"rndc signing -serial <value>" could take longer than a second to
complete. Loop waiting for update to succeed.
For tests where "rndc signing -serial <value>" is supposed to not
succeed, repeatedly test that we don't get the new serial, then
test that we have the old value. This should prevent false negatives.
A short time window exists between logging the addition of an NSEC3PARAM
record to a zone and committing it to the current version of the zone
database. If a query arrives during such a time window, an unsigned
response will be returned. One of the checks in the "inline" system
test requires NSEC3 records to be present in an answer - that check
would fail in the case described above. Use rndc instead of log
watching for checking whether zone signing and NSEC3 chain modifications
are complete in order to prevent intermittent "inline" system test
failures.
While "rndc reload" causes dns_zone_asyncload() to be called for the
signed version of an inline-signed zone, the subsequent zone_load() call
causes the raw version to be reloaded from storage. This means that
DNS_ZONEFLG_LOADPENDING gets set for the signed version of the zone by
dns_zone_asyncload() before the reload is attempted, but zone_postload()
is only called for the raw version and thus DNS_ZONEFLG_LOADPENDING is
cleared for the raw version, but not for the signed version. This in
turn prevents zone maintenance from happening for the signed version of
the zone.
Until commit 29b7efdd9f8ce9b49371809498744c4b076dc3ee, this problem
remained dormant because DNS_ZONEFLG_LOADPENDING was previously
immediately, unconditionally cleared after zone loading was started
(whereas it should only be cleared when zone loading is finished or an
error occurs). This behavior caused other issues [1] and thus had to be
changed.
Fix reloading inline-signed zones by clearing DNS_ZONEFLG_LOADPENDING
for the signed version of the zone once the raw version reload
completes. Take care not to clear it prematurely during initial zone
load. Also make sure that DNS_ZONEFLG_LOADPENDING gets cleared when
zone_postload() encounters an error or returns early, to prevent other
scenarios from resulting in the same problem. Add comments aiming to
help explain code flow.
[1] see RT #47076
When an inline-signed zone is loaded, the master file for its signed
version is loaded and then a rollforward of the journal for the signed
version of the zone is performed. If DNS_JOURNALOPT_RESIGN is not set
during the latter phase, signatures loaded from the journal for the
signed version of the zone will not be scheduled for refresh. Fix the
conditional expression determining which flags should be used for the
dns_journal_rollforward() call so that DNS_JOURNALOPT_RESIGN is set when
zone_postload() is called for the signed version of an inline-signed
zone.
Extend bin/tests/system/stop.pl so that it can use "rndc halt" instead
of "rndc stop" as the former allows master file flushing upon shutdown
to be suppressed.
If "rndc signing -nsec3param ..." is ran for a zone which has not yet
been loaded or transferred (i.e. its "db" field is NULL), it will be
silently ignored by named despite rndc logging an "nsec3param request
queued" message, which is misleading. Prevent this by keeping a
per-zone queue of NSEC3PARAM change requests which arrive before a zone
is loaded or transferred and processing that queue once the raw version
of an inline-signed zone becomes available.
When inline signing is enabled for a zone without creating signing keys
for it, changes subsequently applied to the raw zone will not be
reflected in the secure zone due to the dns_update_signaturesinc() call
inside receive_secure_serial() failing. Given that an inline zone will
be served (without any signatures) even with no associated signing keys
being present, keep applying raw zone deltas to the secure zone until
keys become available in an attempt to follow the principle of least
astonishment.
properly determining if there were active KSK and
ZSK keys for a algorithm when update-check-ksk is
true (default) leaving records unsigned. [RT #46743]
4727. [bug] Retransferring an inline-signed slave using NSEC3
around the time its NSEC3 salt was changed could result
in an infinite signing loop. [RT #45080]
4594. [func] dnssec-keygen no longer uses RSASHA1 by default;
the signing algorithm must be specified on
the command line with the "-a" option. Signing
scripts that rely on the existing default behavior
will break; use "dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1" to
repair them. (The goal of this change is to make
it easier to find scripts using RSASHA1 so they
can be changed in the event of that algorithm
being deprecated in the future.) [RT #44755]
3943. [func] SERVFAIL responses can now be cached for a
limited time (configured by "servfail-ttl",
default 10 seconds, limit 30). This can reduce
the frequency of retries when an authoritative
server is known to be failing, e.g., due to
ongoing DNSSEC validation problems. [RT #21347]
3705. [func] "configure --enable-native-pkcs11" enables BIND
to use the PKCS#11 API for all cryptographic
functions, so that it can drive a hardware service
module directly without the need to use a modified
OpenSSL as intermediary (so long as the HSM's vendor
provides a complete-enough implementation of the
PKCS#11 interface). This has been tested successfully
with the Thales nShield HSM and with SoftHSMv2 from
the OpenDNSSEC project. [RT #29031]
