diff --git a/doc/sudoers.man.in b/doc/sudoers.man.in
index d32613156..25904fb57 100644
--- a/doc/sudoers.man.in
+++ b/doc/sudoers.man.in
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 .nr BA @BAMAN@
 .nr LC @LCMAN@
 .nr PS @PSMAN@
-.TH "SUDOERS" "@mansectform@" "August 16, 2021" "Sudo @PACKAGE_VERSION@" "File Formats Manual"
+.TH "SUDOERS" "@mansectform@" "August 18, 2021" "Sudo @PACKAGE_VERSION@" "File Formats Manual"
 .nh
 .if n .ad l
 .SH "NAME"
@@ -3056,6 +3056,28 @@ by default.
 .sp
 This setting is only supported by version 1.9.8 or higher.
 .TP 18n
+intercept_allow_setid
+On most systems, the dynamic loader will ignore
+\fRLD_PRELOAD\fR
+(or the equivalent) when running set user-ID and set group-ID
+programs, effectively disabling intercept mode.
+To prevent this from happening,
+\fBsudoers\fR
+will not permit a set user-ID or set group-ID program to be run in
+intercept mode unless
+\fIintercept_allow_setid\fR
+is set.
+This flag has no effect unless the
+\fIintercept\fR
+flag is enabled or the
+\fIINTERCEPT\fR
+tag has been set for the command.
+This flag is
+\fIon\fR
+by default.
+.sp
+This setting is only supported by version 1.9.8 or higher.
+.TP 18n
 intercept_authenticate
 If set, commands run by an intercepted process must be authenticated
 when the user's time stamp is not current.
@@ -6300,6 +6322,13 @@ functionality only works for programs that use the
 system call to run the new command.
 This may be expanded in a future release of
 \fBsudo\fR.
+Because most dynamic loaders ignore
+\fRLD_PRELOAD\fR
+(or the equivalent) when running set user-ID and set group-ID programs,
+\fBsudoers\fR
+will not permit such programs to be run in
+\fIintercept\fR
+mode.
 .sp
 The
 \fIintercept\fR
diff --git a/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in b/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in
index 8be2f2e84..f4444302e 100644
--- a/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in
+++ b/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 .nr BA @BAMAN@
 .nr LC @LCMAN@
 .nr PS @PSMAN@
-.Dd August 16, 2021
+.Dd August 18, 2021
 .Dt SUDOERS @mansectform@
 .Os Sudo @PACKAGE_VERSION@
 .Sh NAME
@@ -2877,6 +2877,27 @@ This flag is
 by default.
 .Pp
 This setting is only supported by version 1.9.8 or higher.
+.It intercept_allow_setid
+On most systems, the dynamic loader will ignore
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD
+(or the equivalent) when running set user-ID and set group-ID
+programs, effectively disabling intercept mode.
+To prevent this from happening,
+.Nm
+will not permit a set user-ID or set group-ID program to be run in
+intercept mode unless
+.Em intercept_allow_setid
+is set.
+This flag has no effect unless the
+.Em intercept
+flag is enabled or the
+.Em INTERCEPT
+tag has been set for the command.
+This flag is
+.Em on
+by default.
+.Pp
+This setting is only supported by version 1.9.8 or higher.
 .It intercept_authenticate
 If set, commands run by an intercepted process must be authenticated
 when the user's time stamp is not current.
@@ -5822,6 +5843,13 @@ functionality only works for programs that use the
 system call to run the new command.
 This may be expanded in a future release of
 .Nm sudo .
+Because most dynamic loaders ignore
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD
+(or the equivalent) when running set user-ID and set group-ID programs,
+.Nm
+will not permit such programs to be run in
+.Em intercept
+mode.
 .Pp
 The
 .Em intercept
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.c b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.c
index 06d3db6a6..50b1d55a1 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.c
@@ -593,6 +593,10 @@ struct sudo_defs_types sudo_defs_table[] = {
 	"intercept_authenticate", T_FLAG,
 	N_("Subsequent commands in an intercepted session must be authenticated"),
 	NULL,
+    }, {
+	"intercept_allow_setid", T_FLAG,
+	N_("Allow an intercepted command to run set setuid or setgid programs"),
+	NULL,
     }, {
 	NULL, 0, NULL
     }
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.h b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.h
index e1cbb9c7e..dfdce1e93 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.h
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.h
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@
 #define def_log_exit_status     (sudo_defs_table[I_LOG_EXIT_STATUS].sd_un.flag)
 #define I_INTERCEPT_AUTHENTICATE 136
 #define def_intercept_authenticate (sudo_defs_table[I_INTERCEPT_AUTHENTICATE].sd_un.flag)
+#define I_INTERCEPT_ALLOW_SETID 137
+#define def_intercept_allow_setid (sudo_defs_table[I_INTERCEPT_ALLOW_SETID].sd_un.flag)
 
 enum def_tuple {
     never,
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.in b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.in
index 6309fb6ae..8872714cb 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/def_data.in
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/def_data.in
@@ -427,3 +427,6 @@ log_exit_status
 intercept_authenticate
 	T_FLAG
 	"Subsequent commands in an intercepted session must be authenticated"
+intercept_allow_setid
+	T_FLAG
+	"Allow an intercepted command to run set setuid or setgid programs"
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/match_command.c b/plugins/sudoers/match_command.c
index a6f847226..27b9ca946 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/match_command.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/match_command.c
@@ -87,29 +87,40 @@ command_args_match(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args)
  * Returns true on success, else false.
  */
 static bool
-do_stat(int fd, const char *path, const char *runchroot, struct stat *sb)
+do_stat(int fd, const char *path, const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    struct stat *sb)
 {
     struct stat sbuf;
     char pathbuf[PATH_MAX];
+    bool ret;
     debug_decl(do_stat, SUDOERS_DEBUG_MATCH);
 
     if (sb == NULL)
 	sb = &sbuf;
 
-    if (fd != -1)
-	debug_return_bool(fstat(fd, sb) == 0);
-
-    /* Make path relative to the new root, if any. */
-    if (runchroot != NULL) {
-	const int len =
-	    snprintf(pathbuf, sizeof(pathbuf), "%s%s", runchroot, path);
-	if (len >= ssizeof(pathbuf)) {
-	    errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-	    debug_return_bool(false);
+    if (fd != -1) {
+	ret = fstat(fd, sb) == 0;
+    } else {
+	/* Make path relative to the new root, if any. */
+	if (runchroot != NULL) {
+	    const int len =
+		snprintf(pathbuf, sizeof(pathbuf), "%s%s", runchroot, path);
+	    if (len >= ssizeof(pathbuf)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		debug_return_bool(false);
+	    }
+	    path = pathbuf;
 	}
-	path = pathbuf;
+	ret = stat(path, sb) == 0;
     }
-    debug_return_bool(stat(path, sb) == 0);
+    if (ret && intercepted) {
+	if (!def_intercept_allow_setid && ISSET(sb->st_mode, S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) {
+	    sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_WARN|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO,
+		"rejecting setid command %s", path);
+	    ret = false;
+	}
+    }
+    debug_return_int(ret);
 }
 #endif /* SUDOERS_NAME_MATCH */
 
@@ -220,7 +231,7 @@ set_cmnd_fd(int fd)
  */
 static bool
 command_matches_dir(const char *sudoers_dir, size_t dlen, const char *runchroot,
-    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    bool intercepted, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     char buf[PATH_MAX], sdbuf[PATH_MAX];
     struct stat sudoers_stat;
@@ -271,7 +282,7 @@ command_matches_dir(const char *sudoers_dir, size_t dlen, const char *runchroot,
 	/* Open the file for fdexec or for digest matching. */
 	if (!open_cmnd(buf, NULL, digests, &fd))
 	    continue;
-	if (!do_stat(fd, buf, NULL, &sudoers_stat))
+	if (!do_stat(fd, buf, NULL, intercepted, &sudoers_stat))
 	    continue;
 
 	if (user_stat == NULL ||
@@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ command_matches_dir(const char *sudoers_dir, size_t dlen, const char *runchroot,
  */
 static bool
 command_matches_dir(const char *sudoers_dir, size_t dlen, const char *runchroot,
-    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    bool intercepted, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     int fd = -1;
     debug_decl(command_matches_dir, SUDOERS_DEBUG_MATCH);
@@ -335,7 +346,7 @@ bad:
 
 static bool
 command_matches_all(const char *runchroot,
-    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    bool intercepted, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     int fd = -1;
     debug_decl(command_matches_all, SUDOERS_DEBUG_MATCH);
@@ -345,7 +356,7 @@ command_matches_all(const char *runchroot,
 	if (!open_cmnd(user_cmnd, runchroot, digests, &fd))
 	    goto bad;
 #ifndef SUDOERS_NAME_MATCH
-	if (!do_stat(fd, user_cmnd, runchroot, NULL))
+	if (!do_stat(fd, user_cmnd, runchroot, intercepted, NULL))
 	    goto bad;
 #endif
     }
@@ -365,7 +376,8 @@ bad:
 
 static bool
 command_matches_fnmatch(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
-    const char *runchroot, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     int fd = -1;
     debug_decl(command_matches_fnmatch, SUDOERS_DEBUG_MATCH);
@@ -386,7 +398,7 @@ command_matches_fnmatch(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
 	if (!open_cmnd(user_cmnd, runchroot, digests, &fd))
 	    goto bad;
 #ifndef SUDOERS_NAME_MATCH
-	if (!do_stat(fd, user_cmnd, runchroot, NULL))
+	if (!do_stat(fd, user_cmnd, runchroot, intercepted, NULL))
 	    goto bad;
 #endif
 	/* Check digest of user_cmnd since sudoers_cmnd is a pattern. */
@@ -407,7 +419,8 @@ bad:
 #ifndef SUDOERS_NAME_MATCH
 static bool
 command_matches_glob(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
-    const char *runchroot, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     struct stat sudoers_stat;
     bool bad_digest = false;
@@ -468,7 +481,7 @@ command_matches_glob(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
 	    /* Open the file for fdexec or for digest matching. */
 	    if (!open_cmnd(cp, runchroot, digests, &fd))
 		continue;
-	    if (!do_stat(fd, cp, runchroot, &sudoers_stat))
+	    if (!do_stat(fd, cp, runchroot, intercepted, &sudoers_stat))
 		continue;
 	    if (user_stat == NULL ||
 		(user_stat->st_dev == sudoers_stat.st_dev &&
@@ -505,7 +518,7 @@ command_matches_glob(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
 	    /* If it ends in '/' it is a directory spec. */
 	    dlen = strlen(cp);
 	    if (cp[dlen - 1] == '/') {
-		if (command_matches_dir(cp, dlen, runchroot, digests)) {
+		if (command_matches_dir(cp, dlen, runchroot, intercepted, digests)) {
 		    globfree(&gl);
 		    debug_return_bool(true);
 		}
@@ -520,7 +533,7 @@ command_matches_glob(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
 	    /* Open the file for fdexec or for digest matching. */
 	    if (!open_cmnd(cp, runchroot, digests, &fd))
 		continue;
-	    if (!do_stat(fd, cp, runchroot, &sudoers_stat))
+	    if (!do_stat(fd, cp, runchroot, intercepted, &sudoers_stat))
 		continue;
 	    if (user_stat == NULL ||
 		(user_stat->st_dev == sudoers_stat.st_dev &&
@@ -553,7 +566,8 @@ done:
 
 static bool
 command_matches_normal(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
-    const char *runchroot, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     struct stat sudoers_stat;
     const char *base;
@@ -565,7 +579,7 @@ command_matches_normal(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
     dlen = strlen(sudoers_cmnd);
     if (sudoers_cmnd[dlen - 1] == '/') {
 	debug_return_bool(command_matches_dir(sudoers_cmnd, dlen, runchroot,
-	    digests));
+	    intercepted, digests));
     }
 
     /* Only proceed if user_base and basename(sudoers_cmnd) match */
@@ -584,7 +598,7 @@ command_matches_normal(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
      *  c) there are args in sudoers and on command line and they match
      *  d) there is a digest and it matches
      */
-    if (user_stat != NULL && do_stat(fd, sudoers_cmnd, runchroot, &sudoers_stat)) {
+    if (user_stat != NULL && do_stat(fd, sudoers_cmnd, runchroot, intercepted, &sudoers_stat)) {
 	if (user_stat->st_dev != sudoers_stat.st_dev ||
 	    user_stat->st_ino != sudoers_stat.st_ino)
 	    goto bad;
@@ -614,15 +628,17 @@ bad:
 #else /* SUDOERS_NAME_MATCH */
 static bool
 command_matches_glob(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
-    const char *runchroot, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     return command_matches_fnmatch(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot,
-	digests);
+	intercepted, digests);
 }
 
 static bool
 command_matches_normal(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
-    const char *runchroot, const struct command_digest_list *digests)
+    const char *runchroot, bool intercepted,
+    const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
     size_t dlen;
     int fd = -1;
@@ -632,7 +648,7 @@ command_matches_normal(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
     dlen = strlen(sudoers_cmnd);
     if (sudoers_cmnd[dlen - 1] == '/') {
 	debug_return_bool(command_matches_dir(sudoers_cmnd, dlen, runchroot,
-	    digests));
+	    intercepted, digests));
     }
 
     if (strcmp(user_cmnd, sudoers_cmnd) == 0) {
@@ -670,6 +686,7 @@ command_matches(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
     const char *runchroot, struct cmnd_info *info,
     const struct command_digest_list *digests)
 {
+    const bool intercepted = info ? info->intercepted : false;
     char *saved_user_cmnd = NULL;
     struct stat saved_user_stat;
     bool rc = false;
@@ -702,7 +719,7 @@ command_matches(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
     }
 
     if (sudoers_cmnd == NULL) {
-	rc = command_matches_all(runchroot, digests);
+	rc = command_matches_all(runchroot, intercepted, digests);
 	goto done;
     }
 
@@ -728,12 +745,16 @@ command_matches(const char *sudoers_cmnd, const char *sudoers_args,
 	 * If sudoers_cmnd has meta characters in it, we need to
 	 * use glob(3) and/or fnmatch(3) to do the matching.
 	 */
-	if (def_fast_glob)
-	    rc = command_matches_fnmatch(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot, digests);
-	else
-	    rc = command_matches_glob(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot, digests);
+	if (def_fast_glob) {
+	    rc = command_matches_fnmatch(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot, 
+		intercepted, digests);
+	} else {
+	    rc = command_matches_glob(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot,
+		intercepted, digests);
+	}
     } else {
-	rc = command_matches_normal(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot, digests);
+	rc = command_matches_normal(sudoers_cmnd, sudoers_args, runchroot,
+	    intercepted, digests);
     }
 done:
     if (saved_user_cmnd != NULL) {
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/parse.c b/plugins/sudoers/parse.c
index da51487d8..6c21daca6 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/parse.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/parse.c
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ sudoers_lookup_check(struct sudo_nss *nss, struct passwd *pw,
     debug_decl(sudoers_lookup_check, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PARSER);
 
     memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
+    if (def_intercept || ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_POLICY_INTERCEPTED))
+	info->intercepted = true;
 
     TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(us, &nss->parse_tree->userspecs, userspec_list, entries) {
 	if (userlist_matches(nss->parse_tree, pw, &us->users) != ALLOW)
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/parse.h b/plugins/sudoers/parse.h
index 0aedfd95b..ea2a179d1 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/parse.h
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/parse.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ struct cmnd_info {
     struct stat cmnd_stat;
     char *cmnd_path;
     int status;
+    bool intercepted;
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/regress/fuzz/fuzz_sudoers.c b/plugins/sudoers/regress/fuzz/fuzz_sudoers.c
index 19eb4ed61..25e43de80 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/regress/fuzz/fuzz_sudoers.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/regress/fuzz/fuzz_sudoers.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct sudo_user sudo_user;
 struct passwd *list_pw;
 sudo_conv_t sudo_conv = fuzz_conversation;
 bool sudoers_recovery = true;
+int sudo_mode;
 
 FILE *
 open_sudoers(const char *file, bool doedit, bool *keepopen)