+/* -+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the -+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global -+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. -+ * -+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as -+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but -+ * it's safe. -+ */ -+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 -+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the -+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation -+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. -+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object -+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. -+ * -+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list -+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request -+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION -+ { -+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ -+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ -+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ -+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ -+ union -+ { -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ -+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ -+ } u_RSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ -+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ -+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ -+ } u_DSA; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ -+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ -+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ -+ } u_DH; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ struct -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ -+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; -+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ -+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ -+ } u_cipher; -+ } opdata_u; -+ } PK11_SESSION; -+ -+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub -+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv -+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num -+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num -+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num -+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key -+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub -+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num -+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv -+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num -+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key -+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh -+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num -+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key -+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key -+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len -+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt -+ -+/* -+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: -+ * 1) asymmetric operations -+ * 2) random operations -+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations -+ * -+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware -+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware -+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support -+ * only a single group of operations. -+ * -+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have -+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from -+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. -+ * -+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are -+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. -+ */ -+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM -+ { -+ OP_RAND, -+ OP_RSA, -+ OP_DSA, -+ OP_DH, -+ OP_CIPHER, -+ OP_DIGEST, -+ OP_MAX -+ } PK11_OPTYPE; -+ -+/* -+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches -+ * and locks associated with the lists. -+ */ -+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *head; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; -+#endif -+ } PK11_CACHE; -+ -+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ -+typedef struct PK11_active_st -+ { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; -+ unsigned int refcnt; -+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; -+ struct PK11_active_st *next; -+ } PK11_active; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; -+#endif -+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; -+/* -+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See -+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. -+ */ -+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) -+#else -+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) -+#endif -+ -+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+ -+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; -+ -+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#include -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DSA stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); -+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, -+ DSA *dsa); -+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, -+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -+#endif -+ -+/* DH stuff */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); -+#endif -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", -+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ -+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ -+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ -+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ -+ }; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", -+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ -+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ -+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL /* app_data */ -+ }; -+ -+DSA_METHOD * -+PK11_DSA(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dsa); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* -+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for -+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but -+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by -+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be -+ * enough. -+ */ -+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 -+ -+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = -+ { -+ "PKCS#11 DH method", -+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ -+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ -+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ -+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ -+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ -+ 0, /* flags */ -+ NULL, /* app_data */ -+ NULL /* generate_params */ -+ }; -+ -+DH_METHOD * -+PK11_DH(void) -+ { -+ return (&pk11_dh); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ -+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 -+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+/* -+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to -+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not -+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. -+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors -+ * should be catched in the padding functions -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); -+ break; -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (i <= 0) goto err; -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -+err: -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ -+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* make data into a big number */ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. -+ */ -+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) -+ if (buf[j] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + j; -+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA -+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -+ { -+ BIGNUM f; -+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; -+ unsigned char *p; -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ -+ BN_init(&f); -+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); -+ if (buf == NULL) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things -+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes -+ */ -+ if (flen > num) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) -+ { -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, -+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ -+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); -+ -+ /* -+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. -+ * Needs to skip these 0's here -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) -+ if (buf[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ -+ p = buf + i; -+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ -+ -+ switch (padding) -+ { -+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: -+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); -+ break; -+ default: -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (r < 0) -+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); -+ -+err: -+ BN_clear_free(&f); -+ if (buf != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(buf); -+ } -+ return (r); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and -+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_encrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and -+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, -+ rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ retval = ul_sig_len; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and -+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit -+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. -+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, -+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; -+ int retval = -1; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (-1); -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, -+ p_mech, h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, -+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ retval = bytes_decrypted; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, -+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need -+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum -+ * structures. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); -+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) -+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#else -+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, -+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, -+ const RSA *rsa) -+#endif -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, -+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+/* The DSA function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+static DSA_SIG * -+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int i; -+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ -+ /* -+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, -+ * each is 20 bytes long -+ */ -+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ -+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || -+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ dsa_sig->r = r; -+ dsa_sig->s = s; -+ -+ret: -+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) -+ { -+ if (r != NULL) -+ BN_free(r); -+ if (s != NULL) -+ BN_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (dsa_sig); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, -+ DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int retval = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; -+ -+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; -+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; -+ -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ -+ -+ if (dlen > i) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) -+ goto ret; -+ -+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, -+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, -+ h_pub_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, -+ rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could -+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need -+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. -+ */ -+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); -+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - -+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, -+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); -+ goto ret; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ retval = 1; -+ret: -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); -+ return (retval); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. -+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure -+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, -+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ -+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ -+ }; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA -+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+/* The DH function implementation */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Generate DH key-pair. -+ * -+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key -+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key -+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard -+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem -+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. -+ */ -+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ CK_RV rv, rv1; -+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; -+ -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that -+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of -+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. -+ */ -+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) -+ { -+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + -+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); -+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting -+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are -+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. -+ */ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ pub_key_template, -+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_pub_key, -+ &h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory -+ * should be sufficient for reuse. -+ */ -+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; -+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || -+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, -+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, -+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); -+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = 1; -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) -+ { -+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); -+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, -+ DH *dh) -+ { -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ CK_ULONG seclen; -+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, -+ }; -+ -+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ int ret = -1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ -+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; -+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); -+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); -+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); -+ -+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); -+ -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = -+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, -+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, -+ &mechanism, -+ h_key, -+ priv_key_template, -+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, -+ &h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); -+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, -+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same -+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key -+ */ -+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) -+ { -+ /* -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip -+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, -+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The -+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was -+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading -+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the -+ * pre-master secret. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) -+ { -+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, -+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); -+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ -+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, -+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); -+ } -+ } -+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); -+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (mechanism.pParameter) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); -+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, -+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ int i; -+ -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, -+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; -+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; -+ -+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); -+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); -+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); -+ -+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); -+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) -+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = dh; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) -+ { -+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); -+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ * -+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh -+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. -+ */ -+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key -+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached -+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() -+#define NOPTHREADS -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ -+/* Debug mutexes */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ -+#define DEBUG_MUTEX -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+#define __USE_UNIX98 -+#endif -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA -+#endif -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" -+ -+/* -+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), -+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the -+ * RSA keys by reference feature. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; -+ -+/* -+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when -+ * logging into the token. -+ */ -+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; -+ -+/* -+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for -+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given -+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be -+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already -+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each -+ * PK11_SESSION object. -+ * -+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the -+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also -+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another -+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in -+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. -+ * -+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. -+ * They are also used for active list protection. -+ */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one -+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session -+ * list) for given algorithm type -+ */ -+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; -+ -+/* -+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available -+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed -+ * without losing the secret key objects. -+ */ -+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+/* ENGINE level stuff */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); -+ -+/* RAND stuff */ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -+static int pk11_rand_status(void); -+ -+/* These functions are also used in other files */ -+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+ -+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); -+ -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -+ -+/* Local helper functions */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent); -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); -+ -+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -+ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); -+ -+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ -+ { \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ -+ { \ -+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ -+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ -+ } \ -+ if (uselock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ } -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine -+ */ -+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) -+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) -+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = -+ { -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, -+ "SO_PATH", -+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_PIN, -+ "PIN", -+ "Specifies the pin code", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING -+ }, -+ { -+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, -+ "SLOT", -+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", -+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, -+ }, -+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ -+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = -+ { -+ pk11_rand_seed, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_cleanup, -+ pk11_rand_add, -+ pk11_rand_bytes, -+ pk11_rand_status -+ }; -+ -+ -+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA -+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" -+#endif -+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; -+ -+/* -+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function -+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether -+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. -+ */ -+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; -+ -+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -+char *pk11_pin = NULL; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; -+static int pk11_pid = 0; -+ -+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; -+ -+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; -+ -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX -+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); -+ -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ session_cache[type].lock = -+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); -+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) -+ goto malloc_err; -+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+#else -+ return (1); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int type; -+ -+ if (token_lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); -+ token_lock = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); -+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); -+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); -+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. -+ */ -+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || -+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || -+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_have_random) -+ { -+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) -+ return (0); -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } -+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || -+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || -+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || -+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || -+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ -+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -+#error "dynamic engine not supported" -+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -+ { -+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) -+ return (0); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) -+ -+#else -+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); -+ -+ if (!ret) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) -+ { -+ ENGINE_free(ret); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+void -+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) -+ { -+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to -+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. -+ */ -+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ -+ if (!pk11_dso) -+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); -+ if (!e_pk11) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically -+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 -+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter -+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) -+ { -+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); -+ -+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); -+ ERR_clear_error(); -+ } -+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ -+ -+/* -+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and -+ * the function symbol names to bind to. -+ */ -+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ -+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ } -+ -+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) -+ { -+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); -+ -+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; -+ } -+ -+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ -+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); -+ } -+ -+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them -+ * accessible to all threads. -+ */ -+static void pk11_fork_child(void) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ int i; -+ -+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) -+ return; -+ -+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); -+ } -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) -+{ -+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); -+} -+ -+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = -+ { -+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ -+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ -+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ -+ }; -+ -+/* -+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. -+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also -+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and -+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function -+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; -+ CK_INFO info; -+ int any_slot_found; -+ int i; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which -+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still -+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine -+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is -+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application -+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() -+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can -+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional -+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In -+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly -+ * initialize the engine again. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_library_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ /* -+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case -+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the -+ * engine first. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ -+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, -+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); -+ if (!p) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ -+ rv = p(&pFuncList); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ -+ -+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); -+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); -+#endif -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); -+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); -+#endif -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any -+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an -+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 -+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just -+ * because no slot was present. -+ */ -+ if (any_slot_found == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, -+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; -+ pk11_pid = getpid(); -+ /* -+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() -+ * will do the cleanup. -+ */ -+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) -+ goto err; -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; -+ /* -+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists -+ * for asymmetric ciphers. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ active_list[i] = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) -+ { -+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, -+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); -+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 -+ * library. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) -+ { -+ int i; -+ -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); -+ -+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* free all active lists */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) -+ pk11_free_active_list(i); -+ -+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); -+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function -+ * may have side-effects. -+ */ -+#if 0 -+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -+#endif -+ -+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ pk11_dso = NULL; -+ pFuncList = NULL; -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ pk11_pid = 0; -+ /* -+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than -+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason -+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out -+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes -+ * the engine before calling fork(). -+ */ -+ pk11_free_all_locks(); -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err: -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) -+ { -+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); -+ -+ switch (cmd) -+ { -+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if (initialized) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); -+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: -+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) -+ { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ /* -+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since -+ * the calling functions do not care anyway -+ */ -+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -+ { -+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); -+ } -+ -+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -+static int pk11_rand_status(void) -+ { -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have -+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here -+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. -+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. -+ */ -+PK11_SESSION * -+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; -+#endif -+ static pid_t pid = 0; -+ pid_t new_pid; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in -+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session -+ * here, with no PID information. -+ */ -+ if (pid == 0) -+ pid = getpid(); -+ -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp = freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled -+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first -+ * structure from the freelist. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL) -+ { -+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); -+ -+ /* -+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the -+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so -+ * mark them as unused. -+ */ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all -+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. -+ */ -+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) -+ { -+ pid = new_pid; -+ -+ /* -+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited -+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which -+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the -+ * head of the list). -+ */ -+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ freelist = sp1->next; -+ /* -+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 -+ * sessions and destroy all objects. -+ */ -+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); -+ } -+ -+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ -+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); -+ -+ /* Initialize the process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); -+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this -+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one -+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. -+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more -+ * information. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, -+ rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs -+ * re-initialization. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let -+ * the caller cope with the situation. -+ */ -+ freelist = sp; -+ sp = NULL; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (sp->pid == 0) -+ { -+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ -+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ sp = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ -+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; -+ -+err: -+ if (sp != NULL) -+ sp->next = NULL; -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (sp); -+ } -+ -+ -+void -+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; -+ -+ /* -+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and -+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the -+ * next time we will ask for a new session. -+ */ -+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) -+ return; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ sp->next = freelist; -+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ -+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ int type; -+ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will -+ * return 0 on exit. -+ */ -+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) -+ { -+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many -+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we -+ * return an error on return. -+ */ -+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; -+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; -+#endif -+ int ret = 1; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ case OP_DSA: -+ case OP_DH: -+ case OP_RAND: -+ case OP_DIGEST: -+ case OP_CIPHER: -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; -+#endif -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; -+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) -+ { -+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, -+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); -+ ret = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ freelist = sp->next; -+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); -+ OPENSSL_free(sp); -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+ -+static int -+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; -+ -+ switch (optype) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ case OP_RAND: -+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We are probably a child process so force the -+ * reinitialize of the session -+ */ -+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; -+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) -+ return (0); -+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, -+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ sp->pid = getpid(); -+ -+ if (optype == OP_RSA) -+ { -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent -+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. -+ */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) -+ { -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, -+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' -+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We -+ * must free those as well. -+ */ -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; -+ } -+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) -+ { -+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all -+ * objects in the free list. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) -+ { -+ int ret = 1; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; -+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; -+ -+ if (session != NULL) -+ local_free_session = session; -+ else -+ { -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; -+ uselock = FALSE; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects -+ */ -+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) -+ { -+ local_free_session = sp->next; -+ -+ /* -+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the -+ * destroy operations fails. -+ */ -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) -+ { -+ ret = 0; -+ continue; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ if (session == NULL) -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); -+#else -+ if (session == NULL) -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int -+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, -+ CK_BBOOL persistent) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ /* -+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects -+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so -+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. -+ */ -+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) -+ return (1); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ -+/* -+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported -+ * -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS -+ * -+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a -+ * public key slot. -+ * -+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which -+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of -+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global -+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key -+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) -+ { -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; -+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; -+ unsigned int i; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; -+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; -+ -+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 0; -+ -+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ -+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ -+ if (pSlotList == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); -+ -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; -+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) -+ { -+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; -+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ continue; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ /* -+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. -+ */ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, -+ &mech_info); -+ -+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) -+ { -+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) -+ { -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; -+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; -+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; -+ /* -+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might -+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature -+ * is used. -+ */ -+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", -+ PK11_DBG); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, -+ best_slot_sofar); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " -+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); -+ } -+#else -+ } /* if */ -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ } /* for */ -+ -+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) -+ { -+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; -+ } -+ -+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); -+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ -+ -+ if (pSlotList != NULL) -+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -+ -+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) -+ *any_slot_found = 1; -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ -+ -+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock -+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock -+#define active_list pk11so_active_list -+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags -+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID -+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error -+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data -+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session -+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session -+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add -+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete -+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove -+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv -+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey -+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey -+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub -+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv -+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects -+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object -+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH -+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin -+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList -+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin -+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013 -@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ */ -+ -+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -+/* -+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for -+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). -+ * -+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by -+ * Afchine Madjlessi. -+ */ -+/* -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -+ * distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without -+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. -+ * -+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. -+ * -+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -+ * acknowledgment: -+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * ==================================================================== -+ * -+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young -+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim -+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). -+ * -+ */ -+ -+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -+#error RSA is disabled -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#define NOPTHREADS -+typedef int pid_t; -+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE -+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); -+#ifndef NULL_PTR -+#define NULL_PTR NULL -+#endif -+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+#else -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+#else -+#include "cryptoki.h" -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+#endif -+#include "hw_pk11so.h" -+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" -+ -+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; -+#endif -+ -+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) -+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) -+#endif -+ -+/* RSA stuff */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -+ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -+ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -+ -+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, -+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); -+ -+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private); -+ -+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -+#else -+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list -+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error -+ * variable and jump to the specified label. -+ */ -+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ -+ { \ -+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ -+ { \ -+ var = TRUE; \ -+ if (unlock) \ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ -+ goto label; \ -+ } \ -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the -+ * entry otherwise return NULL. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) -+ if (entry->h == h) -+ return (entry); -+ -+ return (NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a -+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of -+ * failure. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ /* search for entry in the active list */ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) -+ entry->refcnt++; -+ else -+ { -+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ -+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ entry->h = h; -+ entry->refcnt = 1; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ -+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ -+ { -+ entry->next = active_list[type]; -+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; -+ active_list[type] = entry; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (entry->refcnt); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+void -+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *prev_entry; -+ -+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ -+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) -+ { -+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ active_list[type] = entry->next; -+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ -+ if (entry->next != NULL) -+ entry->next->prev = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* sanitization */ -+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ entry->prev = NULL; -+ entry->next = NULL; -+ OPENSSL_free(entry); -+ } -+ -+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -+void -+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry; -+ -+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ -+ switch (type) -+ { -+ case OP_RSA: -+ break; -+ default: -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, -+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. -+ * -+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, -+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. -+ * -+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list -+ * held. -+ */ -+int -+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) -+ { -+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; -+ -+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); -+ entry->refcnt--; -+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) -+ { -+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; -+ -+RSA_METHOD * -+PK11_RSA(void) -+ { -+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; -+ -+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); -+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; -+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; -+ } -+ return (&pk11_rsa); -+ } -+ -+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -+ -+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; -+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; -+ -+/* -+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from -+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. -+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c -+ */ -+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, -+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ X509_SIG sig; -+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; -+ int i, j = 0; -+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; -+ X509_ALGOR algor; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; -+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ unsigned long ulsiglen; -+ -+ /* Encode the digest */ -+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ -+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; -+ s = (unsigned char *)m; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sig.algor = &algor; -+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, -+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; -+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; -+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; -+ -+ sig.digest = &digest; -+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; -+ sig.digest->length = m_len; -+ -+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); -+ } -+ -+ j = RSA_size(rsa); -+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) -+ { -+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ p = s; -+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); -+ } -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, -+ sp->session); -+ -+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ ulsiglen = j; -+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, -+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); -+ *siglen = ulsiglen; -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ -+err: -+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) -+ { -+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); -+ OPENSSL_free(s); -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (ret); -+ } -+ -+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; -+ -+#define MAXATTR 1024 -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *privkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for private keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we -+ * never ask for private components. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_TRUE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) -+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, -+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", -+ NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm -+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer -+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, -+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect -+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We -+ * do not check the return value because even in case -+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key -+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and -+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the -+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not -+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for -+ * consistency reasons. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; -+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we -+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. -+ */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); -+ -+ /* -+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export -+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ /* -+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as -+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key -+ * in the keystore. -+ */ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(privkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); -+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = -+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ rollback = rollback; -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the -+ * PKCS#11 token. -+ */ -+/* ARGSUSED */ -+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, -+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ FILE *pubkey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ RSA *rsa = NULL; -+ PK11_SESSION *sp; -+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; -+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ -+ -+ /* we look for public keys only */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, -+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, -+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ /* -+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA -+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. -+ */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ -+ }; -+ -+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) -+ return (NULL); -+ -+ /* -+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. -+ */ -+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) -+ { -+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; -+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); -+ -+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, -+ CK_FALSE) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition -+ for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure -+ * if we can't find it. -+ */ -+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, -+ &ks_key) == 0) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA -+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); -+ -+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; -+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ /* -+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. -+ */ -+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, -+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. -+ */ -+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, -+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, -+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); -+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling -+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The -+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA -+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for -+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears -+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if -+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different -+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that -+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore -+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. -+ */ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) -+ { -+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ (void) fclose(pubkey); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * This will always destroy the RSA -+ * object since we have a new RSA -+ * structure here. -+ */ -+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); -+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; -+ -+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = -+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, -+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); -+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ return (pkey); -+err: -+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); -+ if (rsa != NULL) -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ if (pkey != NULL) -+ { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ pkey = NULL; -+ } -+ return (pkey); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, -+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} -+ }; -+ -+ int i; -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); -+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); -+ -+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); -+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( -+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); -+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) -+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); -+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. -+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. -+ */ -+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, -+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ int i; -+ CK_ULONG found; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; -+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; -+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; -+ -+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = -+ { -+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, -+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, -+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, -+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, -+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, -+ }; -+ -+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { -+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ goto set; -+ } -+ -+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; -+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; -+ -+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ -+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || -+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, -+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto malloc_err; -+ } -+ -+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ -+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+ /* -+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' -+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA -+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for -+ * searching for the private key handle. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; -+ /* -+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing -+ * session keys. -+ */ -+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, -+ ul_key_attr_count); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); -+ -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (found == 0) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components -+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the -+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a -+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just -+ * create a new session key using the private -+ * components from the RSA structure. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, -+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, -+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ -+set: -+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) -+ { -+ /* -+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never -+ * extract private components from the keystore. In -+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the -+ * application to properly cope with that. It is -+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by -+ * reference are used we expect it to be used -+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there -+ * is no problem. If the application expects the -+ * private components to be read from the keystore -+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. -+ */ -+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ rollback = TRUE; -+ goto err; -+ } -+ else -+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well -+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache -+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. -+ */ -+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); -+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); -+ -+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ -+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); -+ if (key_ptr != NULL) -+ *key_ptr = rsa; -+ -+err: -+ if (rollback) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() -+ * since we are doing rollback. -+ */ -+ if (found == 0 && -+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) -+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); -+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ } -+ -+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); -+ -+malloc_err: -+ /* -+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. -+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. -+ */ -+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) -+ { -+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) -+ { -+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, -+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); -+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); -+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return (h_key); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the -+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA -+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values -+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. -+ * -+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public -+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we -+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public -+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for -+ * both data signing and verifying. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle -+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. -+ */ -+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) -+ { -+ /* -+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making -+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent -+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure -+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the -+ * public component since with the keys by reference -+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA -+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we -+ * compare the handle as well. -+ */ -+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || -+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || -+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) -+ { -+ /* -+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of -+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer -+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() -+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. -+ */ -+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Local function to simplify key template population -+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error -+ */ -+static int -+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, -+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) -+ { -+ CK_ULONG len = 0; -+ -+ /* -+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is -+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. -+ */ -+ if (bn != NULL) -+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); -+ -+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) -+ return (1); -+ -+ *ul_value_len = len; -+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); -+ if (*p_value == NULL) -+ return (0); -+ -+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+static void -+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) -+ { -+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) -+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the -+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. -+ * Assume object store locked. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 OK -+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found -+ */ -+static int -+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_ULONG objcnt; -+ -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, -+ rv); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); -+ -+ if (objcnt > 1) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, -+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ else if (objcnt == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* from uri stuff */ -+ -+extern char *pk11_pin; -+ -+static int pk11_get_pin(void); -+ -+static int -+pk11_get_pin(void) -+{ -+ char *pin; -+ -+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); -+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of -+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from -+ * multiple threads. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+static int -+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, -+ CK_BBOOL is_private) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+#if 0 -+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* -+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been -+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we -+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access -+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for -+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED -+ * flag is set. -+ */ -+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && -+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread -+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We -+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with -+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the -+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment -+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to -+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call -+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We -+ * lock right before C_Login(). -+ */ -+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || -+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) -+ { -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ { -+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from -+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. -+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in -+ * the engine. -+ * -+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. -+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) -+ { -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, -+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, -+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+ goto err_locked; -+ } -+ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* -+ * If token does not require login we take it as the -+ * login was done. -+ */ -+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; -+ } -+ -+ return (1); -+ -+err_locked: -+ if (pk11_pin) { -+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); -+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); -+ } -+ pk11_pin = NULL; -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+/* -+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the -+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() -+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for -+ * this. -+ * -+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is -+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. -+ * -+ * Returns: -+ * 1 on success -+ * 0 on failure -+ */ -+int -+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) -+ { -+ CK_RV rv; -+ -+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) -+ return (0); -+ -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, -+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) -+ { -+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, -+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+ } -+#ifndef NOPTHREADS -+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); -+#else -+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); -+#endif -+ -+ return (1); -+ } -+ -+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) -+ { -+ static char buf[128]; -+ HANDLE h; -+ DWORD cc, mode; -+ int cnt; -+ -+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); -+ fputs(prompt, stderr); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); -+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); -+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); -+ -+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) -+ { -+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); -+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') -+ break; -+ fputc('*', stdout); -+ fflush(stderr); -+ fflush(stdout); -+ } -+ -+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); -+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; -+ fputs("\n", stderr); -+ return buf; -+ } -+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ -+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ -+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+extern "C" { -+#endif -+ -+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by -+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These -+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them -+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend -+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also -+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or -+ * dynamically). -+ * -+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention -+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki -+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte -+ * aligned. -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following -+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) -+ * -+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using -+ * the following preprocessor directive before including -+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: -+ * -+ * #pragma pack(1) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might -+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. -+ * -+ * -+ * Now for the macros: -+ * -+ * -+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an -+ * object. It can be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce -+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR far * -+ * -+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_PTR * -+ * -+ * -+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in -+ * a Cryptoki library: -+ * -+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ) -+ * { -+ * ... -+ * } -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a -+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the -+ * following fashion: -+ * -+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( -+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved -+ * ); -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a -+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it -+ * might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType name -+ * -+ * -+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro -+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or -+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a -+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function -+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. -+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); -+ * -+ * or -+ * -+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a -+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning -+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type -+ * // funcPtrType. -+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); -+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access -+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might -+ * be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes -+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of -+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. -+ * It should be used in the following fashion: -+ * -+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); -+ * -+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback -+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also -+ * be used like this: -+ * -+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); -+ * myCallbackType myCallback; -+ * -+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 -+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer -+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) -+ * -+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: -+ * -+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ -+ * returnType (* name) -+ * -+ * -+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. -+ * -+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), -+ * this should best be defined by -+ * -+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR -+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 -+ * #endif -+ */ -+ -+ -+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the -+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ -+#include "pkcs11t.h" -+ -+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for -+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is -+ * a pointer to that kind of function. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) -+ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+/* ============================================================== -+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST -+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version -+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in -+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in -+ * pkcs11t.h. -+ * ============================================================== -+ */ -+ -+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ -+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; -+ -+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { -+ -+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ -+ -+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ -+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki -+ * function prototypes. */ -+#include "pkcs11f.h" -+ -+}; -+ -+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -+ -+ -+#undef __PASTE -+ -+#ifdef __cplusplus -+} -+#endif -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 -@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ -+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ -+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ -+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ -+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ -+/* should not be altered. */ -+ -+/* General-purpose */ -+ -+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets -+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR -+ * and dereferenced */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the -+ * Cryptoki library. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to -+ * function list */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Slot and token management */ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in -+ * the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ -+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token -+ * in the system. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types -+ * supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular -+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Session management */ -+ -+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ -+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a -+ * token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation -+ * in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic -+ * operation in a session. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ -+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Object management */ -+ -+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the -+ * copy. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object -+ * attributes. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object -+ * attributes */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session -+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object -+ * handles. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session -+ * objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Encryption and decryption */ -+ -+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Message digesting */ -+ -+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting -+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of -+ * the data already digested. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting -+ * operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Signing and MACing */ -+ -+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) -+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to -+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the -+ *signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single -+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the -+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, -+ * returning the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where -+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the -+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ -+ -+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the -+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, -+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext -+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, -+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification -+ * operation, checking the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part -+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ -+ -+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting -+ * and encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * digesting operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and -+ * encryption operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and -+ * verify operation. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Key management */ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, -+ * creating new key objects. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session -+ * handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen -+ * mech. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for pub. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template -+ * for priv. -+ * key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. -+ * attrs. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. -+ * key -+ * handle */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets -+ * priv. key -+ * handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new -+ * key object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ -+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key -+ * object. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ -+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Random number generation */ -+ -+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's -+ * random number generator. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Parallel function management */ -+ -+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an -+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an -+ * application. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function -+ * running in parallel. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ -+); -+#endif -+ -+ -+ -+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ -+ -+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, -+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ -+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) -+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST -+( -+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ -+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ -+); -+#endif -Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h -diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 ---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016 -+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 -@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ -+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ -+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ -+ -+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is -+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface -+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. -+ -+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that -+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 -+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or -+ * referencing the derived work. -+ -+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the -+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for -+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied -+ * warranty of any kind. -+ */ -+ -+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that -+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that -+ * must be set before including this file. */ -+ -+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ -+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 -+ -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 -+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 -+ -+#define CK_TRUE 1 -+#define CK_FALSE 0 -+ -+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE -+#ifndef FALSE -+#define FALSE CK_FALSE -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef TRUE -+#define TRUE CK_TRUE -+#endif -+#endif -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ -+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; -+ -+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; -+ -+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; -+ -+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; -+ -+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ -+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; -+ -+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ -+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef long int CK_LONG; -+ -+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; -+ -+ -+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ -+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) -+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; -+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; -+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; -+ -+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ -+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ -+/* handle or object handle */ -+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_VERSION { -+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ -+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ -+} CK_VERSION; -+ -+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_INFO { -+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ -+ -+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ -+} CK_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that -+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ -+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; -+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 -+ -+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 -+ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ -+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { -+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+} CK_SLOT_INFO; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ -+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ -+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ -+ -+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ -+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { -+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from -+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, -+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been -+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ -+ -+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ -+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ -+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ -+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # -+ * generator */ -+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is -+ * write- -+ * protected */ -+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must -+ * login */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's -+ * PIN is set */ -+ -+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, -+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic -+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys -+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ -+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means -+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that -+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ -+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 -+ -+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is -+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login -+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ -+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 -+ -+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, -+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform -+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and -+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt -+ * and sign) */ -+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an -+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. -+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause -+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ -+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 -+ -+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is -+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for -+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and -+ onwards. */ -+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once -+ * since the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the -+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not -+ * possible. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 -+ -+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an -+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since -+ * the last successful authentication. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO -+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. -+ */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 -+ -+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, -+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token -+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been -+ * expired by the card. */ -+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 -+ -+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that -+ * identifies a session */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ -+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; -+/* Security Officer */ -+#define CKU_SO 0 -+/* Normal user */ -+#define CKU_USER 1 -+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ -+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 -+ -+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ -+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; -+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 -+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 -+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 -+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 -+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 -+ -+ -+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ -+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { -+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; -+ CK_STATE state; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ -+ -+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ -+} CK_SESSION_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined in the following table: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ -+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ -+ -+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an -+ * object */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or -+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined -+ * as follows: */ -+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; -+ -+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ -+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ -+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 -+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 -+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 -+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 -+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 -+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 -+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 -+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 -+ -+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 -+ -+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a -+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object -+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ -+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 -+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 -+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 -+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ -+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following key types are defined: */ -+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 -+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 -+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ -+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 -+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 -+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 -+ -+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 -+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 -+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 -+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 -+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 -+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 -+ -+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 -+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 -+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ -+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 -+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 -+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A -+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B -+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C -+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D -+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E -+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 -+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 -+ -+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 -+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 -+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 -+ -+ -+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate -+ * type */ -+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG -+ * for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ -+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ -+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 -+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 -+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 -+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute -+ * type */ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; -+ -+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which -+ consists of an array of values. */ -+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 -+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 -+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 -+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 -+ -+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ -+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 -+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 -+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 -+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 -+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 -+ -+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 -+ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 -+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 -+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 -+ -+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new -+ * for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 -+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 -+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 -+ -+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 -+ -+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... -+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 -+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 -+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A -+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B -+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 -+ -+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 -+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 -+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 -+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 -+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 -+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 -+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 -+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 -+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 -+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 -+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A -+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B -+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C -+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 -+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 -+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 -+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 -+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 -+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 -+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 -+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 -+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 -+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 -+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 -+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 -+ -+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 -+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 -+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS -+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ -+ -+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 -+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 -+ -+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, -+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, -+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 -+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 -+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 -+ -+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 -+ -+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 -+ -+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ -+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 -+ -+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 -+ -+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, -+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ -+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 -+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 -+ -+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... -+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 -+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) -+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) -+ -+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ -+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 -+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 -+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 -+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 -+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E -+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F -+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C -+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D -+ -+ -+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET -+ * are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 -+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 -+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 -+ -+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 -+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 -+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 -+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 -+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 -+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 -+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 -+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 -+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 -+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 -+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 -+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 -+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 -+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 -+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) -+ -+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length -+ * and value of an attribute */ -+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ -+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; -+ -+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ -+typedef struct CK_DATE{ -+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ -+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ -+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ -+} CK_DATE; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism -+ * type */ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; -+ -+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 -+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 -+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS -+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ -+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 -+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 -+ -+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A -+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C -+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D -+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 -+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 -+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 -+ -+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for -+ * v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 -+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 -+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 -+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 -+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 -+ -+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 -+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 -+ -+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 -+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 -+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 -+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 -+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 -+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 -+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 -+ -+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 -+ -+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 -+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 -+ -+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, -+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 -+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 -+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 -+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 -+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 -+ -+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 -+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 -+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 -+ -+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 -+ -+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 -+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 -+ -+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 -+ -+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 -+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 -+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 -+ -+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, -+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, -+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 -+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 -+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 -+ -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 -+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 -+ -+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 -+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 -+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 -+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 -+ -+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 -+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 -+ -+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 -+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 -+ -+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 -+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 -+ -+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ -+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ -+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 -+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 -+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 -+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 -+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 -+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 -+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 -+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 -+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 -+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 -+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 -+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 -+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 -+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 -+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 -+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 -+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 -+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 -+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 -+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 -+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 -+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 -+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 -+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 -+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 -+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 -+ -+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and -+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 -+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 -+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 -+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 -+ -+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 -+ -+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 -+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 -+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 -+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 -+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 -+ -+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 -+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 -+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 -+ -+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 -+ -+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA -+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB -+ -+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ -+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 -+ -+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 -+ -+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 -+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 -+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 -+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 -+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 -+ -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 -+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 -+ -+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 -+ -+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 -+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 -+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 -+ -+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 -+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 -+ -+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 -+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 -+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 -+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 -+ -+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 -+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 -+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 -+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 -+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 -+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 -+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 -+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 -+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 -+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, -+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ -+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 -+ -+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 -+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 -+ -+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE -+ * are new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 -+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 -+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 -+ -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 -+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 -+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 -+ -+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, -+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, -+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are -+ * new for v2.11 */ -+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 -+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 -+ -+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 -+ -+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 -+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 -+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 -+ -+ -+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 -+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 -+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 -+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 -+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 -+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 -+ -+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 -+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 -+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 -+ -+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; -+ -+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ -+} CK_MECHANISM; -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { -+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; -+ -+/* The flags are defined as follows: -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ -+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ -+ -+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, -+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, -+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, -+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not -+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ -+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 -+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 -+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 -+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 -+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 -+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 -+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 -+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 -+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 -+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 -+ -+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, -+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They -+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism -+ * information. */ -+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 -+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 -+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 -+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 -+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 -+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 -+ -+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ -+ -+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a -+ * Cryptoki function */ -+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; -+ -+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 -+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 -+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 -+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 -+ -+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 -+ -+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, -+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 -+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 -+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 -+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A -+ -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 -+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 -+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 -+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 -+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 -+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 -+ -+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ -+ -+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 -+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 -+ -+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, -+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, -+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for -+ * v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 -+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 -+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 -+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 -+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 -+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 -+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A -+ -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 -+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 -+ -+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID -+ * were removed for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 -+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 -+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 -+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 -+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 -+ -+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 -+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 -+ -+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 -+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 -+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 -+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 -+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 -+ -+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and -+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 -+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 -+ -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 -+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 -+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 -+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 -+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 -+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 -+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 -+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 -+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 -+ -+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES -+ * are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 -+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 -+ -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 -+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 -+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 -+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.11 */ -+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.0 */ -+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 -+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 -+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 -+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 -+ -+/* These are new to v2.01 */ -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 -+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 -+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 -+ -+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 -+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 -+ -+/* This is new to v2.20 */ -+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 -+ -+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 -+ -+ -+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ -+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec -+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the -+ * Cryptoki functions */ -+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; -+ -+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a -+ * mutex object */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a -+ * mutex */ -+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( -+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ -+); -+ -+ -+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to -+ * C_Initialize */ -+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { -+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; -+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; -+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; -+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; -+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; -+ -+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot -+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning -+ */ -+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 -+ -+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ -+ -+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ -+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message -+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when -+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption -+ * scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following MGFs are defined */ -+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 -+ * are new for v2.20 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 -+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source -+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block -+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ -+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ -+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; -+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; -+ CK_ULONG sLen; -+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; -+ -+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ -+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 -+ -+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, -+ * where each party contributes one key pair. -+ */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ -+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined -+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 -+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party -+ * contributes one key pair */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. -+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation -+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; -+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; -+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BBOOL isSender; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just -+ * holds the effective keysize */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { -+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for -+ * v2.0 */ -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ -+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ -+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC -+ * mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ -+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the -+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ -+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ -+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ -+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ -+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block -+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of -+ * the MAC */ -+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ -+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; -+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; -+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; -+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; -+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the -+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ -+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ -+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ -+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+ -+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; -+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; -+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; -+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ -+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; -+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; -+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; -+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; -+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; -+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; -+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; -+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; -+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ -+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; -+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; -+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG ulLen; -+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; -+ -+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ -+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; -+ -+ -+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the -+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit -+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the -+ * derived key */ -+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to -+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate -+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 -+ -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the -+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 -+ * PBKDF2. */ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; -+ -+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ -+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 -+ -+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. -+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the -+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ -+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; -+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; -+ CK_ULONG iterations; -+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; -+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; -+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; -+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+ -+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; -+} CK_OTP_PARAM; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { -+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; -+ CK_ULONG ulCount; -+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; -+ -+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 -+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 -+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 -+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 -+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 -+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 -+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 -+ -+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ -+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 -+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 -+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 -+ -+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ -+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; -+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; -+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { -+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; -+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ -+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { -+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; -+ CK_ULONG length; -+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; -+ -+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; -+ -+#endif -Index: openssl/util/libeay.num -diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.13.2.3 ---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:32 2016 -+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:52:51 2016 -@@ -4415,4 +4415,5 @@ - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host 4771 EXIST::FUNCTION: - EC_GROUP_get_mont_data 4772 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC - i2d_re_X509_tbs 4773 EXIST::FUNCTION: --EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION: -+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE -+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE -Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.12.2.3 ---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:33 2016 -+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016 -@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ - no-ecdh - No ECDH - no-engine - No engine - no-hw - No hw -+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor -+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor - nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm - nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare - nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare -@@ -287,6 +289,8 @@ - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; -+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; - $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m; -@@ -361,6 +365,9 @@ - $dir=$val; - } - -+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") -+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} -+ - if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") - { $cflags .= " $val";} - -@@ -1219,6 +1226,8 @@ - "no-gost" => \$no_gost, - "no-engine" => \$no_engine, - "no-hw" => \$no_hw, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, -+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, - "no-rsax" => 0, - "just-ssl" => - [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, -Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl -diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.11.2.2 ---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:34 2016 -+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016 -@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ - # External "algorithms" - "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", - # Engines -- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", -+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", - # RFC3779 - "RFC3779", - # TLS -@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ - my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; - my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; - my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; -+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; - my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; - my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; - my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; -@@ -251,6 +252,8 @@ - elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; } - elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; } - elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } -+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } - } - - -@@ -1206,6 +1209,8 @@ - if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } -+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } - if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } -Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl -diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.10.2.3 ---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:35 2016 -+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:53 2016 -@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ - $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag"; - my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; - $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; -- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; -+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; - $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; - - *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {