The warnings (see below) seem to be false-positives. Address them
by adding runtime checks.
resolver.c:1627:10: warning: Access to field 'tid' results in a dereference of a null pointer (loaded from variable 'fctx') [core.NullDereference]
1627 | REQUIRE(fctx->tid == isc_tid());
| ^~~~~~~~~
../../lib/isc/include/isc/util.h:332:34: note: expanded from macro 'REQUIRE'
332 | #define REQUIRE(e) ISC_REQUIRE(e)
| ^
../../lib/isc/include/isc/assertions.h:45:11: note: expanded from macro 'ISC_REQUIRE'
45 | ((void)((cond) || \
| ^~~~
resolver.c:10335:6: warning: Access to field 'depth' results in a dereference of a null pointer (loaded from variable 'fctx') [core.NullDereference]
10335 | if (fctx->depth > depth) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
2 warnings generated.
- the DNS_DB_NSEC3ONLY and DNS_DB_NONSEC3 flags are mutually
exclusive; it never made sense to set both at the same time.
to enforce this, it is now a fatal error to do so. the
dbiterator implementation has been cleaned up to remove
code that treated the two as independent: if nonsec3 is
true, we can be certain nsec3only is false, and vice versa.
- previously, iterating a database backwards omitted
NSEC3 records even if DNS_DB_NONSEC3 had not been set. this
has been corrected.
- when an iterator reaches the origin node of the NSEC3 tree, we
need to skip over it and go to the next node in the sequence.
the NSEC3 origin node is there for housekeeping purposes and
never contains data.
- the dbiterator_test unit test has been expanded, several
incorrect expectations have been fixed. (for example, the
expected number of iterations has been reduced by one; we were
previously counting the NSEC3 origin node and we should not
have been doing so.)
- create_node() in rbt.c cannot fail
- the dns_rbt_*name() functions, which are wrappers around
dns_rbt_[add|find|delete]node(), were never used except in tests.
this change isn't really necessary since RBT is likely to go away
eventually anyway. but keeping the API as simple as possible while it
persists is a good thing, and may reduce confusion while QPDB is being
developed from RBTDB code.
these values pertain to whether a node is in the main, nsec, or nsec3
tree of an RBTDB. they need to be moved to a more generic location so
they can also be used by QPDB.
(this is in db.h rather than db_p.h because rbt.c needs access to it.
technically, that's a layer violation, but it's a long-existing one;
refactoring to get rid of it would be a large hassle, and eventually
we expect to remove rbt.c anyway.)
when the QPDB is implemented, we will need to have both qpdb_p.h and
rbtdb_p.h. in order to prevent name collisions or code duplication,
this commit adds a generic private header file, db_p.h, containing
structures and macros that will be used by both databases.
some functions and structs have been renamed to more specifically refer
to the RBT database, in order to avoid namespace collision with similar
things that will be needed by the QPDB later.
refactor the wildcard matching code to make it a bit easier to
understand, in hopes that it will reduce the difficulty of converting
from RBTDB to QPDB later.
there are also some minor optimizations: previously, after stepping
backward to find the predecessor, we stepped back foward *from* the
predecessor to find the successor. we now reset the rbtnode chain to
its original starting point before stepping forward; this eliminates
some unnecessary processing. and, if neither predecessor nor successor
is found, we return early rather than carrying on with an unnecessary
effort to match labels.
Coverity detected that address->type.sa was too small when copying
a struct sockaddr_sin6, use the alterative union element
address->type.sin6 instead.
After removing sockaddr_unix from isc_sockaddr, we can also remove
sockaddr_storage and reduce the isc_sockaddr size from 152 bytes to just
48 bytes needed to hold IPv6 addresses.
Stop the cname_and_other_data processing if we already know that the
result is true. Also, we know that CNAME will be placed in the priority
headers, so we can stop looking for CNAME if we haven't found CNAME and
we are past the priority headers.
Mark the infrastructure RRTypes as "priority" types and place them at
the beginning of the rdataslab header data graph. The non-priority
types either go right after the priority types (if any).
The cachedb was missing piece of code (already found in zonedb) that
would make lookups in the slabheaders to miss the RRSIGs for CNAME if
the order of CNAME and RRSIG(CNAME) was reversed in the node->data.
Expose the newly added 'first refresh' flag in the information
provided by the 'rndc staus' command, by showing the number of
zones, which are not yet fully ready, and their first refresh
is pending or is in-progress.
Add a new zone flag to indicate that a secondary type zone is
not yet fully ready, and a first time refresh is pending or is
in progress.
Expose this new flag in the statistics channel's "Incoming Zone
Transfers" section.
Instead of running all the cryptographic validation in a tight loop,
spread it out into multiple event loop "ticks", but moving every single
validation into own isc_async_run() asynchronous event. Move the
cryptographic operations - both verification and DNSKEY selection - to
the offloaded threads (isc_work_enqueue), this further limits the time
we spend doing expensive operations on the event loops that should be
fast.
Limit the impact of invalid or malicious RRSets that contain crafted
records causing the dns_validator to do many validations per single
fetch by adding a cap on the maximum number of validations and maximum
number of validation failures that can happen before the resolving
fails.
Checking the DS at the parent only happens if dns_zone_getdnsseckeys()
returns success. However, if this function somehow fails, it can also
prevent the keymgr from running.
Before adding the check DS functionality, the keymgr should only run
if 'dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys()' did not return an error (either
ISC_R_SUCCESS or ISC_R_NOTFOUND). After this change the correct
result code is used again.
The fix for CVE-2023-4408 introduced a regression in the message
parser, which could cause a crash if an rdata type that can only
occur in the question was found in another section.
Use 'dns__message_putassociatedrdataset()' instead of
'dns__message_puttemprdataset()', because after calling the
'dns_rdatalist_tordataset()' function earlier the 'rdataset'
is associated.
the fix for CVE-2023-4408 introduced a regression in the message
parser, which could cause a crash if duplicate rdatasets were found
in the question section. this commit ensures that rdatasets are
correctly disassociated and freed when this occurs.
This is now the default way to implement attaching to/detaching from
a pointer.
Also update cfg_keystore_fromconfig() to allow NULL value for the
keystore pointer. In most cases we detach it immediately after the
function call.
Add a default key-directory parameter to the function that can
be returned if there is no keystore, or if the keystore directory
is NULL (the latter is also true for the built-in keystore).
When using the same PKCS#11 URI for a zone that uses different
DNSSEC policies, the PKCS#11 label could collide, i.e. the same
label could be used for different keys. Add the policy name to
the label to make it more unique.
Also, the zone name could contain characters that are interpreted
as special characters when parsing the PKCS#11 URI string. Mangle
the zone name through 'dns_name_tofilenametext()' to make it
PKCS#11 safe.
Move the creation to a separate function for clarity.
Furthermore, add a log message whenever a PKCS#11 object has been
successfully created.
The internal keymgr used 'isc_dir_open(&dir)' and 'isc_dir_close(&dir)',
but was not using the variable 'dir`, other than checking if the
directory can be opened. Errors like these will be be caught already
in the dst_api function calls.
The pkcs11-provider did not yet support getting X/Y coordinates
on newly generated EC PKEY keys, thus we attempted to get the
key from the label after it was generated in the keystore.
This has been fixed in:
https://github.com/latchset/pkcs11-provider/pull/293
Thus now we should be able to use the generated key structure
immediately.
If not set, the created keys allows signing plus decrypt which is bad
practice. Setting the key usage explicitly will generate keys that
allow only signing.
The pkcs11-provider has changed to take a PKCS#11 URI instead of an
object identifier. Change the BIND 9 code accordingly to pass through
the label instead of just the object identifier.
See: https://github.com/latchset/pkcs11-provider/pull/284
Move dns_dnssec_findzonekeys from the dnssec.{c,h} source code to
zone.{c,h} (the header file already commented that this should be done
inside dns_zone_t).
Alter the function in such a way, that keys are searched for in the
key stores if a 'dnssec-policy' (kasp) is attached to the zone,
otherwise keep using the zone's key-directory.
When writing key files to disk, use the internally stored directory.
Add an access function 'dst_key_directory()'.
Most calls to keymgr functions no longer need to provide the
key-directory value. Only 'dns_keymgr_run' still needs access to
the zone's key-directory in case the key-store is set to the built-in
key-directory.
Refactor dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys and dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset
to take into account the key store directories in case the zone is using
dnssec-policy (kasp). Add 'kasp' and 'keystores' parameters.
This requires the keystorelist to be stored inside the zone structure.
The calls to these functions in the DNSSEC tools can use NULL as the
kasp value, as dnssec-signzone does not (yet) support dnssec-policy,
and key collision is checked inside the directory where it is created.
If there is a keystore configured with a PKCS#11 URI, zones that
are using a dnssec-policy that uses such a keystore should create keys
via the PKCS#11 interface. Those keys are generally stored inside an
HSM.
Some changes to the code are required, to store the engine reference
into the keystore.
When creating the kasp structure, instead of storing the name of the
key store on keys, store a reference to the key store object instead.
This requires to build the keystore list prior to creating the kasp
structures, in the dnssec tools, the check code and the server code.
We will create a builtin keystore called "key-directory" which means
use the zone's key-directory as the key store.
The check code changes, because now the keystore is looked up before
creating the kasp structure (and if the keystore is not found, this
is an error). Instead of looking up the keystore after all
'dnssec-policy' clauses have been read.
Add checkconf check to ensure that the used key-store in the keys
section exists. Error if that is not the case. We also don't allow
the special keyword 'key-directory' as that is internally used to
signal that the zone's key-directory should be used.
Add code for configuring keystore objects. Add this to the "kaspconf"
code, as it is related to 'dnssec-policy' and it is too small to create
a separate file for it.
Instead of issuing a separate isc_async_run() call for every RBTDB node
that triggers tree pruning, maintain a list of nodes from which tree
pruning can be started from and only issue an isc_async_run() call if
pruning has not yet been triggered by another RBTDB node.
In some older BIND 9 branches, the extra queuing overhead eliminated by
this change could be remotely exploited to cause excessive memory use.
Due to architectural shift, this branch is not vulnerable to that issue,
but applying the fix to the latter is nevertheless deemed prudent for
consistency and to make the code future-proof.
When parsing messages use a hashmap instead of a linear search to reduce
the amount of work done in findname when there's more than one name in
the section.
There are two hashmaps:
1) hashmap for owner names - that's constructed for each section when we
hit the second name in the section and destroyed right after parsing
that section;
2) per-name hashmap - for each name in the section, we construct a new
hashmap for that name if there are more than one rdataset for that
particular name.
1) Restart the process with a write lock if we discover an expired key
while holding the read lock.
2) Move incrementing the key reference inside the lock block of code.
