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Move log_denial() calls and logic to log_failure().

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Move authentication failure logging to log_auth_failure().
Both of these call audit_failure() for us.

This subtly changes logging for commands that are denied by sudoers
but where the user failed to enter the correct password.  Previously,
these would be logged as "N incorrect password attempts" but now
are logged as "command not allowed".  Fixes bug #563
This commit is contained in:
Todd C. Miller
2012-07-10 12:42:33 -04:00
parent 9c9cf9da41
commit 8b03f3e7d0
6 changed files with 147 additions and 86 deletions
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37
plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
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@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ sudoers_policy_close(int exit_status, int error_code)
/*
* The init_session function is called before executing the command
* and before uid/gid changes occur.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure and -1 on error.
*/
static int
sudoers_policy_init_session(struct passwd *pwd, char **user_env[])
@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ sudoers_policy_init_session(struct passwd *pwd, char **user_env[])
if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
/* called via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
return -1;
debug_return_bool(-1);
}
debug_return_bool(sudo_auth_begin_session(pwd, user_env));
@@ -371,10 +372,6 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* Find command in path */
cmnd_status = set_cmnd();
if (cmnd_status == -1) {
rval = -1;
goto done;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) {
@@ -463,8 +460,11 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
rval = check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
if (rval != true)
if (rval != true) {
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK))
log_failure(validated, cmnd_status);
goto done;
}
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
@@ -482,30 +482,7 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
/* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */
if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
audit_failure(NewArgv, _("No user or host"));
log_denial(validated, 1);
} else {
if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
* have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
log_denial(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
warningx(_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
warningx(_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
log_denial(validated, 1);
}
audit_failure(NewArgv, _("validation failure"));
}
log_failure(validated, cmnd_status);
goto bad;
}