If a filename (the last argument) is not provided for named-checkzone or
named-compilezone, or if it is a single dash "-" character,
zone data will be read from stdin.
Example of invocation:
cat /etc/zone_name.db | named-compilezone -f text -F raw \
-o zone_name.raw zone_name
Both clang-tidy and uncrustify chokes on statement like this:
for (...)
if (...)
break;
This commit uses a very simple semantic patch (below) to add braces around such
statements.
Semantic patch used:
@@
statement S;
expression E;
@@
while (...)
- if (E) S
+ { if (E) { S } }
@@
statement S;
expression E;
@@
for (...;...;...)
- if (E) S
+ { if (E) { S } }
@@
statement S;
expression E;
@@
if (...)
- if (E) S
+ { if (E) { S } }
Also disable the semantic patch as the code needs tweaks here and there because
some destroy functions might not destroy the object and return early if the
object is still in use.
13429 cleanup:
13430 cancel_refresh(zone);
CID 1452702 (#1 of 1): Dereference before null check (REVERSE_INULL)
check_after_deref: Null-checking stub suggests that it may
be null, but it has already been dereferenced on all paths
leading to the check.
13431 if (stub != NULL) {
13432 stub->magic = 0;
The isc_buffer_allocate() function now cannot fail with ISC_R_MEMORY.
This commit removes all the checks on the return code using the semantic
patch from previous commit, as isc_buffer_allocate() now returns void.
The `rndc signing -clear` command cleans up the private-type records
that keep track of zone signing activity, but before this change it
did not tell the secondary servers that the zone has changed.
the internal keytable structure has not yet been changed, but
insertion of DS anchors is the only method now available.
NOTE: the keytable unit test is currently failing because of tests
that expect individual keynode objects to contain single DST key
objects.
as initial-key and static-key trust anchors will now be stored as a
DS rrset, code referencing keynodes storing DNSKEY trust anchors will
no longer be reached.
this function is used by dns_view_untrust() to handle revoked keys, so
it will still be needed after the keytable/validator refactoring is
complete, even though the keytable will be storing DS trust anchors
instead of keys. to simplify the way it's called, it now takes a DNSKEY
rdata struct instead of a DST key.
This commits removes superfluous checks when using the isc_refcount API.
Examples of superfluous checks:
1. The isc_refcount_decrement function ensures there was not underflow,
so this check is superfluous:
INSIST(isc_refcount_decrement(&r) > 0);
2 .The isc_refcount_destroy() includes check whether the counter
is zero, therefore this is superfluous:
INSIST(isc_refcount_decrement(&r) == 1 && isc_refcount_destroy(&r));
We were not reseting the keynode value when iterating over DNSKEYs in
RRSET, so we weren't checking all DNSKEYs against all trust anchors. This
commit fixes the issue by resetting keynode with every loop.
use empty placeholder KEYDATA records for all trust anchors, not just
DS-style trust anchors.
this revealed a pre-existing bug: keyfetch_done() skips keys without
the SEP bit when populating the managed-keys zone. consequently, if a
zone only has a single ZSK which is configured as trust anchor and no
KSKs, then no KEYDATA record is ever written to the managed-keys zone
when keys are refreshed.
that was how the root server in the dnssec system test was configured.
however, previously, the KEYDATA was created when the key was
initialized; this prevented us from noticing the bug until now.
configuring a ZSK as an RFC 5011 trust anchor is not forbidden by the
spec, but it is highly unusual and not well defined. so for the time
being, I have modified the system test to generate both a KSK and ZSK
for the root zone, enabling the test to pass.
we should consider adding code to detect this condition and allow keys
without the SEP bit to be used as trust anchors if no key with the SEP
bit is available, or at minimum, log a warning.
note: this also needs further refactoring.
- when initializing RFC 5011 for a name, we populate the managed-keys
zone with KEYDATA records derived from the initial-key trust anchors.
however, with initial-ds trust anchors, there is no key. but the
managed-keys zone still must have a KEYDATA record for the name,
otherwise zone_refreshkeys() won't refresh that key. so, for
initial-ds trust anchors, we now add an empty KEYDATA record and set
the key refresh timer so that the real keys will be looked up as soon
as possible.
- when a key refresh query is done, we verify it against the
trust anchor; this is done in two ways, one with the DS RRset
set up during configuration if present, or with the keys linked
from each keynode in the list if not. because there are two different
verification methods, the loop structure is overly complex and should
be simplified.
- the keyfetch_done() and sync_keyzone() functions are both too long
and should be broken into smaller functions.
note: this is a frankensteinian kluge which needs further refactoring.
the keytable started as an RBT where the node->data points to a list of
dns_keynode structures, each of which points to a single dst_key.
later it was modified so that the list could instead point to a single
"null" keynode structure, which does not reference a key; this means
a trust anchor has been configured but the RFC 5011 refresh failed.
in this branch it is further updated to allow the first keynode in
the list to point to an rdatalist of DS-style trust anchors. these will
be used by the validator to populate 'val->dsset' when validating a zone
key.
a DS style trust anchor can be updated as a result of RFC 5011
processing to contain DST keys instead; this results in the DS list
being freed. the reverse is not possible; attempting to add a DS-style
trust anchor if a key-style trust anchor is already in place results
in an error.
later, this should be refactored to use rdatalists for both DS-style
and key-style trust anchors, but we're keeping the existing code for
old-style trust anchors for now.
The 'sign_apex()' function has special processing for signing the
DNSKEY RRset such that it will always be signed with the active
KSK. Since CDS and CDNSKEY are also signed with the KSK, it
should have the same special processing. The special processing is
moved into a new function 'tickle_apex_rrset()' and is applied to
all three RR types (DNSKEY, CDS, CDNSKEY).
In addition, when kasp is involved, update the DNSKEY TTL accordingly
to what is in the policy.
Update dns_dnssec_keyactive to differentiate between the roles ZSK
and KSK. A key is active if it is signing but that differs per role.
A ZSK is signing if its ZRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT,
a KSK is signing if its KRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT.
This means that a key can be actively signing for one role but not
the other. Add checks in inline signing (zone.c and update.c) to
cover the case where a CSK is active in its KSK role but not the ZSK
role.
Update the signing code in lib/dns/zone.c and lib/dns/update.c to
use kasp logic if a dnssec-policy is enabled.
This means zones with dnssec-policy should no longer follow
'update-check-ksk' and 'dnssec-dnskey-kskonly' logic, instead the
KASP keys configured dictate which RRset gets signed with what key.
Also use the next rekey event from the key manager rather than
setting it to one hour.
Mark the zone dynamic, as otherwise a zone with dnssec-policy is
not eligble for automatic DNSSEC maintenance.
Update dns_dnssec_get_hints and dns_dnssec_keyactive to use dst_key
functions and thus if dnssec-policy/KASP is used the key states are
being considered.
Add a new variable to 'struct dns_dnsseckey' to signal whether this
key is a zone-signing key (it is no longer true that ksk == !zsk).
Also introduce a hint for revoke.
Update 'dns_dnssec_findzonekeys' and 'dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys'
to also read the key state file, if available.
Remove 'allzsk' from 'dns_dnssec_updatekeys' as this was only a
hint for logging.
Also make get_hints() (now dns_dnssec_get_hints()) public so that
we can use it in the key manager.
When signing a zone with dnssec-policy, we don't mind DNSSEC records.
This is useful for testing purposes, and perhaps it is better to
signal this behavior with a different configuration option.
This stores the dnssec-policy configuration and adds methods to
create, destroy, and attach/detach, as well as find a policy with
the same name in a list.
Also, add structures and functions for creating and destroying
kasp keys.
When doing regular signing expiry time is jittered to make sure
that the re-signing times are not clumped together. This expands
this behaviour to expiry times of dynamically added records.
When incrementally re-signing a zone use the full jitter range if
the server appears to have been offline for greater than 5 minutes
otherwise use a small jitter range of 3600 seconds. This will stop
the signatures becoming more clustered if the server has been off
line for a significant period of time (> 5 minutes).
This commit add RUNTIME_CHECK() around all simple dns_name_copy() calls where
the third argument is NULL using the semantic patch from the previous commit.
