The code for specifying OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine as part of the label
(e.g. -l "pkcs11:token=..." instead of -E pkcs11 -l "token=...")
was non-functional. This commit just cleans the related code.
The coccinellery repository provides many little semantic patches to fix common
problems in the code. The number of semantic patches in the coccinellery
repository is high and most of the semantic patches apply only for Linux, so it
doesn't make sense to run them on regular basis as the processing takes a lot of
time.
The list of issue found in BIND 9, by no means complete, includes:
- double assignment to a variable
- `continue` at the end of the loop
- double checks for `NULL`
- useless checks for `NULL` (cannot be `NULL`, because of earlier return)
- using `0` instead of `NULL`
- useless extra condition (`if (foo) return; if (!foo) { ...; }`)
- removing & in front of static functions passed as arguments
- Replace external -DOPENSSL/-DPKCS11CRYPTO with properly AC_DEFINEd
HAVE_OPENSSL/HAVE_PKCS11
- Don't enforce the crypto provider from platform.h, just from dst_api.c
and configure scripts
The three functions has been modeled after the arc4random family of
functions, and they will always return random bytes.
The isc_random family of functions internally use these CSPRNG (if available):
1. getrandom() libc call (might be available on Linux and Solaris)
2. SYS_getrandom syscall (might be available on Linux, detected at runtime)
3. arc4random(), arc4random_buf() and arc4random_uniform() (available on BSDs and Mac OS X)
4. crypto library function:
4a. RAND_bytes in case OpenSSL
4b. pkcs_C_GenerateRandom() in case PKCS#11 library
4183. [cleanup] Use timing-safe memory comparisons in cryptographic
code. Also, the timing-safe comparison functions have
been renamed to avoid possible confusion with
memcmp(). [RT #40148]
3705. [func] "configure --enable-native-pkcs11" enables BIND
to use the PKCS#11 API for all cryptographic
functions, so that it can drive a hardware service
module directly without the need to use a modified
OpenSSL as intermediary (so long as the HSM's vendor
provides a complete-enough implementation of the
PKCS#11 interface). This has been tested successfully
with the Thales nShield HSM and with SoftHSMv2 from
the OpenDNSSEC project. [RT #29031]
