We now pass a pointer to the context where necessary. There are a
few cases where we need to request the context from sudoers via
sudoers_get_context() for the plugin API functions. If the plugin
API was able to pass around a closure pointer this would not be
necessary.
We just need a way for the policy (and visudo) to override the
default sudoers path. This adds a getter to be used in file.c when
sudoers is first opened.
This splits the code to find the command, perform a sudoers lookup,
ask for a password as needed, and perform post-lokup checks out
into sudoers_check_common(). The old sudoers_policy_main() has
been replaced by sudoers_check_cmnd() (called by sudoers_policy_check()),
sudoers_validate_user() (called by sudoers_policy_validate()) and
sudoers_list() (called by sudoers_policy_list()). The list_user
lookup is now performed in sudoers_list().
privs. Previously, only root or a user with the ability to run any
command as either root or the target user on the current host could
use the -U option. For "sudo -l [-U otheruser] command", NewArgv[0]
is now set to "list" (just like "sudo -l") and the actual command
to be checked starts with NewArgv[1].
If log_input is set, log_{stdin,ttyin} will be set as well.
If log_output is set, log_{stdout,stderr,ttyout} will be set as well.
This provides more fine-grained control over I/O logging and makes it
possible to disable logging piped or redirected intput or output.
sudoers now supports an APPARMOR_PROFILE option, which can be specified
as e.g.
alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=foo ALL
The line above says "user alice can run any command as any user/group,
under confinement by the AppArmor profile 'foo'." Profiles can be
specified in any way that complies with the rules of
aa_change_profile(2). For instance, the sudoers configuration
alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=unconfined ALL
allows alice to run any command unconfined (i.e., without an AppArmor
profile), while
alice ALL=(ALL:ALL) APPARMOR_PROFILE=foo//&bar ALL
tells sudoers that alice can run any command under the stacked AppArmor
profiles 'foo' and 'bar'.
The intention of this option is to give sysadmins on Linux distros
supporting AppArmor better options for fine-grained access control.
Among other things, this option can enforce mandatory access control
(MAC) over the operations that a privileged user is able to perform to
ensure that they cannot privesc past the boundaries of a specified
profile. It can also be used to limit which users are able to get
unconfined system access, by enforcing a default AppArmor profile on all
users and then specifying 'APPARMOR_PROFILE=unconfined' for a privileged
subset of users.
