postfix-2.11-20131228

postfix/.indent.pro

@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
 -TDELTA_TIME
 -TDICT
 -TDICT_CACHE
+-TDICT_CACHE_SREQ
+-TDICT_CACHE_SREQ_INFO
+-TDICT_CACHE_TEST
 -TDICT_CDBM
 -TDICT_CDBQ
 -TDICT_CIDR

postfix/HISTORY

@@ -19409,8 +19409,8 @@ Apologies for any names omitted.
 20131219
 
 	Cleanup: renamed postconf(1) internal identifiers according
-	to a consistent scheme, to avoid name future name conflicts
+	to a consistent scheme, to avoid future name conflicts as
-	as Postfix evolves. This is a no-feature change.  Files:
+	Postfix evolves. This is a no-feature change.  Files:
 	postconf/*.[hc], postconf/extract.awk.
 
 	Documentation: linearized the order of exposition in
@@ -19440,3 +19440,32 @@ Apologies for any names omitted.
 
 	Documentation: added section on how to verify that forward
 	secrecy works. File: proto/FORWARD_SECRECY_README.html.
+
+20131222
+
+	Documentation: forward secrecy, with feedback from Adam
+	Shostack.  Viktor Dukhovni and Wietse Venema. File:
+	proto/FORWARD_SECRECY_README.html.
+
+20131224
+
+	Feature: smtpd_sasl_service (until now, this was hard-coded
+	internally as "smtp"). On request by Michal (sksoft.cz).
+	Files: global/mail_params.h, proto/postconf.proto,
+	mantools/postlink, smtpd/smtpd.c, smtpd/smtpd_sasl_glue.c.
+
+	Documentation: updated example to Dovecot version 2 syntax.
+	File: proto/SASL_README/html.
+
+20131228
+
+	Cleanup: DANE support: test script. Viktor Dukhovni. File
+	tls/tls_dane.sh.
+
+	LMDB will not be supported in the stable Postfix 2.11 release.
+
+	Debugging: test driver to speed up LMDB debugging and stress
+	testing.  Shockingly, LMDB terminates the postcreen daemon
+	without logfile record.  Fixing this will require changes
+	in LMDB or changes in the way Postfix can use LMDB. File:
+	util/dict_cache.c.

postfix/README_FILES/FORWARD_SECRECY_README

@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+WWaarrnniinngg
+
+Forward secrecy does not protect against active attacks such as forged DNS
+replies or forged TLS server certificates. If such attacks are a concern, then
+the SMTP client will need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a
+sufficiently-secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint of the public key
+or certificate. Conventional PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily
+subverted by a state-funded adversary.
+
 BBaacckkggrroouunndd
 
 Postfix supports forward secrecy of TLS network communication since version
@@ -34,18 +43,15 @@ cost constraints on the efficacy of bulk surveillance, recovering all past
 traffic is generally infeasible, and even recovery of individual sessions may
 be infeasible given a sufficiently-strong key agreement method.
 
-Forward secrecy protects network communication in the absence of active
-attacks, i.e. no forged DNS replies, and no forged TLS server certificates. If
-active attacks are a concern, then you will need to authenticate the remote
-SMTP server in a secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint of the public
-key or certificate. Conventional PKI relies on too many trusted parties.
-
 Topics covered in this document:
 
   * Forward Secrecy in TLS
   * Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Server
   * Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Client
-  * How do I know that it works?
+  * Getting started, quick and dirty
+  * How can I see that a connection has forward secrecy?
+  * What ciphers provide forward secrecy?
+  * What do "Anonymous", "Untrusted", etc. in Postfix logging mean?
   * Credits
 
 And last but not least, for the impatient:
@@ -71,18 +77,19 @@ not compromised by future disclosure of long-term authentication keys.
 
 The key-exchange algorithms used for forward secrecy require the TLS server to
 designate appropriate "parameters" consisting of a mathematical "group" and an
-element of that group called a "generator". There are two flavors of "groups"
+element of that group called a "generator". Presently, there are two flavors of
-that work with PFS:
+"groups" that work with PFS:
 
-  * Prime field groups. The server needs to be configured with a suitably large
+  * PPrriimmee--ffiieelldd ggrroouuppss ((EEDDHH)):: The server needs to be configured with a
-    prime and a corresponding "generator".
+    suitably-large prime and a corresponding "generator". The acronym for
-  * Elliptic curve groups. The server needs to be configured with a "named
+    forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
-    curve". These offer better security at lower computational cost than prime
+    (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE).
-    field groups, but are not as widely implemented.
 
-The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or Ephemeral Diffie-
+  * EElllliippttiicc--ccuurrvvee ggrroouuppss ((EEEECCDDHH)):: The server needs to be configured with a
-Hellman (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE). The acronym for the elliptic curve
+    "named curve". These offer better security at lower computational cost than
-version is EECDH which is short for Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
+    prime field groups, but are not as widely implemented. The acronym for the
+    elliptic curve version is EECDH which is short for Ephemeral Elliptic Curve
+    Diffie-Hellman.
 
 It is not essential to know what these are, but one does need to know that
 OpenSSL only supports EECDH as of version 1.0.0. Thus the configuration
@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ supported. The OpenSSL code for making this possible is not yet released as of
 late 2013 (it is available only in OpenSSL development snapshots).
 
 At some point Postfix will need to adjust to the new API for setting the
-elliptic curve options. Fortunately, when EECDH support was added to Postfix,
+elliptic-curve options. Fortunately, when EECDH support was added to Postfix,
 it introduced a layer of indirection:
 
         smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong | ultra
@@ -172,10 +179,12 @@ main.cf.
 FFoorrwwaarrdd SSeeccrreeccyy iinn tthhee PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP CClliieenntt
 
 The Postfix >= 2.2 SMTP client supports forward secrecy in its default
-configuration. If the remote SMTP server supports cipher suites with forward
+configuration. No configuration changes are needed besides turning on elliptic-
-secrecy (and does not override the SMTP client cipher preference), then the
+curve support with Postfix 2.6 and 2.7 (see the quick-start section). If the
-traffic between the server and client will resist decryption even if the
+remote SMTP server supports cipher suites with forward secrecy (and does not
-server's long-term authentication keys are later compromised.
+override the SMTP client's cipher preference), then the traffic between the
+server and client will resist decryption even if the server's long-term
+authentication keys are later compromised.
 
 The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly ordered to prefer
 EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar cipher suites that don't implement
@@ -189,8 +198,22 @@ a case-by-case basis via the TLS policy table.
 
 GGeettttiinngg ssttaarrtteedd,, qquuiicckk aanndd ddiirrttyy
 
-At least one time as root (prime group generation can take a few seconds to a
+  * Postfix 2.6 and 2.7: Enable elliptic-curve support. This is the default
-few minutes):
+    with Postfix >= 2.8.
+
+        /etc/postfix/main.cf:
+            # Postfix 2.6 or 2.7 only. This is default with Postfix 2.8 and
+        later.
+            smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong
+
+  * Optionally generate non-default EDH parameters for improved security
+    against pre-computation attacks and for compatibility with Debian-patched
+    EXIM SMTP clients (these require a minimum 2048-bit length for the non-
+    export prime). The parameter files are not secret, after all these
+    parameters are sent to all SMTP clients in the clear. Mode 0644 is fine.
+
+    Execute as root (prime group generation can take a few seconds to a few
+    minutes):
 
         # cd /etc/postfix
         # openssl dhparam -out dh512.tmp 512 && mv dh512.tmp dh512.pem
@@ -198,23 +221,18 @@ few minutes):
         # openssl dhparam -out dh2048.tmp 2048 && mv dh2048.tmp dh2048.pem
         # chmod 644 dh512.pem dh1024.pem dh2048.pem
 
-Note: greater security against "pre-computation" attacks against EDH can be
+    You can improve security against pre-computation attacks further by
-obtained by periodically regenerating the EDH parameters as above (an hourly or
+    regenerating the EDH parameters periodically (an hourly or daily cron job
-daily cron job running as root can automate this task). The parameter files are
+    running as root can automate this task).
-not secret, after all these are sent to all SMTP clients in the clear. Mode
-0644 is fine.
 
-Once the parameters are in place, update main.cf as follows:
+    Once the parameters are in place, update main.cf as follows:
 
         /etc/postfix/main.cf:
-        # Postfix >= 2.6
-        smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong
-        # All versions of Postfix:
             smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh2048.pem
             smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh512.pem
 
-If some of your MSA clients don't support 2048-bit EDH, you may need to adjust
+    If some of your MSA clients don't support 2048-bit EDH, you may need to
-the submission entry in master.cf accordingly:
+    adjust the submission entry in master.cf accordingly:
 
         /etc/postfix/master.cf:
             submission inet n       -       n       -       -       smtpd
@@ -225,32 +243,51 @@ the submission entry in master.cf accordingly:
                 -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
                 ...
 
-HHooww ddoo II kknnooww tthhaatt iitt wwoorrkkss??
+HHooww ccaann II sseeee tthhaatt aa ccoonnnneeccttiioonn hhaass ffoorrwwaarrdd sseeccrreeccyy??
 
-Postfix reports TLS connection information in several ways:
+Postfix can be configured to report information about the negotiated cipher,
+the corresponding key lengths, and the remote peer certificate or public-key
+verification status.
 
   * With "smtp_tls_loglevel = 1" and "smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1", the Postfix SMTP
-    client and server will log information about, among others, the remote peer
+    client and server will log TLS connection information to the maillog file.
-    certificate or public-key verification status, the negotiated cipher, and
+    The general logfile format is:
-    key lengths. The general logfile format is:
 
-        postfix/smtp[xxx]: Trusted TLS connection established to
+        postfix/smtp[process-id]: Untrusted TLS connection established
-        host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+        to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
+        (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits)
 
-        postfix/smtpd[xxx]: Untrusted TLS connection established from
+        postfix/smtpd[process-id]: Anonymous TLS connection established
-        host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+        from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
+        (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits)
 
   * With "smtpd_tls_received_header = yes", the Postfix SMTP server will record
-    similar information in the Received: header in the form of comments (text
+    TLS connection information in the Received: header in the form of comments
-    inside parentheses). The general format is:
+    (text inside parentheses). The general format depends on the
+    smtpd_tls_ask_ccert setting:
 
         Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
-                (using TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits))
+                (using TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
-                (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "Wietse Venema" (not
+                (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits))
+                (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "John Doe" (not
         verified))
 
+        Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
+                (using TLSv1 with cipher cipher-name
+                (actual-key-size/raw-key-size bits))
+                (No client certificate requested)
+
+The next sections will explain what cipher-name, key-size, and peer
+verification status information to expect.
+
+WWhhaatt cciipphheerrss pprroovviiddee ffoorrwwaarrdd sseeccrreeccyy??
+
 There are dozens of ciphers that support forward secrecy. What follows is the
-beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with OpenSSL 1.0.1e:
+beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with OpenSSL 1.0.1e. The list is
+sorted in the default Postfix preference order. It excludes null ciphers that
+only authenticate and don't encrypt, together with export and low-grade ciphers
+whose encryption is too weak to offer meaningful secrecy. The first column
+shows the cipher name, and the second shows the key exchange method.
 
     $ openssl ciphers -v \
             'aNULL:-aNULL:kEECDH:kEDH:+RC4:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!LOW:@STRENGTH' |
@@ -271,6 +308,81 @@ beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with OpenSSL 1.0.1e:
     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256            Kx=DH
     ...
 
+To date, all ciphers that support forward secrecy have one of five values for
+the first component of their OpenSSL name: "AECDH", "ECDHE", "ADH", "EDH" or
+"DHE". Ciphers that don't implement forward secrecy have names that don't start
+with one of these prefixes. This pattern is likely to persist until some new
+key-exchange mechanism is invented that also supports forward secrecy.
+
+The actual key length and raw algorithm key length are generally the same with
+non-export ciphers, but may they differ for the legacy export ciphers where the
+actual key is artificially shortened.
+
+WWhhaatt ddoo ""AAnnoonnyymmoouuss"",, ""UUnnttrruusstteedd"",, eettcc.. iinn PPoossttffiixx llooggggiinngg mmeeaann??
+
+The verification levels below are subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to
+different degrees. If such attacks are a concern, then the SMTP client will
+need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a sufficiently-secure manner.
+For example, by the fingerprint of the public key or certificate. Remember that
+conventional PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a
+state-funded adversary.
+
+AAnnoonnyymmoouuss (no peer certificate)
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP cclliieenntt:: With opportunistic TLS (the "may" security level) the
+    Postfix SMTP client does not verify any information in the peer
+    certificate. In this case it enables and prefers anonymous cipher suites in
+    which the remote SMTP server does not present a certificate (these ciphers
+    offer forward secrecy of necessity). When the remote SMTP server also
+    supports anonymous TLS, and agrees to such a cipher suite, the verification
+    status will be logged as "Anonymous".
+
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP sseerrvveerr:: This is by far most common, as client certificates are
+    optional, and the Postfix SMTP server does not request client certificates
+    by default (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert). Even when client certificates are
+    requested, the remote SMTP client might not send a certificate. Unlike the
+    Postfix SMTP client, the Postfix SMTP server "anonymous" verification
+    status does not imply that the cipher suite is anonymous, which corresponds
+    to the server not sending a certificate.
+
+UUnnttrruusstteedd (peer certificate not signed by trusted CA)
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP cclliieenntt:: The remote SMTP server presented a certificate, but
+    the Postfix SMTP client was unable to check the issuing CA signature. With
+    opportunistic TLS this is common with remote SMTP servers that don't
+    support anonymous cipher suites.
+
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP sseerrvveerr:: The remote SMTP client presented a certificate, but
+    the Postfix SMTP server was unable to check the issuing CA signature. This
+    can happen when the server is configured to request client certificates
+    (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert).
+
+TTrruusstteedd (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, unverified peer name)
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP cclliieenntt:: The remote SMTP server's certificate was signed by a
+    CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, but either the client was not
+    configured to verify the destination server name against the certificate,
+    or the server certificate did not contain any matching names. This is
+    common with opportunistic TLS (smtp_tls_security_level is "may" or else
+    "dane" with no usable TLSA DNS records) when the Postfix SMTP client's
+    trusted CAs can verify the authenticity of the remote SMTP server's
+    certificate, but the client is not configured or unable to verify the
+    server name.
+
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP sseerrvveerr:: The remote SMTP client certificate was signed by a CA
+    that the Postfix SMTP server trusts. The Postfix SMTP server never verifies
+    the remote SMTP client name against the names in the certificate. Since the
+    client chooses to connect to the server, the Postfix SMTP server has no
+    expectation of a particular client hostname.
+
+VVeerriiffiieedd (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, verified peer name)
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP cclliieenntt:: The remote SMTP server's certificate was signed by a
+    CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, and it matches one of the expected
+    server names. This implies that the Postfix SMTP client enforced
+    verification for the destination server name, otherwise the verification
+    status would have been just "Trusted".
+
+    PPoossttffiixx SSMMTTPP sseerrvveerr:: The status is never "Verified", as the Postfix SMTP
+    server never verifies the remote SMTP client name against the names in the
+    certificate.
+
 CCrreeddiittss
 
   * TLS support for Postfix was originally developed by Lutz Jänicke at Cottbus

postfix/README_FILES/SASL_README

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+X
+
 PPoossttffiixx SSAASSLL HHoowwttoo
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -109,71 +111,30 @@ configure and operate the Dovecot authentication server.
 PPoossttffiixx ttoo DDoovveeccoott SSAASSLL ccoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn
 
 Communication between the Postfix SMTP server and Dovecot SASL happens over a
-UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket. Dovecot 1 supports UNIX-domain socket
+UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket. We will be using a UNIX-domain socket
-communication only.
+for better privacy.
 
-UUNNIIXX--ddoommaaiinn ssoocckkeett ccoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn
+The following fragment for Dovecot version 2 assumes that the Postfix queue is
+under /var/spool/postfix/.
 
-The socket pathname and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need to be
+     1 conf.d/10-master.conf:
-specified on the Dovecot server side in dovecot.conf.
-
-The following example assumes that the Postfix queue is under /var/spool/
-postfix/.
-
-Note: the example uses Dovecot 1 syntax, See http://www.dovecot.org/ for newer
-syntax.
-
-     1 /etc/dovecot.conf:
-     2     auth default {
-     3       mechanisms = plain login
-     4         passdb pam {
-     5         }
-     6         userdb passwd {
-     7         }
-     8         socket listen {
-     9         client {
-    10           path = /var/spool/postfix/private/auth
-    11           mode = 0660
-    12           user = postfix
-    13           group = postfix
-    14         }
-    15       }
-    16     }
-
-Line 3 provides plain and login as mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server, line
-10 places the Dovecot SASL socket in /var/spool/postfix/private/auth, and lines
-11-13 limit read+write permissions to user and group postfix only.
-
-Proceed with the section "Enabling SASL authentication and authorization in the
-Postfix SMTP server" to turn on and use SASL in the Postfix SMTP server.
-
-TTCCPP ssoocckkeett ccoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn
-
-The TCP port and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need to be specified
-on the Dovecot server side in 10-auth.conf and 10-master.conf.
-
-The following examples assume that Postfix should communicate with Dovecot on
-TCP port 12345.
-
-Note: the examples use Dovecot 1 syntax, See http://www.dovecot.org/ for newer
-syntax.
-
-    1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf:
-    2     auth_mechanisms = plain login
-
-Line 2 provides plain and login as mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server.
-
-    1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-master.conf:
      2     service auth {
-    3       unix_listener auth-userdb {
+     3       ...
-    4       }
+     4       unix_listener /var/spool/postfix/private/auth {
-    5       inet_listener {
+     5         mode = 0660
-    6         port = 12345
+     6         # Assuming the default Postfix user and group
-    7       }
+     7         user = postfix
-    8     }
+     8         group = postfix
+     9       }
+    10       ...
+    11     }
+    12
+    13 conf.d/10-auth.conf
+    14     auth_mechanisms = plain login
 
-Line 5 creates a new TCP socket and line 6 specifies port 12345 where Dovecot
+Line 4 places the Dovecot SASL socket in /var/spool/postfix/private/auth, lines
-SASL should wait for Postfix authentication requests.
+5-8 limit read+write permissions to user and group postfix only, and line 14
+provides plain and login as mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server.
 
 Proceed with the section "Enabling SASL authentication and authorization in the
 Postfix SMTP server" to turn on and use SASL in the Postfix SMTP server.

postfix/WISHLIST

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Wish list:
 	independent from the DNS and native routines for host
 	name/address lookup.
 
+	Incorporate 3rd-party code such as dynamic_maps.
+
+	Support 3rd-party extension with /etc/postfix/postfix-files.d
+
 	Make been_here flag BH_FLAG_FOLD configurable for masochists.
 
 	Replace some redundant TLS_README sections with pointers

postfix/conf/main.cf

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # For common configuration examples, see BASIC_CONFIGURATION_README
 # and STANDARD_CONFIGURATION_README. To find these documents, use
 # the command "postconf html_directory readme_directory", or go to
-# http://www.postfix.org/.
+# http://www.postfix.org/BASIC_CONFIGURATION_README.html etc.
 #
 # For best results, change no more than 2-3 parameters at a time,
 # and test if Postfix still works after every change.

postfix/conf/master.cf

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #
 # Postfix master process configuration file.  For details on the format
-# of the file, see the master(5) manual page (command: "man 5 master").
+# of the file, see the master(5) manual page (command: "man 5 master" or
+# on-line: http://www.postfix.org/master.5.html).
 #
 # Do not forget to execute "postfix reload" after editing this file.
 #

postfix/html/FORWARD_SECRECY_README.html

@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ TLS Forward Secrecy in Postfix
 
 <hr>
 
+<h2> Warning </h2>
+
+<p> Forward secrecy does not protect against active attacks such
+as forged DNS replies or forged TLS server certificates. If such
+attacks are a concern, then the SMTP client will need to authenticate
+the remote SMTP server in a sufficiently-secure manner.  For example,
+by the fingerprint of the public key or certificate.  Conventional
+PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a
+state-funded adversary.  </p>
+
 <h2> Background </h2>
 
 <p> Postfix supports forward secrecy of TLS network communication
@@ -55,13 +65,6 @@ all past traffic is generally infeasible, and even recovery of
 individual sessions may be infeasible given a sufficiently-strong
 key agreement method. </p>
 
-<p> Forward secrecy protects network communication in the absence
-of active attacks, i.e. no forged DNS replies, and no forged TLS
-server certificates. If active attacks are a concern, then you will
-need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a secure manner.
-For example, by the fingerprint of the public key or certificate.
-Conventional PKI relies on too many trusted parties. </p>
-
 <p> Topics covered in this document: </p>
 
 <ul>
@@ -72,7 +75,14 @@ Conventional PKI relies on too many trusted parties. </p>
 
 <li><a href="#client_fs">Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Client</a>
 
-<li><a href="#test">How do I know that it works?</a>
+<li><a href="#quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a>
+
+<li><a href="#test">How can I see that a connection has forward secrecy?</a>
+
+<li><a href="#ciphers"> What ciphers provide forward secrecy? </a>
+
+<li><a href="#status"> What do "Anonymous", "Untrusted", etc. in
+Postfix logging mean? </a> 
 
 <li><a href="#credits"> Credits </a>
 
@@ -109,24 +119,24 @@ of long-term authentication keys. </p>
 <p> The key-exchange algorithms used for forward secrecy require
 the TLS server to designate appropriate "parameters" consisting of a
 mathematical "group" and an element of that group called a "generator".
-There are two flavors of "groups" that work with PFS: </p>
+Presently, there are two flavors of "groups" that work with PFS: </p>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li> Prime field groups.  The server needs to be configured with a
+<li> <p> <b> Prime-field groups (EDH):</b>  The server needs to be
-suitably large prime and a corresponding "generator".
+configured with a suitably-large prime and a corresponding "generator".
+The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or Ephemeral
+Diffie-Hellman (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE).  </p>
 
-<li> Elliptic curve groups.  The server needs to be configured with
+<li> <p> <b> Elliptic-curve groups (EECDH): </b>  The server needs
-a "named curve".  These offer better security at lower computational
+to be configured with a "named curve".  These offer better security
-cost than prime field groups, but are not as widely implemented.
+at lower computational cost than prime field groups, but are not
+as widely implemented.  The acronym for the elliptic curve version
+is EECDH which is short for Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
+</p>
 
 </ul>
 
-<p> The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or
-Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE).  The
-acronym for the elliptic curve version is EECDH which is short for
-Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. </p>
-
 <p> It is not essential to know what these are, but one does need
 to know that OpenSSL only supports EECDH as of version 1.0.0.  Thus
 the configuration parameters related to Elliptic Curve forward secrecy
@@ -156,8 +166,6 @@ the <a href="postconf.5.html">main.cf</a> setting "<a href="postconf.5.html#tls_
 will likely cause interoperability issues with older Exchange servers
 and is not recommended for now.  </p>
 
-</ul>
-
 <h3> EDH Server support </h3>
 
 <p> Postfix &ge; 2.2 support 1024-bit-prime EDH out of the box,
@@ -215,7 +223,7 @@ code for making this possible is not yet released as of late 2013
 (it is available only in OpenSSL development snapshots). </p>
 
 <p> At some point Postfix will need to adjust to the new API for
-setting the elliptic curve options.  Fortunately, when EECDH support
+setting the elliptic-curve options.  Fortunately, when EECDH support
 was added to Postfix, it introduced a layer of indirection: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
@@ -237,19 +245,23 @@ more curves at the desired security level without any changes to
 <h2> <a name="client_fs">Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Client</a> </h2>
 
 <p> The Postfix &ge; 2.2 SMTP client supports forward secrecy in
-its default configuration.  If the remote SMTP server supports
+its default configuration.  No configuration changes are needed
-cipher suites with forward secrecy (and does not override the SMTP
+besides turning on elliptic-curve support with Postfix 2.6 and 2.7
-client cipher preference), then the traffic between the server and
+(see the <a href="#quick-start"> quick-start</a> section).  If the
-client will resist decryption even if the server's long-term
+remote SMTP server supports cipher suites with forward secrecy (and
-authentication keys are <i>later</i> compromised. </p>
+does not override the SMTP client's cipher preference), then the
+traffic between the server and client will resist decryption even
+if the server's long-term authentication keys are <i>later</i>
+compromised.  </p>
 
-<p> The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly ordered
+<p> The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly
-to prefer EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar cipher suites
+ordered to prefer EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar
-that don't implement forward secrecy.  Administrators are strongly
+cipher suites that don't implement forward secrecy.  Administrators
-discouraged from changing the cipher list definitions.  It is likely
+are strongly discouraged from changing the cipher list definitions.
-safe to set "<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_ciphers">smtp_tls_ciphers</a> = medium" if you wish to disable the
+It is likely safe to set "<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_ciphers">smtp_tls_ciphers</a> = medium" if you wish
-obsolete "export" and "low" grade ciphers even with opportunistic
+to disable the obsolete "export" and "low" grade ciphers even with
-TLS.  Setting a minimum strength does not change the preference
+opportunistic TLS.  Setting a minimum strength does not change the
+preference
 order.  Note that strengths higher than "medium" exclude Exchange
 2003 and likely other widely used MTAs, thus "high" grade ciphers
 should only be used on a case-by-case basis via the <a
@@ -257,7 +269,27 @@ href="TLS_README.html#client_tls_policy">TLS policy</a> table. </p>
 
 <h2><a name="quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a></h2>
 
-<p> At least one time as root (prime group generation can take a
+<ul>
+
+<li> <p> Postfix 2.6 and 2.7: Enable elliptic-curve support. This
+is the default with Postfix &ge; 2.8.
+
+<blockquote>
+<pre>
+/etc/postfix/<a href="postconf.5.html">main.cf</a>:
+    # Postfix 2.6 or 2.7 only. This is default with Postfix 2.8 and later.
+    <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade">smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade</a> = strong
+</pre>
+</blockquote>
+
+<li> <p> Optionally generate non-default EDH parameters for improved
+security against pre-computation attacks and for compatibility with
+Debian-patched EXIM SMTP clients (these require a minimum 2048-bit
+length for the non-export prime).  The parameter files are not
+secret, after all these parameters are sent to all SMTP clients in
+the clear.  Mode 0644 is fine.  </p>
+
+<p> Execute as root (prime group generation can take a
 few seconds to a few minutes): </p>
 
 <blockquote>
@@ -270,20 +302,15 @@ few seconds to a few minutes): </p>
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<p> Note: greater security against "pre-computation" attacks against
+<p> You can improve security against pre-computation attacks further
-EDH can be obtained by periodically regenerating the EDH parameters
+by regenerating the EDH parameters periodically (an hourly or daily
-as above (an hourly or daily cron job running as root can automate
+cron job running as root can automate this task). </p>
-this task).  The parameter files are not secret, after all these are
-sent to all SMTP clients in the clear. Mode 0644 is fine.  </p>
 
 <p> Once the parameters are in place, update <a href="postconf.5.html">main.cf</a> as follows: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
 /etc/postfix/<a href="postconf.5.html">main.cf</a>:
-    # Postfix &ge; 2.6
-    <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade">smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade</a> = strong
-    # All versions of Postfix:
     <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file">smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file</a> = ${<a href="postconf.5.html#config_directory">config_directory</a>}/dh2048.pem
     <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file">smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file</a> = ${<a href="postconf.5.html#config_directory">config_directory</a>}/dh512.pem
 </pre>
@@ -305,44 +332,67 @@ need to adjust the submission entry in <a href="master.5.html">master.cf</a> acc
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<h2><a name="test">How do I know that it works? </a> </h2>
+</ul>
 
-<p> Postfix reports TLS connection information in several ways: </p>
+<h2><a name="test">How can I see that a connection has forward
+secrecy? </a> </h2>
+
+<p> Postfix can be configured to report information about the
+negotiated cipher, the corresponding key lengths, and the remote
+peer certificate or public-key verification status.  </p>
 
 <ul>
 
 <li> <p> With "<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_loglevel">smtp_tls_loglevel</a> = 1" and "<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_loglevel">smtpd_tls_loglevel</a> = 1",
-the Postfix SMTP client and server will log information about, among
+the Postfix SMTP client and server will log TLS connection information
-others, the remote peer certificate or public-key verification
+to the maillog file. The general logfile format is: </p>
-status, the negotiated cipher, and key lengths. The general logfile
-format is: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
-postfix/smtp[xxx]: Trusted TLS connection established to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+postfix/smtp[<i>process-id</i>]: Untrusted TLS connection established
+to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits)
 
-postfix/smtpd[xxx]: Untrusted TLS connection established from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+postfix/smtpd[<i>process-id</i>]: Anonymous TLS connection established
+from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits)
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
 <li> <p> With "<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_received_header">smtpd_tls_received_header</a> = yes", the Postfix SMTP
-server will record similar information in the Received: header in
+server will record TLS connection information in the Received:
-the form of comments (text inside parentheses). The general format
+header in the form of comments (text inside parentheses). The general
-is: </p>
+format depends on the <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_ask_ccert">smtpd_tls_ask_ccert</a> setting:
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
 Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
-        (using TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits))
+        (using TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
-        (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "Wietse Venema" (not verified))
+        (<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits))
+        (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "John Doe" (not verified))
+
+Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
+        (using TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+        (<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits))
+        (No client certificate requested)
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
 </ul>
 
+<p> The next sections will explain what <i>cipher-name</i>,
+<i>key-size</i>, and peer verification status information to expect.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="ciphers"> What ciphers provide forward secrecy? </a> </h2>
+
 <p> There are dozens of ciphers that support forward secrecy.  What
 follows is the beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with
-OpenSSL 1.0.1e: </p>
+OpenSSL 1.0.1e.  The list is sorted in the default Postfix preference
+order.  It excludes null ciphers that only authenticate and don't
+encrypt, together with export and low-grade ciphers whose encryption
+is too weak to offer meaningful secrecy. The first column shows the
+cipher name, and the second shows the key exchange method. </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
@@ -367,6 +417,112 @@ DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256            Kx=DH
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
+<p> To date, all ciphers that support forward secrecy have one of
+five values for the first component of their OpenSSL name: "AECDH",
+"ECDHE", "ADH", "EDH" or "DHE".  Ciphers that don't implement forward
+secrecy have names that don't start with one of these prefixes.
+This pattern is likely to persist until some new key-exchange
+mechanism is invented that also supports forward secrecy.  </p>
+
+<p> The actual key length and raw algorithm key length 
+are generally the same with non-export ciphers, but may they
+differ for the legacy export ciphers where the actual key 
+is artificially shortened. </p>
+
+<h2><a name="status"> What do "Anonymous", "Untrusted", etc. in
+Postfix logging mean? </a> </h2>
+
+<p> The verification levels below are subject to man-in-the-middle
+attacks to different degrees.  If such attacks are a concern, then
+the SMTP client will need to authenticate the remote SMTP server
+in a sufficiently-secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint
+of the public key or certificate.  Remember that conventional PKI
+relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a
+state-funded adversary.  </p>
+
+<dl>
+
+<dt><b>Anonymous</b> (no peer certificate)</dt>
+
+<dd> <p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> With opportunistic TLS (the "may" security level) the Postfix
+SMTP client does not verify any information in the peer certificate.
+In this case it enables and prefers anonymous cipher suites in which
+the remote SMTP server does not present a certificate (these ciphers
+offer forward secrecy of necessity).  When the remote SMTP server
+also supports anonymous TLS, and agrees to such a cipher suite, the
+verification status will be logged as "Anonymous".  </p> </dd>
+
+<dd> <p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> This is by far most common,
+as client certificates are optional, and the Postfix SMTP server
+does not request client certificates by default (see <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_ask_ccert">smtpd_tls_ask_ccert</a>).
+Even when client certificates are requested, the remote SMTP client
+might not send a certificate.  Unlike the Postfix SMTP client, the
+Postfix SMTP server "anonymous" verification status does not imply
+that the cipher suite is anonymous, which corresponds to the
+<i>server</i> not sending a certificate.  </p> </dd>
+
+<dt><b>Untrusted</b> (peer certificate not signed by trusted CA)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server presented
+a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP client was unable to check the
+issuing CA signature.  With opportunistic TLS this is common with
+remote SMTP servers that don't support anonymous cipher suites.
+</p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The remote SMTP client presented
+a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP server was unable to check the
+issuing CA signature.  This can happen when the server is configured
+to request client certificates (see <a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_tls_ask_ccert">smtpd_tls_ask_ccert</a>).  </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+<dt><b>Trusted</b> (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, unverified
+peer name)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server's certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, but either
+the client was not configured to verify the destination server name
+against the certificate, or the server certificate did not contain
+any matching names.  This is common with opportunistic TLS
+(<a href="postconf.5.html#smtp_tls_security_level">smtp_tls_security_level</a> is "may" or else "dane" with no usable
+TLSA DNS records) when the Postfix SMTP client's trusted CAs can
+verify the authenticity of the remote SMTP server's certificate,
+but the client is not configured or unable to verify the server
+name. </p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The remote SMTP client certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP server trusts.  The Postfix
+SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client name against the
+names in the certificate. Since the client chooses to connect to
+the server, the Postfix SMTP server has no expectation of a particular
+client hostname. </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+<dt><b>Verified</b> (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, verified
+peer name)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server's certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, and it
+matches one of the expected server names.  This implies that the
+Postfix SMTP client enforced verification for the destination server
+name, otherwise the verification status would have been just
+"Trusted". </p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The status is never "Verified",
+as the Postfix SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client
+name against the names in the certificate. </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+</dl>
+
 <h2><a name="credits">Credits </a> </h2>
 
 <ul>

postfix/html/SASL_README.html

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
+X<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
         "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
 
 <head>
@@ -185,91 +185,36 @@ to configure and operate the Dovecot authentication server.  </p>
 <h4><a name="server_dovecot_comm">Postfix to Dovecot SASL communication</a></h4>
 
 <p> Communication between the Postfix SMTP server and Dovecot SASL
-happens over a UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket.  Dovecot 1
+happens over a UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket. We will
-supports UNIX-domain socket communication only. </p>
+be using a UNIX-domain socket for better privacy. </p>
 
-<h5>UNIX-domain socket communication</h5>
+<p> The following fragment for Dovecot version 2 assumes that the
-
+Postfix queue is under <code>/var/spool/postfix/</code>. </p>
-<p> The socket
-pathname and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need to be
-specified on the Dovecot server side in <code>dovecot.conf</code>.
-</p>
-
-<p> The following example assumes that the Postfix queue is under
-<code>/var/spool/postfix/</code>. </p>
-
-<p> Note: the example uses Dovecot 1 syntax, See <a href="http://www.dovecot.org/">http://www.dovecot.org/</a>
-for newer syntax. </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
- 1 /etc/dovecot.conf:
+ 1 conf.d/10-master.conf:
- 2     auth default {
+ 2     service auth {
- 3       mechanisms = plain login
+ 3       ...
- 4         passdb pam {
+ 4       unix_listener /var/spool/postfix/private/auth {
- 5         }
+ 5         mode = 0660
- 6         userdb passwd {
+ 6         # Assuming the default Postfix user and group
- 7         }
+ 7         user = postfix
- 8         socket listen {
+ 8         group = postfix        
- 9         client {
+ 9       }
-10           path = /var/spool/postfix/private/auth
+10       ...
-11           mode = 0660
+11     }
-12           user = postfix
+12 
-13           group = postfix
+13 conf.d/10-auth.conf
-14         }
+14     auth_mechanisms = plain login
-15       }
-16     }
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<p> Line 3 provides <code>plain</code> and <code>login</code> as
+<p> Line 4 places the Dovecot SASL socket in
-mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server, line 10 places the Dovecot
+<code>/var/spool/postfix/private/auth</code>, lines 5-8 limit
-SASL socket in <code>/var/spool/postfix/private/auth</code>, and
+read+write permissions to user and group <code>postfix</code> only,
-lines 11-13 limit read+write permissions to user and group
+and line 14 provides <code>plain</code> and <code>login</code> as
-<code>postfix</code> only. </p>
+mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server. </p>
-
-<p> Proceed with the section "<a href="#server_sasl_enable">Enabling
-SASL authentication and authorization in the Postfix SMTP server</a>"
-to turn on and use SASL in the Postfix SMTP server.  </p>
-
-<h5>TCP socket communication</h5>
-
-<p> The TCP port and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need
-to be specified on the Dovecot server side in <code>10-auth.conf</code>
-and <code>10-master.conf</code>. </p>
-
-<p> The following examples assume that Postfix should communicate
-with Dovecot on TCP port 12345. </p>
-
-<p> Note: the examples use Dovecot 1 syntax, See <a href="http://www.dovecot.org/">http://www.dovecot.org/</a>
-for newer syntax. </p>
-
-<blockquote>
-<pre>
-1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf:
-2     auth_mechanisms = plain login
-</pre>
-</blockquote>
-
-<p> Line 2 provides plain and login as mechanisms for the Postfix
-SMTP server. </p>
-
-<blockquote>
-<pre>
-1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-master.conf:
-2     service auth {
-3       unix_listener auth-userdb {
-4       }
-5       inet_listener {
-6         port = 12345
-7       }
-8     }
-</pre>
-</blockquote>
-
-<p> Line 5 creates a new TCP socket and line 6 specifies port 12345
-where Dovecot SASL should wait for Postfix authentication requests.
-</p>
 
 <p> Proceed with the section "<a href="#server_sasl_enable">Enabling
 SASL authentication and authorization in the Postfix SMTP server</a>"

postfix/html/postconf.5.html

@@ -14620,6 +14620,19 @@ Example:
 </pre>
 
 
+</DD>
+
+<DT><b><a name="smtpd_sasl_service">smtpd_sasl_service</a>
+(default: smtp)</b></DT><DD>
+
+<p> The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+selected with <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_type">smtpd_sasl_type</a></b> and <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_path">smtpd_sasl_path</a></b>.
+</p>
+
+<p> This feature is available in Postfix 2.11 and later. Prior
+versions behave as if "<b>smtp</b>" is specified. </p>
+
+
 </DD>
 
 <DT><b><a name="smtpd_sasl_tls_security_options">smtpd_sasl_tls_security_options</a>

postfix/html/smtpd.8.html

@@ -361,6 +361,12 @@ SMTPD(8)                                                              SMTPD(8)
               Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files, cur-
               rently used only to locate the $<a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_path">smtpd_sasl_path</a>.conf file.
 
+       Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
+
+       <b>smtpd_sasl_service (smtp)</b>
+              The  service  name  that  is  passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+              selected with <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_type">smtpd_sasl_type</a></b> and <b><a href="postconf.5.html#smtpd_sasl_path">smtpd_sasl_path</a></b>.
+
 <b>STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS</b>
        Detailed information about STARTTLS configuration may be found  in  the
        <a href="TLS_README.html">TLS_README</a> document.

postfix/man/man5/postconf.5

@@ -9767,6 +9767,12 @@ smtpd_sasl_security_options = noanonymous, noplaintext
 .fi
 .ad
 .ft R
+.SH smtpd_sasl_service (default: smtp)
+The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR.
+.PP
+This feature is available in Postfix 2.11 and later. Prior
+versions behave as if "\fBsmtp\fR" is specified.
 .SH smtpd_sasl_tls_security_options (default: $smtpd_sasl_security_options)
 The SASL authentication security options that the Postfix SMTP
 server uses for TLS encrypted SMTP sessions.

postfix/man/man8/smtpd.8

@@ -347,6 +347,11 @@ Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
 .IP "\fBcyrus_sasl_config_path (empty)\fR"
 Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files,
 currently used only to locate the $smtpd_sasl_path.conf file.
+.PP
+Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
+.IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_service (smtp)\fR"
+The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR.
 .SH "STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS"
 .na
 .nf

postfix/proto/FORWARD_SECRECY_README.html

@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ TLS Forward Secrecy in Postfix
 
 <hr>
 
+<h2> Warning </h2>
+
+<p> Forward secrecy does not protect against active attacks such
+as forged DNS replies or forged TLS server certificates. If such
+attacks are a concern, then the SMTP client will need to authenticate
+the remote SMTP server in a sufficiently-secure manner.  For example,
+by the fingerprint of the public key or certificate.  Conventional
+PKI relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a
+state-funded adversary.  </p>
+
 <h2> Background </h2>
 
 <p> Postfix supports forward secrecy of TLS network communication
@@ -55,13 +65,6 @@ all past traffic is generally infeasible, and even recovery of
 individual sessions may be infeasible given a sufficiently-strong
 key agreement method. </p>
 
-<p> Forward secrecy protects network communication in the absence
-of active attacks, i.e. no forged DNS replies, and no forged TLS
-server certificates. If active attacks are a concern, then you will
-need to authenticate the remote SMTP server in a secure manner.
-For example, by the fingerprint of the public key or certificate.
-Conventional PKI relies on too many trusted parties. </p>
-
 <p> Topics covered in this document: </p>
 
 <ul>
@@ -72,7 +75,14 @@ Conventional PKI relies on too many trusted parties. </p>
 
 <li><a href="#client_fs">Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Client</a>
 
-<li><a href="#test">How do I know that it works?</a>
+<li><a href="#quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a>
+
+<li><a href="#test">How can I see that a connection has forward secrecy?</a>
+
+<li><a href="#ciphers"> What ciphers provide forward secrecy? </a>
+
+<li><a href="#status"> What do "Anonymous", "Untrusted", etc. in
+Postfix logging mean? </a> 
 
 <li><a href="#credits"> Credits </a>
 
@@ -109,24 +119,24 @@ of long-term authentication keys. </p>
 <p> The key-exchange algorithms used for forward secrecy require
 the TLS server to designate appropriate "parameters" consisting of a
 mathematical "group" and an element of that group called a "generator".
-There are two flavors of "groups" that work with PFS: </p>
+Presently, there are two flavors of "groups" that work with PFS: </p>
 
 <ul>
 
-<li> Prime field groups.  The server needs to be configured with a
+<li> <p> <b> Prime-field groups (EDH):</b>  The server needs to be
-suitably large prime and a corresponding "generator".
+configured with a suitably-large prime and a corresponding "generator".
+The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or Ephemeral
+Diffie-Hellman (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE).  </p>
 
-<li> Elliptic curve groups.  The server needs to be configured with
+<li> <p> <b> Elliptic-curve groups (EECDH): </b>  The server needs
-a "named curve".  These offer better security at lower computational
+to be configured with a "named curve".  These offer better security
-cost than prime field groups, but are not as widely implemented.
+at lower computational cost than prime field groups, but are not
+as widely implemented.  The acronym for the elliptic curve version
+is EECDH which is short for Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
+</p>
 
 </ul>
 
-<p> The acronym for forward secrecy over prime fields is EDH or
-Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (sometimes also abbreviated as DHE).  The
-acronym for the elliptic curve version is EECDH which is short for
-Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. </p>
-
 <p> It is not essential to know what these are, but one does need
 to know that OpenSSL only supports EECDH as of version 1.0.0.  Thus
 the configuration parameters related to Elliptic Curve forward secrecy
@@ -156,8 +166,6 @@ the main.cf setting "tls_preempt_cipherlist = yes".  However, this
 will likely cause interoperability issues with older Exchange servers
 and is not recommended for now.  </p>
 
-</ul>
-
 <h3> EDH Server support </h3>
 
 <p> Postfix &ge; 2.2 support 1024-bit-prime EDH out of the box,
@@ -215,7 +223,7 @@ code for making this possible is not yet released as of late 2013
 (it is available only in OpenSSL development snapshots). </p>
 
 <p> At some point Postfix will need to adjust to the new API for
-setting the elliptic curve options.  Fortunately, when EECDH support
+setting the elliptic-curve options.  Fortunately, when EECDH support
 was added to Postfix, it introduced a layer of indirection: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
@@ -237,19 +245,23 @@ main.cf. </p>
 <h2> <a name="client_fs">Forward Secrecy in the Postfix SMTP Client</a> </h2>
 
 <p> The Postfix &ge; 2.2 SMTP client supports forward secrecy in
-its default configuration.  If the remote SMTP server supports
+its default configuration.  No configuration changes are needed
-cipher suites with forward secrecy (and does not override the SMTP
+besides turning on elliptic-curve support with Postfix 2.6 and 2.7
-client cipher preference), then the traffic between the server and
+(see the <a href="#quick-start"> quick-start</a> section).  If the
-client will resist decryption even if the server's long-term
+remote SMTP server supports cipher suites with forward secrecy (and
-authentication keys are <i>later</i> compromised. </p>
+does not override the SMTP client's cipher preference), then the
+traffic between the server and client will resist decryption even
+if the server's long-term authentication keys are <i>later</i>
+compromised.  </p>
 
-<p> The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly ordered
+<p> The default Postfix SMTP client cipher lists are correctly
-to prefer EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar cipher suites
+ordered to prefer EECDH and EDH cipher suites ahead of similar
-that don't implement forward secrecy.  Administrators are strongly
+cipher suites that don't implement forward secrecy.  Administrators
-discouraged from changing the cipher list definitions.  It is likely
+are strongly discouraged from changing the cipher list definitions.
-safe to set "smtp_tls_ciphers = medium" if you wish to disable the
+It is likely safe to set "smtp_tls_ciphers = medium" if you wish
-obsolete "export" and "low" grade ciphers even with opportunistic
+to disable the obsolete "export" and "low" grade ciphers even with
-TLS.  Setting a minimum strength does not change the preference
+opportunistic TLS.  Setting a minimum strength does not change the
+preference
 order.  Note that strengths higher than "medium" exclude Exchange
 2003 and likely other widely used MTAs, thus "high" grade ciphers
 should only be used on a case-by-case basis via the <a
@@ -257,7 +269,27 @@ href="TLS_README.html#client_tls_policy">TLS policy</a> table. </p>
 
 <h2><a name="quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a></h2>
 
-<p> At least one time as root (prime group generation can take a
+<ul>
+
+<li> <p> Postfix 2.6 and 2.7: Enable elliptic-curve support. This
+is the default with Postfix &ge; 2.8.
+
+<blockquote>
+<pre>
+/etc/postfix/main.cf:
+    # Postfix 2.6 or 2.7 only. This is default with Postfix 2.8 and later.
+    smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong
+</pre>
+</blockquote>
+
+<li> <p> Optionally generate non-default EDH parameters for improved
+security against pre-computation attacks and for compatibility with
+Debian-patched EXIM SMTP clients (these require a minimum 2048-bit
+length for the non-export prime).  The parameter files are not
+secret, after all these parameters are sent to all SMTP clients in
+the clear.  Mode 0644 is fine.  </p>
+
+<p> Execute as root (prime group generation can take a
 few seconds to a few minutes): </p>
 
 <blockquote>
@@ -270,20 +302,15 @@ few seconds to a few minutes): </p>
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<p> Note: greater security against "pre-computation" attacks against
+<p> You can improve security against pre-computation attacks further
-EDH can be obtained by periodically regenerating the EDH parameters
+by regenerating the EDH parameters periodically (an hourly or daily
-as above (an hourly or daily cron job running as root can automate
+cron job running as root can automate this task). </p>
-this task).  The parameter files are not secret, after all these are
-sent to all SMTP clients in the clear. Mode 0644 is fine.  </p>
 
 <p> Once the parameters are in place, update main.cf as follows: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
 /etc/postfix/main.cf:
-    # Postfix &ge; 2.6
-    smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade = strong
-    # All versions of Postfix:
     smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh2048.pem
     smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = ${config_directory}/dh512.pem
 </pre>
@@ -305,44 +332,67 @@ need to adjust the submission entry in master.cf accordingly: </p>
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<h2><a name="test">How do I know that it works? </a> </h2>
+</ul>
 
-<p> Postfix reports TLS connection information in several ways: </p>
+<h2><a name="test">How can I see that a connection has forward
+secrecy? </a> </h2>
+
+<p> Postfix can be configured to report information about the
+negotiated cipher, the corresponding key lengths, and the remote
+peer certificate or public-key verification status.  </p>
 
 <ul>
 
 <li> <p> With "smtp_tls_loglevel = 1" and "smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1",
-the Postfix SMTP client and server will log information about, among
+the Postfix SMTP client and server will log TLS connection information
-others, the remote peer certificate or public-key verification
+to the maillog file. The general logfile format is: </p>
-status, the negotiated cipher, and key lengths. The general logfile
-format is: </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
-postfix/smtp[xxx]: Trusted TLS connection established to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+postfix/smtp[<i>process-id</i>]: Untrusted TLS connection established
+to host.example.com[192.168.0.2]:25: TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits)
 
-postfix/smtpd[xxx]: Untrusted TLS connection established from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits)
+postfix/smtpd[<i>process-id</i>]: Anonymous TLS connection established
+from host.example.com[192.168.0.2]: TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits)
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
 <li> <p> With "smtpd_tls_received_header = yes", the Postfix SMTP
-server will record similar information in the Received: header in
+server will record TLS connection information in the Received:
-the form of comments (text inside parentheses). The general format
+header in the form of comments (text inside parentheses). The general
-is: </p>
+format depends on the smtpd_tls_ask_ccert setting:
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
 Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
-        (using TLSv1 with cipher XXX (YYY/ZZZ bits))
+	(using TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
-        (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "Wietse Venema" (not verified))
+	(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits))
+        (Client CN "host.example.com", Issuer "John Doe" (not verified))
+
+Received: from host.example.com (host.example.com [192.168.0.2])
+	(using TLSv1 with cipher <i>cipher-name</i>
+	(<i>actual-key-size</i>/<i>raw-key-size</i> bits))
+        (No client certificate requested)
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
 </ul>
 
+<p> The next sections will explain what <i>cipher-name</i>,
+<i>key-size</i>, and peer verification status information to expect.
+</p>
+
+<h2><a name="ciphers"> What ciphers provide forward secrecy? </a> </h2>
+
 <p> There are dozens of ciphers that support forward secrecy.  What
 follows is the beginning of a list of 51 ciphers available with
-OpenSSL 1.0.1e: </p>
+OpenSSL 1.0.1e.  The list is sorted in the default Postfix preference
+order.  It excludes null ciphers that only authenticate and don't
+encrypt, together with export and low-grade ciphers whose encryption
+is too weak to offer meaningful secrecy. The first column shows the
+cipher name, and the second shows the key exchange method. </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
@@ -367,6 +417,112 @@ DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256            Kx=DH
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
+<p> To date, all ciphers that support forward secrecy have one of
+five values for the first component of their OpenSSL name: "AECDH",
+"ECDHE", "ADH", "EDH" or "DHE".  Ciphers that don't implement forward
+secrecy have names that don't start with one of these prefixes.
+This pattern is likely to persist until some new key-exchange
+mechanism is invented that also supports forward secrecy.  </p>
+
+<p> The actual key length and raw algorithm key length 
+are generally the same with non-export ciphers, but may they
+differ for the legacy export ciphers where the actual key 
+is artificially shortened. </p>
+
+<h2><a name="status"> What do "Anonymous", "Untrusted", etc. in
+Postfix logging mean? </a> </h2>
+
+<p> The verification levels below are subject to man-in-the-middle
+attacks to different degrees.  If such attacks are a concern, then
+the SMTP client will need to authenticate the remote SMTP server
+in a sufficiently-secure manner. For example, by the fingerprint
+of the public key or certificate.  Remember that conventional PKI
+relies on many trusted parties and is easily subverted by a
+state-funded adversary.  </p>
+
+<dl>
+
+<dt><b>Anonymous</b> (no peer certificate)</dt>
+
+<dd> <p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> With opportunistic TLS (the "may" security level) the Postfix
+SMTP client does not verify any information in the peer certificate.
+In this case it enables and prefers anonymous cipher suites in which
+the remote SMTP server does not present a certificate (these ciphers
+offer forward secrecy of necessity).  When the remote SMTP server
+also supports anonymous TLS, and agrees to such a cipher suite, the
+verification status will be logged as "Anonymous".  </p> </dd>
+
+<dd> <p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> This is by far most common,
+as client certificates are optional, and the Postfix SMTP server
+does not request client certificates by default (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert).
+Even when client certificates are requested, the remote SMTP client
+might not send a certificate.  Unlike the Postfix SMTP client, the
+Postfix SMTP server "anonymous" verification status does not imply
+that the cipher suite is anonymous, which corresponds to the
+<i>server</i> not sending a certificate.  </p> </dd>
+
+<dt><b>Untrusted</b> (peer certificate not signed by trusted CA)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server presented
+a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP client was unable to check the
+issuing CA signature.  With opportunistic TLS this is common with
+remote SMTP servers that don't support anonymous cipher suites.
+</p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The remote SMTP client presented
+a certificate, but the Postfix SMTP server was unable to check the
+issuing CA signature.  This can happen when the server is configured
+to request client certificates (see smtpd_tls_ask_ccert).  </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+<dt><b>Trusted</b> (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, unverified
+peer name)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server's certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, but either
+the client was not configured to verify the destination server name
+against the certificate, or the server certificate did not contain
+any matching names.  This is common with opportunistic TLS
+(smtp_tls_security_level is "may" or else "dane" with no usable
+TLSA DNS records) when the Postfix SMTP client's trusted CAs can
+verify the authenticity of the remote SMTP server's certificate,
+but the client is not configured or unable to verify the server
+name. </p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The remote SMTP client certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP server trusts.  The Postfix
+SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client name against the
+names in the certificate. Since the client chooses to connect to
+the server, the Postfix SMTP server has no expectation of a particular
+client hostname. </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+<dt><b>Verified</b> (peer certificate signed by trusted CA, verified
+peer name)</dt>
+
+<dd>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP client:</b> The remote SMTP server's certificate
+was signed by a CA that the Postfix SMTP client trusts, and it
+matches one of the expected server names.  This implies that the
+Postfix SMTP client enforced verification for the destination server
+name, otherwise the verification status would have been just
+"Trusted". </p>
+
+<p> <b> Postfix SMTP server:</b> The status is never "Verified",
+as the Postfix SMTP server never verifies the remote SMTP client
+name against the names in the certificate. </p>
+
+</dd>
+
+</dl>
+
 <h2><a name="credits">Credits </a> </h2>
 
 <ul>

postfix/proto/SASL_README.html

@@ -185,91 +185,36 @@ to configure and operate the Dovecot authentication server.  </p>
 <h4><a name="server_dovecot_comm">Postfix to Dovecot SASL communication</a></h4>
 
 <p> Communication between the Postfix SMTP server and Dovecot SASL
-happens over a UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket.  Dovecot 1
+happens over a UNIX-domain socket or over a TCP socket. We will
-supports UNIX-domain socket communication only. </p>
+be using a UNIX-domain socket for better privacy. </p>
 
-<h5>UNIX-domain socket communication</h5>
+<p> The following fragment for Dovecot version 2 assumes that the
-
+Postfix queue is under <code>/var/spool/postfix/</code>. </p>
-<p> The socket
-pathname and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need to be
-specified on the Dovecot server side in <code>dovecot.conf</code>.
-</p>
-
-<p> The following example assumes that the Postfix queue is under
-<code>/var/spool/postfix/</code>. </p>
-
-<p> Note: the example uses Dovecot 1 syntax, See http://www.dovecot.org/
-for newer syntax. </p>
 
 <blockquote>
 <pre>
- 1 /etc/dovecot.conf:
+ 1 conf.d/10-master.conf:
- 2     auth default {
+ 2     service auth {
- 3       mechanisms = plain login
+ 3       ...
- 4         passdb pam {
+ 4       unix_listener /var/spool/postfix/private/auth {
- 5         }
+ 5         mode = 0660
- 6         userdb passwd {
+ 6         # Assuming the default Postfix user and group
- 7         }
+ 7         user = postfix
- 8         socket listen {
+ 8         group = postfix        
- 9         client {
+ 9       }
-10           path = /var/spool/postfix/private/auth
+10       ...
-11           mode = 0660
+11     }
-12           user = postfix
+12 
-13           group = postfix
+13 conf.d/10-auth.conf
-14         }
+14     auth_mechanisms = plain login
-15       }
-16     }
 </pre>
 </blockquote>
 
-<p> Line 3 provides <code>plain</code> and <code>login</code> as
+<p> Line 4 places the Dovecot SASL socket in
-mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server, line 10 places the Dovecot
+<code>/var/spool/postfix/private/auth</code>, lines 5-8 limit
-SASL socket in <code>/var/spool/postfix/private/auth</code>, and
+read+write permissions to user and group <code>postfix</code> only,
-lines 11-13 limit read+write permissions to user and group
+and line 14 provides <code>plain</code> and <code>login</code> as
-<code>postfix</code> only. </p>
+mechanisms for the Postfix SMTP server. </p>
-
-<p> Proceed with the section "<a href="#server_sasl_enable">Enabling
-SASL authentication and authorization in the Postfix SMTP server</a>"
-to turn on and use SASL in the Postfix SMTP server.  </p>
-
-<h5>TCP socket communication</h5>
-
-<p> The TCP port and the list of mechanisms offered to Postfix need
-to be specified on the Dovecot server side in <code>10-auth.conf</code>
-and <code>10-master.conf</code>. </p>
-
-<p> The following examples assume that Postfix should communicate
-with Dovecot on TCP port 12345. </p>
-
-<p> Note: the examples use Dovecot 1 syntax, See http://www.dovecot.org/
-for newer syntax. </p>
-
-<blockquote>
-<pre>
-1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf:
-2     auth_mechanisms = plain login
-</pre>
-</blockquote>
-
-<p> Line 2 provides plain and login as mechanisms for the Postfix
-SMTP server. </p>
-
-<blockquote>
-<pre>
-1 /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-master.conf:
-2     service auth {
-3       unix_listener auth-userdb {
-4       }
-5       inet_listener {
-6         port = 12345
-7       }
-8     }
-</pre>
-</blockquote>
-
-<p> Line 5 creates a new TCP socket and line 6 specifies port 12345
-where Dovecot SASL should wait for Postfix authentication requests.
-</p>
 
 <p> Proceed with the section "<a href="#server_sasl_enable">Enabling
 SASL authentication and authorization in the Postfix SMTP server</a>"

postfix/proto/postconf.proto

@@ -10389,6 +10389,15 @@ configuration file or rendezvous point. </p>
 <p> This feature is available in Postfix 2.3 and later. In earlier
 releases it was called <b>smtpd_sasl_application_name</b>. </p>
 
+%PARAM smtpd_sasl_service smtp
+
+<p> The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+selected with <b>smtpd_sasl_type</b> and <b>smtpd_sasl_path</b>.
+</p>
+
+<p> This feature is available in Postfix 2.11 and later. Prior
+versions behave as if "<b>smtp</b>" is specified. </p>
+
 %PARAM cyrus_sasl_config_path
 
 <p> Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files,

postfix/proto/stop

@@ -1282,3 +1282,4 @@ XXX
 YYY
 ZZZ
 kEECDH
+EXIM

postfix/src/global/mail_params.c

@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
 #ifdef HAS_DB
 #include <dict_db.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
 #include <dict_lmdb.h>
 #endif
 #include <inet_proto.h>
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ void    mail_params_init()
 #ifdef HAS_DB
     dict_db_cache_size = var_db_read_buf;
 #endif
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
     dict_lmdb_map_size = var_lmdb_map_size;
 #endif
     inet_windowsize = var_inet_windowsize;

postfix/src/global/mail_params.h

@@ -1560,6 +1560,10 @@ extern char *var_smtpd_sasl_opts;
 #define DEF_SMTPD_SASL_PATH	"smtpd"
 extern char *var_smtpd_sasl_path;
 
+#define VAR_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE	"smtpd_sasl_service"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE	"smtp"
+extern char *var_smtpd_sasl_service;
+
 #define VAR_CYRUS_CONF_PATH	"cyrus_sasl_config_path"
 #define DEF_CYRUS_CONF_PATH	""
 extern char *var_cyrus_conf_path;

postfix/src/global/mail_version.h

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
   * Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
   * patchlevel; they change the release date only.
   */
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE	"20131221"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE	"20131228"
 #define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER	"2.11"
 
 #ifdef SNAPSHOT

postfix/src/global/mkmap_lmdb.c

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 #include <myflock.h>
 #include <warn_stat.h>
 
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
 #ifdef PATH_LMDB_H
 #include PATH_LMDB_H
 #else

postfix/src/global/mkmap_open.c

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static const MKMAP_OPEN_INFO mkmap_types[] = {
     DICT_TYPE_HASH, mkmap_hash_open,
     DICT_TYPE_BTREE, mkmap_btree_open,
 #endif
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
     DICT_TYPE_LMDB, mkmap_lmdb_open,
 #endif
     DICT_TYPE_FAIL, mkmap_fail_open,

postfix/src/smtpd/smtpd.c

@@ -315,6 +315,11 @@
 /* .IP "\fBcyrus_sasl_config_path (empty)\fR"
 /*	Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files,
 /*	currently used only to locate the $smtpd_sasl_path.conf file.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_service (smtp)\fR"
+/*	The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+/*	selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR.
 /* STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS
 /* .ad
 /* .fi
@@ -1179,6 +1184,7 @@ bool    var_smtpd_sasl_enable;
 bool    var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr;
 char   *var_smtpd_sasl_opts;
 char   *var_smtpd_sasl_path;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_service;
 char   *var_cyrus_conf_path;
 char   *var_smtpd_sasl_realm;
 char   *var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks;
@@ -5382,6 +5388,7 @@ int     main(int argc, char **argv)
 	VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, &var_local_rcpt_maps, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, &var_smtpd_sasl_path, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, &var_smtpd_sasl_service, 1, 0,
 	VAR_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, DEF_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, &var_cyrus_conf_path, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, &var_smtpd_sasl_realm, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, &var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks, 0, 0,

postfix/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_glue.c

@@ -202,7 +202,6 @@ void    smtpd_sasl_activate(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *sasl_opts_name,
     /*
      * Set up a new server context for this connection.
      */
-#define SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE "smtp"
 #ifdef USE_TLS
     tls_flag = state->tls_context != 0;
 #else
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ void    smtpd_sasl_activate(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *sasl_opts_name,
 					    state->dest_addr : ""),
 			     client_addr = ADDR_OR_EMPTY(state->addr,
 						       CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN),
-			     service = SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE,
+			     service = var_smtpd_sasl_service,
 			   user_realm = REALM_OR_NULL(var_smtpd_sasl_realm),
 			     security_options = sasl_opts_val,
 			     tls_flag = tls_flag)) == 0)

postfix/src/tls/tls_dane.sh

@@ -17,14 +17,19 @@ key() {
 }
 
 req() {
+    local key=$1; shift
     local cn=$1; shift
 
+    key "$key"
     openssl req -new -sha256 -key "${key}.pem" 2>/dev/null \
 	-config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n%s\n[dn]\nCN=%s\n" \
 		   "prompt = no" "distinguished_name = dn" "${cn}") 
 }
 
 req_nocn() {
+    local key=$1; shift
+
+    key "$key"
     openssl req -new -sha256 -subj / -key "${key}.pem" 2>/dev/null \
 	-config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n[dn]\nCN_default =\n" \
 		   "distinguished_name = dn") 
@@ -46,8 +51,7 @@ genroot() {
     local akid=$1; shift
 
     exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = CA:true")
-    key "$key"
+    req "$key" "$cn" |
-    req "$cn" |
     	cert "$cert" "$exts" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days 30
 }
 
@@ -61,8 +65,7 @@ genca() {
     local cakey=$1; shift
 
     exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = CA:true")
-    key "$key"
+    req "$key" "$cn" |
-    req "$cn" |
     	cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
 	    -set_serial 2 -days 30 "$@"
 }
@@ -80,8 +83,7 @@ genee() {
 	    "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
 	    "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth" \
 	    "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}")
-    key "$key"
+    req "$key" "$cn" |
-    req "$cn" |
     	cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
 	    -set_serial 2 -days 30 "$@"
 }
@@ -97,8 +99,7 @@ genss() {
 	    "basicConstraints = CA:true" \
 	    "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth" \
 	    "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}")
-    key "$key"
+    req "$key" "$cn" |
-    req "$cn" |
 	cert "$cert" "$exts" -set_serial 1 -days 30 -signkey "${key}.pem" "$@"
 }
 
@@ -106,8 +107,7 @@ gennocn() {
     local key=$1; shift
     local cert=$1; shift
 
-    key "$key"
+    req_nocn "$key" |
-    req_nocn |
 	cert "$cert" "" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days -1 "$@"
 }
 

postfix/src/util/Makefile.in

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ TESTPROG= dict_open dup2_pass_on_exec events exec_command fifo_open \
 	unix_recv_fd unix_send_fd stream_recv_fd stream_send_fd hex_code \
 	myaddrinfo myaddrinfo4 inet_proto sane_basename format_tv \
 	valid_utf_8 ip_match base32_code msg_rate_delay netstring \
-	vstream timecmp
+	vstream timecmp dict_cache
 
 LIB_DIR	= ../../lib
 INC_DIR	= ../../include
@@ -460,6 +460,11 @@ timecmp: $(LIB)
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -DTEST -o $@ $@.c $(LIB) $(SYSLIBS)
 	mv junk $@.o
 
+dict_cache: $(LIB)
+	mv $@.o junk
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -DTEST -o $@ $@.c $(LIB) $(SYSLIBS)
+	mv junk $@.o
+
 tests: valid_hostname_test mac_expand_test dict_test unescape_test \
 	hex_quote_test ctable_test inet_addr_list_test base64_code_test \
 	attr_scan64_test attr_scan0_test dict_pcre_test host_port_test \

postfix/src/util/dict_cache.c

@@ -682,3 +682,437 @@ const char *dict_cache_name(DICT_CACHE *cp)
      */
     return (cp->name);
 }
+
+ /*
+  * Test driver with support for interleaved access. First, enter a number of
+  * requests to look up, update or delete a sequence of cache entries, then
+  * interleave those sequences with the "run" command.
+  */
+#ifdef TEST
+#include <msg_vstream.h>
+#include <vstring_vstream.h>
+#include <argv.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+
+#define DELIMS	" "
+#define USAGE	"\n\tTo manage settings:" \
+		"\n\tverbose <level> (verbosity level)" \
+		"\n\telapsed <level> (0=don't show elapsed time)" \
+		"\n\tlmdb_map_size <limit> (initial LMDB size limit)" \
+		"\n\tcache <type>:<name> (switch to named database)" \
+		"\n\tstatus (show map size, cache, pending requests)" \
+		"\n\n\tTo manage pending requests:" \
+		"\n\treset (discard pending requests)" \
+		"\n\trun (execute pending requests in interleaved order)" \
+		"\n\n\tTo add a pending request:" \
+		"\n\tquery <key-prefix> <count> (negative to reverse order)" \
+		"\n\tupdate <key-prefix> <count> (negative to reverse order)" \
+		"\n\tdelete <key-prefix> <count> (negative to reverse order)" \
+		"\n\tpurge <key-prefix>" \
+		"\n\tcount <key-prefix>"
+
+ /*
+  * For realism, open the cache with the same flags as postscreen(8) and
+  * verify(8).
+  */
+#define DICT_CACHE_OPEN_FLAGS (DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE | \
+	DICT_FLAG_OPEN_LOCK)
+
+ /*
+  * Storage for one request to access a sequence of cache entries.
+  */
+typedef struct DICT_CACHE_SREQ {
+    int     flags;			/* per-request: reverse, purge */
+    char   *cmd;			/* command for status report */
+    void    (*action) (struct DICT_CACHE_SREQ *, DICT_CACHE *, VSTRING *);
+    char   *prefix;			/* key prefix */
+    int     done;			/* progress indicator */
+    int     todo;			/* number of entries to process */
+    int     first_next;			/* first/next */
+} DICT_CACHE_SREQ;
+
+#define DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_PURGE	(1<<1)	/* purge instead of count */
+#define DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_REVERSE	(1<<2)	/* reverse instead of forward */
+
+#define DICT_CACHE_SREQ_LIMIT		10
+
+ /*
+  * All test requests combined.
+  */
+typedef struct DICT_CACHE_TEST {
+    int     flags;			/* exclusion flags */
+    int     size;			/* allocated slots */
+    int     used;			/* used slots */
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ job_list[1];	/* actually, a bunch */
+} DICT_CACHE_TEST;
+
+#define DICT_CACHE_TEST_FLAG_ITER	(1<<0)	/* count or purge */
+
+#define STR(x)	vstring_str(x)
+
+int     show_elapsed = 1;		/* show elapsed time */
+
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
+extern size_t dict_lmdb_map_size;	/* LMDB-specific */
+
+#endif
+
+/* usage - command-line usage message */
+
+static NORETURN usage(const char *progname)
+{
+    msg_fatal("usage: %s (no argument)", progname);
+}
+
+/* make_tagged_key - make tagged search key */
+
+static void make_tagged_key(VSTRING *bp, DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp)
+{
+    if (cp->done < 0)
+	msg_panic("make_tagged_key: bad done count: %d", cp->done);
+    if (cp->todo < 1)
+	msg_panic("make_tagged_key: bad todo count: %d", cp->todo);
+    vstring_sprintf(bp, "%s-%d", cp->prefix,
+		    (cp->flags & DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_REVERSE) ?
+		    cp->todo - cp->done - 1 : cp->done);
+}
+
+/* create_requests - create request list */
+
+static DICT_CACHE_TEST *create_requests(int count)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp;
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp;
+
+    tp = (DICT_CACHE_TEST *) mymalloc(sizeof(DICT_CACHE_TEST) +
+				      (count - 1) *sizeof(DICT_CACHE_SREQ));
+    tp->flags = 0;
+    tp->size = count;
+    tp->used = 0;
+    for (cp = tp->job_list; cp < tp->job_list + count; cp++) {
+	cp->flags = 0;
+	cp->cmd = 0;
+	cp->action = 0;
+	cp->prefix = 0;
+	cp->todo = 0;
+	cp->first_next = DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST;
+    }
+    return (tp);
+}
+
+/* reset_requests - reset request list */
+
+static void reset_requests(DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp;
+
+    tp->flags = 0;
+    tp->used = 0;
+    for (cp = tp->job_list; cp < tp->job_list + tp->size; cp++) {
+	cp->flags = 0;
+	if (cp->cmd) {
+	    myfree(cp->cmd);
+	    cp->cmd = 0;
+	}
+	cp->action = 0;
+	if (cp->prefix) {
+	    myfree(cp->prefix);
+	    cp->prefix = 0;
+	}
+	cp->todo = 0;
+	cp->first_next = DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST;
+    }
+}
+
+/* free_requests - destroy request list */
+
+static void free_requests(DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp)
+{
+    reset_requests(tp);
+    myfree((char *) tp);
+}
+
+/* run_requests - execute pending requests in interleaved order */
+
+static void run_requests(DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp, DICT_CACHE *dp, VSTRING *bp)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp;
+    int     todo;
+    struct timeval start;
+    struct timeval finish;
+    struct timeval elapsed;
+
+    if (dp == 0) {
+	msg_warn("no cache");
+	return;
+    }
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&start);
+    do {
+	todo = 0;
+	for (cp = tp->job_list; cp < tp->job_list + tp->used; cp++) {
+	    if (cp->done < cp->todo) {
+		todo = 1;
+		cp->action(cp, dp, bp);
+	    }
+	}
+    } while (todo);
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&finish);
+    timersub(&finish, &start, &elapsed);
+    if (show_elapsed)
+	vstream_printf("Elapsed: %g\n",
+		       elapsed.tv_sec + elapsed.tv_usec / 1000000.0);
+
+    reset_requests(tp);
+}
+
+/* show_status - show settings and pending requests */
+
+static void show_status(DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp, DICT_CACHE *dp)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp;
+
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
+    vstream_printf("lmdb_map_size\t%ld\n", (long) dict_lmdb_map_size);
+#endif
+    vstream_printf("cache\t%s\n", dp ? dp->name : "(none)");
+
+    vstream_printf("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n",
+		   "cmd", "dir", "prefix", "count", "done", "first/next");
+
+    for (cp = tp->job_list; cp < tp->job_list + tp->used; cp++)
+	if (cp->todo > 0)
+	    vstream_printf("%s\t%s\t%s\t%d\t%d\t%d\n",
+			   cp->cmd,
+			   (cp->flags & DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_REVERSE) ?
+			   "reverse" : "forward",
+			   cp->prefix ? cp->prefix : "(null)", cp->todo,
+			   cp->done, cp->first_next);
+}
+
+/* query_action - lookup cache entry */
+
+static void query_action(DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp, DICT_CACHE *dp, VSTRING *bp)
+{
+    const char *lookup;
+
+    make_tagged_key(bp, cp);
+    if ((lookup = dict_cache_lookup(dp, STR(bp))) == 0) {
+	if (dp->error)
+	    msg_warn("query_action: query failed: %s: %m", STR(bp));
+	else
+	    msg_warn("query_action: query failed: %s", STR(bp));
+    } else if (strcmp(STR(bp), lookup) != 0) {
+	msg_warn("lookup result \"%s\" differs from key \"%s\"",
+		 lookup, STR(bp));
+    }
+    cp->done += 1;
+}
+
+/* update_action - update cache entry */
+
+static void update_action(DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp, DICT_CACHE *dp, VSTRING *bp)
+{
+    make_tagged_key(bp, cp);
+    if (dict_cache_update(dp, STR(bp), STR(bp)) != 0) {
+	if (dp->error)
+	    msg_warn("update_action: update failed: %s: %m", STR(bp));
+	else
+	    msg_warn("update_action: update failed: %s", STR(bp));
+    }
+    cp->done += 1;
+}
+
+/* delete_action - delete cache entry */
+
+static void delete_action(DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp, DICT_CACHE *dp, VSTRING *bp)
+{
+    make_tagged_key(bp, cp);
+    if (dict_cache_delete(dp, STR(bp)) != 0) {
+	if (dp->error)
+	    msg_warn("delete_action: delete failed: %s: %m", STR(bp));
+	else
+	    msg_warn("delete_action: delete failed: %s", STR(bp));
+    }
+    cp->done += 1;
+}
+
+/* iter_action - iterate over cache and act on entries with given prefix */
+
+static void iter_action(DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp, DICT_CACHE *dp, VSTRING *bp)
+{
+    const char *cache_key;
+    const char *cache_val;
+    const char *what;
+    int     len;
+
+    if (dict_cache_sequence(dp, cp->first_next, &cache_key, &cache_val) == 0) {
+	if (strcmp(cache_key, cache_val) != 0)
+	    msg_warn("value \"%s\" differs from key \"%s\"",
+		     cache_val, cache_key);
+	len = strlen(cp->prefix);
+	if (strncmp(cache_key, cp->prefix, len) == 0 && cache_key[len] == '-') {
+	    cp->done += 1;
+	    cp->todo = cp->done + 1;		/* XXX */
+	    if ((cp->flags & DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_PURGE)
+		&& dict_cache_delete(dp, cache_key) != 0) {
+		if (dp->error)
+		    msg_warn("purge_action: delete failed: %s: %m", STR(bp));
+		else
+		    msg_warn("purge_action: delete failed: %s", STR(bp));
+	    }
+	}
+	cp->first_next = DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT;
+    } else {
+	what = (cp->flags & DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_PURGE) ? "purge" : "count";
+	if (dp->error)
+	    msg_warn("%s error after %d: %m", what, cp->done);
+	else
+	    vstream_printf("prefix=%s %s=%d\n", cp->prefix, what, cp->done);
+	cp->todo = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Table-driven support.
+  */
+typedef struct DICT_CACHE_SREQ_INFO {
+    const char *name;
+    int     argc;
+    void    (*action) (DICT_CACHE_SREQ *, DICT_CACHE *, VSTRING *);
+    int     test_flags;
+    int     req_flags;
+} DICT_CACHE_SREQ_INFO;
+
+static DICT_CACHE_SREQ_INFO req_info[] = {
+    {"query", 3, query_action},
+    {"update", 3, update_action},
+    {"delete", 3, delete_action},
+    {"count", 2, iter_action, DICT_CACHE_TEST_FLAG_ITER},
+    {"purge", 2, iter_action, DICT_CACHE_TEST_FLAG_ITER, DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_PURGE},
+    0,
+};
+
+/* add_request - add a request to the list */
+
+static void add_request(DICT_CACHE_TEST *tp, ARGV *argv)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ_INFO *rp;
+    DICT_CACHE_SREQ *cp;
+    int     req_flags;
+    int     count;
+    char   *cmd = argv->argv[0];
+    char   *prefix = (argv->argc > 1 ? argv->argv[1] : 0);
+    char   *todo = (argv->argc > 2 ? argv->argv[2] : "1");	/* XXX */
+
+    if (tp->used >= tp->size) {
+	msg_warn("%s: request list is full", cmd);
+	return;
+    }
+    for (rp = req_info; /* See below */ ; rp++) {
+	if (rp->name == 0) {
+	    vstream_printf("usage: %s\n", USAGE);
+	    return;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(rp->name, argv->argv[0]) == 0
+	    && rp->argc == argv->argc)
+	    break;
+    }
+    req_flags = rp->req_flags;
+    if (todo[0] == '-') {
+	req_flags |= DICT_CACHE_SREQ_FLAG_REVERSE;
+	todo += 1;
+    }
+    if (!alldig(todo) || (count = atoi(todo)) == 0) {
+	msg_warn("%s: bad count: %s", cmd, todo);
+	return;
+    }
+    if (tp->flags & rp->test_flags) {
+	msg_warn("%s: command conflicts with other command", cmd);
+	return;
+    }
+    tp->flags |= rp->test_flags;
+    cp = tp->job_list + tp->used;
+    cp->cmd = mystrdup(cmd);
+    cp->action = rp->action;
+    if (prefix)
+	cp->prefix = mystrdup(prefix);
+    cp->done = 0;
+    cp->flags = req_flags;
+    cp->todo = count;
+    tp->used += 1;
+}
+
+/* main - main program */
+
+int     main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    DICT_CACHE_TEST *test_job;
+    VSTRING *inbuf = vstring_alloc(100);
+    char   *bufp;
+    ARGV   *args;
+    DICT_CACHE *cache = 0;
+    int     stdin_is_tty;
+
+    msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
+    if (argc != 1)
+	usage(argv[0]);
+
+
+    test_job = create_requests(DICT_CACHE_SREQ_LIMIT);
+
+    stdin_is_tty = isatty(0);
+
+    for (;;) {
+	if (stdin_is_tty) {
+	    vstream_printf("> ");
+	    vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+	}
+	if (vstring_fgets_nonl(inbuf, VSTREAM_IN) == 0)
+	    break;
+	bufp = vstring_str(inbuf);
+	if (!stdin_is_tty) {
+	    vstream_printf("> %s\n", bufp);
+	    vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+	}
+	if (*bufp == '#')
+	    continue;
+	args = argv_split(bufp, DELIMS);
+	if (argc == 0) {
+	    vstream_printf("usage: %s\n", USAGE);
+	    vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "verbose") == 0 && args->argc == 2) {
+	    msg_verbose = atoi(args->argv[1]);
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "elapsed") == 0 && args->argc == 2) {
+	    show_elapsed = atoi(args->argv[1]);
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "lmdb_map_size") == 0 && args->argc == 2) {
+	    dict_lmdb_map_size = atol(args->argv[1]);
+#endif
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "cache") == 0 && args->argc == 2) {
+	    if (cache)
+		dict_cache_close(cache);
+	    cache = dict_cache_open(args->argv[1], O_CREAT | O_RDWR,
+				    DICT_CACHE_OPEN_FLAGS);
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "reset") == 0 && args->argc == 1) {
+	    reset_requests(test_job);
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "run") == 0 && args->argc == 1) {
+	    run_requests(test_job, cache, inbuf);
+	} else if (strcmp(args->argv[0], "status") == 0 && args->argc == 1) {
+	    show_status(test_job, cache);
+	} else {
+	    add_request(test_job, args);
+	}
+	vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
+	argv_free(args);
+    }
+
+    vstring_free(inbuf);
+    free_requests(test_job);
+    if (cache)
+	dict_cache_close(cache);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+#endif

postfix/src/util/dict_lmdb.c

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 
 #include <sys_defs.h>
 
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
 
 /* System library. */
 

postfix/src/util/dict_open.c

@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static const DICT_OPEN_INFO dict_open_info[] = {
     DICT_TYPE_HASH, dict_hash_open,
     DICT_TYPE_BTREE, dict_btree_open,
 #endif
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
     DICT_TYPE_LMDB, dict_lmdb_open,
 #endif
 #ifdef HAS_NIS

postfix/src/util/slmdb.c

@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@
 /*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
 /*--*/
 
-#ifdef HAS_LMDB
+#if defined(SNAPSHOT) && defined(HAS_LMDB)
 
 /* System library. */