postfix-3.10.4

postfix/HISTORY

@@ -28966,9 +28966,9 @@ Apologies for any names omitted.
 	tls/tls_misc.c.
 
 	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.4, date 20181113): a
-	server with multiple TLS certificates could report for a
+	server with multiple TLS certificates could report, for a
-	resumed TLS session, in logging and Received: message
+	resumed TLS session, the wrong server-signature and
-	headers, the wrong server-signature and server-digest names.
+	server-digest names in logging and Received: message headers.
 	Viktor Dukhovni. File: tls/tls_misc.c.
 
 20250213
@@ -28982,4 +28982,143 @@ Apologies for any names omitted.
 	tls_config_file description. File: proto/postconf.proto.
 	The unused parameters will be deleted in Postfix 3.11.
 
-	Postfix 3.10 code freeze.
+20250215
+
+	Safety: added a TLSRPT library version check. Log a warning
+	when the run-time TLSRPT library API version is not compatible
+	with the build-time TLSRPT API version, where 'compatible'
+	is defined according to the rules of semantic versioning.
+	This completes the Postfix 3.10 stable release.
+
+20250216
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.10): Postfix SMTP
+	client segfault while reporting a 'certificate expired'
+	event. Problem reported by Oemer Gueven. File: tls/tls_verify.c.
+
+20250221
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: 20250210): a recent 'fix' for the
+	default smtp_tls_dane_insecure_mx_policy setting resulted in
+	unnecessary 'dnssec_probe' warnings, on systems that disable
+	DNSSEC lookups (the default). File: smtp/smtp_addr.c.
+
+20250223
+
+	Documentation: updated link to Dovecot documentation. File:
+	proto/SASL_README.
+
+20250227
+
+	Improved and corrected error messages when converting (host
+	or service) information to (symbolic text, numerical text,
+	or binary) form. File: util/myaddrinfo.c.
+
+20250304
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 2.3, date 20051222): the
+	Dovecot auth client did not attempt to create a new connection
+	after an I/O error on an existing connection. Reported by
+	Oleksandr Kozmenko. File: xsasl/xsasl_dovecot_server.c.
+
+20250316
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: date 19991116): when appending
+	a setting to a main.cf or master.cf file that did not end
+	in a newline character, the "postconf -e" command did not
+	add an extra newline character before appending the new
+	setting, causing information to become garbled. Fix by
+	Michael Tokarev. File: postconf/postconf_edit.c.
+
+20250619
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix-3.10, date 20250117):
+	include the current TLS security level in the SMTP connection
+	cache lookup key for lookups by next-hop destination. The
+	idea is that to deliver a message without "TLS-Required:
+	no" header, the Postfix SMTP client must not reuse a
+	connection that was created during a burst of deliveries
+	of messages with "TLS-Required: no" to the same destination.
+
+	Including the TLS security level in the SMTP connection
+	cache lookup key will also prevent false connection reuse
+	when any future feature is added that overrides the TLS
+	security level based on message content or envelope metadata.
+	Files: smtp/smtp.h.
+
+	Likewise, include the current TLS security level in the TLS
+	client serverid field. File: smtp/smtp_proto.c.
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix-3.10, date 20250117): the
+	Postfix SMTP client attempted to look up TLSA records even
+	with "TLS-Required: no". This could result in unnecessary
+	failures. Fix by Viktor Dukhovni & Wietse. Files: smtp/smtp.h,
+	smtp/smtp_policy.c, smtp/smtp_connect.c.
+
+20250710
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: postfix-2.2, date 20050203):
+	after detecting a lookup table change, and after starting
+	a new postscreen process, the old postscreen process logged
+	an ENOTSOCK error while attempting to accept a connection
+	on a socket that it was no longer listening on. This error
+	was introduced first in the multi_server skeleton code, and
+	was five years later duplicated in the event_server skeleton
+	that was created for postscreen. Problem reported by Florian
+	Piekert. Files: master/multi_server.c, master/event_server.c.
+
+20250714
+
+	Deleted an <openssl/engine.h> dependency, because the feature is
+	being removed from OpenSSL, and Postfix no longer needs it. File:
+	posttls-finger/posttls-finger.c.
+
+20250716
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 2.8, date 20101230):
+	after detecting a cache table change and before starting a
+	new postscreen process, the old postscreen process did not
+	close the postscreen_cache_map, and therefore kept an
+	exclusive lock that could prevent a new postscreen process
+	from starting. Problem reported by Florian Piekert. File:
+	postscreen/postscreen.c.
+
+20250717
+
+	Workaround: Postfix daemons no longer automatically restart
+	after a btree:, dbm:, hash:, lmdb:, or sdbm: table file
+	modification time change, when they opened that table for
+	writing. Files: util/dict.c, util/dict_db.c, util/dict_dbm.c,
+	util/dict_lmdb.c, util/dict_sdbm.c.
+
+20250730
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.6, date 20200710):
+	Postfix TLS client code logged "Untrusted TLS connection"
+	(wrong) instead of "Trusted TLS connection" (right), for a
+	new or resumed TLS session, when a server offered a trusted
+	(valid PKI trust chain) certificate that did not match the
+	expected server name pattern. Viktor Dukhovni. Files:
+	tls/tls_client.c, tls/tls_verify.c.
+
+20250801
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.7): incorrect backwards
+	compatible support for the legacy configuration parameters
+	tlsproxy_client_level and tlsproxy_client_policy. This
+	disabled the tlsproxy TLS client role when a legacy parameter
+	was set. Reported by John Doe, diagnosed by Viktor Dukhovni.
+	File: global/mail_params.h.
+
+	Bugfix (defect introduced: Postfix 3.4): with the TLS client
+	role disabled by configuration, the tlsproxy daemon
+	dereferenced a null pointer while handling a tlsproxy client
+	request. Reported by John Doe. File: tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c.
+
+20250803
+
+	Cleanup: with "tls_required_enable = yes", the Postfix SMTP
+	client will no longer maintain TLSRPT statistics for
+	messages that contain a "TLS-Required: no" header. This
+	can prevent TLSRPT notifications for TLSRPT notifications.
+	Files: smtp/smtp_connect.c, smtp_tls_policy.c.

postfix/RELEASE_NOTES

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-This is the Postfix 3.10 experimental release.
+This is the Postfix 3.10 stable release.
 
-The stable Postfix release is called postfix-3.9.x where 3=major
+The stable Postfix release is called postfix-3.10.x where 3=major
-release number, 9=minor release number, x=patchlevel. The stable
+release number, 10=minor release number, x=patchlevel. The stable
 release never changes except for patches that address bugs or
 emergencies. Patches change the patchlevel and the release date.
 
 New features are developed in snapshot releases. These are called
-postfix-3.10-yyyymmdd where yyyymmdd is the release date (yyyy=year,
+postfix-3.11-yyyymmdd where yyyymmdd is the release date (yyyy=year,
 mm=month, dd=day). Patches are never issued for snapshot releases;
 instead, a new snapshot is released.
 
@@ -25,63 +25,74 @@ now also distributed with the more recent Eclipse Public License
 (EPL) 2.0. Recipients can choose to take the software under the
 license of their choice. Those who are more comfortable with the
 IPL can continue with that license.
- 
-[Feature 20250117]
 
-Support for the RFC 8689 "TLS-Required: no" message header to request
+Major changes - tls
-delivery of messages such as TLSRPT summaries even if the preferred
+-------------------
-TLS security policy cannot be enforced. This limits the Postfix
+
-SMTP client to "smtp_tls_security_level = may" which does not
+[Forward compatibility 20250212] Support for OpenSSL 3.5 post-quantum
-authenticate server certificates and which allows falling back to
+cryptography. To manage algorithm selection, OpenSSL introduces new
-plaintext.
+TLS group syntax that Postfix will not attempt to imitate. Instead,
+Postfix now allows the tls_eecdh_auto_curves and tls_ffdhe_auto_groups
+parameter values to have an empty value. When both are set empty,
+the algorithm selection can be managed through OpenSSL configuration.
+For more, look for "Post-quantum" in the postconf(5) manpage.
+
+[Feature 20250117] Support for the RFC 8689 "TLS-Required: no"
+message header to request delivery of messages such as TLSRPT
+summaries even if the preferred TLS security policy cannot be
+enforced. This limits the Postfix SMTP client to "smtp_tls_security_level
+= may" which does not authenticate server certificates and which
+allows falling back to plaintext.
 
 Support for the REQUIRETLS SMTP service extension remains future work.
 
-[Incompat 20250116]
+[Feature 20240926] Support for the TLSRPT protocol (defined in RFC
+8460). With this, a domain can publish a policy in DNS, and request
+daily summary reports for successful and failed SMTP-over-TLS
+connections to that domain's MX hosts.
 
-Postfix needs "postfix reload" after upgrade, because of a change in
+Postfix supports TLSRPT summaries for DANE (built-in) and MTA-STS
-the delivery agent protocol. If this step is skipped, Postfix delivery
+(via an smtp_tls_policy_maps plugin). For details, see TLSRPT_README.
-agents will log a warning:
 
-    unexpected attribute smtputf8 from xxx socket (expecting: sendopts)
+Major changes - privacy
+-----------------------
 
-where xxx is the delivery agent service name.
+[Feature 20250205] With "smtpd_hide_client_session = yes", the
+Postfix SMTP server generates a Received: header without client
+session info This setting may be used with the MUA submission
+services (port 465 and 587), but it must not be used with the MTA
+service (port 25).
 
-[Incompat 20250106]
+Depending on the number of recipients, a redacted Received: header
+has one of the following forms:
 
-The logging of the Milter 'quarantine' action has changed. Instead
+Received: by mail.example.com (Postfix) id postfix-queue-id
-of logging "milter triggers HOLD action", it logs the reason given
+        for <user@example.com>; Day, dd Mon yyyy hh:mm:ss tz-offset (zone)
-by a Milter application, or "default_action" if a Milter application
-was unavailable and the milter_default_action parameter or Milter
-"default_action" property specifies "quarantine".
 
-[Feature 20250106]
+Received: by mail.example.com (Postfix) id postfix-queue-id
+        Day, dd Mon yyyy hh:mm:ss tz-offset (zone)
 
-The Postfix Milter implementation now logs the reason for a 
+The redacted form hides that a message was received with SMTP, and
-'quarantine' action, instead of "milter triggers HOLD action".
+therefore it does not need to provide the information required by
+RFC 5321. It only has to satisfy RFC 5322.
 
-- If the quarantine action was requested by a Milter application,
+Major changes - rfc2047
-  Postfix will log the reason given by the application.
+-----------------------
 
-- If the quarantine action was requested with the "milter_default_action"
+[Feature 20250105] Support for automatic RFC 2047 encoding of
-  parameter setting or with a Milter "default_action" property,
+non-ASCII "full name" information in Postfix-generated From: message
-  Postfix will log "default_action".
+headers.  Encoding non-ASCII full names can avoid the need to use
-
+SMTPUTF8, and therefore can avoid incompatibility with sites that
-[Feature 20250105]
+do not support SMTPUTF8.
-
-Support for automatic RFC 2047 encoding of non-ASCII "full name"
-information in Postfix-generated From: message headers. Encoding
-non-ASCII full names can avoid the need to use SMTPUTF8, and therefore
-can avoid incompatibility with sites that do not support SMTPUTF8.
 
 The encoded result looks like "=?charset?Q?gibberish?=: for
 quoted-printable encoding, or "=?charset?B?gibberish?=" for base64
 encoding. Postfix uses quoted-printable for a full name that is
 short or mostly ASCII, and uses base64 otherwise.
 
-Background: when a message without a From: header is submitted with the
+Background: when a message without a From: header is submitted with
-Postfix sendmail(1) command, Postfix will add a From: header and will
+the Postfix sendmail(1) command, Postfix may add a From: header and
-try to use the sender's full name specified with the Postfix sendmail(1)
+use the sender's full name specified with the Postfix sendmail(1)
 "-F" option, with the sendmail(1) "NAME" environment variable, or
 with the GECOS field in the UNIX password database.
 
@@ -89,31 +100,101 @@ This introduces a new configuration parameter "full_name_encoding_charset"
 (default: utf8) which specifies the character set of the full name
 information in the Postfix sendmail(1) "-F" option or "NAME"
 environment variable, or in the GECOS field in the UNIX password
-database. The parameter value is also part of the encoded full name,
+database. The parameter value becomes part of the encoded full name,
 and informs a Mail User Agent how to display the decoded gibberish.
 
-[Incompat 20250105]
+Major changes - bugfix
+----------------------
 
-The SMTP server now logs the queue ID (or "NOQUEUE") when a connection
+[Incompat 20241130] The spawn(8) daemon failed to enforce the command
-ends abnormally (timeout, lost connection, or too many errors).
+time limit. It was sending the SIGKILL signal using the wrong
+effective UID and GID. The pipe(8) daemon has always done this
+right.
 
-[Feature 20250105]
+Major changes - database
+------------------------
 
-The SMTP server now logs the queue ID (or "NOQUEUE") when a connection
+[Feature 20250207] When mysql: or pgsql: configuration specifies
-ends abnormally (timeout, lost connection, or too many errors).
+a single host, assume that it is a load balancer and reconnect
+immediately after a single failure, instead of failing all requests
+for 60s.
 
-[Feature 20241104]
+[Feature 20250114] first/next iterator support for cdb: tables, and
+other cdb: table code cleanups by Michael Tokarev.
 
-The cleanup server now logs "queueid: canceled" when a message
+[Feature 20241024] In a pgsql: client configuration, the setting
-transaction is started but not completed. This provides a clear
+"dbname" is required, but ignored when the setting "hosts" contains
-signal to logfile collation tools.
+an URI with a database name.
 
-[Feature 20240926]
+[Feature 20241025] The Postfix pgsql: client configuration now
+allows any well-formed URI prefix as a pgsql: client connection
+target (the PostgreSQL URI parser decides what is allowed). The
+dbname setting is now optional if the hosts setting specifies only
+URIs.
 
-Support for the TLSRPT protocol (defined in RFC 8460). With this,
+Major changes - internal protocol
-an email receiving domain can publish a policy in DNS, and request
+---------------------------------
-daily summary reports for successful and failed SMTP-over-TLS
-connections to that domain's MX hosts.
 
-Postfix supports TLSRPT summaries for DANE (built-in) and MTA-STS
+[Incompat 20250116] Postfix needs "postfix reload" after upgrade,
-(via an smtp_tls_policy_maps plugin). For details, see TLSRPT_README.
+because of a change in the delivery agent protocol. If this step
+is skipped, Postfix delivery agents will log a warning:
+
+    unexpected attribute smtputf8 from xxx socket (expecting: sendopts)
+
+where xxx is the delivery agent service name.
+
+Major changes - milter
+----------------------
+
+[Incompat 20250106] The logging of the Milter 'quarantine' action
+has changed.  Instead of logging "milter triggers HOLD action", it
+logs the reason given by a Milter application, or "default_action"
+if a Milter application was unavailable and the milter_default_action
+parameter or per-Milter "default_action" property specifies
+"quarantine".
+
+[Feature 20250106] The Postfix Milter implementation now logs the
+reason for a 'quarantine' action, instead of "milter triggers HOLD
+action".
+
+- If the quarantine action was requested by a Milter application,
+  Postfix will log the reason given by the application.
+
+- If the quarantine action was requested with the "milter_default_action"
+  parameter setting or with a per-Milter "default_action" property,
+  Postfix will log "default_action".
+
+Major changes - logging
+-----------------------
+
+[Feature 20250106] The Postfix Milter implementation now logs the
+reason for a 'quarantine' action, instead of "milter triggers HOLD
+action".
+
+- If the quarantine action was requested by a Milter application,
+  Postfix will log the reason given by the application.
+
+- If the quarantine action was requested with the "milter_default_action"
+  parameter setting or with a per-Milter "default_action" property,
+  Postfix will log "default_action".
+
+[Incompat 20250105] The SMTP server now logs the queue ID (or
+"NOQUEUE") when a connection ends abnormally (timeout, lost connection,
+or too many errors).
+
+[Feature 20250105] The SMTP server now logs the queue ID (or
+"NOQUEUE") when a connection ends abnormally (timeout, lost connection,
+or too many errors).
+
+[Incompat 20241104] The cleanup server now logs "queueid: canceled"
+when a message transaction is started but not completed.
+
+[Feature 20241104] The cleanup server now logs "queueid: canceled"
+when a message transaction is started but not completed. This
+provides a clear signal to logfile collation tools.
+
+[Incompat 20241031] the Dovecot SASL client logging for "Invalid
+authentication mechanism" now includes the name of that mechanism.
+
+[Incompat 20241023] Postfix SMTP server 'reject' logging now shows
+the sasl_method, sasl_username, and sasl_sender if available.

postfix/html/SASL_README.html

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ later. </p>
 <p> Dovecot is a POP/IMAP server that has its own configuration to
 authenticate POP/IMAP clients. When the Postfix SMTP server uses
 Dovecot SASL, it reuses parts of this configuration.  Consult the
-<a href="https://wiki.dovecot.org">Dovecot documentation</a> for how
+<a href="https://doc.dovecot.org">Dovecot documentation</a> for how
 to configure and operate the Dovecot authentication server.  </p>
 
 <h4><a name="server_dovecot_comm">Postfix to Dovecot SASL communication</a></h4>

postfix/html/postconf.5.html

@@ -20119,13 +20119,11 @@ openssl.cnf:
     Groups = *X25519MLKEM768 / *X25519:X448 / P-256:P-384
 </pre>
 
-<p> Caution: It is typically best to just use the default group
+<p> Caution: It is typically best to just use the default OpenSSL
-settings, for which no $<a href="postconf.5.html#tls_config_file">tls_config_file</a> is required (you can set
+group settings, by setting "<a href="postconf.5.html#tls_config_file">tls_config_file</a> = none". Overly strict
-"<a href="postconf.5.html#tls_config_file">tls_config_file</a> = none", to avoid unwanted leakage of system-wide
+system-wide TLS settings will conflict with Postfix's opportunistic
-settings that strive to harden HTTPS against mostly browser-specific
+TLS, where being less restrictive is better than downgrading to
-security and privacy issues into Postfix use of opportunistic TLS,
+cleartext SMTP. </p>
-where they're they can be counterproductive, leading to downgrades
-to cleartext, rather than more "secure" TLS). </p>
 
 <p> This feature is available in Postfix &ge; 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6,
 3.6.10, and 3.5.20. </p>

postfix/makedefs

@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ case "$CC" in
 esac
 
 # Snapshot only.
-CCARGS="$CCARGS -DSNAPSHOT"
+#CCARGS="$CCARGS -DSNAPSHOT"
 
 # Non-production: needs thorough testing, or major changes are still
 # needed before the code stabilizes.

postfix/man/man5/postconf.5

@@ -13988,13 +13988,11 @@ openssl.cnf:
 .fi
 .ad
 .PP
-Caution: It is typically best to just use the default group
+Caution: It is typically best to just use the default OpenSSL
-settings, for which no $tls_config_file is required (you can set
+group settings, by setting "tls_config_file = none". Overly strict
-"tls_config_file = none", to avoid unwanted leakage of system\-wide
+system\-wide TLS settings will conflict with Postfix's opportunistic
-settings that strive to harden HTTPS against mostly browser\-specific
+TLS, where being less restrictive is better than downgrading to
-security and privacy issues into Postfix use of opportunistic TLS,
+cleartext SMTP.
-where they're they can be counterproductive, leading to downgrades
-to cleartext, rather than more "secure" TLS).
 .PP
 This feature is available in Postfix >= 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6,
 3.6.10, and 3.5.20.

postfix/proto/SASL_README.html

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ later. </p>
 <p> Dovecot is a POP/IMAP server that has its own configuration to
 authenticate POP/IMAP clients. When the Postfix SMTP server uses
 Dovecot SASL, it reuses parts of this configuration.  Consult the
-<a href="https://wiki.dovecot.org">Dovecot documentation</a> for how
+<a href="https://doc.dovecot.org">Dovecot documentation</a> for how
 to configure and operate the Dovecot authentication server.  </p>
 
 <h4><a name="server_dovecot_comm">Postfix to Dovecot SASL communication</a></h4>

postfix/proto/postconf.proto

@@ -19245,13 +19245,11 @@ openssl.cnf:
     Groups = *X25519MLKEM768 / *X25519:X448 / P-256:P-384
 </pre>
 
-<p> Caution: It is typically best to just use the default group
+<p> Caution: It is typically best to just use the default OpenSSL
-settings, for which no $tls_config_file is required (you can set
+group settings, by setting "tls_config_file = none". Overly strict
-"tls_config_file = none", to avoid unwanted leakage of system-wide
+system-wide TLS settings will conflict with Postfix's opportunistic
-settings that strive to harden HTTPS against mostly browser-specific
+TLS, where being less restrictive is better than downgrading to
-security and privacy issues into Postfix use of opportunistic TLS,
+cleartext SMTP. </p>
-where they're they can be counterproductive, leading to downgrades
-to cleartext, rather than more "secure" TLS). </p>
 
 <p> This feature is available in Postfix &ge; 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6,
 3.6.10, and 3.5.20. </p>

postfix/proto/stop.spell-history

@@ -100,3 +100,5 @@ Roessner
 bitflags
 Schulze
 tlspol
+Gueven
+Oemer

postfix/src/global/mail_params.h

@@ -4171,7 +4171,9 @@ extern bool var_tlsp_clnt_enforce_tls;
 /* Migrate an incorrect name. */
 #define OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL		"tlsproxy_client_level"
 #define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL		"tlsproxy_client_security_level"
-#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL		"${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL ":$" VAR_SMTP_TLS_LEVEL "}"
+#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL		"${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "?{$" \
+					OBS_TLSP_CLNT_LEVEL "}:{$" \
+					VAR_SMTP_TLS_LEVEL "}}"
 extern char *var_tlsp_clnt_level;
 
 #define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_PER_SITE		"tlsproxy_client_per_site"
@@ -4181,7 +4183,9 @@ extern char *var_tlsp_clnt_per_site;
 /* Migrate an incorrect name. */
 #define OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY		"tlsproxy_client_policy"
 #define VAR_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY		"tlsproxy_client_policy_maps"
-#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY		"${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY ":$" VAR_SMTP_TLS_POLICY "}"
+#define DEF_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY		"${" OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "?{$" \
+					OBS_TLSP_CLNT_POLICY "}:{$" \
+					VAR_SMTP_TLS_POLICY "}}"
 extern char *var_tlsp_clnt_policy;
 
  /*

postfix/src/global/mail_version.h

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
   * Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
   * patchlevel; they change the release date only.
   */
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE	"20250215"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE	"20250818"
-#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER	"3.10"
+#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER	"3.10.4"
 
 #ifdef SNAPSHOT
 #define MAIL_VERSION_DATE	"-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE

postfix/src/master/event_server.c

@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ static unsigned event_server_generation;
 static void (*event_server_pre_disconn) (VSTREAM *, char *, char **);
 static void (*event_server_slow_exit) (char *, char **);
 static int event_server_watchdog = 1000;
+static int event_server_drain_was_called = 0;
 
 /* event_server_exit - normal termination */
 
@@ -327,6 +328,9 @@ int     event_server_drain(void)
     const char *myname = "event_server_drain";
     int     fd;
 
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return (0);
+
     switch (fork()) {
 	/* Try again later. */
     case -1:
@@ -343,6 +347,7 @@ int     event_server_drain(void)
 		msg_warn("%s: dup2(%d, %d): %m", myname, STDIN_FILENO, fd);
 	}
 	var_use_limit = 1;
+	event_server_drain_was_called = 1;
 	return (0);
 	/* Let the master start a new process. */
     default:
@@ -445,6 +450,9 @@ static void event_server_accept_local(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     time_left = -1;
     int     fd;
 
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -457,6 +465,8 @@ static void event_server_accept_local(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (event_server_pre_accept)
 	event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = LOCAL_ACCEPT(listen_fd);
     if (event_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
@@ -483,6 +493,9 @@ static void event_server_accept_pass(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     fd;
     HTABLE *attr = 0;
 
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -495,6 +508,8 @@ static void event_server_accept_pass(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (event_server_pre_accept)
 	event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = pass_accept_attr(listen_fd, &attr);
     if (event_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
@@ -520,6 +535,9 @@ static void event_server_accept_inet(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     time_left = -1;
     int     fd;
 
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -532,6 +550,8 @@ static void event_server_accept_inet(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (event_server_pre_accept)
 	event_server_pre_accept(event_server_name, event_server_argv);
+    if (event_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = inet_accept(listen_fd);
     if (event_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(event_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,

postfix/src/master/multi_server.c

@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ static VSTREAM *multi_server_lock;
 static int multi_server_in_flow_delay;
 static unsigned multi_server_generation;
 static void (*multi_server_pre_disconn) (VSTREAM *, char *, char **);
+static int multi_server_drain_was_called = 0;
 
 /* multi_server_exit - normal termination */
 
@@ -295,6 +296,9 @@ int     multi_server_drain(void)
     const char *myname = "multi_server_drain";
     int     fd;
 
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return (0);
+
     switch (fork()) {
 	/* Try again later. */
     case -1:
@@ -311,6 +315,7 @@ int     multi_server_drain(void)
 		msg_warn("%s: dup2(%d, %d): %m", myname, STDIN_FILENO, fd);
 	}
 	var_use_limit = 1;
+	multi_server_drain_was_called = 1;
 	return (0);
 	/* Let the master start a new process. */
     default:
@@ -429,6 +434,9 @@ static void multi_server_accept_local(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     time_left = -1;
     int     fd;
 
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -441,6 +449,8 @@ static void multi_server_accept_local(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (multi_server_pre_accept)
 	multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = LOCAL_ACCEPT(listen_fd);
     if (multi_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
@@ -467,6 +477,9 @@ static void multi_server_accept_pass(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     fd;
     HTABLE *attr = 0;
 
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -479,6 +492,8 @@ static void multi_server_accept_pass(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (multi_server_pre_accept)
 	multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = pass_accept_attr(listen_fd, &attr);
     if (multi_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,
@@ -504,6 +519,9 @@ static void multi_server_accept_inet(int unused_event, void *context)
     int     time_left = -1;
     int     fd;
 
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
+
     /*
      * Be prepared for accept() to fail because some other process already
      * got the connection (the number of processes competing for clients is
@@ -516,6 +534,8 @@ static void multi_server_accept_inet(int unused_event, void *context)
 
     if (multi_server_pre_accept)
 	multi_server_pre_accept(multi_server_name, multi_server_argv);
+    if (multi_server_drain_was_called)
+	return;
     fd = inet_accept(listen_fd);
     if (multi_server_lock != 0
 	&& myflock(vstream_fileno(multi_server_lock), INTERNAL_LOCK,

postfix/src/postconf/postconf_edit.c

@@ -113,8 +113,13 @@ static char *pcf_find_cf_info(VSTRING *buf, VSTREAM *dst)
 static char *pcf_next_cf_line(VSTRING *buf, VSTREAM *src, VSTREAM *dst, int *lineno)
 {
     char   *cp;
+    int     last_char;
 
-    while (vstring_get(buf, src) != VSTREAM_EOF) {
+    while ((last_char = vstring_get(buf, src)) != VSTREAM_EOF) {
+	if (last_char != '\n') {
+	    VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, '\n');
+	    VSTRING_TERMINATE(buf);
+	}
 	if (lineno)
 	    *lineno += 1;
 	if ((cp = pcf_find_cf_info(buf, dst)) != 0)

postfix/src/postscreen/postscreen.c

@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
     if (new_event_time >= last_event_time + 1
 	&& (name = dict_changed_name()) != 0) {
 	msg_info("table %s has changed - finishing in the background", name);
-	event_server_drain();
+	psc_drain(unused_name, unused_argv);
     } else {
 	last_event_time = new_event_time;
     }

postfix/src/posttls-finger/posttls-finger.c

@@ -414,7 +414,6 @@
 
 #ifdef USE_TLS
 #include <tls_proxy.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
  /*

postfix/src/smtp/Makefile.in

@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ smtp.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ smtp_addr.o: ../../include/own_inet_addr.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_addr.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ smtp_key.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_key.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_key.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -344,6 +347,7 @@ smtp_map11.o: ../../include/quote_flags.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_map11.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -384,6 +388,7 @@ smtp_misc.o: ../../include/quote_flags.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_misc.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -491,6 +496,7 @@ smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sent.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_rcpt.o: ../../include/string_list.h
@@ -530,6 +536,7 @@ smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_reuse.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -572,6 +579,7 @@ smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_sasl_auth_cache.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -613,6 +621,7 @@ smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/smtp_stream.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/split_at.h
@@ -657,6 +666,7 @@ smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sasl_mech_filter.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_sasl_proto.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -697,6 +707,7 @@ smtp_session.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -737,6 +748,7 @@ smtp_state.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_state.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -778,6 +790,7 @@ smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sane_strtol.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_tls_policy.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -821,6 +834,7 @@ smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_tlsrpt.o: ../../include/stringops.h
@@ -864,6 +878,7 @@ smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/smtp_stream.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/string_list.h
@@ -903,6 +918,7 @@ smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/nvtable.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/resolve_clnt.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/scache.h
+smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sendopts.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sock_addr.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/string_list.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h

postfix/src/smtp/smtp.h

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <tok822.h>
 #include <dsn_buf.h>
 #include <header_body_checks.h>
+#include <sendopts.h>
 
  /*
   * Postfix TLS library.
@@ -238,6 +239,12 @@ typedef struct SMTP_STATE {
     unsigned logged_line_length_limit:1;
 } SMTP_STATE;
 
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+#define STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(state) \
+	(var_tls_required_enable && \
+	    ((state)->request->sendopts & SOPT_REQUIRETLS_HEADER))
+#endif
+
  /*
   * Primitives to enable/disable/test connection caching and reuse based on
   * the delivery request next-hop destination (i.e. not smtp_fallback_relay).
@@ -728,7 +735,7 @@ char   *smtp_key_prefix(VSTRING *, const char *, SMTP_ITERATOR *, int);
   */
 #define SMTP_KEY_MASK_SCACHE_DEST_LABEL \
 	(SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SERVICE | COND_SASL_SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SENDER \
-	| SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_NEXTHOP)
+	| SMTP_KEY_FLAG_REQ_NEXTHOP | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL)
 
  /*
   * Connection-cache endpoint lookup key. The SENDER, CUR_NEXTHOP, HOSTNAME,

postfix/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c

@@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ static DNS_RR *smtp_addr_list(DNS_RR *mx_names, DSN_BUF *why)
     if (mx_names->dnssec_valid)
 	res_opt = RES_USE_DNSSEC;
 #ifdef USE_TLS
-    else if (smtp_tls_insecure_mx_policy > TLS_LEV_MAY)
+    else if (smtp_tls_insecure_mx_policy > TLS_LEV_MAY
+	     && smtp_dns_support == SMTP_DNS_DNSSEC)
 	res_opt = RES_USE_DNSSEC;
 #endif
 

postfix/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c

@@ -529,16 +529,6 @@ static int smtp_get_effective_tls_level(DSN_BUF *why, SMTP_STATE *state)
     }
 #endif
 
-    /*
-     * Otherwise, if the TLS level is not TLS_LEV_NONE or some non-level, and
-     * the message contains a "TLS-Required: no" header, limit the level to
-     * TLS_LEV_MAY.
-     */
-    else if (var_tls_required_enable && tls->level > TLS_LEV_NONE
-	     && (state->request->sendopts & SOPT_REQUIRETLS_HEADER)) {
-	tls->level = TLS_LEV_MAY;
-    }
-
     /*
      * Success.
      */
@@ -968,9 +958,15 @@ static void smtp_connect_inet(SMTP_STATE *state, const char *nexthop,
 	 * level of "may" to "encrypt"? This would disable falling back to
 	 * plaintext, and could break interoperability with receivers that
 	 * crank up security up to 11.
+	 * 
+	 * With "TLS-Required: no" in effect, the SMTP client ignores the
+	 * recipient-side policy mechanism TLSRPT, in addition to the already
+	 * ignored DANE and MTA-STS mechanisms. This prevents TLSRPT
+	 * notifications for all SMTP deliveries that do not require TLS.
 	 */
 #ifdef USE_TLSRPT
 	if (smtp_mode && var_smtp_tlsrpt_enable
+	    && STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(state) == 0
 	    && tls_level_lookup(var_smtp_tls_level) > TLS_LEV_NONE
 	    && !valid_hostaddr(domain, DONT_GRIPE))
 	    smtp_tlsrpt_create_wrapper(state, domain);

postfix/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c

@@ -926,13 +926,16 @@ static int smtp_start_tls(SMTP_STATE *state)
      * XXX: The TLS library will salt the serverid with further details of the
      * protocol and cipher requirements including the server ehlo response.
      * Deferring the helo to the digested suffix results in more predictable
-     * SSL session lookup key lengths.
+     * SSL session lookup key lengths. Add the current TLS security level to
+     * account for TLS level overrides based on message content or envelope
+     * metadata.
      */
     serverid = vstring_alloc(10);
     smtp_key_prefix(serverid, "&", state->iterator, SMTP_KEY_FLAG_SERVICE
 		    | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_CUR_NEXTHOP	/* With port */
 		    | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_HOSTNAME
-		    | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR);
+		    | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_ADDR
+		    | SMTP_KEY_FLAG_TLS_LEVEL);
 
     if (state->tls->conn_reuse) {
 	TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS tls_params;

postfix/src/smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c

@@ -647,11 +647,23 @@ static void *policy_create(const char *unused_key, void *context)
      * Compute the per-site TLS enforcement level. For compatibility with the
      * original TLS patch, this algorithm is gives equal precedence to host
      * and next-hop policies.
+     * 
+     * When "TLS-Required: no" is in effect, skip TLS policy lookup and limit
+     * the security level to "may". Do not reset the security level after
+     * policy lookup, as that would result in errors. For example, when TLSA
+     * records are looked up for security level "dane", and then the security
+     * level is reset to "may", the activation of those TLSA records will
+     * fail.
      */
     tls->level = global_tls_level();
     site_level = TLS_LEV_NOTFOUND;
 
-    if (tls_policy) {
+    if (STATE_TLS_NOT_REQUIRED(iter->parent)) {
+	if (msg_verbose)
+	    msg_info("%s: no tls policy lookup", __func__);
+	if (tls->level > TLS_LEV_MAY)
+	    tls->level = TLS_LEV_MAY;
+    } else if (tls_policy) {
 	tls_policy_lookup(tls, &site_level, dest, "next-hop destination");
     } else if (tls_per_site) {
 	tls_site_lookup(tls, &site_level, dest, "next-hop destination");

postfix/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c

@@ -217,8 +217,13 @@ static int smtpd_peer_sockaddr_to_hostaddr(SMTPD_STATE *state)
 	 */
 	if ((aierr = sockaddr_to_hostaddr(sa, sa_length, &client_addr,
 					  &client_port, 0)) != 0)
-	    msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert client address/port to string: %s",
+	    msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert client sockaddr type %s length %ld "
-		      myname, MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
+		      "to string: %s", myname,
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+		      sa->sa_family == AF_INET6 ? "AF_INET6" :
+#endif
+		      sa->sa_family == AF_INET ? "AF_INET" : "other",
+		      (long) sa_length, MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
 	state->port = mystrdup(client_port.buf);
 
 	/*
@@ -299,9 +304,15 @@ static int smtpd_peer_sockaddr_to_hostaddr(SMTPD_STATE *state)
 					  state->dest_sockaddr_len,
 					  &server_addr,
 					  &server_port, 0)) != 0)
-	    msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert server address/port to string: %s",
+	    /* TODO: convert IPv4-in-IPv6 to IPv4 form. */
-		      myname, MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
+	    msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert server sockaddr type %s length %ld "
-	/* TODO: convert IPv4-in-IPv6 to IPv4 form. */
+		    "to string: %s", myname,
+#ifdef AF_INET6
+		   state->dest_sockaddr.ss_family == AF_INET6 ? "AF_INET6" :
+#endif
+		      state->dest_sockaddr.ss_family == AF_INET ? "AF_INET" :
+		      "other", (long) state->dest_sockaddr_len,
+		      MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
 	state->dest_addr = mystrdup(server_addr.buf);
 	state->dest_port = mystrdup(server_port.buf);
 
@@ -409,8 +420,8 @@ static void smtpd_peer_hostaddr_to_sockaddr(SMTPD_STATE *state)
 
     if ((aierr = hostaddr_to_sockaddr(state->addr, state->port,
 				      SOCK_STREAM, &res)) != 0)
-	msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert client address/port to string: %s",
+	msg_fatal("%s: cannot convert client address '%s' port '%s' to binary: %s",
-		  myname, MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
+		  myname, state->addr, state->port, MAI_STRERROR(aierr));
     if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(state->sockaddr))
 	msg_panic("%s: address length > struct sockaddr_storage", myname);
     memcpy((void *) &(state->sockaddr), res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);

postfix/src/tls/tls_client.c

@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ static void uncache_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
 static void verify_x509(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
 			        const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
 {
+    int     x509_err = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
 
     /*
      * On exit both peer_CN and issuer_CN should be set.
@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@ static void verify_x509(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
      * Is the certificate trust chain trusted and matched?  Any required name
      * checks are now performed internally in OpenSSL.
      */
-    if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK) {
+    if (x509_err == X509_V_OK) {
 	TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;
 	if (TLScontext->must_fail) {
 	    msg_panic("%s: cert valid despite trust init failure",
@@ -356,6 +357,13 @@ static void verify_x509(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
 		tls_dane_log(TLScontext);
 	    }
 	}
+    } else if (TLS_MUST_MATCH(TLScontext->level) &&
+	       x509_err == X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) {
+	/*
+	 * If the only error is a hostname mismatch, the certificate must have
+	 * been trusted.
+	 */
+	TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;
     }
 
     /*

postfix/src/tls/tls_verify.c

@@ -120,12 +120,26 @@
 
 /* update_error_state - safely stash away error state */
 
-static void update_error_state(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int depth,
+static void update_error_state(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext,
-			               X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
+			          int depth, X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
 {
-    /* No news is good news */
+
-    if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0 && TLScontext->errordepth <= depth)
+    /*
-	return;
+     * Report the error that is closest to the leaf certificate, any errors
+     * higher up the chain are immaterial until the "inner" errors are fixed.
+     * 
+     * We special-case "X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH" (at depth 0) in order to
+     * distinguish between untrusted certificates and trusted certificates
+     * with a hostname mismatch.  Any other error has a higher priority.
+     */
+    if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0) {
+	if ((TLScontext->errordepth <= depth &&
+	     TLScontext->errorcode != X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) ||
+	    errorcode == X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH) {
+	    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, TLScontext->errorcode);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
 
     /*
      * The certificate pointer is stable during the verification callback,
@@ -179,12 +193,12 @@ int     tls_verify_certificate_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     if (TLScontext->must_fail) {
 	if (depth == 0) {
 	    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
-	    update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+	    update_error_state(ctx, TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
 	}
 	return (1);
     }
     if (ok == 0)
-	update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+	update_error_state(ctx, TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
 
     if (TLScontext->log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) {
 	if (cert) {
@@ -315,7 +329,7 @@ void    tls_log_verify_error(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext,
 	if (tlsrpt)
 	    trw_report_failure(tlsrpt, TLSRPT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED,
 			        /* additional_info= */ (char *) 0,
-			        /* failure_code= */ (char *) 8);
+			        /* failure_code= */ (char *) 0);
 #endif
 	break;
     case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:

postfix/src/tls/tlsrpt_wrapper.c

@@ -252,6 +252,13 @@
 #include <tlsrpt.h>
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(TLSRPT_PREREQ)
+#define TLSRPT_PREREQ(maj, min) \
+    (defined(TLSRPT_VERSION_MAJOR) && \
+	((TLSRPT_VERSION_MAJOR << 16) + TLSRPT_VERSION_MINOR >= \
+	    ((maj) << 16) + (min)))
+#endif
+
  /*
   * Utility library.
   */
@@ -321,6 +328,15 @@ TLSRPT_WRAPPER *trw_create(const char *rpt_socket_name,
 		 myname, rpt_socket_name, rpt_policy_domain,
 		 rpt_policy_string, skip_reused_hs);
 
+#if TLSRPT_PREREQ(0, 6)
+    if (tlsrpt_version_check(TLSRPT_VERSION_MAJOR, TLSRPT_VERSION_MINOR,
+			     TLSRPT_VERSION_PATCH) == 0)
+	msg_warn("run-time library vs. compile-time header version mismatch: "
+		 "libtlsrpt API version '%s' is not compatible with "
+		 "libtlsrpt API version '%s' ", tlsrpt_version(),
+		 TLSRPT_VERSION_STRING);
+#endif
+
     /*
      * memset() is not portable for pointer etc. types.
      */

postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c

@@ -1267,6 +1267,12 @@ static TLS_APPL_STATE *tlsp_client_init(TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS *tls_params,
     init_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
     init_key = tls_proxy_client_init_serialize(attr_print_plain, init_buf,
 					       init_props);
+#define TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(retval) do { \
+	vstring_free(init_buf); \
+	vstring_free(param_buf); \
+	return (retval); \
+    } while (0)
+
     if (tlsp_pre_jail_done == 0) {
 	if (tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key == 0
 	    || tlsp_pre_jail_client_init_key == 0) {
@@ -1284,9 +1290,12 @@ static TLS_APPL_STATE *tlsp_client_init(TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS *tls_params,
      * TLS_APPL_STATE instance; this makes a mismatch of TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS
      * settings problematic.
      */
-    if (tlsp_pre_jail_done
+    else if (tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key == 0
-	&& !been_here_fixed(tlsp_params_mismatch_filter, param_key)
+	     || tlsp_pre_jail_client_init_key == 0) {
-	&& strcmp(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key) != 0) {
+	msg_warn("TLS client role is disabled by configuration");
+	TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(0);
+    } else if (!been_here_fixed(tlsp_params_mismatch_filter, param_key)
+	       && strcmp(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key) != 0) {
 	msg_warn("request from tlsproxy client with unexpected settings");
 	tlsp_log_config_diff(tlsp_pre_jail_client_param_key, param_key);
 	log_hints = 1;
@@ -1361,9 +1370,7 @@ static TLS_APPL_STATE *tlsp_client_init(TLS_CLIENT_PARAMS *tls_params,
 			 SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
 			 | SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
     }
-    vstring_free(init_buf);
+    TLSP_CLIENT_INIT_RETURN(appl_state);
-    vstring_free(param_buf);
-    return (appl_state);
 }
 
 /* tlsp_close_event - pre-handshake plaintext-client close event */
@@ -1497,6 +1504,7 @@ static void tlsp_get_request_event(int event, void *context)
 				TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT, (void *) state);
 	return;
     } else {
+	state->flags |= TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE;
 	tlsp_request_read_event(plaintext_fd, tlsp_get_fd_event,
 				TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT, (void *) state);
 	return;

postfix/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy_state.c

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ TLSP_STATE *tlsp_state_create(const char *service,
 {
     TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) mymalloc(sizeof(*state));
 
-    state->flags = TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE;
+    state->flags = 0;
     state->service = mystrdup(service);
     state->plaintext_stream = plaintext_stream;
     state->plaintext_buf = 0;

postfix/src/util/dict.c

@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@
 /* .IP "char *context"
 /*	Application context from the caller.
 /* .PP
-/*	dict_changed_name() returns non-zero when any dictionary needs to
+/*	dict_changed_name() returns non-zero when any dictionary is
-/*	be re-opened because it has changed or because it was unlinked.
+/*	opened read-only and has changed, or because it was unlinked.
 /*	A non-zero result is the name of a changed dictionary.
 /*
 /*	dict_load_file_xt() reads name-value entries from the named file.
@@ -601,11 +601,12 @@ const char *dict_changed_name(void)
 	dict = ((DICT_NODE *) h->value)->dict;
 	if (dict->stat_fd < 0)			/* not file-based */
 	    continue;
-	if (dict->mtime == 0)			/* not bloody likely */
+	if (dict->mtime < 0)			/* not bloody likely */
-	    msg_warn("%s: table %s: null time stamp", myname, h->key);
+	    msg_warn("%s: table %s: negative time stamp", myname, h->key);
 	if (fstat(dict->stat_fd, &st) < 0)
 	    msg_fatal("%s: fstat: %m", myname);
 	if (((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_MULTI_WRITER) == 0
+	     && dict->mtime > 0
 	     && st.st_mtime != dict->mtime)
 	    || st.st_nlink == 0)
 	    status = h->key;

postfix/src/util/dict_db.c

@@ -789,7 +789,8 @@ static DICT *dict_db_open(const char *class, const char *path, int open_flags,
     dict_db->dict.stat_fd = dbfd;
     if (fstat(dict_db->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
 	msg_fatal("dict_db_open: fstat: %m");
-    dict_db->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+    if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+	dict_db->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
     dict_db->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
     dict_db->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
 

postfix/src/util/dict_dbm.c

@@ -472,7 +472,8 @@ DICT   *dict_dbm_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
 	msg_fatal("open database %s: cannot support GDBM", path);
     if (fstat(dict_dbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
 	msg_fatal("dict_dbm_open: fstat: %m");
-    dict_dbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+    if (open_mode == O_RDONLY)
+	dict_dbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
     dict_dbm->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
     dict_dbm->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
 

postfix/src/util/dict_lmdb.c

@@ -653,7 +653,8 @@ DICT   *dict_lmdb_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
 	msg_fatal("dict_lmdb_open: fstat: %m");
     dict_lmdb->dict.lock_fd = dict_lmdb->dict.stat_fd = db_fd;
     dict_lmdb->dict.lock_type = MYFLOCK_STYLE_FCNTL;
-    dict_lmdb->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+    if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+	dict_lmdb->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
     dict_lmdb->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
     dict_lmdb->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
 

postfix/src/util/dict_sdbm.c

@@ -449,7 +449,8 @@ DICT   *dict_sdbm_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
     dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd = sdbm_pagfno(dbm);
     if (fstat(dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
 	msg_fatal("dict_sdbm_open: fstat: %m");
-    dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+    if (open_flags == O_RDONLY)
+	dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
     dict_sdbm->dict.owner.uid = st.st_uid;
     dict_sdbm->dict.owner.status = (st.st_uid != 0);
 

postfix/src/xsasl/xsasl_dovecot_server.c

@@ -617,6 +617,7 @@ static int xsasl_dovecot_handle_reply(XSASL_DOVECOT_SERVER *server,
     }
 
     vstring_strcpy(reply, "Connection lost to authentication server");
+    xsasl_dovecot_server_disconnect(server->impl);
     return XSASL_AUTH_TEMP;
 }
 
@@ -707,6 +708,7 @@ int     xsasl_dovecot_server_first(XSASL_SERVER *xp, const char *sasl_method,
 
 	if (i == 1) {
 	    vstring_strcpy(reply, "Can't connect to authentication server");
+	    xsasl_dovecot_server_disconnect(server->impl);
 	    return XSASL_AUTH_TEMP;
 	}
 
@@ -735,6 +737,7 @@ static int xsasl_dovecot_server_next(XSASL_SERVER *xp, const char *request,
 		    "CONT\t%u\t%s\n", server->last_request_id, request);
     if (vstream_fflush(server->impl->sasl_stream) == VSTREAM_EOF) {
 	vstring_strcpy(reply, "Connection lost to authentication server");
+	xsasl_dovecot_server_disconnect(server->impl);
 	return XSASL_AUTH_TEMP;
     }
     return xsasl_dovecot_handle_reply(server, reply);