1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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/*
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2019-04-29 07:21:51 -06:00
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
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*
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2017-12-03 17:53:40 -07:00
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2005, 2010-2015 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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*
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2004-02-13 21:36:49 +00:00
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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1999-07-31 16:19:50 +00:00
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*
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2004-02-13 21:36:49 +00:00
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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2003-04-16 00:42:10 +00:00
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*
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* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
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* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
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* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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*/
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2018-10-26 08:39:09 -06:00
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/*
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* This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it.
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* PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com
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*/
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2018-10-21 08:46:05 -06:00
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2004-11-19 18:39:14 +00:00
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#include <config.h>
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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2001-12-14 19:52:54 +00:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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2015-06-19 14:29:27 -06:00
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#include <stdlib.h>
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2020-05-18 07:59:24 -06:00
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#include <string.h>
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2015-07-02 09:08:28 -06:00
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#include <unistd.h>
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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#include <pwd.h>
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2023-09-25 10:13:28 -06:00
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#include <sudoers.h>
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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#include "sudo_auth.h"
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2000-03-23 00:27:41 +00:00
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#define DESLEN 13
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#define HAS_AGEINFO(p, l) (l == 18 && p[DESLEN] == ',')
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2001-12-14 06:15:08 +00:00
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int
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2023-08-21 09:21:49 -06:00
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sudo_passwd_init(const struct sudoers_context *ctx, struct passwd *pw,
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sudo_auth *auth)
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2001-12-14 06:15:08 +00:00
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{
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2019-12-22 08:48:16 -07:00
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debug_decl(sudo_passwd_init, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH);
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2011-10-22 14:40:21 -04:00
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2021-09-21 20:05:35 -06:00
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/* Only initialize once. */
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if (auth->data != NULL)
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debug_return_int(AUTH_SUCCESS);
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2001-12-14 06:15:08 +00:00
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#ifdef HAVE_SKEYACCESS
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2023-08-21 09:21:49 -06:00
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if (skeyaccess(pw, ctx->user.tty, NULL, NULL) == 0)
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2011-10-22 14:40:21 -04:00
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debug_return_int(AUTH_FAILURE);
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2001-12-14 06:15:08 +00:00
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#endif
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2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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sudo_setspent();
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auth->data = sudo_getepw(pw);
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sudo_endspent();
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2023-08-26 10:45:29 -06:00
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debug_return_int(auth->data ? AUTH_SUCCESS : AUTH_ERROR);
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2001-12-14 06:15:08 +00:00
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}
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2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
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#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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int
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2023-08-21 09:21:49 -06:00
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sudo_passwd_verify(const struct sudoers_context *ctx, struct passwd *pw,
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const char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_conv_callback *callback)
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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{
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2022-10-28 07:29:55 -06:00
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char des_pass[9], *epass;
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2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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char *pw_epasswd = auth->data;
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2000-03-23 00:27:41 +00:00
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size_t pw_len;
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
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int ret;
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2019-12-22 08:48:16 -07:00
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debug_decl(sudo_passwd_verify, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH);
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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2015-02-19 14:17:57 -07:00
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/* An empty plain-text password must match an empty encrypted password. */
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if (pass[0] == '\0')
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debug_return_int(pw_epasswd[0] ? AUTH_FAILURE : AUTH_SUCCESS);
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2000-03-23 00:27:41 +00:00
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2000-03-03 23:04:50 +00:00
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/*
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* Truncate to 8 chars if standard DES since not all crypt()'s do this.
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*/
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2015-02-19 14:17:57 -07:00
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pw_len = strlen(pw_epasswd);
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2022-10-28 07:29:55 -06:00
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if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) {
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
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(void)strlcpy(des_pass, pass, sizeof(des_pass));
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2022-10-28 07:29:55 -06:00
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pass = des_pass;
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}
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2000-03-03 23:04:50 +00:00
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2000-03-13 20:52:25 +00:00
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/*
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* Normal UN*X password check.
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2000-03-23 00:27:41 +00:00
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* HP-UX may add aging info (separated by a ',') at the end so
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* only compare the first DESLEN characters in that case.
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2000-03-13 20:52:25 +00:00
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*/
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2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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epass = (char *) crypt(pass, pw_epasswd);
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
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ret = AUTH_FAILURE;
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2013-04-11 13:10:40 -04:00
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if (epass != NULL) {
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
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if (HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len) && strlen(epass) == DESLEN) {
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if (strncmp(pw_epasswd, epass, DESLEN) == 0)
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ret = AUTH_SUCCESS;
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} else {
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if (strcmp(pw_epasswd, epass) == 0)
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ret = AUTH_SUCCESS;
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}
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2013-04-11 13:10:40 -04:00
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}
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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2022-11-08 13:17:11 -07:00
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explicit_bzero(des_pass, sizeof(des_pass));
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|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
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debug_return_int(ret);
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1999-07-11 00:32:11 +00:00
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}
|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
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#else
|
2025-03-30 14:56:28 -06:00
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/*
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* Constant-time string match, compares "candidate" against "target".
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* Will always traverse the entirety of "candidate".
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* Returns 0 for match, -1 for mismatch.
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*/
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static int
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timingsafe_strmatch(const char *candidate, const char *target)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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debug_decl(timingsafe_strmatch, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH);
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for (;;) {
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ret |= *candidate ^ *target;
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if (*candidate == '\0')
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break;
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candidate++;
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target += *target != '\0';
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}
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debug_return_int(ret ? -1 : 0);
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}
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|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
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int
|
2023-08-21 09:21:49 -06:00
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sudo_passwd_verify(const struct sudoers_context *ctx, struct passwd *pw,
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const char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_conv_callback *callback)
|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
|
|
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{
|
2025-03-30 14:56:28 -06:00
|
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int (* volatile cmp)(const char *, const char *) = timingsafe_strmatch;
|
|
|
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const char *pw_passwd = auth->data;
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
|
|
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debug_decl(sudo_passwd_verify, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH);
|
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|
2020-10-30 10:15:30 -06:00
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/* Simple string compare for systems without crypt(). */
|
2025-03-30 14:56:28 -06:00
|
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|
if (cmp(pass, pw_passwd) == 0)
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = AUTH_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ret = AUTH_FAILURE;
|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
|
|
|
|
Try to make sudo less vulnerable to ROWHAMMER attacks.
We now use ROWHAMMER-resistent values for ALLOW, DENY, AUTH_SUCCESS,
AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_ERROR and AUTH_NONINTERACTIVE. In addition, we
explicitly test for expected values instead of using a negated test
against an error value. In the parser match functions this means
explicitly checking for ALLOW or DENY instead of accepting anything
that is not set to UNSPEC.
Thanks to Andrew J. Adiletta, M. Caner Tol, Yarkin Doroz, and Berk
Sunar, all affiliated with the Vernam Applied Cryptography and
Cybersecurity Lab at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, for the report.
Paper preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02545
2023-09-09 14:07:04 -06:00
|
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debug_return_int(ret);
|
2020-09-18 08:18:07 -06:00
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}
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#endif
|
2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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int
|
2023-08-21 09:21:49 -06:00
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sudo_passwd_cleanup(const struct sudoers_context *ctx, struct passwd *pw,
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sudo_auth *auth, bool force)
|
2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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{
|
2019-12-22 08:48:16 -07:00
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debug_decl(sudo_passwd_cleanup, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH);
|
2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
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2022-11-17 08:10:35 -07:00
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if (auth->data != NULL) {
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|
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/* Zero out encrypted password before freeing. */
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|
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size_t len = strlen((char *)auth->data);
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freezero(auth->data, len);
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|
auth->data = NULL;
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}
|
2020-08-10 19:24:33 -06:00
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2011-10-22 14:40:21 -04:00
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debug_return_int(AUTH_SUCCESS);
|
2010-08-06 13:55:33 -04:00
|
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|
}
|