2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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|
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|
/*
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
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* Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 Nicira, Inc.
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2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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*
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2009-06-15 15:11:30 -07:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
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2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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*
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2009-06-15 15:11:30 -07:00
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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*/
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#ifndef MAC_LEARNING_H
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#define MAC_LEARNING_H 1
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2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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#include <time.h>
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
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#include "heap.h"
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2011-07-21 17:41:58 -07:00
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#include "hmap.h"
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2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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#include "list.h"
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2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
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#include "ovs-atomic.h"
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#include "ovs-thread.h"
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2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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#include "packets.h"
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2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
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#include "timeval.h"
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2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
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|
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
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/* MAC learning table
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* ==================
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*
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* A MAC learning table is a dictionary data structure that is specialized to
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* map from an (Ethernet address, VLAN ID) pair to a user-provided pointer. In
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* an Ethernet switch implementation, it used to keep track of the port on
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* which a packet from a given Ethernet address was last seen. This knowledge
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* is useful when the switch receives a packet to such an Ethernet address, so
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* that the switch can send the packet directly to the correct port instead of
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* having to flood it to every port.
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*
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* A few complications make the implementation into more than a simple wrapper
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* around a hash table. First, and most simply, MAC learning can be disabled
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* on a per-VLAN basis. (This is most useful for RSPAN; see
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* ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5) documentation of the "output_vlan" column in the
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* Mirror table for more information.). The data structure maintains a bitmap
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* to track such VLANs.
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*
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* Second, the implementation has the ability to "lock" a MAC table entry
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* updated by a gratuitous ARP. This is a simple feature but the rationale for
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* it is complicated. Please refer to the description of SLB bonding in
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* vswitchd/INTERNALS for an explanation.
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*
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* Third, the implementation expires entries that are idle for longer than a
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* configurable amount of time. This is implemented by keeping all of the
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* current table entries on a list ordered from least recently used (LRU) to
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* most recently used (MRU). Each time a MAC entry is used, it is moved to the
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* MRU end of the list. Periodically mac_learning_run() sweeps through the
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* list starting from the LRU end, deleting each entry that has been idle too
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* long.
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*
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* Finally, the number of MAC learning table entries has a configurable maximum
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* size to prevent memory exhaustion. When a new entry must be inserted but
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* the table is already full, the implementation uses an eviction strategy
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* based on fairness: it chooses the port that currently has greatest number of
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* learned MACs (choosing arbitrarily in case of a tie), and among that port's
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* entries it evicts the least recently used. (This is a security feature
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* because it prevents an attacker from forcing other ports' MACs out of the
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* MAC learning table with a "MAC flooding attack" that causes the other ports'
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* traffic to be flooded so that the attacker can easily sniff it.) The
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* implementation of this feature is like a specialized form of the
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* general-purpose "eviction groups" that OVS implements in OpenFlow (see the
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* documentation of the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table in
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* ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5) for details).
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*
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*
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* Thread-safety
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* =============
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*
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* Many operations require the caller to take the MAC learning table's rwlock
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* for writing (please refer to the Clang thread safety annotations). The
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* important exception to this is mac_learning_lookup(), which only needs a
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* read lock. This is useful for the common case where a MAC learning entry
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* being looked up already exists and does not need an update. However,
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* there's no deadlock-free way to upgrade a read lock to a write lock, so in
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* the case where the lookup result means that an update is required, the
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* caller must drop the read lock, take the write lock, and then repeat the
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* lookup (in case some other thread has already made a change).
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*/
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2012-02-01 15:04:51 -08:00
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struct mac_learning;
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2012-12-08 12:32:33 -08:00
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/* Default maximum size of a MAC learning table, in entries. */
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#define MAC_DEFAULT_MAX 2048
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2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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2009-07-15 11:02:24 -07:00
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/* Time, in seconds, before expiring a mac_entry due to inactivity. */
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2012-02-01 15:04:51 -08:00
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#define MAC_ENTRY_DEFAULT_IDLE_TIME 300
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2009-07-15 11:02:24 -07:00
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2010-06-02 16:26:46 -07:00
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/* Time, in seconds, to lock an entry updated by a gratuitous ARP to avoid
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* relearning based on a reflection from a bond slave. */
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#define MAC_GRAT_ARP_LOCK_TIME 5
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2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
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/* A MAC learning table entry.
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
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* Guarded by owning 'mac_learning''s rwlock. */
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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struct mac_entry {
|
2011-07-21 17:41:58 -07:00
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struct hmap_node hmap_node; /* Node in a mac_learning hmap. */
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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time_t expires; /* Expiration time. */
|
2010-06-02 16:26:46 -07:00
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time_t grat_arp_lock; /* Gratuitous ARP lock expiration time. */
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
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uint8_t mac[ETH_ADDR_LEN]; /* Known MAC address. */
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uint16_t vlan; /* VLAN tag. */
|
2011-03-18 15:03:24 -07:00
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|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
/* The following are marked guarded to prevent users from iterating over or
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
|
|
|
* accessing a mac_entry without holding the parent mac_learning rwlock. */
|
2014-12-15 14:10:38 +01:00
|
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struct ovs_list lru_node OVS_GUARDED; /* Element in 'lrus' list. */
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
|
|
|
/* Learned port.
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|
|
|
*
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|
|
|
* The client-specified data is mlport->port. */
|
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|
struct mac_learning_port *mlport;
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|
struct ovs_list port_lru_node; /* In mac_learning_port's "port_lru"s. */
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
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|
|
|
|
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|
static inline void *mac_entry_get_port(const struct mac_learning *ml,
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const struct mac_entry *);
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|
|
|
void mac_entry_set_port(struct mac_learning *, struct mac_entry *, void *port);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Information about client-provided port pointers (the 'port' member), to
|
|
|
|
|
* allow for per-port fairness.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* The client-provided pointer is opaque to the MAC-learning table, which never
|
|
|
|
|
* dereferences it. */
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_learning_port {
|
|
|
|
|
struct hmap_node hmap_node; /* In mac_learning's "ports_by_ptr". */
|
|
|
|
|
struct heap_node heap_node; /* In mac_learning's "ports_by_usage". */
|
|
|
|
|
void *port; /* Client-provided port pointer. */
|
|
|
|
|
struct ovs_list port_lrus; /* Contains "struct mac_entry"s by port_lru. */
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
/* Sets a gratuitous ARP lock on 'mac' that will expire in
|
|
|
|
|
* MAC_GRAT_ARP_LOCK_TIME seconds. */
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void mac_entry_set_grat_arp_lock(struct mac_entry *mac)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
mac->grat_arp_lock = time_now() + MAC_GRAT_ARP_LOCK_TIME;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Returns true if a gratuitous ARP lock is in effect on 'mac', false if none
|
|
|
|
|
* has ever been asserted or if it has expired. */
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool mac_entry_is_grat_arp_locked(const struct mac_entry *mac)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-03-30 13:01:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
return time_now() < mac->grat_arp_lock;
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
|
|
|
|
/* MAC learning table. */
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_learning {
|
2011-07-21 17:41:58 -07:00
|
|
|
|
struct hmap table; /* Learning table. */
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
|
|
|
struct ovs_list lrus OVS_GUARDED; /* In-use entries, LRU at front. */
|
2010-01-19 10:41:46 -08:00
|
|
|
|
uint32_t secret; /* Secret for randomizing hash table. */
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *flood_vlans; /* Bitmap of learning disabled VLANs. */
|
2012-02-01 15:04:51 -08:00
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idle_time; /* Max age before deleting an entry. */
|
2012-12-08 12:32:33 -08:00
|
|
|
|
size_t max_entries; /* Max number of learned MACs. */
|
2013-12-27 19:39:24 -08:00
|
|
|
|
struct ovs_refcount ref_cnt;
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
struct ovs_rwlock rwlock;
|
2013-08-01 18:04:07 -07:00
|
|
|
|
bool need_revalidate;
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fairness.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Both of these data structures include the same "struct
|
|
|
|
|
* mac_learning_port" but indexed differently.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* ports_by_usage is a per-port max-heap, in which the priority is the
|
|
|
|
|
* number of MAC addresses for the port. When the MAC learning table
|
|
|
|
|
* overflows, this allows us to evict a MAC entry from one of the ports
|
|
|
|
|
* that have the largest number of MAC entries, achieving a form of
|
|
|
|
|
* fairness.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* ports_by_ptr is a hash table indexed by the client-provided pointer. */
|
|
|
|
|
struct hmap ports_by_ptr; /* struct mac_learning_port hmap_nodes. */
|
|
|
|
|
struct heap ports_by_usage; /* struct mac_learning_port heap_nodes. */
|
2009-06-08 12:20:38 -07:00
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
int mac_entry_age(const struct mac_learning *ml, const struct mac_entry *e)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_RDLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
/* Basics. */
|
2012-02-01 15:04:51 -08:00
|
|
|
|
struct mac_learning *mac_learning_create(unsigned int idle_time);
|
2013-06-18 19:41:51 -07:00
|
|
|
|
struct mac_learning *mac_learning_ref(const struct mac_learning *);
|
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_unref(struct mac_learning *);
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-01 18:04:07 -07:00
|
|
|
|
bool mac_learning_run(struct mac_learning *ml) OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_wait(struct mac_learning *ml)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_RDLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Configuration. */
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
bool mac_learning_set_flood_vlans(struct mac_learning *ml,
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned long *bitmap)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_set_idle_time(struct mac_learning *ml,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idle_time)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_set_max_entries(struct mac_learning *ml, size_t max_entries)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Learning. */
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
bool mac_learning_may_learn(const struct mac_learning *ml,
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t src_mac[ETH_ADDR_LEN],
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
uint16_t vlan)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_RDLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_entry *mac_learning_insert(struct mac_learning *ml,
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t src[ETH_ADDR_LEN],
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
uint16_t vlan)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup. */
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
struct mac_entry *mac_learning_lookup(const struct mac_learning *ml,
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t dst[ETH_ADDR_LEN],
|
2013-08-01 18:04:07 -07:00
|
|
|
|
uint16_t vlan)
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_RDLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2011-03-22 09:47:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flushing. */
|
2013-07-22 11:11:54 -07:00
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_expire(struct mac_learning *ml, struct mac_entry *e)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
2013-08-01 18:04:07 -07:00
|
|
|
|
void mac_learning_flush(struct mac_learning *ml) OVS_REQ_WRLOCK(ml->rwlock);
|
mac-learning: Implement per-port MAC learning fairness.
In "MAC flooding", an attacker transmits an overwhelming number of frames
with unique Ethernet source address on a switch port. The goal is to
force the switch to evict all useful MAC learning table entries, so that
its behavior degenerates to that of a hub, flooding all traffic. In turn,
that allows an attacker to eavesdrop on the traffic of other hosts attached
to the switch, with all the risks that that entails.
Before this commit, the Open vSwitch "normal" action that implements its
standalone switch behavior (and that can be used by OpenFlow controllers
as well) was vulnerable to MAC flooding attacks. This commit fixes the
problem by implementing per-port fairness for MAC table entries: when
the MAC table is at its maximum size, MAC table eviction always deletes an
entry from the port with the most entries. Thus, MAC entries will never
be evicted from ports with only a few entries if a port with a huge number
of entries exists.
Controllers could introduce their own MAC flooding vulnerabilities into
OVS. For a controller that adds destination MAC based flows to an OpenFlow
flow table as a reaction to "packet-in" events, such a bug, if it exists,
would be in the controller code itself and would need to be fixed in the
controller. For a controller that relies on the Open vSwitch "learn"
action to add destination MAC based flows, Open vSwitch has existing
support for eviction policy similar to that implemented in this commit
through the "groups" column in the Flow_Table table documented in
ovs-vswitchd.conf.db(5); we recommend that users of "learn" not already
familiar with eviction groups to read that documentation.
In addition to implementation of per-port MAC learning fairness,
this commit includes some closely related changes:
- Access to client-provided "port" data in struct mac_entry
is now abstracted through helper functions, which makes it
easier to ensure that the per-port data structures are maintained
consistently.
- The mac_learning_changed() function, which had become trivial,
vestigial, and confusing, was removed. Its functionality was folded
into the new function mac_entry_set_port().
- Many comments were added and improved; there had been a lot of
comment rot in previous versions.
CERT: VU#784996
Reported-by: "Ronny L. Bull - bullrl" <bullrl@clarkson.edu>
Reported-at: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon4/t314-exploring-layer-2-network-security-in-virtualized-environments-ronny-l-bull-dr-jeanna-n-matthews
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Ethan Jackson <ethan@nicira.com>
2015-02-11 23:34:50 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Inlines. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void *
|
|
|
|
|
mac_entry_get_port(const struct mac_learning *ml OVS_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
|
const struct mac_entry *e)
|
|
|
|
|
OVS_REQ_RDLOCK(ml->rwlock)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return e->mlport ? e->mlport->port : NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-07-08 13:19:16 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* mac-learning.h */
|