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3833: Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS)

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Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)
3655: Redefinition of DNS Authenticated Data (AD) bit
3658: Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR)
3833: Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS)
3845: DNS Security (DNSSEC) NextSECure (NSEC) RDATA Format

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doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt → doc/rfc/rfc3833.txt
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@@ -1,38 +1,27 @@
Network Working Group D. Atkins
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt IHTFP Consulting
R. Austein
Request for Comments: 3833 IHTFP Consulting
Category: Informational R. Austein
ISC
April 2004
August 2004
Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System
Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS)
Status of this Memo
Status of this document
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
Copyright Notice
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt>
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Please send comments to
the Namedroppers mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
@@ -46,16 +35,6 @@ Abstract
doing so, attempts to measure to what extent (if any) DNSSEC is a
useful tool in defending against these threats.
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 1]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
1. Introduction
The earliest organized work on DNSSEC within the IETF was an open
@@ -74,6 +53,13 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
authentication of DNS clients and servers as a basis for access
control, this work was also ruled out of scope for DNSSEC per se.
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 1]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
- Backwards compatibility and co-existence with "insecure DNS" was
listed as an explicit requirement.
@@ -98,20 +84,12 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
While it may seem a bit strange to publish the threat analysis a
decade after starting work on the protocol designed to defend against
it, that is nevertheless what this note attempts to do. Better late
than never.
it, that is, nevertheless, what this note attempts to do. Better
late than never.
This note assumes that the reader is familiar with both the DNS and
with DNSSEC, and does not attempt to provide a tutorial on either.
The DNS documents most relevant to the subject of this note are:
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 2]
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[RFC1034], [RFC1035], section 6.1 of [RFC1123], [RFC2181], [RFC2308],
[RFC2671], [RFC2845], [RFC2930], [RFC3007], and [RFC2535].
@@ -127,6 +105,17 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
as zone transfers and dynamic update requests), and perhaps should be
changed in a future revision of this note.
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 2]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
2. Known Threats
There are several distinct classes of threats to the DNS, most of
@@ -150,37 +139,39 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
may just be a means to an end for the attacker: the attacker might
even choose to return the correct result in the answer section of a
reply message while using other parts of the message to set the stage
for something more complicated, for example, a name-based attack (see
below).
for something more complicated, for example, a name chaining attack
(see section 2.3).
While it certainly would be possible to sign DNS messages using a
channel security mechanism such as TSIG or IPsec, or even to encrypt
them using IPsec, this would not be a very good solution. First,
this approach would impose a fairly high processing cost per DNS
message, as well as a very high cost associated with establishing and
maintaining bilateral trust relationships between all the parties
that might be involved in resolving any particular query. For
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 3]
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heavily used name servers (such as the servers for the root zone),
this cost would almost certainly be prohibitively high. Even more
important, however, is that the underlying trust model in such a
design would be wrong, since at best it would only provide a hop-by-
hop integrity check on DNS messages and would not provide any sort of
end-to-end integrity check between the producer of DNS data (the zone
administrator) and the consumer of DNS data (the application that
triggered the query).
them using IPsec, this would not be a very good solution for
interception attacks. First, this approach would impose a fairly
high processing cost per DNS message, as well as a very high cost
associated with establishing and maintaining bilateral trust
relationships between all the parties that might be involved in
resolving any particular query. For heavily used name servers (such
as the servers for the root zone), this cost would almost certainly
be prohibitively high. Even more important, however, is that the
underlying trust model in such a design would be wrong, since at best
it would only provide a hop-by-hop integrity check on DNS messages
and would not provide any sort of end-to-end integrity check between
the producer of DNS data (the zone administrator) and the consumer of
DNS data (the application that triggered the query).
By contrast, DNSSEC (when used properly) does provide an end-to-end
data integrity check, and is thus a much better solution for this
class of problems during basic DNS lookup operations.
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 3]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
TSIG does have its place in corners of the DNS protocol where there's
a specific trust relationship between a particular client and a
particular server, such as zone transfer, dynamic update, or a
@@ -216,14 +207,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
By itself, ID guessing is not enough to allow an attacker to inject
bogus data, but combined with knowledge (or guesses) about QNAMEs and
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 4]
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QTYPEs for which a resolver might be querying, this leaves the
resolver only weakly defended against injection of bogus responses.
@@ -234,6 +217,17 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
because the victim is responding (in a predictable way) to some third
party action known to the attacker.
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 4]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
This attack is both more and less difficult for the attacker than the
simple interception attack described above: more difficult, because
the attack only works when the attacker guesses correctly; less
@@ -242,29 +236,29 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
In most other respects, this attack is similar to a packet
interception attack. A resolver that checks DNSSEC signatures will
be able to detect the forged response; resolvers that do not
themselves perform DNSSEC signature checking should use TSIG or some
be able to detect the forged response; resolvers that do not perform
DNSSEC signature checking themselves should use TSIG or some
equivalent mechanism to ensure the integrity of their communication
with a recursing name server that does perform DNSSEC signature
with a recursive name server that does perform DNSSEC signature
checking.
2.3. Name Chaining
Perhaps the most interesting class of DNS-specific threats are the
name chaining attacks. These are a subset of a larger class of name-
based attacks, sometimes called "cache poisoning" attacks. Most
name-based attacks can be at least partially mitigated by the long-
standing defense of checking RRs in response messages for relevance
to the original query, but such defenses do not catch name chaining
attacks. There are several variations on the basic attack, but what
they all have in common is that they all involve DNS RRs whose RDATA
portion (right hand side) includes a DNS name (or, in a few cases,
something that is not a DNS name but which directly maps to a DNS
name). Any such RR is, at least in principle, a hook that lets an
attacker feed bad data into a victim's cache, thus potentially
subverting subsequent decisions based on DNS names.
name chaining attacks. These are a subset of a larger class of
name-based attacks, sometimes called "cache poisoning" attacks. Most
name-based attacks can be partially mitigated by the long-standing
defense of checking RRs in response messages for relevance to the
original query, but such defenses do not catch name chaining attacks.
There are several variations on the basic attack, but what they all
have in common is that they all involve DNS RRs whose RDATA portion
(right hand side) includes a DNS name (or, in a few cases, something
that is not a DNS name but which directly maps to a DNS name). Any
such RR is, at least in principle, a hook that lets an attacker feed
bad data into a victim's cache, thus potentially subverting
subsequent decisions based on DNS names.
The worst examples in this class of RRs are CNAME, NS, and DNAME RRs,
The worst examples in this class of RRs are CNAME, NS, and DNAME RRs
because they can redirect a victim's query to a location of the
attacker's choosing. RRs like MX and SRV are somewhat less
dangerous, but in principle they can also be used to trigger further
@@ -272,14 +266,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
such as A or AAAA don't have DNS names in their RDATA, but since the
IN-ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA trees are indexed using a DNS encoding of
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, these record types can also be used in a
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 5]
draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
name chaining attack.
The general form of a name chaining attack is something like this:
@@ -290,6 +276,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
using this query as a means to inject false information about some
other name).
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 5]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
- Attacker injects response, whether via packet interception, query
guessing, or by being a legitimate name server that's involved at
some point in the process of answering the query that the victim
@@ -328,25 +322,27 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
a link to a 1x1-pixel "web bug" graphic in a piece of Text/HTML mail
to the victim. If the victim's mail reading program attempts to
follow such a link, the result will be a DNS query for a name chosen
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 6]
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by the attacker.
DNSSEC should provide a good defense against most (all?) variations
on this class of attack. By checking signatures, a resolver can
determine whether the data associated with a name really was inserted
by the delegated authority for that portion of the DNS name space
(more precisely, a resolver can determine whether the entity that
by the delegated authority for that portion of the DNS name space.
More precisely, a resolver can determine whether the entity that
injected the data had access to an allegedly secret key whose
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 6]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
corresponding public key appears at an expected location in the DNS
name space with an expected chain of parental signatures that start
with a public key of which the resolver has prior knowledge).
with a public key of which the resolver has prior knowledge.
DNSSEC signatures do not cover glue records, so there's still a
possibility of a name chaining attack involving glue, but with DNSSEC
@@ -365,15 +361,16 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
PPP options. Besides accidental betrayal of this trust relationship
(via server bugs, successful server break-ins, etc), the server
itself may be configured to give back answers that are not what the
user would expect (whether in an honest attempt to help the user or
to further some other goal such as furthering a business partnership
between the ISP and some third party).
user would expect, whether in an honest attempt to help the user or
to promote some other goal such as furthering a business partnership
between the ISP and some third party.
This problem is particularly acute for frequent travelers who carry
their own equipment and expect it to work in much the same way no
matter which network it's plugged into at any given moment (and no
matter what brand of middle boxes a particular hotel chain might have
installed when adding network drops in every guest room...).
their own equipment and expect it to work in much the same way
wherever they go. Such travelers need trustworthy DNS service
without regard to who operates the network into which their equipment
is currently plugged or what brand of middle boxes the local
infrastructure might use.
While the obvious solution to this problem would be for the client to
choose a more trustworthy server, in practice this may not be an
@@ -384,14 +381,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
prevent the client host from being able to run an iterative resolver
even if the owner of the client machine is willing and able to do so.
Thus, while the initial source of this problem is not a DNS protocol
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 7]
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attack per se, this sort of betrayal is a threat to DNS clients, and
simply switching to a different recursive name server is not an
adequate defense.
@@ -399,6 +388,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
Viewed strictly from the DNS protocol standpoint, the only difference
between this sort of betrayal and a packet interception attack is
that in this case the client has voluntarily sent its request to the
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 7]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
attacker. The defense against this is the same as with a packet
interception attack: the resolver must either check DNSSEC signatures
itself or use TSIG (or equivalent) to authenticate the server that it
@@ -413,8 +410,8 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
that is doing work on its behalf and wants to check the DNSSEC
signatures itself, the resolver really does need to have independent
knowledge of the DNSSEC public key(s) it needs in order to perform
the check (usually the public key for the root zone, but in some
cases knowledge of additional keys may also be appropriate).
the check. Usually the public key for the root zone is enough, but
in some cases knowledge of additional keys may also be appropriate.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a properly paranoid
resolver must always perform its own signature checking, and that
@@ -440,27 +437,26 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
Much discussion has taken place over the question of authenticated
denial of domain names. The particular question is whether there is
a requirement for authenticating the non-existence of a name. The
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 8]
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issue is whether the resolver should be able to detect when an
attacker removes RRs from a response.
General paranoia aside, the existence of RR types whose absence
causes an action other than immediate failure (such as missing MX and
SRV RRs, which fail over to A RRs) constitutes a real threat.
Arguably, in some cases, even the immediate failure of a missing RR
might be considered a problem. The question remains: how serious is
this threat? Clearly the threat does exist; general paranoia says
that some day it'll be on the front page of some major newspaper,
even if we cannot conceive of a plausible scenario involving this
attack today. This implies that some mitigation of this risk is
required.
Arguably, in some cases, even the absence of an RR might be
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 8]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
considered a problem. The question remains: how serious is this
threat? Clearly the threat does exist; general paranoia says that
some day it'll be on the front page of some major newspaper, even if
we cannot conceive of a plausible scenario involving this attack
today. This implies that some mitigation of this risk is required.
Note that it's necessary to prove the non-existence of applicable
wildcard RRs as part of the authenticated denial mechanism, and that,
@@ -496,25 +492,27 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
applicable).
Note that this makes the wildcard mechanisms dependent upon the
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 9]
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authenticated denial mechanism described in the previous section.
DNSSEC includes mechanisms along the lines described above, which
make it possible for a resolver to verify that a name server applied
the wildcard expansion rules correctly when generating an answer.
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 9]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
3. Weaknesses of DNSSEC
DNSSEC has some problems of its own:
- DNSSEC is complex to implement, and includes some nasty edge cases
- DNSSEC is complex to implement and includes some nasty edge cases
at the zone cuts that require very careful coding. Testbed
experience to date suggests that trivial zone configuration errors
or expired keys can cause serious problems for a DNSSEC-aware
@@ -530,10 +528,10 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
and in some cases will also need to issue further queries. This
increased workload will also increase the time it takes to get an
answer back to the original DNS client, which is likely to trigger
both timeouts and re-queries in some cases. (Arguably, many
current DNS clients are already too impatient even before taking
the further delays that DNSSEC will impose into account, but that's
a separate topic for another document....)
both timeouts and re-queries in some cases. Arguably, many current
DNS clients are already too impatient even before taking the
further delays that DNSSEC will impose into account, but that topic
is beyond the scope of this note.
- Like DNS itself, DNSSEC's trust model is almost totally
hierarchical. While DNSSEC does allow resolvers to have special
@@ -552,20 +550,20 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
the validating resolver and the entity creating the DNSSEC
signatures. Prior to DNSSEC, all time-related actions in DNS could
be performed by a machine that only knew about "elapsed" or
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"relative" time. Because the validity period of a DNSSEC signature
is based on "absolute" time, a validating resolver must have the
same concept of absolute time as the zone signer in order to
determine whether the signature is within its validity period or
has expired. An attacker that can change a resolver's opinion of
the current absolute time can fool the resolver using expired
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 10]
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signatures. An attacker that can change the zone signer's opinion
of the current absolute time can fool the zone signer into
generating signatures whose validity period does not match what the
@@ -578,24 +576,23 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
to whether the authenticated denial mechanism is completely
airtight and whether it would be worthwhile to optimize the
authenticated denial mechanism for the common case in which
wildcards are not present in a zone, but the main problem is just
the inherent complexity of the wildcard mechanism itself. This
complexity probably makes the code for generating and checking
wildcards are not present in a zone. However, the main problem is
just the inherent complexity of the wildcard mechanism itself.
This complexity probably makes the code for generating and checking
authenticated denial attestations somewhat fragile, but since the
alternative of giving up wildcards entirely is not practical due to
widespread use, we are going to have to live with wildcards, and
the question just becomes one of whether or not the proposed
widespread use, we are going to have to live with wildcards. The
question just becomes one of whether or not the proposed
optimizations would make DNSSEC's mechanisms more or less fragile.
- Even with DNSSEC, the class of attacks discussed in section 2.4 is
not easy to defeat. In order for DNSSEC to be effective in this
case, it must be possible to configure the resolver to expect
certain categories of DNS records to be signed, which may require
certain categories of DNS records to be signed. This may require
manual configuration of the resolver, especially during the initial
DNSSEC rollout period when the resolver cannot reasonably expect
the root and TLD zones to be signed.
4. Topics for Future Work
This section lists a few subjects not covered above which probably
@@ -604,17 +601,10 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
4.1. Interactions With Other Protocols
The above discussion has concentrated exclusively on attacks within
the boundaries of the DNS protocol itself, since those are the
problems against (some of) which DNSSEC was intended to protect.
There are, however, other potential problems at the boundaries where
DNS interacts with other protocols.
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the boundaries of the DNS protocol itself, since those are (some of)
the problems against which DNSSEC was intended to protect. There
are, however, other potential problems at the boundaries where DNS
interacts with other protocols.
4.2. Securing DNS Dynamic Update
@@ -622,6 +612,14 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
with DNSSEC. Dynamic update of a non-secure zone can use TSIG to
authenticate the updating client to the server. While TSIG does not
scale very well (it requires manual configuration of shared keys
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 11]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
between the DNS name server and each TSIG client), it works well in a
limited or closed environment such as a DHCP server updating a local
DNS name server.
@@ -634,10 +632,10 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
the changes to the zone. This means that either:
a) The updating client must have access to a zone-signing key in
order to sign the update before sending it to the server, or
order to sign the update before sending it to the server, or
b) The DNS name server must have access to an online zone-signing key
in order to sign the update.
in order to sign the update.
In either case, a zone-signing key must be available to create signed
RRsets to place in the updated zone. The fact that this key must be
@@ -661,17 +659,6 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
Scaling properties of the key management problem here are a
particular concern that needs more study.
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4.3. Securing DNS Zone Replication
As discussed in previous sections, DNSSEC per se attempts to provide
@@ -681,19 +668,27 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
protocol. For purposes of replicating entire DNS zones, however,
DNSSEC does not provide object security, because zones include
unsigned NS RRs and glue at delegation points. Use of TSIG to
Atkins & Austein Informational [Page 12]
RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
protect zone transfer (AXFR or IXFR) operations provides "channel
security", but still does not provide object security for complete
zones, so the trust relationships involved in zone transfer are still
zones. The trust relationships involved in zone transfer are still
very much a hop-by-hop matter of name server operators trusting other
name server operators, rather than an end-to-end matter of name
server operators trusting zone administrators.
name server operators rather than an end-to-end matter of name server
operators trusting zone administrators.
Zone object security was not an explicit design goal of DNSSEC, so
failure to provide this service should not be a surprise.
Nevertheless, there are some zone replication scenarios for which
this would be a very useful additional service, so this seems like a
useful area for future work. In theory it should not be difficult to
zone object security as a backwards compatible enhancement to the
add zone object security as a backwards compatible enhancement to the
existing DNSSEC model, but the DNSEXT WG has not yet discussed either
the desirability of or the requirements for such an enhancement.
@@ -708,29 +703,38 @@ Security Considerations
The authors believe that deploying DNSSEC will help to address some,
but not all, of the known threats to the DNS.
IANA Considerations
None.
Acknowledgments
This note is based both previous published works by others and on a
number of discussions both public and private over a period of many
years, but particular thanks go to Jaap Akkerhuis, Steve Bellovin,
Dan Bernstein, Randy Bush, Steve Crocker, Olafur Gudmundsson, Russ
Housley, Rip Loomis, Allison Mankin, Paul Mockapetris, Thomas Narten
Mans Nilsson, Pekka Savola, Paul Vixie, Xunhua Wang, and any other
This note is based both on previous published works by others and on
a number of discussions both public and private over a period of many
years, but particular thanks go to
Jaap Akkerhuis,
Steve Bellovin,
Dan Bernstein,
Randy Bush,
Steve Crocker,
Olafur Gudmundsson,
Russ Housley,
Rip Loomis,
Allison Mankin,
Paul Mockapetris,
Thomas Narten
Mans Nilsson,
Pekka Savola,
Paul Vixie,
Xunhua Wang,
Atkins & Austein Expires 9 October 2004 [Page 13]
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RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
members of the DNS, DNSSEC, DNSIND, and DNSEXT working groups whose
names and contributions the authors have forgotten, none of whom are
responsible for what the authors did with their ideas.
and any other members of the DNS, DNSSEC, DNSIND, and DNSEXT working
groups whose names and contributions the authors have forgotten, none
of whom are responsible for what the authors did with their ideas.
As with any work of this nature, the authors of this note acknowledge
that we are standing on the toes of those who have gone before us.
@@ -739,139 +743,144 @@ draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-07.txt April 2004
Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Editor, "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", RFC 1123, October 1989.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.
[RFC2181] Elz, R., and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification" RFC 2181, July 1997.
[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)"
RFC 2308, March 1998.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, March 1998.
[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC
2671, August 1999.
[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC
2671, August 1999.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)" RFC 2845, May 2000.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for
DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
[RFC2930] Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)"
RFC 2930, September 2000.
[RFC2930] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS
(TKEY RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.
[RFC3007] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update" RFC 3007, November 2000.
[RFC3007] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
[RFC2535] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2535, March 1999.
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RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
[RFC2535] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
Informative References
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E., Korver, B., and the Internet Architecture
Board, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
Considerations", RFC 3552, July 2003.
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[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
[Bellovin95] Bellovin, S., "Using the Domain Name System for System
Break-Ins", Proceedings of the Fifth Usenix Unix Security
Symposium, June 1995.
Break-Ins", Proceedings of the Fifth Usenix Unix
Security Symposium, June 1995.
[Galvin93] Design team meeting summary message posted to dns-
security@tis.com mailing list by Jim Galvin on 19 November 1993.
[Galvin93] Design team meeting summary message posted to dns-
security@tis.com mailing list by Jim Galvin on 19
November 1993.
[Schuba93] Schuba, C., "Addressing Weaknesses in the Domain Name
System Protocol", Master's thesis, Purdue University Department
of Computer Sciences, August 1993.
[Schuba93] Schuba, C., "Addressing Weaknesses in the Domain Name
System Protocol", Master's thesis, Purdue University
Department of Computer Sciences, August 1993.
[Vixie95] Vixie, P, "DNS and BIND Security Issues", Proceedings of
the Fifth Usenix Unix Security Symposium, June 1995.
[Vixie95] Vixie, P, "DNS and BIND Security Issues", Proceedings of
the Fifth Usenix Unix Security Symposium, June 1995.
Authors' addresses:
Authors' Addresses
Derek Atkins
IHTFP Consulting, Inc.
6 Farragut Ave
Somerville, MA 02144
USA
Derek Atkins
IHTFP Consulting, Inc.
6 Farragut Ave
Somerville, MA 02144
USA
Email: derek@ihtfp.com
EMail: derek@ihtfp.com
Rob Austein
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA
Email: sra@isc.org
Intellectual Property Statement
Rob Austein
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
EMail: sra@isc.org
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RFC 3833 DNS Threat Analysis August 2004
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Acknowledgement
@@ -886,10 +895,5 @@ Acknowledgement
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