2
0
mirror of https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs synced 2025-08-22 18:07:40 +00:00
ovs/lib/netlink-socket.c

1614 lines
50 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 Nicira, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include "netlink-socket.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "coverage.h"
#include "dynamic-string.h"
#include "hash.h"
#include "hmap.h"
#include "netlink.h"
#include "netlink-protocol.h"
#include "odp-netlink.h"
#include "ofpbuf.h"
#include "ovs-thread.h"
#include "poll-loop.h"
#include "seq.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "vlog.h"
VLOG_DEFINE_THIS_MODULE(netlink_socket);
COVERAGE_DEFINE(netlink_overflow);
COVERAGE_DEFINE(netlink_received);
COVERAGE_DEFINE(netlink_recv_jumbo);
COVERAGE_DEFINE(netlink_sent);
/* Linux header file confusion causes this to be undefined. */
#ifndef SOL_NETLINK
#define SOL_NETLINK 270
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
static struct ovs_mutex portid_mutex = OVS_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
static uint32_t g_last_portid = 0;
/* Port IDs must be unique! */
static uint32_t
portid_next(void)
OVS_GUARDED_BY(portid_mutex)
{
g_last_portid++;
return g_last_portid;
}
#endif /* _WIN32 */
/* A single (bad) Netlink message can in theory dump out many, many log
* messages, so the burst size is set quite high here to avoid missing useful
* information. Also, at high logging levels we log *all* Netlink messages. */
static struct vlog_rate_limit rl = VLOG_RATE_LIMIT_INIT(60, 600);
static uint32_t nl_sock_allocate_seq(struct nl_sock *, unsigned int n);
static void log_nlmsg(const char *function, int error,
const void *message, size_t size, int protocol);
#ifdef _WIN32
static int get_sock_pid_from_kernel(struct nl_sock *sock);
#endif
/* Netlink sockets. */
struct nl_sock {
#ifdef _WIN32
HANDLE handle;
#else
int fd;
#endif
uint32_t next_seq;
uint32_t pid;
int protocol;
unsigned int rcvbuf; /* Receive buffer size (SO_RCVBUF). */
};
/* Compile-time limit on iovecs, so that we can allocate a maximum-size array
* of iovecs on the stack. */
#define MAX_IOVS 128
/* Maximum number of iovecs that may be passed to sendmsg, capped at a
* minimum of _XOPEN_IOV_MAX (16) and a maximum of MAX_IOVS.
*
* Initialized by nl_sock_create(). */
static int max_iovs;
static int nl_pool_alloc(int protocol, struct nl_sock **sockp);
static void nl_pool_release(struct nl_sock *);
/* Creates a new netlink socket for the given netlink 'protocol'
* (NETLINK_ROUTE, NETLINK_GENERIC, ...). Returns 0 and sets '*sockp' to the
* new socket if successful, otherwise returns a positive errno value. */
int
nl_sock_create(int protocol, struct nl_sock **sockp)
{
static struct ovsthread_once once = OVSTHREAD_ONCE_INITIALIZER;
struct nl_sock *sock;
#ifndef _WIN32
struct sockaddr_nl local, remote;
#endif
socklen_t local_size;
int rcvbuf;
int retval = 0;
if (ovsthread_once_start(&once)) {
int save_errno = errno;
errno = 0;
max_iovs = sysconf(_SC_UIO_MAXIOV);
if (max_iovs < _XOPEN_IOV_MAX) {
if (max_iovs == -1 && errno) {
VLOG_WARN("sysconf(_SC_UIO_MAXIOV): %s", ovs_strerror(errno));
}
max_iovs = _XOPEN_IOV_MAX;
} else if (max_iovs > MAX_IOVS) {
max_iovs = MAX_IOVS;
}
errno = save_errno;
ovsthread_once_done(&once);
}
*sockp = NULL;
sock = xmalloc(sizeof *sock);
#ifdef _WIN32
sock->handle = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\OpenVSwitchDevice",
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
int last_error = GetLastError();
if (sock->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
VLOG_ERR("fcntl: %s", ovs_strerror(last_error));
goto error;
}
#else
sock->fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, protocol);
if (sock->fd < 0) {
VLOG_ERR("fcntl: %s", ovs_strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
#endif
sock->protocol = protocol;
sock->next_seq = 1;
rcvbuf = 1024 * 1024;
#ifdef _WIN32
sock->rcvbuf = rcvbuf;
retval = get_sock_pid_from_kernel(sock);
if (retval != 0) {
goto error;
}
#else
if (setsockopt(sock->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE,
&rcvbuf, sizeof rcvbuf)) {
/* Only root can use SO_RCVBUFFORCE. Everyone else gets EPERM.
* Warn only if the failure is therefore unexpected. */
if (errno != EPERM) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "setting %d-byte socket receive buffer failed "
"(%s)", rcvbuf, ovs_strerror(errno));
}
}
retval = get_socket_rcvbuf(sock->fd);
if (retval < 0) {
retval = -retval;
goto error;
}
sock->rcvbuf = retval;
/* Connect to kernel (pid 0) as remote address. */
memset(&remote, 0, sizeof remote);
remote.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
remote.nl_pid = 0;
if (connect(sock->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &remote, sizeof remote) < 0) {
VLOG_ERR("connect(0): %s", ovs_strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
/* Obtain pid assigned by kernel. */
local_size = sizeof local;
if (getsockname(sock->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local, &local_size) < 0) {
VLOG_ERR("getsockname: %s", ovs_strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
if (local_size < sizeof local || local.nl_family != AF_NETLINK) {
VLOG_ERR("getsockname returned bad Netlink name");
retval = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
sock->pid = local.nl_pid;
#endif
*sockp = sock;
return 0;
error:
if (retval == 0) {
retval = errno;
if (retval == 0) {
retval = EINVAL;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
if (sock->handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
CloseHandle(sock->handle);
}
#else
if (sock->fd >= 0) {
close(sock->fd);
}
#endif
free(sock);
return retval;
}
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
/* Creates a new netlink socket for the same protocol as 'src'. Returns 0 and
* sets '*sockp' to the new socket if successful, otherwise returns a positive
* errno value. */
int
nl_sock_clone(const struct nl_sock *src, struct nl_sock **sockp)
{
return nl_sock_create(src->protocol, sockp);
}
/* Destroys netlink socket 'sock'. */
void
nl_sock_destroy(struct nl_sock *sock)
{
if (sock) {
#ifdef _WIN32
CloseHandle(sock->handle);
#else
close(sock->fd);
#endif
free(sock);
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
/* Reads the pid for 'sock' generated in the kernel datapath. The function
* follows a transaction semantic. Eventually this function should call into
* nl_transact. */
static int
get_sock_pid_from_kernel(struct nl_sock *sock)
{
struct nl_transaction txn;
struct ofpbuf request;
uint64_t request_stub[128];
struct ofpbuf reply;
uint64_t reply_stub[128];
struct ovs_header *ovs_header;
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg;
uint32_t seq;
int retval;
DWORD bytes;
int ovs_msg_size = sizeof (struct nlmsghdr) + sizeof (struct genlmsghdr) +
sizeof (struct ovs_header);
ofpbuf_use_stub(&request, request_stub, sizeof request_stub);
txn.request = &request;
ofpbuf_use_stub(&reply, reply_stub, sizeof reply_stub);
txn.reply = &reply;
seq = nl_sock_allocate_seq(sock, 1);
nl_msg_put_genlmsghdr(&request, 0, OVS_WIN_NL_CTRL_FAMILY_ID, 0,
OVS_CTRL_CMD_WIN_GET_PID, OVS_WIN_CONTROL_VERSION);
nlmsg = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(txn.request);
nlmsg->nlmsg_seq = seq;
ovs_header = ofpbuf_put_uninit(&request, sizeof *ovs_header);
ovs_header->dp_ifindex = 0;
ovs_header = ofpbuf_put_uninit(&reply, ovs_msg_size);
if (!DeviceIoControl(sock->handle, OVS_IOCTL_TRANSACT,
ofpbuf_data(txn.request), ofpbuf_size(txn.request),
ofpbuf_data(txn.reply), ofpbuf_size(txn.reply),
&bytes, NULL)) {
retval = EINVAL;
goto done;
} else {
if (bytes < ovs_msg_size) {
retval = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
nlmsg = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(txn.reply);
if (nlmsg->nlmsg_seq != seq) {
retval = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
sock->pid = nlmsg->nlmsg_pid;
}
retval = 0;
done:
ofpbuf_uninit(&request);
ofpbuf_uninit(&reply);
return retval;
}
#endif /* _WIN32 */
/* Tries to add 'sock' as a listener for 'multicast_group'. Returns 0 if
* successful, otherwise a positive errno value.
*
* A socket that is subscribed to a multicast group that receives asynchronous
* notifications must not be used for Netlink transactions or dumps, because
* transactions and dumps can cause notifications to be lost.
*
* Multicast group numbers are always positive.
*
* It is not an error to attempt to join a multicast group to which a socket
* already belongs. */
int
nl_sock_join_mcgroup(struct nl_sock *sock, unsigned int multicast_group)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
#define OVS_VPORT_MCGROUP_FALLBACK_ID 33
struct ofpbuf msg_buf;
struct message_multicast
{
struct nlmsghdr;
/* if true, join; if else, leave */
unsigned char join;
unsigned int groupId;
};
struct message_multicast msg = { 0 };
msg.nlmsg_len = sizeof(struct message_multicast);
msg.nlmsg_type = OVS_VPORT_MCGROUP_FALLBACK_ID;
msg.nlmsg_flags = 0;
msg.nlmsg_seq = 0;
msg.nlmsg_pid = sock->pid;
msg.join = 1;
msg.groupId = multicast_group;
msg_buf.base_ = &msg;
msg_buf.data_ = &msg;
msg_buf.size_ = msg.nlmsg_len;
nl_sock_send__(sock, &msg_buf, msg.nlmsg_seq, 0);
#else
if (setsockopt(sock->fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP,
&multicast_group, sizeof multicast_group) < 0) {
VLOG_WARN("could not join multicast group %u (%s)",
multicast_group, ovs_strerror(errno));
return errno;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/* Tries to make 'sock' stop listening to 'multicast_group'. Returns 0 if
* successful, otherwise a positive errno value.
*
* Multicast group numbers are always positive.
*
* It is not an error to attempt to leave a multicast group to which a socket
* does not belong.
*
* On success, reading from 'sock' will still return any messages that were
* received on 'multicast_group' before the group was left. */
int
nl_sock_leave_mcgroup(struct nl_sock *sock, unsigned int multicast_group)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
struct ofpbuf msg_buf;
struct message_multicast
{
struct nlmsghdr;
/* if true, join; if else, leave*/
unsigned char join;
};
struct message_multicast msg = { 0 };
nl_msg_put_nlmsghdr(&msg, sizeof(struct message_multicast),
multicast_group, 0);
msg.join = 0;
msg_buf.base_ = &msg;
msg_buf.data_ = &msg;
msg_buf.size_ = msg.nlmsg_len;
nl_sock_send__(sock, &msg_buf, msg.nlmsg_seq, 0);
#else
if (setsockopt(sock->fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP,
&multicast_group, sizeof multicast_group) < 0) {
VLOG_WARN("could not leave multicast group %u (%s)",
multicast_group, ovs_strerror(errno));
return errno;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
static int
nl_sock_send__(struct nl_sock *sock, const struct ofpbuf *msg,
uint32_t nlmsg_seq, bool wait)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(msg);
int error;
nlmsg->nlmsg_len = ofpbuf_size(msg);
nlmsg->nlmsg_seq = nlmsg_seq;
nlmsg->nlmsg_pid = sock->pid;
do {
int retval;
#ifdef _WIN32
bool result;
DWORD last_error = 0;
result = WriteFile(sock->handle, ofpbuf_data(msg), ofpbuf_size(msg),
&retval, NULL);
last_error = GetLastError();
if (last_error != ERROR_SUCCESS && !result) {
retval = -1;
errno = EAGAIN;
}
#else
retval = send(sock->fd, ofpbuf_data(msg), ofpbuf_size(msg), wait ? 0 : MSG_DONTWAIT);
#endif
error = retval < 0 ? errno : 0;
} while (error == EINTR);
log_nlmsg(__func__, error, ofpbuf_data(msg), ofpbuf_size(msg), sock->protocol);
if (!error) {
COVERAGE_INC(netlink_sent);
}
return error;
}
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
/* Tries to send 'msg', which must contain a Netlink message, to the kernel on
* 'sock'. nlmsg_len in 'msg' will be finalized to match ofpbuf_size(msg), nlmsg_pid
* will be set to 'sock''s pid, and nlmsg_seq will be initialized to a fresh
* sequence number, before the message is sent.
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
*
* Returns 0 if successful, otherwise a positive errno value. If
* 'wait' is true, then the send will wait until buffer space is ready;
* otherwise, returns EAGAIN if the 'sock' send buffer is full. */
int
nl_sock_send(struct nl_sock *sock, const struct ofpbuf *msg, bool wait)
{
return nl_sock_send_seq(sock, msg, nl_sock_allocate_seq(sock, 1), wait);
}
/* Tries to send 'msg', which must contain a Netlink message, to the kernel on
* 'sock'. nlmsg_len in 'msg' will be finalized to match ofpbuf_size(msg), nlmsg_pid
* will be set to 'sock''s pid, and nlmsg_seq will be initialized to
* 'nlmsg_seq', before the message is sent.
*
* Returns 0 if successful, otherwise a positive errno value. If
* 'wait' is true, then the send will wait until buffer space is ready;
* otherwise, returns EAGAIN if the 'sock' send buffer is full.
*
* This function is suitable for sending a reply to a request that was received
* with sequence number 'nlmsg_seq'. Otherwise, use nl_sock_send() instead. */
int
nl_sock_send_seq(struct nl_sock *sock, const struct ofpbuf *msg,
uint32_t nlmsg_seq, bool wait)
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
{
return nl_sock_send__(sock, msg, nlmsg_seq, wait);
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
}
static int
nl_sock_recv__(struct nl_sock *sock, struct ofpbuf *buf, bool wait)
{
/* We can't accurately predict the size of the data to be received. The
* caller is supposed to have allocated enough space in 'buf' to handle the
* "typical" case. To handle exceptions, we make available enough space in
* 'tail' to allow Netlink messages to be up to 64 kB long (a reasonable
* figure since that's the maximum length of a Netlink attribute). */
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsghdr;
#ifdef _WIN32
#define MAX_STACK_LENGTH 81920
uint8_t tail[MAX_STACK_LENGTH];
#else
uint8_t tail[65536];
#endif
struct iovec iov[2];
struct msghdr msg;
ssize_t retval;
netlink-socket: Work around upstream kernel Netlink bug. The upstream kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c netlink_recvmsg() contains the following code to refill the Netlink socket buffer with more dump skbs while a dump is in progress: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } The netlink_dump() function that this calls returns a negative number on error, the convention used throughout the kernel, and thus sk->sk_err receives a negative value on error. However, sk->sk_err is supposed to contain either 0 or a positive errno value, as one can see from a quick "grep" through net for 'sk_err =', e.g.: ipv4/tcp.c:2067: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp.c:2069: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4106: sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4109: sk->sk_err = EPIPE; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4114: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; netlink/af_netlink.c:741: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; netlink/af_netlink.c:1796: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; packet/af_packet.c:2476: sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; unix/af_unix.c:341: other->sk_err = ECONNRESET; unix/af_unix.c:407: skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET; The result is that the next attempt to receive from the socket will return the error to userspace with the wrong sign. (The root of the error in this case is that multiple threads are attempting to read a single flow dump from a shared fd. That should work, but the kernel has an internal race that can result in one or more of those threads hitting the EINVAL case at the start of netlink_dump(). The EINVAL is harmless in this case and userspace should be able to ignore it, but reporting the EINVAL as if it were a 22-byte message received in userspace throws a real wrench in the works.) This bug makes me think that there are probably not many programs doing multithreaded Netlink dumps. Maybe it is good that we are considering other approaches. VMware-BZ: #1255704 Reported-by: Mihir Gangar <gangarm@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-06-30 14:57:42 -07:00
int error;
ovs_assert(buf->allocated >= sizeof *nlmsghdr);
ofpbuf_clear(buf);
iov[0].iov_base = ofpbuf_base(buf);
iov[0].iov_len = buf->allocated;
iov[1].iov_base = tail;
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof tail;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof msg);
msg.msg_iov = iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
netlink-socket: Work around upstream kernel Netlink bug. The upstream kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c netlink_recvmsg() contains the following code to refill the Netlink socket buffer with more dump skbs while a dump is in progress: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } The netlink_dump() function that this calls returns a negative number on error, the convention used throughout the kernel, and thus sk->sk_err receives a negative value on error. However, sk->sk_err is supposed to contain either 0 or a positive errno value, as one can see from a quick "grep" through net for 'sk_err =', e.g.: ipv4/tcp.c:2067: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp.c:2069: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4106: sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4109: sk->sk_err = EPIPE; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4114: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; netlink/af_netlink.c:741: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; netlink/af_netlink.c:1796: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; packet/af_packet.c:2476: sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; unix/af_unix.c:341: other->sk_err = ECONNRESET; unix/af_unix.c:407: skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET; The result is that the next attempt to receive from the socket will return the error to userspace with the wrong sign. (The root of the error in this case is that multiple threads are attempting to read a single flow dump from a shared fd. That should work, but the kernel has an internal race that can result in one or more of those threads hitting the EINVAL case at the start of netlink_dump(). The EINVAL is harmless in this case and userspace should be able to ignore it, but reporting the EINVAL as if it were a 22-byte message received in userspace throws a real wrench in the works.) This bug makes me think that there are probably not many programs doing multithreaded Netlink dumps. Maybe it is good that we are considering other approaches. VMware-BZ: #1255704 Reported-by: Mihir Gangar <gangarm@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-06-30 14:57:42 -07:00
/* Receive a Netlink message from the kernel.
*
* This works around a kernel bug in which the kernel returns an error code
* as if it were the number of bytes read. It doesn't actually modify
* anything in the receive buffer in that case, so we can initialize the
* Netlink header with an impossible message length and then, upon success,
* check whether it changed. */
nlmsghdr = ofpbuf_base(buf);
do {
netlink-socket: Work around upstream kernel Netlink bug. The upstream kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c netlink_recvmsg() contains the following code to refill the Netlink socket buffer with more dump skbs while a dump is in progress: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } The netlink_dump() function that this calls returns a negative number on error, the convention used throughout the kernel, and thus sk->sk_err receives a negative value on error. However, sk->sk_err is supposed to contain either 0 or a positive errno value, as one can see from a quick "grep" through net for 'sk_err =', e.g.: ipv4/tcp.c:2067: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp.c:2069: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4106: sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4109: sk->sk_err = EPIPE; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4114: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; netlink/af_netlink.c:741: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; netlink/af_netlink.c:1796: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; packet/af_packet.c:2476: sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; unix/af_unix.c:341: other->sk_err = ECONNRESET; unix/af_unix.c:407: skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET; The result is that the next attempt to receive from the socket will return the error to userspace with the wrong sign. (The root of the error in this case is that multiple threads are attempting to read a single flow dump from a shared fd. That should work, but the kernel has an internal race that can result in one or more of those threads hitting the EINVAL case at the start of netlink_dump(). The EINVAL is harmless in this case and userspace should be able to ignore it, but reporting the EINVAL as if it were a 22-byte message received in userspace throws a real wrench in the works.) This bug makes me think that there are probably not many programs doing multithreaded Netlink dumps. Maybe it is good that we are considering other approaches. VMware-BZ: #1255704 Reported-by: Mihir Gangar <gangarm@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-06-30 14:57:42 -07:00
nlmsghdr->nlmsg_len = UINT32_MAX;
#ifdef _WIN32
boolean result = false;
DWORD last_error = 0;
result = ReadFile(sock->handle, tail, MAX_STACK_LENGTH, &retval, NULL);
last_error = GetLastError();
if (last_error != ERROR_SUCCESS && !result) {
retval = -1;
errno = EAGAIN;
} else {
ofpbuf_put(buf, tail, retval);
}
#else
retval = recvmsg(sock->fd, &msg, wait ? 0 : MSG_DONTWAIT);
#endif
netlink-socket: Work around upstream kernel Netlink bug. The upstream kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c netlink_recvmsg() contains the following code to refill the Netlink socket buffer with more dump skbs while a dump is in progress: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } The netlink_dump() function that this calls returns a negative number on error, the convention used throughout the kernel, and thus sk->sk_err receives a negative value on error. However, sk->sk_err is supposed to contain either 0 or a positive errno value, as one can see from a quick "grep" through net for 'sk_err =', e.g.: ipv4/tcp.c:2067: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp.c:2069: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4106: sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4109: sk->sk_err = EPIPE; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4114: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; netlink/af_netlink.c:741: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; netlink/af_netlink.c:1796: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; packet/af_packet.c:2476: sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; unix/af_unix.c:341: other->sk_err = ECONNRESET; unix/af_unix.c:407: skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET; The result is that the next attempt to receive from the socket will return the error to userspace with the wrong sign. (The root of the error in this case is that multiple threads are attempting to read a single flow dump from a shared fd. That should work, but the kernel has an internal race that can result in one or more of those threads hitting the EINVAL case at the start of netlink_dump(). The EINVAL is harmless in this case and userspace should be able to ignore it, but reporting the EINVAL as if it were a 22-byte message received in userspace throws a real wrench in the works.) This bug makes me think that there are probably not many programs doing multithreaded Netlink dumps. Maybe it is good that we are considering other approaches. VMware-BZ: #1255704 Reported-by: Mihir Gangar <gangarm@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-06-30 14:57:42 -07:00
error = (retval < 0 ? errno
: retval == 0 ? ECONNRESET /* not possible? */
: nlmsghdr->nlmsg_len != UINT32_MAX ? 0
: retval);
netlink-socket: Work around upstream kernel Netlink bug. The upstream kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c netlink_recvmsg() contains the following code to refill the Netlink socket buffer with more dump skbs while a dump is in progress: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } The netlink_dump() function that this calls returns a negative number on error, the convention used throughout the kernel, and thus sk->sk_err receives a negative value on error. However, sk->sk_err is supposed to contain either 0 or a positive errno value, as one can see from a quick "grep" through net for 'sk_err =', e.g.: ipv4/tcp.c:2067: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp.c:2069: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4106: sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4109: sk->sk_err = EPIPE; ipv4/tcp_input.c:4114: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; netlink/af_netlink.c:741: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; netlink/af_netlink.c:1796: sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS; packet/af_packet.c:2476: sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; unix/af_unix.c:341: other->sk_err = ECONNRESET; unix/af_unix.c:407: skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET; The result is that the next attempt to receive from the socket will return the error to userspace with the wrong sign. (The root of the error in this case is that multiple threads are attempting to read a single flow dump from a shared fd. That should work, but the kernel has an internal race that can result in one or more of those threads hitting the EINVAL case at the start of netlink_dump(). The EINVAL is harmless in this case and userspace should be able to ignore it, but reporting the EINVAL as if it were a 22-byte message received in userspace throws a real wrench in the works.) This bug makes me think that there are probably not many programs doing multithreaded Netlink dumps. Maybe it is good that we are considering other approaches. VMware-BZ: #1255704 Reported-by: Mihir Gangar <gangarm@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-06-30 14:57:42 -07:00
} while (error == EINTR);
if (error) {
if (error == ENOBUFS) {
/* Socket receive buffer overflow dropped one or more messages that
* the kernel tried to send to us. */
COVERAGE_INC(netlink_overflow);
}
return error;
}
if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) {
VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "truncated message (longer than %"PRIuSIZE" bytes)",
sizeof tail);
return E2BIG;
}
if (retval < sizeof *nlmsghdr
|| nlmsghdr->nlmsg_len < sizeof *nlmsghdr
|| nlmsghdr->nlmsg_len > retval) {
VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "received invalid nlmsg (%"PRIuSIZE" bytes < %"PRIuSIZE")",
retval, sizeof *nlmsghdr);
return EPROTO;
}
#ifndef _WIN32
ofpbuf_set_size(buf, MIN(retval, buf->allocated));
if (retval > buf->allocated) {
COVERAGE_INC(netlink_recv_jumbo);
ofpbuf_put(buf, tail, retval - buf->allocated);
}
#endif
log_nlmsg(__func__, 0, ofpbuf_data(buf), ofpbuf_size(buf), sock->protocol);
COVERAGE_INC(netlink_received);
return 0;
}
/* Tries to receive a Netlink message from the kernel on 'sock' into 'buf'. If
* 'wait' is true, waits for a message to be ready. Otherwise, fails with
* EAGAIN if the 'sock' receive buffer is empty.
*
* The caller must have initialized 'buf' with an allocation of at least
* NLMSG_HDRLEN bytes. For best performance, the caller should allocate enough
* space for a "typical" message.
*
* On success, returns 0 and replaces 'buf''s previous content by the received
* message. This function expands 'buf''s allocated memory, as necessary, to
* hold the actual size of the received message.
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
*
* On failure, returns a positive errno value and clears 'buf' to zero length.
* 'buf' retains its previous memory allocation.
*
* Regardless of success or failure, this function resets 'buf''s headroom to
* 0. */
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
int
nl_sock_recv(struct nl_sock *sock, struct ofpbuf *buf, bool wait)
netlink-socket: Make dumping and doing transactions on same nl_sock safe. It's not safe to use a single Netlink fd to do multiple operations in an synchronous way. Some of the limitations are fundamental; for example, the kernel only supports a single "dump" operation at a time. Others are limitations imposed by the OVS coding style; for example, our Netlink library is not callback based, so nothing can be done about incoming messages that can't be handled immediately. Regardless, in OVS multicast groups, transactions, and dumps cannot coexist on a single nl_sock. This is only mildly irritating at the moment, but it will become much worse later on, when dpif-linux shifts to using Netlink dumps for listing various kinds of datapath entities. When that happens, a dump will be in progress in situations where the dpif-linux client might want to do other operations. For example, it is reasonable for the client to list flows and, in the middle, look up information on vports mentioned in those flows. It might be possible to simply ban and avoid such nested operations--I have not even audited the source tree to find out whether we do anything like that already--but that seems like an unnecessary cramp on our coding style. Furthermore, it's difficult to explain and justify without understanding the implementation. This patch takes another approach, by improving the Netlink socket library to avoid artificial constraints. When an operation, or a dump, or joining a multicast group would cause a problem, this patch makes the library transparently create a separate Netlink socket. This solves the problem without putting any onerous restrictions on use. This commit also slightly simplifies netdev_vport_reset_names(). It had been written to destroy the dump object before the Netlink socket that it used, but this is no longer necessary and doing it in the opposite order saved a few lines of code. Reviewed by Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>.
2011-01-22 15:23:10 -08:00
{
return nl_sock_recv__(sock, buf, wait);
}
static void
nl_sock_record_errors__(struct nl_transaction **transactions, size_t n,
int error)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
struct nl_transaction *txn = transactions[i];
txn->error = error;
if (txn->reply) {
ofpbuf_clear(txn->reply);
}
}
}
static int
nl_sock_transact_multiple__(struct nl_sock *sock,
struct nl_transaction **transactions, size_t n,
size_t *done)
{
uint64_t tmp_reply_stub[1024 / 8];
struct nl_transaction tmp_txn;
struct ofpbuf tmp_reply;
uint32_t base_seq;
struct iovec iovs[MAX_IOVS];
struct msghdr msg;
int error;
int i;
base_seq = nl_sock_allocate_seq(sock, n);
*done = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
struct nl_transaction *txn = transactions[i];
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(txn->request);
nlmsg->nlmsg_len = ofpbuf_size(txn->request);
nlmsg->nlmsg_seq = base_seq + i;
nlmsg->nlmsg_pid = sock->pid;
iovs[i].iov_base = ofpbuf_data(txn->request);
iovs[i].iov_len = ofpbuf_size(txn->request);
}
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof msg);
msg.msg_iov = iovs;
msg.msg_iovlen = n;
do {
#ifdef _WIN32
DWORD last_error = 0;
bool result = FALSE;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
result = WriteFile((HANDLE)sock->handle, iovs[i].iov_base, iovs[i].iov_len,
&error, NULL);
last_error = GetLastError();
if (last_error != ERROR_SUCCESS && !result) {
error = EAGAIN;
errno = EAGAIN;
} else {
error = 0;
}
}
#else
error = sendmsg(sock->fd, &msg, 0) < 0 ? errno : 0;
#endif
} while (error == EINTR);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
struct nl_transaction *txn = transactions[i];
log_nlmsg(__func__, error, ofpbuf_data(txn->request), ofpbuf_size(txn->request),
sock->protocol);
}
if (!error) {
COVERAGE_ADD(netlink_sent, n);
}
if (error) {
return error;
}
ofpbuf_use_stub(&tmp_reply, tmp_reply_stub, sizeof tmp_reply_stub);
tmp_txn.request = NULL;
tmp_txn.reply = &tmp_reply;
tmp_txn.error = 0;
while (n > 0) {
struct nl_transaction *buf_txn, *txn;
uint32_t seq;
/* Find a transaction whose buffer we can use for receiving a reply.
* If no such transaction is left, use tmp_txn. */
buf_txn = &tmp_txn;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (transactions[i]->reply) {
buf_txn = transactions[i];
break;
}
}
/* Receive a reply. */
error = nl_sock_recv__(sock, buf_txn->reply, false);
if (error) {
if (error == EAGAIN) {
nl_sock_record_errors__(transactions, n, 0);
*done += n;
error = 0;
}
break;
}
/* Match the reply up with a transaction. */
seq = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(buf_txn->reply)->nlmsg_seq;
if (seq < base_seq || seq >= base_seq + n) {
VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "ignoring unexpected seq %#"PRIx32, seq);
continue;
}
i = seq - base_seq;
txn = transactions[i];
/* Fill in the results for 'txn'. */
if (nl_msg_nlmsgerr(buf_txn->reply, &txn->error)) {
if (txn->reply) {
ofpbuf_clear(txn->reply);
}
if (txn->error) {
VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "received NAK error=%d (%s)",
error, ovs_strerror(txn->error));
}
} else {
txn->error = 0;
if (txn->reply && txn != buf_txn) {
/* Swap buffers. */
struct ofpbuf *reply = buf_txn->reply;
buf_txn->reply = txn->reply;
txn->reply = reply;
}
}
/* Fill in the results for transactions before 'txn'. (We have to do
* this after the results for 'txn' itself because of the buffer swap
* above.) */
nl_sock_record_errors__(transactions, i, 0);
/* Advance. */
*done += i + 1;
transactions += i + 1;
n -= i + 1;
base_seq += i + 1;
}
ofpbuf_uninit(&tmp_reply);
return error;
}
static void
nl_sock_transact_multiple(struct nl_sock *sock,
struct nl_transaction **transactions, size_t n)
{
int max_batch_count;
int error;
if (!n) {
return;
}
/* In theory, every request could have a 64 kB reply. But the default and
* maximum socket rcvbuf size with typical Dom0 memory sizes both tend to
* be a bit below 128 kB, so that would only allow a single message in a
* "batch". So we assume that replies average (at most) 4 kB, which allows
* a good deal of batching.
*
* In practice, most of the requests that we batch either have no reply at
* all or a brief reply. */
max_batch_count = MAX(sock->rcvbuf / 4096, 1);
max_batch_count = MIN(max_batch_count, max_iovs);
while (n > 0) {
size_t count, bytes;
size_t done;
/* Batch up to 'max_batch_count' transactions. But cap it at about a
* page of requests total because big skbuffs are expensive to
* allocate in the kernel. */
#if defined(PAGESIZE)
enum { MAX_BATCH_BYTES = MAX(1, PAGESIZE - 512) };
#else
enum { MAX_BATCH_BYTES = 4096 - 512 };
#endif
bytes = ofpbuf_size(transactions[0]->request);
for (count = 1; count < n && count < max_batch_count; count++) {
if (bytes + ofpbuf_size(transactions[count]->request) > MAX_BATCH_BYTES) {
break;
}
bytes += ofpbuf_size(transactions[count]->request);
}
error = nl_sock_transact_multiple__(sock, transactions, count, &done);
transactions += done;
n -= done;
if (error == ENOBUFS) {
VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "receive buffer overflow, resending request");
} else if (error) {
VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "transaction error (%s)", ovs_strerror(error));
nl_sock_record_errors__(transactions, n, error);
}
}
}
static int
nl_sock_transact(struct nl_sock *sock, const struct ofpbuf *request,
struct ofpbuf **replyp)
{
struct nl_transaction *transactionp;
struct nl_transaction transaction;
transaction.request = CONST_CAST(struct ofpbuf *, request);
transaction.reply = replyp ? ofpbuf_new(1024) : NULL;
transactionp = &transaction;
nl_sock_transact_multiple(sock, &transactionp, 1);
if (replyp) {
if (transaction.error) {
ofpbuf_delete(transaction.reply);
*replyp = NULL;
} else {
*replyp = transaction.reply;
}
}
return transaction.error;
}
/* Drain all the messages currently in 'sock''s receive queue. */
int
nl_sock_drain(struct nl_sock *sock)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
return 0;
#else
return drain_rcvbuf(sock->fd);
#endif
}
/* Starts a Netlink "dump" operation, by sending 'request' to the kernel on a
* Netlink socket created with the given 'protocol', and initializes 'dump' to
* reflect the state of the operation.
*
* 'request' must contain a Netlink message. Before sending the message,
* nlmsg_len will be finalized to match request->size, and nlmsg_pid will be
* set to the Netlink socket's pid. NLM_F_DUMP and NLM_F_ACK will be set in
* nlmsg_flags.
*
* The design of this Netlink socket library ensures that the dump is reliable.
*
* This function provides no status indication. nl_dump_done() provides an
* error status for the entire dump operation.
*
* The caller must eventually destroy 'request'.
*/
void
nl_dump_start(struct nl_dump *dump, int protocol, const struct ofpbuf *request)
{
nl_msg_nlmsghdr(request)->nlmsg_flags |= NLM_F_DUMP | NLM_F_ACK;
ovs_mutex_init(&dump->mutex);
ovs_mutex_lock(&dump->mutex);
dump->status = nl_pool_alloc(protocol, &dump->sock);
if (!dump->status) {
dump->status = nl_sock_send__(dump->sock, request,
nl_sock_allocate_seq(dump->sock, 1),
true);
}
dump->nl_seq = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(request)->nlmsg_seq;
ovs_mutex_unlock(&dump->mutex);
}
static int
nl_dump_refill(struct nl_dump *dump, struct ofpbuf *buffer)
OVS_REQUIRES(dump->mutex)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsghdr;
int error;
while (!ofpbuf_size(buffer)) {
error = nl_sock_recv__(dump->sock, buffer, false);
if (error) {
/* The kernel never blocks providing the results of a dump, so
* error == EAGAIN means that we've read the whole thing, and
* therefore transform it into EOF. (The kernel always provides
* NLMSG_DONE as a sentinel. Some other thread must have received
* that already but not yet signaled it in 'status'.)
*
* Any other error is just an error. */
return error == EAGAIN ? EOF : error;
}
nlmsghdr = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(buffer);
if (dump->nl_seq != nlmsghdr->nlmsg_seq) {
VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "ignoring seq %#"PRIx32" != expected %#"PRIx32,
nlmsghdr->nlmsg_seq, dump->nl_seq);
ofpbuf_clear(buffer);
}
}
if (nl_msg_nlmsgerr(buffer, &error) && error) {
VLOG_INFO_RL(&rl, "netlink dump request error (%s)",
ovs_strerror(error));
ofpbuf_clear(buffer);
return error;
}
return 0;
}
static int
nl_dump_next__(struct ofpbuf *reply, struct ofpbuf *buffer)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsghdr = nl_msg_next(buffer, reply);
if (!nlmsghdr) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "netlink dump contains message fragment");
return EPROTO;
} else if (nlmsghdr->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE) {
return EOF;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
/* Attempts to retrieve another reply from 'dump' into 'buffer'. 'dump' must
* have been initialized with nl_dump_start(), and 'buffer' must have been
* initialized. 'buffer' should be at least NL_DUMP_BUFSIZE bytes long.
*
* If successful, returns true and points 'reply->data' and
* 'ofpbuf_size(reply)' to the message that was retrieved. The caller must not
* modify 'reply' (because it points within 'buffer', which will be used by
* future calls to this function).
*
* On failure, returns false and sets 'reply->data' to NULL and
* 'ofpbuf_size(reply)' to 0. Failure might indicate an actual error or merely
* the end of replies. An error status for the entire dump operation is
* provided when it is completed by calling nl_dump_done().
*
* Multiple threads may call this function, passing the same nl_dump, however
* each must provide independent buffers. This function may cache multiple
* replies in the buffer, and these will be processed before more replies are
* fetched. When this function returns false, other threads may continue to
* process replies in their buffers, but they will not fetch more replies.
*/
bool
nl_dump_next(struct nl_dump *dump, struct ofpbuf *reply, struct ofpbuf *buffer)
{
int retval = 0;
/* If the buffer is empty, refill it.
*
* If the buffer is not empty, we don't check the dump's status.
* Otherwise, we could end up skipping some of the dump results if thread A
* hits EOF while thread B is in the midst of processing a batch. */
if (!ofpbuf_size(buffer)) {
netlink-socket: Work around kernel Netlink dump thread races. The Linux kernel Netlink implementation has two races that cause problems for processes that attempt to dump a table in a multithreaded manner. The first race is in the structure of the kernel netlink_recv() function. This function pulls a message from the socket queue and, if there is none, reports EAGAIN: skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (skb == NULL) goto out; Only if a message is successfully read from the socket queue does the function, toward the end, try to queue up a new message to be dumped: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } This means that if thread A reads a message from a dump, then thread B attempts to read one before A queues up the next, B will get EAGAIN. This means that, following EAGAIN, B needs to wait until A returns to userspace before it tries to read the socket again. nl_dump_next() already does this, using 'dump->status_seq' (although the need for it has never been explained clearly, to my knowledge). The second race is more serious. Suppose thread X and thread Y both simultaneously attempt to queue up a new message to be dumped, using the call to netlink_dump() quoted above. netlink_dump() begins with: mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex); cb = nlk->cb; if (cb == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; goto errout_skb; } Suppose that X gets cb_mutex first and finds that the dump is complete. It will therefore, toward the end of netlink_dump(), clear nlk->cb to NULL to indicate that no dump is in progress and release the mutex: nlk->cb = NULL; mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex); When Y grabs cb_mutex afterward, it will see that nlk->cb is NULL and return -EINVAL as quoted above. netlink_recv() stuffs -EINVAL in sk_err, but that error is not reported immediately; instead, it is saved for the next read from the socket. Since Open vSwitch maintains a pool of Netlink sockets, that next failure can crop up pretty much anywhere. One of the worst places for it to crop up is in the execution of a later transaction (e.g. in nl_sock_transact_multiple__()), because userspace treats Netlink transactions as idempotent and will re-execute them when socket errors occur. For a transaction that sends a packet, this causes packet duplication, which we actually observed in practice. (ENOBUFS should actually cause transactions to be re-executed in many cases, but EINVAL should not; this is a separate bug in the userspace netlink code.) VMware-BZ: #1283188 Reported-and-tested-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-07-10 16:48:16 -07:00
ovs_mutex_lock(&dump->mutex);
if (!dump->status) {
/* Take the mutex here to avoid an in-kernel race. If two threads
* try to read from a Netlink dump socket at once, then the socket
* error can be set to EINVAL, which will be encountered on the
* next recv on that socket, which could be anywhere due to the way
* that we pool Netlink sockets. Serializing the recv calls avoids
* the issue. */
dump->status = nl_dump_refill(dump, buffer);
}
retval = dump->status;
netlink-socket: Work around kernel Netlink dump thread races. The Linux kernel Netlink implementation has two races that cause problems for processes that attempt to dump a table in a multithreaded manner. The first race is in the structure of the kernel netlink_recv() function. This function pulls a message from the socket queue and, if there is none, reports EAGAIN: skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (skb == NULL) goto out; Only if a message is successfully read from the socket queue does the function, toward the end, try to queue up a new message to be dumped: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } This means that if thread A reads a message from a dump, then thread B attempts to read one before A queues up the next, B will get EAGAIN. This means that, following EAGAIN, B needs to wait until A returns to userspace before it tries to read the socket again. nl_dump_next() already does this, using 'dump->status_seq' (although the need for it has never been explained clearly, to my knowledge). The second race is more serious. Suppose thread X and thread Y both simultaneously attempt to queue up a new message to be dumped, using the call to netlink_dump() quoted above. netlink_dump() begins with: mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex); cb = nlk->cb; if (cb == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; goto errout_skb; } Suppose that X gets cb_mutex first and finds that the dump is complete. It will therefore, toward the end of netlink_dump(), clear nlk->cb to NULL to indicate that no dump is in progress and release the mutex: nlk->cb = NULL; mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex); When Y grabs cb_mutex afterward, it will see that nlk->cb is NULL and return -EINVAL as quoted above. netlink_recv() stuffs -EINVAL in sk_err, but that error is not reported immediately; instead, it is saved for the next read from the socket. Since Open vSwitch maintains a pool of Netlink sockets, that next failure can crop up pretty much anywhere. One of the worst places for it to crop up is in the execution of a later transaction (e.g. in nl_sock_transact_multiple__()), because userspace treats Netlink transactions as idempotent and will re-execute them when socket errors occur. For a transaction that sends a packet, this causes packet duplication, which we actually observed in practice. (ENOBUFS should actually cause transactions to be re-executed in many cases, but EINVAL should not; this is a separate bug in the userspace netlink code.) VMware-BZ: #1283188 Reported-and-tested-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-07-10 16:48:16 -07:00
ovs_mutex_unlock(&dump->mutex);
}
netlink-socket: Work around kernel Netlink dump thread races. The Linux kernel Netlink implementation has two races that cause problems for processes that attempt to dump a table in a multithreaded manner. The first race is in the structure of the kernel netlink_recv() function. This function pulls a message from the socket queue and, if there is none, reports EAGAIN: skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (skb == NULL) goto out; Only if a message is successfully read from the socket queue does the function, toward the end, try to queue up a new message to be dumped: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } This means that if thread A reads a message from a dump, then thread B attempts to read one before A queues up the next, B will get EAGAIN. This means that, following EAGAIN, B needs to wait until A returns to userspace before it tries to read the socket again. nl_dump_next() already does this, using 'dump->status_seq' (although the need for it has never been explained clearly, to my knowledge). The second race is more serious. Suppose thread X and thread Y both simultaneously attempt to queue up a new message to be dumped, using the call to netlink_dump() quoted above. netlink_dump() begins with: mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex); cb = nlk->cb; if (cb == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; goto errout_skb; } Suppose that X gets cb_mutex first and finds that the dump is complete. It will therefore, toward the end of netlink_dump(), clear nlk->cb to NULL to indicate that no dump is in progress and release the mutex: nlk->cb = NULL; mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex); When Y grabs cb_mutex afterward, it will see that nlk->cb is NULL and return -EINVAL as quoted above. netlink_recv() stuffs -EINVAL in sk_err, but that error is not reported immediately; instead, it is saved for the next read from the socket. Since Open vSwitch maintains a pool of Netlink sockets, that next failure can crop up pretty much anywhere. One of the worst places for it to crop up is in the execution of a later transaction (e.g. in nl_sock_transact_multiple__()), because userspace treats Netlink transactions as idempotent and will re-execute them when socket errors occur. For a transaction that sends a packet, this causes packet duplication, which we actually observed in practice. (ENOBUFS should actually cause transactions to be re-executed in many cases, but EINVAL should not; this is a separate bug in the userspace netlink code.) VMware-BZ: #1283188 Reported-and-tested-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-07-10 16:48:16 -07:00
/* Fetch the next message from the buffer. */
if (!retval) {
retval = nl_dump_next__(reply, buffer);
if (retval) {
/* Record 'retval' as the dump status, but don't overwrite an error
* with EOF. */
ovs_mutex_lock(&dump->mutex);
if (dump->status <= 0) {
dump->status = retval;
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&dump->mutex);
}
}
if (retval) {
ofpbuf_set_data(reply, NULL);
ofpbuf_set_size(reply, 0);
}
return !retval;
}
/* Completes Netlink dump operation 'dump', which must have been initialized
* with nl_dump_start(). Returns 0 if the dump operation was error-free,
* otherwise a positive errno value describing the problem. */
int
nl_dump_done(struct nl_dump *dump)
{
int status;
ovs_mutex_lock(&dump->mutex);
status = dump->status;
ovs_mutex_unlock(&dump->mutex);
/* Drain any remaining messages that the client didn't read. Otherwise the
* kernel will continue to queue them up and waste buffer space.
*
* XXX We could just destroy and discard the socket in this case. */
if (!status) {
uint64_t tmp_reply_stub[NL_DUMP_BUFSIZE / 8];
struct ofpbuf reply, buf;
ofpbuf_use_stub(&buf, tmp_reply_stub, sizeof tmp_reply_stub);
while (nl_dump_next(dump, &reply, &buf)) {
/* Nothing to do. */
}
ofpbuf_uninit(&buf);
ovs_mutex_lock(&dump->mutex);
status = dump->status;
ovs_mutex_unlock(&dump->mutex);
ovs_assert(status);
}
nl_pool_release(dump->sock);
netlink-socket: Work around kernel Netlink dump thread races. The Linux kernel Netlink implementation has two races that cause problems for processes that attempt to dump a table in a multithreaded manner. The first race is in the structure of the kernel netlink_recv() function. This function pulls a message from the socket queue and, if there is none, reports EAGAIN: skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (skb == NULL) goto out; Only if a message is successfully read from the socket queue does the function, toward the end, try to queue up a new message to be dumped: if (nlk->cb && atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 2) { ret = netlink_dump(sk); if (ret) { sk->sk_err = ret; sk->sk_error_report(sk); } } This means that if thread A reads a message from a dump, then thread B attempts to read one before A queues up the next, B will get EAGAIN. This means that, following EAGAIN, B needs to wait until A returns to userspace before it tries to read the socket again. nl_dump_next() already does this, using 'dump->status_seq' (although the need for it has never been explained clearly, to my knowledge). The second race is more serious. Suppose thread X and thread Y both simultaneously attempt to queue up a new message to be dumped, using the call to netlink_dump() quoted above. netlink_dump() begins with: mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex); cb = nlk->cb; if (cb == NULL) { err = -EINVAL; goto errout_skb; } Suppose that X gets cb_mutex first and finds that the dump is complete. It will therefore, toward the end of netlink_dump(), clear nlk->cb to NULL to indicate that no dump is in progress and release the mutex: nlk->cb = NULL; mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex); When Y grabs cb_mutex afterward, it will see that nlk->cb is NULL and return -EINVAL as quoted above. netlink_recv() stuffs -EINVAL in sk_err, but that error is not reported immediately; instead, it is saved for the next read from the socket. Since Open vSwitch maintains a pool of Netlink sockets, that next failure can crop up pretty much anywhere. One of the worst places for it to crop up is in the execution of a later transaction (e.g. in nl_sock_transact_multiple__()), because userspace treats Netlink transactions as idempotent and will re-execute them when socket errors occur. For a transaction that sends a packet, this causes packet duplication, which we actually observed in practice. (ENOBUFS should actually cause transactions to be re-executed in many cases, but EINVAL should not; this is a separate bug in the userspace netlink code.) VMware-BZ: #1283188 Reported-and-tested-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Acked-by: Alex Wang <alexw@nicira.com>
2014-07-10 16:48:16 -07:00
ovs_mutex_destroy(&dump->mutex);
return status == EOF ? 0 : status;
}
/* Causes poll_block() to wake up when any of the specified 'events' (which is
* a OR'd combination of POLLIN, POLLOUT, etc.) occur on 'sock'. */
void
nl_sock_wait(const struct nl_sock *sock, short int events)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
poll_fd_wait(sock->handle, events);
#else
poll_fd_wait(sock->fd, events);
#endif
}
/* Returns the underlying fd for 'sock', for use in "poll()"-like operations
* that can't use nl_sock_wait().
*
* It's a little tricky to use the returned fd correctly, because nl_sock does
* "copy on write" to allow a single nl_sock to be used for notifications,
* transactions, and dumps. If 'sock' is used only for notifications and
* transactions (and never for dump) then the usage is safe. */
int
nl_sock_fd(const struct nl_sock *sock)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
return sock->handle;
#else
return sock->fd;
#endif
}
/* Returns the PID associated with this socket. */
uint32_t
nl_sock_pid(const struct nl_sock *sock)
{
return sock->pid;
}
/* Miscellaneous. */
struct genl_family {
struct hmap_node hmap_node;
uint16_t id;
char *name;
};
static struct hmap genl_families = HMAP_INITIALIZER(&genl_families);
static const struct nl_policy family_policy[CTRL_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID] = {.type = NL_A_U16},
[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS] = {.type = NL_A_NESTED, .optional = true},
};
static struct genl_family *
find_genl_family_by_id(uint16_t id)
{
struct genl_family *family;
HMAP_FOR_EACH_IN_BUCKET (family, hmap_node, hash_int(id, 0),
&genl_families) {
if (family->id == id) {
return family;
}
}
return NULL;
}
static void
define_genl_family(uint16_t id, const char *name)
{
struct genl_family *family = find_genl_family_by_id(id);
if (family) {
if (!strcmp(family->name, name)) {
return;
}
free(family->name);
} else {
family = xmalloc(sizeof *family);
family->id = id;
hmap_insert(&genl_families, &family->hmap_node, hash_int(id, 0));
}
family->name = xstrdup(name);
}
static const char *
genl_family_to_name(uint16_t id)
{
if (id == GENL_ID_CTRL) {
return "control";
} else {
struct genl_family *family = find_genl_family_by_id(id);
return family ? family->name : "unknown";
}
}
#ifndef _WIN32
static int
do_lookup_genl_family(const char *name, struct nlattr **attrs,
struct ofpbuf **replyp)
{
struct nl_sock *sock;
struct ofpbuf request, *reply;
int error;
*replyp = NULL;
error = nl_sock_create(NETLINK_GENERIC, &sock);
if (error) {
return error;
}
ofpbuf_init(&request, 0);
nl_msg_put_genlmsghdr(&request, 0, GENL_ID_CTRL, NLM_F_REQUEST,
CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY, 1);
nl_msg_put_string(&request, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, name);
error = nl_sock_transact(sock, &request, &reply);
ofpbuf_uninit(&request);
if (error) {
nl_sock_destroy(sock);
return error;
}
if (!nl_policy_parse(reply, NLMSG_HDRLEN + GENL_HDRLEN,
family_policy, attrs, ARRAY_SIZE(family_policy))
|| nl_attr_get_u16(attrs[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID]) == 0) {
nl_sock_destroy(sock);
ofpbuf_delete(reply);
return EPROTO;
}
nl_sock_destroy(sock);
*replyp = reply;
return 0;
}
#else
static int
do_lookup_genl_family(const char *name, struct nlattr **attrs,
struct ofpbuf **replyp)
{
struct nl_sock *sock;
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg;
struct ofpbuf *reply;
int error;
uint16_t family_id;
const char *family_name;
uint32_t family_version;
uint32_t family_attrmax;
uint32_t mcgrp_id = OVS_WIN_NL_INVALID_MCGRP_ID;
const char *mcgrp_name = NULL;
*replyp = NULL;
reply = ofpbuf_new(1024);
/* CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS is supported only for VPORT family. */
if (!strcmp(name, OVS_WIN_CONTROL_FAMILY)) {
family_id = OVS_WIN_NL_CTRL_FAMILY_ID;
family_name = OVS_WIN_CONTROL_FAMILY;
family_version = OVS_WIN_CONTROL_VERSION;
family_attrmax = OVS_WIN_CONTROL_ATTR_MAX;
} else if (!strcmp(name, OVS_DATAPATH_FAMILY)) {
family_id = OVS_WIN_NL_DATAPATH_FAMILY_ID;
family_name = OVS_DATAPATH_FAMILY;
family_version = OVS_DATAPATH_VERSION;
family_attrmax = OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX;
} else if (!strcmp(name, OVS_PACKET_FAMILY)) {
family_id = OVS_WIN_NL_PACKET_FAMILY_ID;
family_name = OVS_PACKET_FAMILY;
family_version = OVS_PACKET_VERSION;
family_attrmax = OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX;
} else if (!strcmp(name, OVS_VPORT_FAMILY)) {
family_id = OVS_WIN_NL_VPORT_FAMILY_ID;
family_name = OVS_VPORT_FAMILY;
family_version = OVS_VPORT_VERSION;
family_attrmax = OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX;
mcgrp_id = OVS_WIN_NL_VPORT_MCGRP_ID;
mcgrp_name = OVS_VPORT_MCGROUP;
} else if (!strcmp(name, OVS_FLOW_FAMILY)) {
family_id = OVS_WIN_NL_FLOW_FAMILY_ID;
family_name = OVS_FLOW_FAMILY;
family_version = OVS_FLOW_VERSION;
family_attrmax = OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX;
} else {
ofpbuf_delete(reply);
return EINVAL;
}
nl_msg_put_genlmsghdr(reply, 0, GENL_ID_CTRL, 0,
CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY, family_version);
/* CTRL_ATTR_HDRSIZE and CTRL_ATTR_OPS are not populated, but the
* callers do not seem to need them. */
nl_msg_put_u16(reply, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID, family_id);
nl_msg_put_string(reply, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, family_name);
nl_msg_put_u32(reply, CTRL_ATTR_VERSION, family_version);
nl_msg_put_u32(reply, CTRL_ATTR_MAXATTR, family_attrmax);
if (mcgrp_id != OVS_WIN_NL_INVALID_MCGRP_ID) {
size_t mcgrp_ofs1 = nl_msg_start_nested(reply, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS);
size_t mcgrp_ofs2= nl_msg_start_nested(reply,
OVS_WIN_NL_VPORT_MCGRP_ID - OVS_WIN_NL_MCGRP_START_ID);
nl_msg_put_u32(reply, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID, mcgrp_id);
ovs_assert(mcgrp_name != NULL);
nl_msg_put_string(reply, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME, mcgrp_name);
nl_msg_end_nested(reply, mcgrp_ofs2);
nl_msg_end_nested(reply, mcgrp_ofs1);
}
/* Set the total length of the netlink message. */
nlmsg = nl_msg_nlmsghdr(reply);
nlmsg->nlmsg_len = ofpbuf_size(reply);
if (!nl_policy_parse(reply, NLMSG_HDRLEN + GENL_HDRLEN,
family_policy, attrs, ARRAY_SIZE(family_policy))
|| nl_attr_get_u16(attrs[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID]) == 0) {
nl_sock_destroy(sock);
ofpbuf_delete(reply);
return EPROTO;
}
*replyp = reply;
return 0;
}
#endif
/* Finds the multicast group called 'group_name' in genl family 'family_name'.
* When successful, writes its result to 'multicast_group' and returns 0.
* Otherwise, clears 'multicast_group' and returns a positive error code.
*/
int
nl_lookup_genl_mcgroup(const char *family_name, const char *group_name,
unsigned int *multicast_group)
{
struct nlattr *family_attrs[ARRAY_SIZE(family_policy)];
const struct nlattr *mc;
struct ofpbuf *reply;
unsigned int left;
int error;
*multicast_group = 0;
error = do_lookup_genl_family(family_name, family_attrs, &reply);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!family_attrs[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS]) {
error = EPROTO;
goto exit;
}
NL_NESTED_FOR_EACH (mc, left, family_attrs[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS]) {
static const struct nl_policy mc_policy[] = {
[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID] = {.type = NL_A_U32},
[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME] = {.type = NL_A_STRING},
};
struct nlattr *mc_attrs[ARRAY_SIZE(mc_policy)];
const char *mc_name;
if (!nl_parse_nested(mc, mc_policy, mc_attrs, ARRAY_SIZE(mc_policy))) {
error = EPROTO;
goto exit;
}
mc_name = nl_attr_get_string(mc_attrs[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
if (!strcmp(group_name, mc_name)) {
*multicast_group =
nl_attr_get_u32(mc_attrs[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]);
error = 0;
goto exit;
}
}
error = EPROTO;
exit:
ofpbuf_delete(reply);
return error;
}
/* If '*number' is 0, translates the given Generic Netlink family 'name' to a
* number and stores it in '*number'. If successful, returns 0 and the caller
* may use '*number' as the family number. On failure, returns a positive
* errno value and '*number' caches the errno value. */
int
nl_lookup_genl_family(const char *name, int *number)
{
if (*number == 0) {
struct nlattr *attrs[ARRAY_SIZE(family_policy)];
struct ofpbuf *reply;
int error;
error = do_lookup_genl_family(name, attrs, &reply);
if (!error) {
*number = nl_attr_get_u16(attrs[CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID]);
define_genl_family(*number, name);
} else {
*number = -error;
}
ofpbuf_delete(reply);
ovs_assert(*number != 0);
}
return *number > 0 ? 0 : -*number;
}
struct nl_pool {
struct nl_sock *socks[16];
int n;
};
static struct ovs_mutex pool_mutex = OVS_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
static struct nl_pool pools[MAX_LINKS] OVS_GUARDED_BY(pool_mutex);
static int
nl_pool_alloc(int protocol, struct nl_sock **sockp)
{
struct nl_sock *sock = NULL;
struct nl_pool *pool;
ovs_assert(protocol >= 0 && protocol < ARRAY_SIZE(pools));
ovs_mutex_lock(&pool_mutex);
pool = &pools[protocol];
if (pool->n > 0) {
sock = pool->socks[--pool->n];
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&pool_mutex);
if (sock) {
*sockp = sock;
return 0;
} else {
return nl_sock_create(protocol, sockp);
}
}
static void
nl_pool_release(struct nl_sock *sock)
{
if (sock) {
struct nl_pool *pool = &pools[sock->protocol];
ovs_mutex_lock(&pool_mutex);
if (pool->n < ARRAY_SIZE(pool->socks)) {
pool->socks[pool->n++] = sock;
sock = NULL;
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&pool_mutex);
nl_sock_destroy(sock);
}
}
/* Sends 'request' to the kernel on a Netlink socket for the given 'protocol'
* (e.g. NETLINK_ROUTE or NETLINK_GENERIC) and waits for a response. If
* successful, returns 0. On failure, returns a positive errno value.
*
* If 'replyp' is nonnull, then on success '*replyp' is set to the kernel's
* reply, which the caller is responsible for freeing with ofpbuf_delete(), and
* on failure '*replyp' is set to NULL. If 'replyp' is null, then the kernel's
* reply, if any, is discarded.
*
* Before the message is sent, nlmsg_len in 'request' will be finalized to
* match ofpbuf_size(msg), nlmsg_pid will be set to the pid of the socket used
* for sending the request, and nlmsg_seq will be initialized.
*
* The caller is responsible for destroying 'request'.
*
* Bare Netlink is an unreliable transport protocol. This function layers
* reliable delivery and reply semantics on top of bare Netlink.
*
* In Netlink, sending a request to the kernel is reliable enough, because the
* kernel will tell us if the message cannot be queued (and we will in that
* case put it on the transmit queue and wait until it can be delivered).
*
* Receiving the reply is the real problem: if the socket buffer is full when
* the kernel tries to send the reply, the reply will be dropped. However, the
* kernel sets a flag that a reply has been dropped. The next call to recv
* then returns ENOBUFS. We can then re-send the request.
*
* Caveats:
*
* 1. Netlink depends on sequence numbers to match up requests and
* replies. The sender of a request supplies a sequence number, and
* the reply echos back that sequence number.
*
* This is fine, but (1) some kernel netlink implementations are
* broken, in that they fail to echo sequence numbers and (2) this
* function will drop packets with non-matching sequence numbers, so
* that only a single request can be usefully transacted at a time.
*
* 2. Resending the request causes it to be re-executed, so the request
* needs to be idempotent.
*/
int
nl_transact(int protocol, const struct ofpbuf *request,
struct ofpbuf **replyp)
{
struct nl_sock *sock;
int error;
error = nl_pool_alloc(protocol, &sock);
if (error) {
*replyp = NULL;
return error;
}
error = nl_sock_transact(sock, request, replyp);
nl_pool_release(sock);
return error;
}
/* Sends the 'request' member of the 'n' transactions in 'transactions' on a
* Netlink socket for the given 'protocol' (e.g. NETLINK_ROUTE or
* NETLINK_GENERIC), in order, and receives responses to all of them. Fills in
* the 'error' member of each transaction with 0 if it was successful,
* otherwise with a positive errno value. If 'reply' is nonnull, then it will
* be filled with the reply if the message receives a detailed reply. In other
* cases, i.e. where the request failed or had no reply beyond an indication of
* success, 'reply' will be cleared if it is nonnull.
*
* The caller is responsible for destroying each request and reply, and the
* transactions array itself.
*
* Before sending each message, this function will finalize nlmsg_len in each
* 'request' to match the ofpbuf's size, set nlmsg_pid to the pid of the socket
* used for the transaction, and initialize nlmsg_seq.
*
* Bare Netlink is an unreliable transport protocol. This function layers
* reliable delivery and reply semantics on top of bare Netlink. See
* nl_transact() for some caveats.
*/
void
nl_transact_multiple(int protocol,
struct nl_transaction **transactions, size_t n)
{
struct nl_sock *sock;
int error;
error = nl_pool_alloc(protocol, &sock);
if (!error) {
nl_sock_transact_multiple(sock, transactions, n);
nl_pool_release(sock);
} else {
nl_sock_record_errors__(transactions, n, error);
}
}
static uint32_t
nl_sock_allocate_seq(struct nl_sock *sock, unsigned int n)
{
uint32_t seq = sock->next_seq;
sock->next_seq += n;
/* Make it impossible for the next request for sequence numbers to wrap
* around to 0. Start over with 1 to avoid ever using a sequence number of
* 0, because the kernel uses sequence number 0 for notifications. */
if (sock->next_seq >= UINT32_MAX / 2) {
sock->next_seq = 1;
}
return seq;
}
static void
nlmsghdr_to_string(const struct nlmsghdr *h, int protocol, struct ds *ds)
{
struct nlmsg_flag {
unsigned int bits;
const char *name;
};
static const struct nlmsg_flag flags[] = {
{ NLM_F_REQUEST, "REQUEST" },
{ NLM_F_MULTI, "MULTI" },
{ NLM_F_ACK, "ACK" },
{ NLM_F_ECHO, "ECHO" },
{ NLM_F_DUMP, "DUMP" },
{ NLM_F_ROOT, "ROOT" },
{ NLM_F_MATCH, "MATCH" },
{ NLM_F_ATOMIC, "ATOMIC" },
};
const struct nlmsg_flag *flag;
uint16_t flags_left;
ds_put_format(ds, "nl(len:%"PRIu32", type=%"PRIu16,
h->nlmsg_len, h->nlmsg_type);
if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_NOOP) {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(no-op)");
} else if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR) {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(error)");
} else if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE) {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(done)");
} else if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_OVERRUN) {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(overrun)");
} else if (h->nlmsg_type < NLMSG_MIN_TYPE) {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(reserved)");
} else if (protocol == NETLINK_GENERIC) {
ds_put_format(ds, "(%s)", genl_family_to_name(h->nlmsg_type));
} else {
ds_put_cstr(ds, "(family-defined)");
}
ds_put_format(ds, ", flags=%"PRIx16, h->nlmsg_flags);
flags_left = h->nlmsg_flags;
for (flag = flags; flag < &flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags)]; flag++) {
if ((flags_left & flag->bits) == flag->bits) {
ds_put_format(ds, "[%s]", flag->name);
flags_left &= ~flag->bits;
}
}
if (flags_left) {
ds_put_format(ds, "[OTHER:%"PRIx16"]", flags_left);
}
ds_put_format(ds, ", seq=%"PRIx32", pid=%"PRIu32,
h->nlmsg_seq, h->nlmsg_pid);
}
static char *
nlmsg_to_string(const struct ofpbuf *buffer, int protocol)
{
struct ds ds = DS_EMPTY_INITIALIZER;
const struct nlmsghdr *h = ofpbuf_at(buffer, 0, NLMSG_HDRLEN);
if (h) {
nlmsghdr_to_string(h, protocol, &ds);
if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR) {
const struct nlmsgerr *e;
e = ofpbuf_at(buffer, NLMSG_HDRLEN,
NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsgerr)));
if (e) {
ds_put_format(&ds, " error(%d", e->error);
if (e->error < 0) {
ds_put_format(&ds, "(%s)", ovs_strerror(-e->error));
}
ds_put_cstr(&ds, ", in-reply-to(");
nlmsghdr_to_string(&e->msg, protocol, &ds);
ds_put_cstr(&ds, "))");
} else {
ds_put_cstr(&ds, " error(truncated)");
}
} else if (h->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE) {
int *error = ofpbuf_at(buffer, NLMSG_HDRLEN, sizeof *error);
if (error) {
ds_put_format(&ds, " done(%d", *error);
if (*error < 0) {
ds_put_format(&ds, "(%s)", ovs_strerror(-*error));
}
ds_put_cstr(&ds, ")");
} else {
ds_put_cstr(&ds, " done(truncated)");
}
} else if (protocol == NETLINK_GENERIC) {
struct genlmsghdr *genl = nl_msg_genlmsghdr(buffer);
if (genl) {
ds_put_format(&ds, ",genl(cmd=%"PRIu8",version=%"PRIu8")",
genl->cmd, genl->version);
}
}
} else {
ds_put_cstr(&ds, "nl(truncated)");
}
return ds.string;
}
static void
log_nlmsg(const char *function, int error,
const void *message, size_t size, int protocol)
{
struct ofpbuf buffer;
char *nlmsg;
if (!VLOG_IS_DBG_ENABLED()) {
return;
}
ofpbuf_use_const(&buffer, message, size);
nlmsg = nlmsg_to_string(&buffer, protocol);
VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "%s (%s): %s", function, ovs_strerror(error), nlmsg);
free(nlmsg);
}