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https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs
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Currently Open vSwitch is unable to create or connect to Unix Domain Sockets outside designated 'run' directory, because of fear of potential remote exploits where a hacked remote OVSDB manager would tell Open vSwitch to connect to a unix domain socket owned by other daemon on the same hypervisor. This patch allows to disable this behavior by changing /etc/default/openvswitch (Ubuntu) or /etc/sysconfig/openvswitch (RHEL) file to: ... OVS_CTL_OPTS=--no-self-confinement ... Note, that it is better to stick with default behavior, unless: 1. You have Open vSwitch running under SELinux or AppArmor that would prevent OVS from messing with sockets owned by other daemons; OR 2. You are sure that relying on OpenFlow handshake is enough to prevent OVS to adversely interact with those other daemons running on the same hypervisor; OR 3. You don't have much worries of remote exploits in the first place, because perhaps OVSDB manager is running on the same host as OVS. The initial use-case for this patch is to allow to connect to OpenFlow controller that has its socket outside OVS run directory. However, in the future it could be generalized to allow to disable self-confinement for other things like DPDK vhost-user sockets or anything else that is specifiable in OVSDB with full path. Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@ovn.org> Acked-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org> VMware-BZ: #1525857
145 lines
4.2 KiB
C
145 lines
4.2 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2014 Nicira, Inc.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include "daemon.h"
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#include "daemon-private.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "util.h"
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#include "ovs-thread.h"
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#include "openvswitch/vlog.h"
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VLOG_DEFINE_THIS_MODULE(daemon);
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/* For each of the standard file descriptors, whether to replace it by
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* /dev/null (if false) or keep it for the daemon to use (if true). */
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static bool save_fds[3];
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/* Self Confinement is a security feature that introduces additional
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* layer of defense where OVS in self-denying manner would refuse to connect
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* to or create unix domain sockets outside designated 'run' directory even
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* if remote (or local) OVSDB manager asked it to do so. This feature may
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* be disabled if Mandatory Access Control is used. */
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static bool self_confine = true;
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/* Will daemonize() really detach? */
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bool
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get_detach(void)
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{
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return detach;
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}
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/* If configured with set_pidfile() or set_detach(), creates the pid file and
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* detaches from the foreground session. */
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void
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daemonize(void)
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{
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daemonize_start(false);
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daemonize_complete();
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}
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/* Sets up a following call to daemonize() to create a pidfile named 'name'.
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* If 'name' begins with '/' (or contains ':' in windows), then it is treated
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* as an absolute path. Otherwise, it is taken relative to RUNDIR,
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* which is $(prefix)/var/run by default.
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*
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* If 'name' is null, then program_name followed by ".pid" is used. */
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void
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set_pidfile(const char *name)
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{
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assert_single_threaded();
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free(pidfile);
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pidfile = make_pidfile_name(name);
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}
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/* Disables self confinement. */
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void
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daemon_disable_self_confinement(void)
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{
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self_confine = false;
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}
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/* Returns true, if self-confinement should be enforced.
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* Otherwise, returns false. */
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bool
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daemon_should_self_confine(void)
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{
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return self_confine;
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}
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/* A daemon doesn't normally have any use for the file descriptors for stdin,
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* stdout, and stderr after it detaches. To keep these file descriptors from
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* e.g. holding an SSH session open, by default detaching replaces each of
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* these file descriptors by /dev/null. But a few daemons expect the user to
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* redirect stdout or stderr to a file, in which case it is desirable to keep
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* these file descriptors. This function, therefore, disables replacing 'fd'
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* by /dev/null when the daemon detaches. */
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void
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daemon_save_fd(int fd)
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{
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ovs_assert(fd == STDIN_FILENO ||
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fd == STDOUT_FILENO ||
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fd == STDERR_FILENO);
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save_fds[fd] = true;
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}
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/* Returns a readable and writable fd for /dev/null, if successful, otherwise
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* a negative errno value. The caller must not close the returned fd (because
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* the same fd will be handed out to subsequent callers). */
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static int
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get_null_fd(void)
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{
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static int null_fd;
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#ifndef _WIN32
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char *device = "/dev/null";
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#else
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char *device = "nul";
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#endif
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if (!null_fd) {
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null_fd = open(device, O_RDWR);
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if (null_fd < 0) {
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int error = errno;
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VLOG_ERR("could not open %s: %s", device, ovs_strerror(error));
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null_fd = -error;
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}
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}
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return null_fd;
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}
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/* Close standard file descriptors (except any that the client has requested we
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* leave open by calling daemon_save_fd()). If we're started from e.g. an SSH
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* session, then this keeps us from holding that session open artificially. */
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void
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close_standard_fds(void)
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{
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int null_fd = get_null_fd();
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if (null_fd >= 0) {
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int fd;
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for (fd = 0; fd < 3; fd++) {
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if (!save_fds[fd]) {
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dup2(null_fd, fd);
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}
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}
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}
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/* Disable logging to stderr to avoid wasting CPU time. */
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vlog_set_levels(NULL, VLF_CONSOLE, VLL_OFF);
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}
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