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postfix-2.8.18
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@ -16971,3 +16971,41 @@ Apologies for any names omitted.
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20140104
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Bugfix: malformed error message. File: conf/post-install.
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20140116
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Workaround: prepend "-I. -I../../include" to CCARGS, to
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avoid name clashes with non-Postfix header files. File:
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makedefs.
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20140223
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Logging: the TLS client logged that an "Untrusted" TLS
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connection was established instead of "Anonymous". Viktor
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Dukhovni. File: tls/tls_client.c.
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20140619
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Bugfix (introduced: 2001): qmqpd null pointer bug when it
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logs a lost connection while not in a mail transaction.
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Reported by Michal Adamek. File: qmqpd/qmqpd.c.
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20140920
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Bugfix (introduced: 20080212): incorrect client name in
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reject messages from check_reverse_client_hostname_access
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and check_reverse_client_hostname_{mx,ns}_access. They
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replied with the verified client name, instead of the name
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that was rejected. Problem reported by Reindl Harald. File:
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smtpd/smtpd_check.c.
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20141012
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Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 2.3): the PREPEND access/policy
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action added headers ABOVE Postfix's own Received: header,
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exposing Postfix's own Received: header to Milters (protocol
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violation) and hiding the PREPENDed header from Milters.
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The latter caused problems for DMARC implementations with
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SPF policy plus DKIM Milter. PREPENDed headers are now
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added BELOW Postfix's own Received: header and remain visible
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to Milters. File: smtpd/smtpd.c.
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@ -658,6 +658,9 @@ export SYSTYPE AR ARFL RANLIB SYSLIBS CC OPT DEBUG AWK OPTS
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# needed before the code stabilizes.
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#CCARGS="$CCARGS -DNONPROD"
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# Workaround.
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CCARGS="-I. -I../../include $CCARGS"
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sed 's/ / /g' <<EOF
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SYSTYPE = $SYSTYPE
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AR = $AR
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@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
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* Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
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* patchlevel; they change the release date only.
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*/
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#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20140116"
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#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "2.8.17"
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#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20141013"
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#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "2.8.18"
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#ifdef SNAPSHOT
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# define MAIL_VERSION_DATE "-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE
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@ -700,7 +700,8 @@ static void qmqpd_proto(QMQPD_STATE *state)
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*/
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if (state->reason && state->where)
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msg_info("%s: %s: %s while %s",
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state->queue_id, state->namaddr, state->reason, state->where);
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state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE",
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state->namaddr, state->reason, state->where);
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}
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/* qmqpd_service - service one client */
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@ -2829,13 +2829,6 @@ static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
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rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_MESG, "");
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}
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/*
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* PREPEND message headers.
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*/
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if (state->prepend)
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for (cpp = state->prepend->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
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out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s", *cpp);
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/*
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* Suppress our own Received: header in the unlikely case that we are an
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* intermediate proxy.
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@ -2926,6 +2919,18 @@ static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
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"\t(envelope-from %s)", STR(state->buffer));
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* PREPEND message headers below our own Received: header. According
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* https://www.milter.org/developers/api/smfi_insheader, Milters see only
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* headers that have been sent by the SMTP client and those header
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* modifications by earlier filters. Based on this we allow Milters to
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* see headers added by access map or by policy service.
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*/
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if (state->prepend)
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for (cpp = state->prepend->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
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out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s", *cpp);
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smtpd_chat_reply(state, "354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>");
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state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_DATA;
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@ -3697,7 +3697,7 @@ static int generic_checks(SMTPD_STATE *state, ARGV *restrictions,
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SMTPD_NAME_CLIENT, def_acl);
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} else if (is_map_command(state, name, CHECK_REVERSE_CLIENT_ACL, &cpp)) {
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status = check_namadr_access(state, *cpp, state->reverse_name, state->addr,
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FULL, &found, state->namaddr,
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FULL, &found, state->reverse_name,
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SMTPD_NAME_REV_CLIENT, def_acl);
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forbid_whitelist(state, name, status, state->reverse_name);
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} else if (strcasecmp(name, REJECT_MAPS_RBL) == 0) {
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@ -3764,14 +3764,14 @@ static int generic_checks(SMTPD_STATE *state, ARGV *restrictions,
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} else if (is_map_command(state, name, CHECK_REVERSE_CLIENT_NS_ACL, &cpp)) {
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if (strcasecmp(state->reverse_name, "unknown") != 0) {
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status = check_server_access(state, *cpp, state->reverse_name,
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T_NS, state->namaddr,
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T_NS, state->reverse_name,
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SMTPD_NAME_REV_CLIENT, def_acl);
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forbid_whitelist(state, name, status, state->reverse_name);
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}
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} else if (is_map_command(state, name, CHECK_REVERSE_CLIENT_MX_ACL, &cpp)) {
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if (strcasecmp(state->reverse_name, "unknown") != 0) {
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status = check_server_access(state, *cpp, state->reverse_name,
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T_MX, state->namaddr,
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T_MX, state->reverse_name,
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SMTPD_NAME_REV_CLIENT, def_acl);
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forbid_whitelist(state, name, status, state->reverse_name);
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}
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@ -983,7 +983,9 @@ TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
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*/
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if (props->log_level >= 1)
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msg_info("%s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s "
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"(%d/%d bits)", TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
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"(%d/%d bits)",
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!TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(TLScontext) ? "Anonymous" :
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TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
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TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
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props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
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TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);
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