The dns_adb_beginudpfetch() is called only for UDP queries, but
the dns_adb_endudpfetch() is called for all queries, including
TCP. This messages the quota counting in adb.c.
- TSAN can't handle more than 64 locks in one thread, lock ADB bucket-by-bucket
in TSAN mode. This means that the dump won't be consistent but it's good
enough for testing
- Use proper order when unlocking adb->namelocks and adb->entrylocks when
dumping ADB.
isc_mem_traceflag_test messes with stdout/stderr, which can cause
problems with subsequent tests (no output, libuv problems). Moving that
test case to the end ensures there are no side effects.
close the uv_handle for the worker async channel, and call
uv_loop_close() on shutdown to ensure that the event loop's
internal resources are properly freed.
when the TCPDNS_CLIENTS_PER_CONN limit has been exceeded for a TCP
DNS connection, switch to sequential mode to ensure that memory cannot
be exhausted by too many simultaneous queries.
-Wl,-z,interpose is not supported.
-Wl,rpath=<path> is not supported use -Wl,rpath,<path> instead.
Use @SO@ for loadable extension.
Use -L <path> -l libwrap instead of libwrap.sa.
this adds functions in conf.sh.common to create DS-style trust anchor
files. those functions are then used to create nearly all of the trust
anchors in the system tests.
there are a few exceptions:
- some tests in dnssec and mkeys rely on detection of unsupported
algorithms, which only works with key-style trust anchors, so those
are used for those tests in particular.
- the mirror test had a problem with the use of a CSK without a
SEP bit, which still needs addressing
in the future, some of these tests should be changed back to using
traditional trust anchors, so that both types will be exercised going
forward.
use empty placeholder KEYDATA records for all trust anchors, not just
DS-style trust anchors.
this revealed a pre-existing bug: keyfetch_done() skips keys without
the SEP bit when populating the managed-keys zone. consequently, if a
zone only has a single ZSK which is configured as trust anchor and no
KSKs, then no KEYDATA record is ever written to the managed-keys zone
when keys are refreshed.
that was how the root server in the dnssec system test was configured.
however, previously, the KEYDATA was created when the key was
initialized; this prevented us from noticing the bug until now.
configuring a ZSK as an RFC 5011 trust anchor is not forbidden by the
spec, but it is highly unusual and not well defined. so for the time
being, I have modified the system test to generate both a KSK and ZSK
for the root zone, enabling the test to pass.
we should consider adding code to detect this condition and allow keys
without the SEP bit to be used as trust anchors if no key with the SEP
bit is available, or at minimum, log a warning.
note: this also needs further refactoring.
- when initializing RFC 5011 for a name, we populate the managed-keys
zone with KEYDATA records derived from the initial-key trust anchors.
however, with initial-ds trust anchors, there is no key. but the
managed-keys zone still must have a KEYDATA record for the name,
otherwise zone_refreshkeys() won't refresh that key. so, for
initial-ds trust anchors, we now add an empty KEYDATA record and set
the key refresh timer so that the real keys will be looked up as soon
as possible.
- when a key refresh query is done, we verify it against the
trust anchor; this is done in two ways, one with the DS RRset
set up during configuration if present, or with the keys linked
from each keynode in the list if not. because there are two different
verification methods, the loop structure is overly complex and should
be simplified.
- the keyfetch_done() and sync_keyzone() functions are both too long
and should be broken into smaller functions.
note: this is a frankensteinian kluge which needs further refactoring.
the keytable started as an RBT where the node->data points to a list of
dns_keynode structures, each of which points to a single dst_key.
later it was modified so that the list could instead point to a single
"null" keynode structure, which does not reference a key; this means
a trust anchor has been configured but the RFC 5011 refresh failed.
in this branch it is further updated to allow the first keynode in
the list to point to an rdatalist of DS-style trust anchors. these will
be used by the validator to populate 'val->dsset' when validating a zone
key.
a DS style trust anchor can be updated as a result of RFC 5011
processing to contain DST keys instead; this results in the DS list
being freed. the reverse is not possible; attempting to add a DS-style
trust anchor if a key-style trust anchor is already in place results
in an error.
later, this should be refactored to use rdatalists for both DS-style
and key-style trust anchors, but we're keeping the existing code for
old-style trust anchors for now.
- val->keynode and val->seensig were set but never used.
- val->nearest, val->soaset, val->soaname, val->nsecset and val->nsec3set
were never used at all.
- pull out the code that checks whether a key was signed by a trust
anchor into a separate function, anchor_signed().
- pull out the code that looks up a DS while validating a zone key
into a separate function, get_dsset().
- check in create_validator() whether the sigrdataset is bound, so that
we can always pass in &val->fsigrdataset during an insecurity proof;
this will allow a reduction of code duplication.
- also simplified some calls: don't pass siginfo where val->siginfo
is sufficient, don't INSIST where returning false is sufficient.
- also added header comments to several local functions.
