This is now the default way to implement attaching to/detaching from
a pointer.
Also update cfg_keystore_fromconfig() to allow NULL value for the
keystore pointer. In most cases we detach it immediately after the
function call.
The name "uri" was considered to be too generic and could potentially
clash with a future URI configuration option. Renamed to "pkcs11-uri".
Note that this option name was also preferred over "pkcs11uri", the
dash is considered to be the more clearer form.
If there is a keystore configured with a PKCS#11 URI, zones that
are using a dnssec-policy that uses such a keystore should create keys
via the PKCS#11 interface. Those keys are generally stored inside an
HSM.
Some changes to the code are required, to store the engine reference
into the keystore.
When creating the kasp structure, instead of storing the name of the
key store on keys, store a reference to the key store object instead.
This requires to build the keystore list prior to creating the kasp
structures, in the dnssec tools, the check code and the server code.
We will create a builtin keystore called "key-directory" which means
use the zone's key-directory as the key store.
The check code changes, because now the keystore is looked up before
creating the kasp structure (and if the keystore is not found, this
is an error). Instead of looking up the keystore after all
'dnssec-policy' clauses have been read.
Add code for configuring keystore objects. Add this to the "kaspconf"
code, as it is related to 'dnssec-policy' and it is too small to create
a separate file for it.
Add an option to enable/disable inline-signing inside the
dnssec-policy clause. The existing inline-signing option that is
set in the zone clause takes priority, but if it is omitted, then the
value that is set in dnssec-policy is taken.
The built-in policies use inline-signing.
This means that if you want to use the default policy without
inline-signing you either have to set it explicitly in the zone
clause:
zone "example" {
...
dnssec-policy default;
inline-signing no;
};
Or create a new policy, only overriding the inline-signing option:
dnssec-policy "default-dynamic" {
inline-signing no;
};
zone "example" {
...
dnssec-policy default-dynamic;
};
This also means that if you are going insecure with a dynamic zone,
the built-in "insecure" policy needs to be accompanied with
"inline-signing no;".
There are times where you want named-checkconf to check whether the
dnssec-policies should be constrained by the cryptographic algorithms
supported by the operation system or to just accept all possible
algorithms. This provides a mechanism to make that selection.
- RSASHA1 (5) and NSEC3RSASHA1 (7) are not accepted in FIPS mode
- minimum RSA key size is set to 2048 bit
adjust kasp and checkconf system tests to ensure non FIPS
compliant configurations are not used in FIPS mode
Completely remove the TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying) from
BIND 9 (from named, named.conf and all the tools). The TKEY usage is
fringe at best and in all known cases, GSSAPI is being used as it should.
The draft-eastlake-dnsop-rfc2930bis-tkey specifies that:
4.2 Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying (Deprecated)
The use of this mode (#2) is NOT RECOMMENDED for the following two
reasons but the specification is still included in Appendix A in case
an implementation is needed for compatibility with old TKEY
implementations. See Section 4.6 on ECDH Exchanged Keying.
The mixing function used does not meet current cryptographic
standards because it uses MD5 [RFC6151].
RSA keys must be excessively long to achieve levels of security
required by current standards.
We might optionally implement Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key
exchange mode 6 if the draft ever reaches the RFC status. Meanwhile the
insecure DH mode needs to be removed.
Remove the duplication from the defaultconf and inherit the values
not set in the "insecure" policy from the "default" policy. Therefore,
we must insist that the first read built-in policy is the default one.
Most of the settings (durations) are already inheriting from the default
because they use the constants from lib/dns/kasp.h. We need them as
constants so we can use them in named-checkconf to verify the policy
parameters.
The NSEC(3) parameters and keys should come from the actual default
policy. Change the call to cfg_kasp_fromconfig() to include the default
kasp. We also no longer need to corner case where config is NULL we load
the built-in policy: the built-in policies are now loaded when config is
set to named_g_config.
Finally, add a debug log (it is useful to see which policies are being
loaded).
Update the defaultconf with the built-in policies. These will now be
printed with "named -C".
Change the defines in kasp.h to be strings, so they can be concatenated
in the defaultconf. This means when creating a kasp structure, we no
longer initialize the defaults (this is fine because only kaspconf.c
uses dns_kasp_create() and it inherits from the default policy).
In kaspconf.c, the default values now need to be parsed from string.
Introduce some variables so we don't need to do get_duration multiple
times on the same configuration option.
Finally, clang-format-14 decided to do some random formatting changes.
The key lifetime should not be shorter than the time it costs to
introduce the successor key, otherwise keys will be created faster than
they are removed, resulting in a large key set.
The time it takes to replace a key is determined by the publication
interval (Ipub) of the successor key and the retire interval of the
predecessor key (Iret).
For the ZSK, Ipub is the sum of the DNSKEY TTL and zone propagation
delay (and publish safety). Iret is the sum of Dsgn, the maximum zone
TTL and zone propagation delay (and retire safety). The sign delay is
the signature validity period minus the refresh interval: The time to
ensure that all existing RRsets have been re-signed with the new key.
The ZSK lifetime should be larger than both values.
For the KSK, Ipub is the sum of the DNSKEY TTL and zone propagation
delay (and publish safety). Iret is the sum of the DS TTL and parent
zone propagation delay (and retire safety). The KSK lifetime should be
larger than both values.
The signatures-refresh should not near the signatures-validity value,
to prevent operational instability. Same is true when checking against
signatures-validity-dnskey.
For each algorithm there must be a key performing the KSK and
ZSK rolls. After reading the keys from named.conf check that
each algorithm present has both rolls. CSK implicitly has both
rolls.
This commit converts the license handling to adhere to the REUSE
specification. It specifically:
1. Adds used licnses to LICENSES/ directory
2. Add "isc" template for adding the copyright boilerplate
3. Changes all source files to include copyright and SPDX license
header, this includes all the C sources, documentation, zone files,
configuration files. There are notes in the doc/dev/copyrights file
on how to add correct headers to the new files.
4. Handle the rest that can't be modified via .reuse/dep5 file. The
binary (or otherwise unmodifiable) files could have license places
next to them in <foo>.license file, but this would lead to cluttered
repository and most of the files handled in the .reuse/dep5 file are
system test files.
A kasp structure was not detached when looking to see if there
was an existing kasp structure with the same name, causing memory
to be leaked. Fixed by calling dns_kasp_detach() to release the
reference.
When using 'nsec3param' in 'dnssec-policy' and no specific parameters
are provided, default to zero additional iterations and no salt, as
recommended by draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance.
Remove the dynamic registration of result codes. Convert isc_result_t
from unsigned + #defines into 32-bit enum type in grand unified
<isc/result.h> header. Keep the existing values of the result codes
even at the expense of the description and identifier tables being
unnecessary large.
Additionally, add couple of:
switch (result) {
[...]
default:
break;
}
statements where compiler now complains about missing enum values in the
switch statement.
Add a new built-in policy "insecure", to be used to gracefully unsign
a zone. Previously you could just remove the 'dnssec-policy'
configuration from your zone statement, or remove it.
The built-in policy "none" (or not configured) now actually means
no DNSSEC maintenance for the corresponding zone. So if you
immediately reconfigure your zone from whatever policy to "none",
your zone will temporarily be seen as bogus by validating resolvers.
This means we can remove the functions 'dns_zone_use_kasp()' and
'dns_zone_secure_to_insecure()' again. We also no longer have to
check for the existence of key state files to figure out if a zone
is transitioning to insecure.
When reducing the number of NSEC3 iterations to 150, commit
aa26cde2ae added tests for dnssec-policy
to check that a too high iteration count is a configuration failure.
The test is not sufficient because 151 was always too high for
ECDSAP256SHA256. The test should check for a different algorithm.
There was an existing test case that checks for NSEC3 iterations.
Update the test with the new maximum values.
Update the code in 'kaspconf.c' to allow at most 150 iterations.
Add a new option 'purge-keys' to 'dnssec-policy' that will purge key
files for deleted keys. The option determines how long key files
should be retained prior to removing the corresponding files from
disk.
If set to 0, the option is disabled and 'named' will not remove key
files from disk.
Configure "none" as a builtin policy. Change the 'cfg_kasp_fromconfig'
api so that the 'name' will determine what policy needs to be
configured.
When transitioning a zone from secure to insecure, there will be
cases when a zone with no DNSSEC policy (dnssec-policy none) should
be using KASP. When there are key state files available, this is an
indication that the zone once was DNSSEC signed but is reconfigured
to become insecure.
If we would not run the keymgr, named would abruptly remove the
DNSSEC records from the zone, making the zone bogus. Therefore,
change the code such that a zone will use kasp if there is a valid
dnssec-policy configured, or if there are state files available.
Upon request from Mark, change the configuration of salt to salt
length.
Introduce a new function 'dns_zone_checknsec3aram' that can be used
upon reconfiguration to check if the existing NSEC3 parameters are
in sync with the configuration. If a salt is used that matches the
configured salt length, don't change the NSEC3 parameters.
Check 'nsec3param' configuration for the number of iterations. The
maximum number of iterations that are allowed are based on the key
size (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5155#section-10.3).
Check 'nsec3param' configuration for correct salt. If the string is
not "-" or hex-based, this is a bad salt.
Implement support for NSEC3 in dnssec-policy. Store the configuration
in kasp objects. When configuring a zone, call 'dns_zone_setnsec3param'
to queue an nsec3param event. This will ensure that any previous
chains will be removed and a chain according to the dnssec-policy is
created.
Add tests for dnssec-policy zones that uses the new 'nsec3param'
option, as well as changing to new values, changing to NSEC, and
changing from NSEC.
The keyword 'unlimited' can be used instead of PT0S which means the
same but is more comprehensible for users.
Also fix some redundant "none" parameters in the kasp test.
