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Pass back a failure or error string to the front end.

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The audit_failure() function now stores the failure string.
This will allow an audit plugin to log the reason if the user's
request is a rejected.
This commit is contained in:
Todd C. Miller
2020-01-30 13:25:36 -07:00
parent 22105009d8
commit 45e589d443
8 changed files with 176 additions and 98 deletions
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40
plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2019 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2020 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
/* Not an audit event. */
/* Not an audit event (should it be?). */
sudo_warnx(U_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo"));
goto bad;
}
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
if (!def_closefrom_override) {
/* XXX - audit? */
audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv,
N_("user not allowed to override closefrom limit"));
sudo_warnx(U_("you are not permitted to use the -C option"));
goto bad;
}
@@ -413,6 +414,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
timestamp_gid = pw->pw_gid;
sudo_pw_delref(pw);
} else {
/* XXX - audit too? */
log_warningx(SLOG_SEND_MAIL,
N_("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"), def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID;
@@ -436,6 +438,8 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* Check runas user's shell. */
if (!check_user_shell(runas_pw)) {
audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv, N_("invalid shell for user %s: %s"),
runas_pw->pw_name, runas_pw->pw_shell);
log_warningx(SLOG_RAW_MSG, N_("invalid shell for user %s: %s"),
runas_pw->pw_name, runas_pw->pw_shell);
goto bad;
@@ -517,7 +521,8 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* If user specified a timeout make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (!def_user_command_timeouts && user_timeout > 0) {
/* XXX - audit/log? */
audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv,
N_("user not allowed to set a command timeout"));
sudo_warnx(U_("sorry, you are not allowed set a command timeout"));
goto bad;
}
@@ -525,7 +530,8 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
/* XXX - audit/log? */
audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv,
N_("user not allowed to set a preserve the environment"));
sudo_warnx(U_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"));
goto bad;
} else {
@@ -557,12 +563,10 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
ret = display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw, verbose);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
/* Nothing to do. */
ret = true;
break;
case MODE_RUN:
case MODE_EDIT:
/* ret set by sudoers_policy_exec_setup() below. */
/* ret may be overridden by "goto bad" later */
ret = true;
break;
default:
/* Should not happen. */
@@ -676,19 +680,20 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
goto done;
}
/* Setup execution environment to pass back to front-end. */
ret = sudoers_policy_exec_setup(edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv,
env_get(), cmnd_umask, iolog_path, closure);
/* Zero out stashed copy of environment, it is owned by the front-end. */
(void)env_init(NULL);
goto done;
bad:
ret = false;
done:
/* Setup execution environment to pass back to front-end. */
if (!sudoers_policy_exec_setup(edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv,
env_get(), cmnd_umask, iolog_path, closure))
ret = -1;
/* Zero out stashed copy of environment, it is owned by the front-end. */
(void)env_init(NULL);
if (!rewind_perms())
ret = -1;
@@ -871,8 +876,9 @@ set_cmnd(void)
debug_return_int(-1);
}
if (ret == NOT_FOUND_ERROR) {
if (errno == ENAMETOOLONG)
if (errno == ENAMETOOLONG) {
audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv, N_("command too long"));
}
log_warning(0, "%s", NewArgv[0]);
debug_return_int(ret);
}