Add the m permission bit and change the way exec permissions for mmap are handled

module-nextgen/apparmor/apparmor.h

@@ -153,6 +153,21 @@ struct aaprofile {
 	struct kref count;
 };
 
+enum aafile_type {
+	aa_file_default,
+	aa_file_shmem
+};
+
+/**
+ * aafile - file pointer confinement data
+ *
+ * Data structure assigned to each open file (by apparmor_file_alloc_security)
+ */
+struct aafile {
+	enum aafile_type type;
+	struct aaprofile *profile;
+};
+
 /**
  * struct subdomain - primary label for confined tasks
  * @active: the current active profile

module-nextgen/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 
 #include "apparmor.h"
@@ -459,16 +460,16 @@ static int apparmor_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	struct aaprofile *active;
-	struct aaprofile *f_profile;
+	struct aafile *aaf;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	f_profile = AA_PROFILE(file->f_security);
+	aaf = (struct aafile *)file->f_security;
 	/* bail out early if this isn't a mediated file */
-	if (!(f_profile && VALID_FSTYPE(file->f_dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (!aaf || !VALID_FSTYPE(file->f_dentry->d_inode))
 		goto out;
 
 	active = get_active_aaprofile();
-	if (active && f_profile != active)
+	if (active && aaf->profile != active)
 		error = aa_perm(active, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt,
 				mask & (MAY_EXEC | MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ));
 	put_aaprofile(active);
@@ -480,43 +481,62 @@ out:
 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct aaprofile *active;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	active = get_active_aaprofile();
-	file->f_security = get_aaprofile(active);
+	if (active) {
+		struct aafile *aaf;
+		aaf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct aafile), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+		if (aaf) {
+			aaf->type = aa_file_default;
+			aaf->profile = get_aaprofile(active);
+		} else {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
 	put_aaprofile(active);
 
-	return 0;
+	return error;
 }
 
 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct aaprofile *p = AA_PROFILE(file->f_security);
-	put_aaprofile(p);
+	struct aafile *aaf = (struct aafile *)file->f_security;
+
+	if (aaf) {
+		put_aaprofile(aaf->profile);
+		kfree(aaf);
+	}
 }
 
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			       unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static inline int aa_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+			  unsigned long flags)
 {
 	int error = 0, mask = 0;
 	struct aaprofile *active;
-
-	if (!file)
-		goto out;
+	struct aafile *aaf;
 
 	active = get_active_aaprofile();
+	if (!active || !file ||
+	    !(aaf = (struct aafile *)file->f_security) ||
+	    aaf->type == aa_file_shmem)
+		goto out;
 
 	if (prot & PROT_READ)
 		mask |= MAY_READ;
+
 	/* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
 	 * write back to the files */
-	if (prot & PROT_WRITE && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
+	if (prot & PROT_WRITE && (!flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
 		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-		mask |= MAY_EXEC;
+		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 
 	AA_DEBUG("%s: 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, mask);
 
-	error = aa_perm(active, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mask);
+	if (mask)
+		error = aa_perm(active, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mask);
 
 	put_aaprofile(active);
 
@@ -524,6 +544,19 @@ out:
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			       unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return aa_mmap(file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	return aa_mmap(vma->vm_file, prot,
+		       !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+}
+
 static int apparmor_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	return aa_fork(p);
@@ -535,7 +568,7 @@ static void apparmor_task_free_security(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 static int apparmor_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
-				      int flags)
+				     int flags)
 {
 	return cap_task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
 }
@@ -546,8 +579,19 @@ static void apparmor_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
 	return;
 }
 
+static int apparmor_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			      int shmflg)
+{
+	struct aafile *aaf = (struct aafile *)shp->shm_file->f_security;
+
+	if (aaf)
+		aaf->type = aa_file_shmem;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
-				 size_t size)
+				size_t size)
 {
 	int error;
 	struct aaprofile *active;
@@ -725,12 +769,15 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
 	.file_mmap =			apparmor_file_mmap,
+	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
 
 	.task_alloc_security =		apparmor_task_alloc_security,
 	.task_free_security =		apparmor_task_free_security,
 	.task_post_setuid =		apparmor_task_post_setuid,
 	.task_reparent_to_init =	apparmor_task_reparent_to_init,
 
+	.shm_shmat =			apparmor_shm_shmat,
+
 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 };

module-nextgen/apparmor/main.c

@@ -288,9 +288,10 @@ static unsigned int aa_file_perm(struct aaprofile *active, const char *name,
 
 	AA_DEBUG("%s: %s 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, name, mask);
 
-	/* should not enter with other than R/W/X/L */
+	/* should not enter with other than R/W/M/X/L */
 	WARN_ON(mask &
-	       ~(AA_MAY_READ | AA_MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_EXEC | AA_MAY_LINK));
+	       ~(AA_MAY_READ | AA_MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_MMAP |
+		 AA_MAY_LINK));
 
 	/* Special case access to /proc/self/attr/current
 	 * Currently we only allow access if opened O_WRONLY
@@ -664,12 +665,13 @@ int aa_audit(struct aaprofile *active, const struct aa_audit *sa)
 	if (sa->type == AA_AUDITTYPE_FILE) {
 		int perm = audit ? sa->ival : sa->error_code;
 
-		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s%s%s access to %s ",
-			perm & AA_MAY_READ  ? "r" : "",
-			perm & AA_MAY_WRITE ? "w" : "",
-			perm & AA_MAY_EXEC  ? "x" : "",
-			perm & AA_MAY_LINK  ? "l" : "",
-			sa->name);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s%s%s%s access to %s ",
+				 perm & AA_EXEC_MMAP ? "m" : "",
+				 perm & AA_MAY_READ  ? "r" : "",
+				 perm & AA_MAY_WRITE ? "w" : "",
+				 perm & AA_MAY_EXEC  ? "x" : "",
+				 perm & AA_MAY_LINK  ? "l" : "",
+				 sa->name);
 
 		opspec_error = -EPERM;
 

module-nextgen/apparmor/module_interface.c

@@ -465,6 +465,10 @@ static inline int check_rule_and_add(struct aa_entry *file_entry,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* ix -> m (required so that target exec binary may map itself) */
+  	         if (mode & AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
+  	                 file_entry->mode |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
 	list_add(&file_entry->list, &profile->file_entry);
 	profile->num_file_entries++;
 

module-nextgen/apparmor/shared.h

@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
 #define POS_AA_EXEC_INHERIT		(POS_AA_MAY_LINK + 1)
 #define POS_AA_EXEC_UNCONSTRAINED	(POS_AA_EXEC_INHERIT + 1)
 #define POS_AA_EXEC_PROFILE		(POS_AA_EXEC_UNCONSTRAINED + 1)
-#define POS_AA_FILE_MAX			POS_AA_EXEC_PROFILE
+#define POS_AA_EXEC_MMAP		(POS_AA_EXEC_PROFILE + 1)
+#define POS_AA_FILE_MAX			POS_AA_EXEC_MMAP
 
 /* Modeled after MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC def'ns */
 #define AA_MAY_EXEC			(0x01 << POS_AA_MAY_EXEC)
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 #define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			(0x01 << POS_AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
 #define AA_EXEC_UNCONSTRAINED		(0x01 << POS_AA_EXEC_UNCONSTRAINED)
 #define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			(0x01 << POS_AA_EXEC_PROFILE)
+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP			(0x01 << POS_AA_EXEC_MMAP)
 #define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS(X)		(X & (AA_EXEC_INHERIT | \
 					 A_EXEC_UNCONSTRAINED | \
 					 AA_EXEC_PROFILE))