The kasp system tests are updated with 'check_cds' calls that will
verify that the correct CDS and CDNSKEY records are published during
a rollover and that they are signed with the correct KSK.
This requires a change in 'dnssec.c' to check the kasp key states
whether the CDS/CDNSKEY of a key should be published or not. If no
kasp state exist, fall back to key timings.
Update dns_dnssec_keyactive to differentiate between the roles ZSK
and KSK. A key is active if it is signing but that differs per role.
A ZSK is signing if its ZRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT,
a KSK is signing if its KRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT.
This means that a key can be actively signing for one role but not
the other. Add checks in inline signing (zone.c and update.c) to
cover the case where a CSK is active in its KSK role but not the ZSK
role.
Update dns_dnssec_get_hints and dns_dnssec_keyactive to use dst_key
functions and thus if dnssec-policy/KASP is used the key states are
being considered.
Add a new variable to 'struct dns_dnsseckey' to signal whether this
key is a zone-signing key (it is no longer true that ksk == !zsk).
Also introduce a hint for revoke.
Update 'dns_dnssec_findzonekeys' and 'dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys'
to also read the key state file, if available.
Remove 'allzsk' from 'dns_dnssec_updatekeys' as this was only a
hint for logging.
Also make get_hints() (now dns_dnssec_get_hints()) public so that
we can use it in the key manager.
This affects CDS records generated by `named` and `dnssec-signzone`
based on `-P sync` and `-D sync` key timing instructions.
This is for conformance with the DS/CDS algorithm requirements in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update
dnssec-signzone should sign a zonefile that contains a DNSKEY record
with an unsupported algorithm. Current behavior is that it will
fail, hitting a fatal error. The fix detects unsupported algorithms
and will not try to add it to the keylist.
Also when determining the maximum iterations for NSEC3, don't take
into account DNSKEY records in the zonefile with an unsupported
algorithm.
3705. [func] "configure --enable-native-pkcs11" enables BIND
to use the PKCS#11 API for all cryptographic
functions, so that it can drive a hardware service
module directly without the need to use a modified
OpenSSL as intermediary (so long as the HSM's vendor
provides a complete-enough implementation of the
PKCS#11 interface). This has been tested successfully
with the Thales nShield HSM and with SoftHSMv2 from
the OpenDNSSEC project. [RT #29031]
