git conversion: move .bzrignore to .gitignore

Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve.beattie@canonical.com>

Makefile

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ DIRS=parser \
      changehat/pam_apparmor \
      tests
 
-REPO_URL?=lp:apparmor
+#REPO_URL?=lp:apparmor/2.8
+# --per-file-timestamps is failing over SSH, https://bugs.launchpad.net/bzr/+bug/1257078
+REPO_URL?=https://code.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/apparmor/2.8
 # alternate possibilities to export from
 #REPO_URL=.
 #REPO_URL="bzr+ssh://bazaar.launchpad.net/~sbeattie/+junk/apparmor-dev/"

README

@@ -146,6 +146,20 @@ For details on structure and adding tests, see libraries/libapparmor/README.
 $ cd libraries/libapparmor
 $ make check
 
+Utils
+-----
+There are some simple tests available, including basic perl syntax
+checks for the perl modules and executables. There are also minimal
+checks on the python utilities and python-based tests in the test/
+subdirectory.
+$ cd utils
+$ make check
+
+The aa-decode utility to be tested can be overridden by
+setting up environment variable APPARMOR_DECODE; e.g.:
+
+$ APPARMOR_DECODE=/usr/bin/aa-decode make check
+
 Profile checks
 --------------
 A basic consistency check to ensure that the parser and aa-logprof parse
@@ -184,3 +198,21 @@ Building and Installing AppArmor Kernel Patches
 
 TODO
 
+
+-----------------
+Required versions
+-----------------
+
+The AppArmor userspace utilities are written with some assumptions about
+installed and available versions of other tools. This is a (possibly
+incomplete) list of known version dependencies:
+
+AppArmor.pm (used by aa-audit, aa-autodep, aa-complain, aa-disable,
+aa-enforce, aa-genprof, aa-logprof, aa-unconfined) requires minimum
+Perl 5.10.1.
+
+Python scripts require minimum Python 2.7. Some utilities may require
+Python 3.3. Python 3.0, 3.1, 3.2 are largely untested.
+
+Most shell scripts are written for POSIX-compatible sh. aa-decode expects
+bash, probably version 3.2 and higher.

changehat/mod_apparmor/mod_apparmor.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include "http_config.h"
 #include "http_request.h"
 #include "http_log.h"
+#include "http_main.h"
 #include "http_protocol.h"
 #include "util_filter.h"
 #include "apr.h"
@@ -35,9 +36,18 @@
 #define DEFAULT_HAT "HANDLING_UNTRUSTED_INPUT"
 #define DEFAULT_URI_HAT "DEFAULT_URI"
 
+/* Compatibility with apache 2.2 */
+#if AP_SERVER_MAJORVERSION_NUMBER == 2 && AP_SERVER_MINORVERSION_NUMBER < 3
+  #define APLOG_TRACE1 APLOG_DEBUG
+  server_rec *ap_server_conf = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef APLOG_USE_MODULE
+  APLOG_USE_MODULE(apparmor);
+#endif
 module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA apparmor_module;
 
-static unsigned int magic_token = 0;
+static unsigned long magic_token = 0;
 static int inside_default_hat = 0;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -68,9 +78,10 @@ immunix_init (apr_pool_t *p, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
     	apr_file_read (file, (void *) &magic_token, &size);
 	apr_file_close (file);
     } else {
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "Failed to open /dev/urandom");
+        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, ap_server_conf,
+			"Failed to open /dev/urandom");
     }
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "Opened /dev/urandom successfully");
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, ap_server_conf, "Opened /dev/urandom successfully");
 
     return OK;
 }
@@ -83,35 +94,32 @@ immunix_child_init (apr_pool_t *p, server_rec *s)
 {
     int ret;
 
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "init: calling change_hat");
-    ret = change_hat (DEFAULT_HAT, magic_token);
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, ap_server_conf,
+		    "init: calling change_hat with '%s'", DEFAULT_HAT);
+    ret = aa_change_hat(DEFAULT_HAT, magic_token);
     if (ret < 0) {
-    	change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "Failed to change_hat to '%s'",
-			DEFAULT_HAT);
+    	aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
+        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, ap_server_conf,
+			"Failed to change_hat to '%s'", DEFAULT_HAT);
     } else {
         inside_default_hat = 1;
     }
 }    			 
 
-#ifdef DEBUG
 static void
-debug_dump_uri (apr_uri_t * uri) 
+debug_dump_uri(request_rec *r)
 {
-    if (uri) 
-    	ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "Dumping uri info "
+    apr_uri_t *uri = &r->parsed_uri;
+    if (uri)
+    	ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "Dumping uri info "
     	          "scheme='%s' host='%s' path='%s' query='%s' fragment='%s'",
     		  uri->scheme, uri->hostname, uri->path, uri->query,
 		  uri->fragment);
     else
-    	ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "Asked to dump NULL uri");
+    	ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "Asked to dump NULL uri");
 
 }
-#else
-static void
-debug_dump_uri (apr_uri_t * __unused uri) { }
-#endif
-    
+
 /* 
    immunix_enter_hat will attempt to change_hat in the following order:
    (1) to a hatname in a location directive
@@ -129,8 +137,8 @@ immunix_enter_hat (request_rec *r)
     immunix_srv_cfg * scfg = (immunix_srv_cfg *) 
     		ap_get_module_config (r->server->module_config, &apparmor_module);
 
-    debug_dump_uri (&r->parsed_uri);
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "in immunix_enter_hat (%s) n:0x%lx p:0x%lx main:0x%lx", 
+    debug_dump_uri(r);
+    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "in immunix_enter_hat (%s) n:0x%lx p:0x%lx main:0x%lx",
     	dcfg->path, (unsigned long) r->next, (unsigned long) r->prev, 
 	(unsigned long) r->main);
 
@@ -139,41 +147,48 @@ immunix_enter_hat (request_rec *r)
     	return OK;
 
     if (inside_default_hat) {
-        change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
+        aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
 	inside_default_hat = 0;
     }
 
     if (dcfg != NULL && dcfg->hat_name != NULL) {
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "calling change_hat [dcfg] %s", dcfg->hat_name);
-        sd_ret = change_hat (dcfg->hat_name, magic_token);
+        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, "calling change_hat [dcfg] %s", dcfg->hat_name);
+        sd_ret = aa_change_hat(dcfg->hat_name, magic_token);
 	if (sd_ret < 0) {
-	    change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
+	    aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
 	} else {
 	    return OK;
 	}
     }
 
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "calling change_hat [uri] %s", r->uri);
-    sd_ret = change_hat (r->uri, magic_token);
+    if (scfg) {
+    	ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "Dumping scfg info: "
+    	          "scfg='0x%lx' scfg->hat_name='%s'",
+    		  (unsigned long) scfg, scfg->hat_name);
+    } else {
+    	ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "scfg is null");
+    }
+    if (scfg != NULL && scfg->hat_name != NULL) {
+        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, "calling change_hat [scfg] %s", scfg->hat_name);
+        sd_ret = aa_change_hat(scfg->hat_name, magic_token);
+	if (sd_ret < 0) {
+	    aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
+	} else {
+	    return OK;
+	}
+    }
+
+    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, "calling change_hat [uri] %s", r->uri);
+    sd_ret = aa_change_hat(r->uri, magic_token);
     if (sd_ret < 0) {
-    	change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
+    	aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
     } else {
 	    return OK;
     }
 
-    if (scfg != NULL && scfg->hat_name != NULL) {
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "calling change_hat [scfg] %s", scfg->hat_name);
-        sd_ret = change_hat (scfg->hat_name, magic_token);
-	if (sd_ret < 0) {
-	    change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
-	} else {
-	    return OK;
-	}
-    }
-
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "calling change_hat DEFAULT_URI");
-    sd_ret = change_hat (DEFAULT_URI_HAT, magic_token);
-    if (sd_ret < 0) change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
+    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, "calling change_hat DEFAULT_URI");
+    sd_ret = aa_change_hat(DEFAULT_URI_HAT, magic_token);
+    if (sd_ret < 0) aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
 
     return OK;
 }
@@ -186,14 +201,15 @@ immunix_exit_hat (request_rec *r)
     		ap_get_module_config (r->per_dir_config, &apparmor_module);
     /* immunix_srv_cfg * scfg = (immunix_srv_cfg *)
     		ap_get_module_config (r->server->module_config, &apparmor_module); */
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "exiting change_hat - dir hat %s path %s", dcfg->hat_name, dcfg->path);
-    change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
+    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, "exiting change_hat: dir hat %s dir path %s",
+		    dcfg->hat_name, dcfg->path);
+    aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
 
-    sd_ret = change_hat (DEFAULT_HAT, magic_token);
+    sd_ret = aa_change_hat(DEFAULT_HAT, magic_token);
     if (sd_ret < 0) {
-    	change_hat (NULL, magic_token);
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "Failed to change_hat to '%s'",
-			DEFAULT_HAT);
+    	aa_change_hat(NULL, magic_token);
+        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r,
+			"Failed to change_hat to '%s'", DEFAULT_HAT);
     } else {
         inside_default_hat = 1;
     }
@@ -204,7 +220,7 @@ immunix_exit_hat (request_rec *r)
 static const char *
 aa_cmd_ch_path (cmd_parms * cmd, void * mconfig, const char * parm1)
 {
-    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "config change hat %s",
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, ap_server_conf, "directory config change hat %s",
     			parm1 ? parm1 : "DEFAULT");
     immunix_dir_cfg * dcfg = mconfig;
     if (parm1 != NULL) {
@@ -221,7 +237,7 @@ static const char *
 immunix_cmd_ch_path (cmd_parms * cmd, void * mconfig, const char * parm1)
 {
     if (path_warn_once == 0) {
-    	ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, NULL, "ImmHatName is "
+    	ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, ap_server_conf, "ImmHatName is "
 		     "deprecated, please use AAHatName instead");
 	path_warn_once = 1;
     }
@@ -231,9 +247,10 @@ immunix_cmd_ch_path (cmd_parms * cmd, void * mconfig, const char * parm1)
 static const char *
 aa_cmd_ch_srv (cmd_parms * cmd, void * mconfig, const char * parm1)
 {
-    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "config change hat %s",
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, ap_server_conf, "server config change hat %s",
     			parm1 ? parm1 : "DEFAULT");
-    immunix_srv_cfg * scfg = mconfig;
+    immunix_srv_cfg * scfg = (immunix_srv_cfg *)
+	    ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &apparmor_module);
     if (parm1 != NULL) {
     	scfg->hat_name = parm1;
     } else {
@@ -248,7 +265,7 @@ static const char *
 immunix_cmd_ch_srv (cmd_parms * cmd, void * mconfig, const char * parm1)
 {
     if (srv_warn_once == 0) {
-	ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, NULL, "ImmDefaultHatName is "
+	ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, ap_server_conf, "ImmDefaultHatName is "
 		     "deprecated, please use AADefaultHatName instead");
 	srv_warn_once = 1;
     }
@@ -260,9 +277,9 @@ immunix_create_dir_config (apr_pool_t * p, char * path)
 {
     immunix_dir_cfg * newcfg = (immunix_dir_cfg *) apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(* newcfg));
 
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "in immunix_create_dir (%s)", path ? path : ":no path:");
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, ap_server_conf, "in immunix_create_dir (%s)", path ? path : ":no path:");
     if (newcfg == NULL) {
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "immunix_create_dir: couldn't alloc dir config");
+        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ap_server_conf, "immunix_create_dir: couldn't alloc dir config");
     	return NULL;
     }
     newcfg->path = apr_pstrdup (p, path ? path : ":no path:");
@@ -277,7 +294,7 @@ immunix_merge_dir_config (apr_pool_t * p, void * parent, void * child)
 {
     immunix_dir_cfg * newcfg = (immunix_dir_cfg *) apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(* newcfg));
 
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "in immunix_merge_dir ()");
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, ap_server_conf, "in immunix_merge_dir ()");
     if (newcfg == NULL)
     	return NULL;
 
@@ -290,9 +307,9 @@ immunix_create_srv_config (apr_pool_t * p, server_rec * srv)
 {
     immunix_srv_cfg * newcfg = (immunix_srv_cfg *) apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(* newcfg));
 
-    ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, NULL, "in immunix_create_srv");
+    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, ap_server_conf, "in immunix_create_srv");
     if (newcfg == NULL) {
-        ap_log_error (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, NULL, "immunix_create_srv: couldn't alloc srv config");
+        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ap_server_conf, "immunix_create_srv: couldn't alloc srv config");
     	return NULL;
     }
 

changehat/mod_apparmor/mod_apparmor.pod

@@ -72,11 +72,10 @@ behavior described above.
 
 AADefaultHatName allows you to specify a default hat to be used for
 virtual hosts and other Apache server directives, so that you can have
-different defaults for different virtual hosts. This can be overridden by
-the AAHatName directive and is checked for only if there isn't a matching
-AAHatName or hat named by the URI. If the AADefaultHatName hat does not
-exist, it falls back to the DEFAULT_URI hat if it exists (as described
-above).
+different defaults for different virtual hosts. This can be overridden
+by the AAHatName directive and is checked for only if there isn't
+a matching AAHatName. If the AADefaultHatName hat does not exist,
+then it falls back to the behavior described above.
 
 =back
 
@@ -96,11 +95,11 @@ will:
 1. try to aa_change_hat(2) into a matching AAHatName hat if it exists and
 applies, otherwise it will
 
-2. try to aa_change_hat(2) into the URI itself, otherwise it will
-
-3. try to aa_change_hat(2) into an AADefaultHatName hat if it has been defined
+2. try to aa_change_hat(2) into an AADefaultHatName hat if it has been defined
 for the server/vhost, otherwise it will
 
+3. try to aa_change_hat(2) into the URI itself, otherwise it will
+
 4. try to aa_change_hat(2) into the DEFAULT_URI hat, if it exists, otherwise it
 will
 
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ with the prefork MPM configuration -- threaded configurations of Apache
 may not work correctly.
 
 There are likely other bugs lurking about; if you find any, please report
-them at L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
+them at L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

common/Make.rules

@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
 DISTRIBUTION=AppArmor
 VERSION=$(shell cat common/Version)
 
+AWK:=$(shell which awk)
+ifndef AWK
+$(error awk utility required for build but not available)
+endif
+
+# Convenience functions
+pathsearch = $(firstword $(wildcard $(addsuffix /$(1),$(subst :, ,$(PATH)))))
+map = $(foreach a,$(2),$(call $(1),$(a)))
+
 # OVERRIDABLE variables
 # Set these variables before including Make.rules to change its behavior
 #   SPECFILE - for packages that have a non-standard specfile name
@@ -127,6 +136,17 @@ endif
 
 endif
 
+ifndef PYTHON_VERSIONS
+PYTHON_VERSIONS = $(call map, pathsearch, python2 python3)
+endif
+
+ifndef PYTHON
+PYTHON = $(firstword ${PYTHON_VERSIONS})
+endif
+
+#Helper function to be used with $(call pyalldo, run_test_with_all.py)
+pyalldo=set -e; $(foreach py, $(PYTHON_VERSIONS), $(py) $(1);)
+
 .PHONY: version
 .SILENT: version
 version:

common/Version

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.8.0
+2.8.5

kernel-patches/3.5/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+From 05bf1eb7276886a3eda0588a8e012b558b693e96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
+ to interface
+
+Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
+introspection.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Kconfig      |    9 ++
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
++++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+ 	  boot.
+ 
+ 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
++
++config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
++	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
++	default y
++	help
++	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
++          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
++          is desired.
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 16c15ec..42b7c9f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,234 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
+ 	.release	= single_release,
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++/**
++ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
++ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
++ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
++ * while switching current namespace.
++ *
++ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
++ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
++ */
++static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
++					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
++{
++	struct aa_namespace *parent;
++
++	/* is next namespace a child */
++	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
++		struct aa_namespace *next;
++		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
++		read_lock(&next->lock);
++		return next;
++	}
++
++	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
++	parent = ns->parent;
++	while (parent) {
++		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
++		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
++			read_lock(&ns->lock);
++			return ns;
++		}
++		if (parent == root)
++			return NULL;
++		ns = parent;
++		parent = parent->parent;
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
++ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
++ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
++					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
++{
++	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
++		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
++			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
++						struct aa_profile, base.list);
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
++ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
++ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *parent;
++	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
++
++	/* is next profile a child */
++	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
++		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
++					base.list);
++
++	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
++	parent = p->parent;
++	while (parent) {
++		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
++					     base.list)
++				return p;
++		p = parent;
++		parent = parent->parent;
++	}
++
++	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
++	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
++		return p;
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
++ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
++ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
++				       struct aa_profile *profile)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
++	if (next)
++		return next;
++
++	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
++	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
++ * @f: seq_file to fill
++ * @pos: current position
++ *
++ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
++ *
++ * acquires first ns->lock
++ */
++static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
++	__acquires(root->lock)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
++	loff_t l = *pos;
++	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
++
++
++	/* find the first profile */
++	read_lock(&root->lock);
++	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
++
++	/* skip to position */
++	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
++		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
++
++	return profile;
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_next - read the next profile entry
++ * @f: seq_file to fill
++ * @p: profile previously returned
++ * @pos: current position
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
++ *
++ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
++ */
++static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
++	(*pos)++;
++
++	return next_profile(root, profile);
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
++ * @f: seq_file we are filling
++ * @p: the last profile writen
++ *
++ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
++ */
++static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
++	__releases(root->lock)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
++
++	if (profile) {
++		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
++			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&root->lock);
++	aa_put_namespace(root);
++}
++
++/**
++ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
++ * @f: seq_file to file
++ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: error on failure
++ */
++static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
++
++	if (profile->ns != root)
++		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
++	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
++		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
++	.start = p_start,
++	.next = p_next,
++	.stop = p_stop,
++	.show = seq_show_profile,
++};
++
++static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
++}
++
++static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	return seq_release(inode, file);
++}
++
++const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
++	.open = profiles_open,
++	.read = seq_read,
++	.llseek = seq_lseek,
++	.release = profiles_release,
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24 */
++
+ /** Base file system setup **/
+ 
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
+@@ -210,6 +438,9 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
++#endif
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
+ 	{ }
+ };
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.5/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+From 4facdf9db37c12ff655c91270d9030e2ed805ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+Base support for network mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/.gitignore       |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/Makefile         |   42 +++++++++-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |    1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |    4 +
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   44 ++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c            |  162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   46 ++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
+-af_names.h
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+ 
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ 	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    [1] = "local",
++#    [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
++# to
++#    [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+ 			    $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ 		      $(src)/Makefile
+ 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++		     $(src)/Makefile
++	$(call cmd,make-af)
++	$(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 42b7c9f..114fb23 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
++	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	{ }
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 4b7e189..17734f9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			u32 denied;
+ 			uid_t ouid;
+ 		} fs;
++		struct {
++			int type, protocol;
++			struct sock *sk;
++		} net;
+ 	};
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cb8a121
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
++
++#include <net/sock.h>
++
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
++
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
++
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
++
++extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
++
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
++{
++	/* NOP */
++}
++
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+ 
+ extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
+@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
+  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+  *
+  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
+@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ 	struct aa_policydb policy;
+ 	struct aa_file_rules file;
+ 	struct aa_caps caps;
++	struct aa_net net;
+ 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 8ea39aa..f628734 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
+@@ -614,6 +615,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (kern)
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++				    NULL);
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
++}
++
+ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.name =				"apparmor",
+ 
+@@ -646,6 +745,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
+ 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+ 
++	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
++	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
++	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
++	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
++	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
++	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
++	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
++	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
++	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
++	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
++	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
++	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
++
+ 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+ 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+ 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..003dd18
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++#include "net_names.h"
++
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
++		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa;
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
++	if (sk) {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
++	} else {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	}
++	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.u.net = &net;
++	sa.aad->op = op,
++	sa.u.net->family = family;
++	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
++	sa.aad->net.type = type;
++	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
++		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++		u16 kill_mask = 0;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++
++		if (denied & kill_mask)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
++	}
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
++		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	u16 family_mask;
++	int error;
++
++	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++		return 0;
++
++	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
++
++	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
++
++	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++	 */
++	if (in_interrupt())
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++	return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index cf5fd22..27c8161 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+ 
+ 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 329b1fd..1b90dfa 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
++{
++	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++			return 0;
++		if (data)
++			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *name = NULL;
++	size_t size = 0;
+ 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
+ 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+ 	u32 tmp;
+@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++	if (size) {
++
++		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++			 * never request
++			 */
++			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++				u16 tmp;
++				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++					goto fail;
++				continue;
++			}
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++		}
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++			goto fail;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++	 * by IPC
++	 */
++	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.5/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 4b25e62dc1e8d81d80f778e1e57b7c38ba4fd901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
+ mediation
+
+If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/net.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ 	} else {
+ 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+-		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
+ 
+ 		if (denied & kill_mask)
+ 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.5/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From e2d745442133f625e715f713c0441f0f2a7ea6ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:01 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] apparmor: Ensure apparmor does not mediate kernel based
+ sockets
+
+Currently apparmor makes the assumption that kernel sockets are unmediated
+because mediation is only done against tasks that have a profile attached.
+Ensure we never get in a situation where a kernel socket is being mediated
+by tagging the sk_security field for kernel sockets.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h |    2 ++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c         |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c         |    3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+index cb8a121..bc8198b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
+ 
+ #include "apparmorfs.h"
+ 
++#define AA_SOCK_KERN 0xAA
++
+ /* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+  * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+  * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index f628734..a172d01 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -630,6 +630,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
++				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	if (kern)
++		/* tag kernel sockets so we don't mediate them later */
++		sock->sk->sk_security = (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ 				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+ {
+@@ -713,6 +723,12 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+ 	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+ }
+ 
++static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
++				       struct sock *newsk)
++{
++	newsk->sk_security = sk->sk_security;
++}
++
+ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.name =				"apparmor",
+ 
+@@ -746,6 +762,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+ 
+ 	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
++	.socket_post_create =		apparmor_socket_post_create,
+ 	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
+ 	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
+ 	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
+@@ -757,6 +774,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+ 	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+ 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
++	.sk_clone_security =		apparmor_sk_clone_security,
+ 
+ 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+ 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 6e6e5c9..baa4df1 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+ 	if (in_interrupt())
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	if (sk->sk_security == (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ 	if (!unconfined(profile))
+ 		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.5/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
+From 272431fc90fab50ea9593d969d3ab8d98f03627c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
+ mount
+
+Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+The basic form of the rules are.
+
+  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+  where [conds] can be
+    fstype=<expr>
+    options=<expr>
+
+Example mount commands
+  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
+
+  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+  umount,
+
+  umount /m*,
+
+See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Makefile           |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   13 +
+ security/apparmor/audit.c            |    4 +
+ security/apparmor/domain.c           |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |    3 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   11 +
+ security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |    2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |   54 +++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   59 ++++
+ security/apparmor/mount.c            |  620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
+ 
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 114fb23..ee77ec9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -426,10 +426,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
++	{ }
++};
++
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
++	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
++	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	{ }
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+index 3ae28db..e267963 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
+ 	"file_mmap",
+ 	"file_mprotect",
+ 
++	"pivotroot",
++	"mount",
++	"umount",
++
+ 	"create",
+ 	"post_create",
+ 	"bind",
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index b81ea10..afa8671 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+  *
+  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+  */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+ 
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+ 
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 17734f9..66a738c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
+ 	OP_FMMAP,
+ 	OP_FMPROT,
+ 
++	OP_PIVOTROOT,
++	OP_MOUNT,
++	OP_UMOUNT,
++
+ 	OP_CREATE,
+ 	OP_POST_CREATE,
+ 	OP_BIND,
+@@ -122,6 +126,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
+ 		struct {
++			const char *src_name;
++			const char *type;
++			const char *trans;
++			const char *data;
++			unsigned long flags;
++		} mnt;
++		struct {
+ 			const char *target;
+ 			u32 request;
+ 			u32 denied;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ 	char **table;
+ };
+ 
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bc17a53
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
++
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
++
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
++
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
++
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags);
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name);
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data);
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
++		  struct path *new_path);
++
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index a172d01..5da8af9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+@@ -504,6 +505,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
++			     unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* Discard magic */
++	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
++			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++		else
++			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++					     flags, data);
++	}
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ 				char **value)
+ {
+@@ -737,6 +792,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
+ 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
+ 
++	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
++	.sb_umount =			apparmor_sb_umount,
++	.sb_pivotroot =			apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
++
+ 	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
+ 	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
+ 	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..478aa4d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++	if (flags & MS_BIND)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++				 ", unbindable");
++	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++				 ", private");
++	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++				 ", slave");
++	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++				 ", shared");
++	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
++		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
++		       const char *type, const char *trans,
++		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa = { };
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++
++	if (likely(!error)) {
++		u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++			mask = 0xffff;
++
++		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++		request &= mask;
++
++		if (likely(!request))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		/* only report permissions that were denied */
++		request = request & ~perms->allow;
++
++		if (request & perms->kill)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++		if (!request)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++				complain_error(error) : error;
++	}
++
++	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.aad->op = op;
++	sa.aad->name = name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
++	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
++	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
++	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
++	sa.aad->info = info;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
++ *
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
++ */
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++				    unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++		if ((1 << i) & flags)
++			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
++	}
++
++	return state;
++}
++
++/**
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
++ *
++ * Returns: mount permissions
++ */
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++					   unsigned int state)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms;
++
++	perms.kill = 0;
++	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
++
++	return perms;
++}
++
++static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
++	"match succeeded",
++	"failed mntpnt match",
++	"failed srcname match",
++	"failed type match",
++	"failed flags match",
++	"failed data match"
++};
++
++/*
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
++ */
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (devname)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 2;
++
++	if (type)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 3;
++
++	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++	if (!state)
++		return 4;
++	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++		if (!state)
++			return 4;
++
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++		if (!state)
++			return 5;
++		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* failed at end of flags match */
++	return 4;
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++		     const char *devname, const char *type,
++		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++	int pos;
++
++	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++	if (pos) {
++		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
++{
++	return profile->path_flags |
++		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	int binary, error;
++
++	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++			  &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *orig_name)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int binary = 1;
++	int error;
++
++	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++	if (type) {
++		int requires_dev;
++		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++		if (!fstype)
++			return -ENODEV;
++
++		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++		put_filesystem(fstype);
++
++		if (requires_dev) {
++			struct path dev_path;
++
++			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++				error = -ENOENT;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++
++			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++			path_put(&dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++		}
++	}
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
++			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++	return error;
++
++}
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
++		  struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     new_name);
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++			if (!target)
++				error = -ENOENT;
++			else
++				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
++		}
++	} else
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++	aa_put_profile(target);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++	kfree(new_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.5/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From f58c91bc1871d604f88d0056099dc34f8ce3ae21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:27:32 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] apparmor: fix IRQ stack overflow during free_profile
+
+BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1056078
+
+Profile replacement can cause long chains of profiles to build up when
+the profile being replaced is pinned. When the pinned profile is finally
+freed, it puts the reference to its replacement, which may in turn nest
+another call to free_profile on the stack. Because this may happen for
+each profile in the replacedby chain this can result in a recusion that
+causes the stack to overflow.
+
+Break this nesting by directly walking the chain of replacedby profiles
+(ie. use iteration instead of recursion to free the list). This results
+in at most 2 levels of free_profile being called, while freeing a
+replacedby chain.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 27c8161..56e5304 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
+  */
+ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ {
++	struct aa_profile *p;
++
+ 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
+ 
+ 	if (!profile)
+@@ -752,7 +754,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
+ 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
+ 
+-	aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
++	/* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
++	 * put_profile(kref_put).
++	 * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
++	 * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
++	 * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
++	 * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
++	 */
++	for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
++		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
++			/* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
++			struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
++			/* break the chain */
++			p->replacedby = NULL;
++			/* now free p, chain is broken */
++			free_profile(p);
++
++			/* follow up with next profile in the chain */
++			p = next;
++		} else
++			break;
++	}
+ 
+ 	kzfree(profile);
+ }
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+From 259cf7251194d81a4a3c4e6d76c2cf9e38d5647d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
+ to interface
+
+Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
+introspection.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Kconfig      |    9 ++
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
++++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+ 	  boot.
+ 
+ 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
++
++config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
++	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
++	default y
++	help
++	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
++          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
++          is desired.
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 16c15ec..42b7c9f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,234 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
+ 	.release	= single_release,
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++/**
++ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
++ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
++ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
++ * while switching current namespace.
++ *
++ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
++ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
++ */
++static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
++					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
++{
++	struct aa_namespace *parent;
++
++	/* is next namespace a child */
++	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
++		struct aa_namespace *next;
++		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
++		read_lock(&next->lock);
++		return next;
++	}
++
++	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
++	parent = ns->parent;
++	while (parent) {
++		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
++		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
++			read_lock(&ns->lock);
++			return ns;
++		}
++		if (parent == root)
++			return NULL;
++		ns = parent;
++		parent = parent->parent;
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
++ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
++ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
++					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
++{
++	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
++		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
++			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
++						struct aa_profile, base.list);
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
++ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
++ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *parent;
++	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
++
++	/* is next profile a child */
++	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
++		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
++					base.list);
++
++	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
++	parent = p->parent;
++	while (parent) {
++		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
++					     base.list)
++				return p;
++		p = parent;
++		parent = parent->parent;
++	}
++
++	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
++	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
++		return p;
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
++ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
++ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
++ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
++ */
++static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
++				       struct aa_profile *profile)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
++	if (next)
++		return next;
++
++	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
++	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
++ * @f: seq_file to fill
++ * @pos: current position
++ *
++ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
++ *
++ * acquires first ns->lock
++ */
++static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
++	__acquires(root->lock)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
++	loff_t l = *pos;
++	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
++
++
++	/* find the first profile */
++	read_lock(&root->lock);
++	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
++
++	/* skip to position */
++	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
++		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
++
++	return profile;
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_next - read the next profile entry
++ * @f: seq_file to fill
++ * @p: profile previously returned
++ * @pos: current position
++ *
++ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
++ *
++ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
++ */
++static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
++	(*pos)++;
++
++	return next_profile(root, profile);
++}
++
++/**
++ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
++ * @f: seq_file we are filling
++ * @p: the last profile writen
++ *
++ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
++ */
++static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
++	__releases(root->lock)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
++
++	if (profile) {
++		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
++			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&root->lock);
++	aa_put_namespace(root);
++}
++
++/**
++ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
++ * @f: seq_file to file
++ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: error on failure
++ */
++static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
++	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
++
++	if (profile->ns != root)
++		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
++	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
++		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
++	.start = p_start,
++	.next = p_next,
++	.stop = p_stop,
++	.show = seq_show_profile,
++};
++
++static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
++}
++
++static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	return seq_release(inode, file);
++}
++
++const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
++	.open = profiles_open,
++	.read = seq_read,
++	.llseek = seq_lseek,
++	.release = profiles_release,
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24 */
++
+ /** Base file system setup **/
+ 
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
+@@ -210,6 +438,9 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
++	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
++#endif
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
+ 	{ }
+ };
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+From 0317e6ba6aa4adc71f645b7da5318f4caa69267e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+Base support for network mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/.gitignore       |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/Makefile         |   42 +++++++++-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |    1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |    4 +
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   44 ++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c            |  162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   46 ++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
+-af_names.h
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+ 
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ 	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    [1] = "local",
++#    [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
++# to
++#    [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+ 			    $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ 		      $(src)/Makefile
+ 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++		     $(src)/Makefile
++	$(call cmd,make-af)
++	$(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 42b7c9f..114fb23 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
++	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	{ }
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 4b7e189..17734f9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			u32 denied;
+ 			uid_t ouid;
+ 		} fs;
++		struct {
++			int type, protocol;
++			struct sock *sk;
++		} net;
+ 	};
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cb8a121
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
++
++#include <net/sock.h>
++
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
++
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
++
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
++
++extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
++
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
++{
++	/* NOP */
++}
++
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+ 
+ extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
+@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
+  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+  *
+  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
+@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ 	struct aa_policydb policy;
+ 	struct aa_file_rules file;
+ 	struct aa_caps caps;
++	struct aa_net net;
+ 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 8ea39aa..f628734 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
+@@ -614,6 +615,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (kern)
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++				    NULL);
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
++}
++
+ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.name =				"apparmor",
+ 
+@@ -646,6 +745,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
+ 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+ 
++	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
++	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
++	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
++	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
++	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
++	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
++	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
++	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
++	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
++	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
++	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
++	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
++
+ 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+ 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+ 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..003dd18
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++#include "net_names.h"
++
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
++		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa;
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
++	if (sk) {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
++	} else {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	}
++	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.u.net = &net;
++	sa.aad->op = op,
++	sa.u.net->family = family;
++	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
++	sa.aad->net.type = type;
++	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
++		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++		u16 kill_mask = 0;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++
++		if (denied & kill_mask)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
++	}
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
++		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	u16 family_mask;
++	int error;
++
++	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++		return 0;
++
++	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
++
++	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
++
++	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++	 */
++	if (in_interrupt())
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++	return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index cf5fd22..27c8161 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+ 
+ 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 329b1fd..1b90dfa 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
++{
++	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++			return 0;
++		if (data)
++			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *name = NULL;
++	size_t size = 0;
+ 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
+ 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+ 	u32 tmp;
+@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++	if (size) {
++
++		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++			 * never request
++			 */
++			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++				u16 tmp;
++				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++					goto fail;
++				continue;
++			}
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++		}
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++			goto fail;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++	 * by IPC
++	 */
++	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From b1cb9d1b4f0d585c271c584da954d9eb2e347b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
+ mediation
+
+If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/net.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ 	} else {
+ 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+-		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
+ 
+ 		if (denied & kill_mask)
+ 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From f284c9554341aded2d599e9355574cac36c2dd23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:01 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] apparmor: Ensure apparmor does not mediate kernel based
+ sockets
+
+Currently apparmor makes the assumption that kernel sockets are unmediated
+because mediation is only done against tasks that have a profile attached.
+Ensure we never get in a situation where a kernel socket is being mediated
+by tagging the sk_security field for kernel sockets.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h |    2 ++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c         |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c         |    3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+index cb8a121..bc8198b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
+ 
+ #include "apparmorfs.h"
+ 
++#define AA_SOCK_KERN 0xAA
++
+ /* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+  * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+  * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index f628734..a172d01 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -630,6 +630,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
++				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	if (kern)
++		/* tag kernel sockets so we don't mediate them later */
++		sock->sk->sk_security = (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ 				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+ {
+@@ -713,6 +723,12 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+ 	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+ }
+ 
++static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
++				       struct sock *newsk)
++{
++	newsk->sk_security = sk->sk_security;
++}
++
+ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.name =				"apparmor",
+ 
+@@ -746,6 +762,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+ 
+ 	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
++	.socket_post_create =		apparmor_socket_post_create,
+ 	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
+ 	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
+ 	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
+@@ -757,6 +774,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+ 	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+ 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
++	.sk_clone_security =		apparmor_sk_clone_security,
+ 
+ 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+ 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 6e6e5c9..baa4df1 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+ 	if (in_interrupt())
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	if (sk->sk_security == (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ 	if (!unconfined(profile))
+ 		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
+From f5e962d77f98deab3461404567abd4759f5445a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
+ mount
+
+Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+The basic form of the rules are.
+
+  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+  where [conds] can be
+    fstype=<expr>
+    options=<expr>
+
+Example mount commands
+  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
+
+  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+  umount,
+
+  umount /m*,
+
+See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Makefile           |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   13 +
+ security/apparmor/audit.c            |    4 +
+ security/apparmor/domain.c           |    2 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |    3 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   11 +
+ security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |    2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |   54 +++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   59 ++++
+ security/apparmor/mount.c            |  620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
+ 
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 114fb23..ee77ec9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -426,10 +426,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
++	{ }
++};
++
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
++	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
++	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	{ }
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+index 3ae28db..e267963 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
+ 	"file_mmap",
+ 	"file_mprotect",
+ 
++	"pivotroot",
++	"mount",
++	"umount",
++
+ 	"create",
+ 	"post_create",
+ 	"bind",
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index b81ea10..afa8671 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+  *
+  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+  */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+ 
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+ 
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 17734f9..66a738c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
+ 	OP_FMMAP,
+ 	OP_FMPROT,
+ 
++	OP_PIVOTROOT,
++	OP_MOUNT,
++	OP_UMOUNT,
++
+ 	OP_CREATE,
+ 	OP_POST_CREATE,
+ 	OP_BIND,
+@@ -122,6 +126,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
+ 		struct {
++			const char *src_name;
++			const char *type;
++			const char *trans;
++			const char *data;
++			unsigned long flags;
++		} mnt;
++		struct {
+ 			const char *target;
+ 			u32 request;
+ 			u32 denied;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ 	char **table;
+ };
+ 
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bc17a53
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
++
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
++
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
++
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
++
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags);
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name);
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data);
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
++		  struct path *new_path);
++
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index a172d01..5da8af9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+@@ -504,6 +505,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
++			     unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* Discard magic */
++	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
++			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++		else
++			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++					     flags, data);
++	}
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ 				char **value)
+ {
+@@ -737,6 +792,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ 	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
+ 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
+ 
++	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
++	.sb_umount =			apparmor_sb_umount,
++	.sb_pivotroot =			apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
++
+ 	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
+ 	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
+ 	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..478aa4d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++	if (flags & MS_BIND)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++				 ", unbindable");
++	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++				 ", private");
++	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++				 ", slave");
++	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++				 ", shared");
++	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
++		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
++		       const char *type, const char *trans,
++		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa = { };
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++
++	if (likely(!error)) {
++		u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++			mask = 0xffff;
++
++		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++		request &= mask;
++
++		if (likely(!request))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		/* only report permissions that were denied */
++		request = request & ~perms->allow;
++
++		if (request & perms->kill)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++		if (!request)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++				complain_error(error) : error;
++	}
++
++	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.aad->op = op;
++	sa.aad->name = name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
++	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
++	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
++	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
++	sa.aad->info = info;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
++ *
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
++ */
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++				    unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++		if ((1 << i) & flags)
++			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
++	}
++
++	return state;
++}
++
++/**
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
++ *
++ * Returns: mount permissions
++ */
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++					   unsigned int state)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms;
++
++	perms.kill = 0;
++	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
++
++	return perms;
++}
++
++static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
++	"match succeeded",
++	"failed mntpnt match",
++	"failed srcname match",
++	"failed type match",
++	"failed flags match",
++	"failed data match"
++};
++
++/*
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
++ */
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (devname)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 2;
++
++	if (type)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 3;
++
++	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++	if (!state)
++		return 4;
++	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++		if (!state)
++			return 4;
++
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++		if (!state)
++			return 5;
++		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* failed at end of flags match */
++	return 4;
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++		     const char *devname, const char *type,
++		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++	int pos;
++
++	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++	if (pos) {
++		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
++{
++	return profile->path_flags |
++		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	int binary, error;
++
++	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++			  &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
++		  const char *orig_name)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int binary = 1;
++	int error;
++
++	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++	if (type) {
++		int requires_dev;
++		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++		if (!fstype)
++			return -ENODEV;
++
++		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++		put_filesystem(fstype);
++
++		if (requires_dev) {
++			struct path dev_path;
++
++			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++				error = -ENOENT;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++
++			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++			path_put(&dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++		}
++	}
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
++			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++	return error;
++
++}
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
++		  struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     new_name);
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++			if (!target)
++				error = -ENOENT;
++			else
++				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
++		}
++	} else
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++	aa_put_profile(target);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++	kfree(new_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

kernel-patches/3.6/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 663d5bbe6197bf990721c37ec877ea8ba5840202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:27:32 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] apparmor: fix IRQ stack overflow during free_profile
+
+BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1056078
+
+Profile replacement can cause long chains of profiles to build up when
+the profile being replaced is pinned. When the pinned profile is finally
+freed, it puts the reference to its replacement, which may in turn nest
+another call to free_profile on the stack. Because this may happen for
+each profile in the replacedby chain this can result in a recusion that
+causes the stack to overflow.
+
+Break this nesting by directly walking the chain of replacedby profiles
+(ie. use iteration instead of recursion to free the list). This results
+in at most 2 levels of free_profile being called, while freeing a
+replacedby chain.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 27c8161..56e5304 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
+  */
+ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ {
++	struct aa_profile *p;
++
+ 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
+ 
+ 	if (!profile)
+@@ -752,7 +754,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
+ 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
+ 
+-	aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
++	/* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
++	 * put_profile(kref_put).
++	 * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
++	 * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
++	 * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
++	 * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
++	 */
++	for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
++		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
++			/* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
++			struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
++			/* break the chain */
++			p->replacedby = NULL;
++			/* now free p, chain is broken */
++			free_profile(p);
++
++			/* follow up with next profile in the chain */
++			p = next;
++		} else
++			break;
++	}
+ 
+ 	kzfree(profile);
+ }
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

libraries/libapparmor/autogen.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
 DIE=0
+package=libapparmor
 
 (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
         echo
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ DIE=0
         DIE=1
 }
 
-(libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+(libtoolize --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
 	echo
 	echo "You must have libtool installed to compile $package."
 	echo "Download the appropriate package for your system,"

libraries/libapparmor/configure.in

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(libapparmor1, apparmor_version)
 AM_PROG_LEX
 AC_PROG_YACC
 AC_PROG_SED
+PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
 
 AC_PATH_PROG([SWIG], [swig])
 

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_change_hat.pod

@@ -99,16 +99,25 @@ Insufficient kernel memory was available.
 
 =item B<EPERM>
 
-The calling application is not confined by apparmor.
+The calling application is not confined by apparmor, the specified
+I<subprofile> is not a I<hat profile>, the task is being ptraced and the
+tracing task does not have permission to trace the specified I<subprofile> or the no_new_privs execution bit is
+enabled.
 
 =item B<ECHILD>
 
 The application's profile has no hats defined for it.
 
+=item B<ENOENT>
+
+The specified I<subprofile> does not exist in this profile but other hats
+are defined.
+
 =item B<EACCES>
 
-The specified I<subprofile> does not exist in this profile or the
-process tried to change another process's domain.
+The specified magic token did not match, and permissions to change to
+the specified I<subprofile> has been denied. This will in most situations
+also result in the task being killed, to prevent brute force attacks.
 
 =back 
 
@@ -239,7 +248,7 @@ The output when run:
 =head1 BUGS
 
 None known. If you find any, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>. Note that
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>. Note that
 aa_change_hat(2) provides no memory barriers between different areas of a
 program; if address space separation is required, then separate processes
 should be used.

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_change_profile.pod

@@ -74,8 +74,9 @@ errno(3) is set appropriately.
 
 =item B<EINVAL>
 
-The apparmor kernel module is not loaded or the communication via the
-F</proc/*/attr/current> file did not conform to protocol.
+The apparmor kernel module is not loaded, neither a profile nor a namespace
+was specified, or the communication via the F</proc/*/attr/current> file did
+not conform to protocol.
 
 =item B<ENOMEM>
 
@@ -83,12 +84,18 @@ Insufficient kernel memory was available.
 
 =item B<EPERM>
 
-The calling application is not confined by apparmor.
+The calling application is not confined by apparmor, or the no_new_privs
+bit is set.
 
 =item B<EACCES>
 
 The task does not have sufficient permissions to change its domain.
 
+=item B<ENOENT>
+
+The specified profile does not exist, or is not visible from the current
+Namespace.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 EXAMPLE
@@ -190,7 +197,7 @@ used (in addition to the one for 'i_cant_be_trusted_anymore', above):
 =head1 BUGS
 
 None known. If you find any, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>. Note that using
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>. Note that using
 aa_change_profile(2) without execve(2) provides no memory barriers between
 different areas of a program; if address space separation is required, then
 separate processes should be used.

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_find_mountpoint.pod

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ The apparmor filesystem mount could not be found
 =head1 BUGS
 
 None known. If you find any, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_getcon.pod

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ The confinement data is to large to fit in the supplied buffer.
 =head1 BUGS
 
 None known. If you find any, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

libraries/libapparmor/m4/ac_python_devel.m4

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ AC_DEFUN([AC_PYTHON_DEVEL],[
         # Check for a version of Python >= 2.1.0
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for a version of Python >= '2.1.0'])
-        ac_supports_python_ver=`$PYTHON -c "import sys, string; \
-                ver = string.split(sys.version)[[0]]; \
-                print ver >= '2.1.0'"`
+        ac_supports_python_ver=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; \
+                ver = sys.version.split()[[0]]; \
+                sys.stdout.write(str(ver >= '2.1.0'))"`
         if test "$ac_supports_python_ver" != "True"; then
                 if test -z "$PYTHON_NOVERSIONCHECK"; then
                         AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ to something else than an empty string.
         #
         if test -n "$1"; then
                 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for a version of Python $1])
-                ac_supports_python_ver=`$PYTHON -c "import sys, string; \
-                        ver = string.split(sys.version)[[0]]; \
-                        print ver $1"`
+                ac_supports_python_ver=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; \
+                        ver = sys.version.split()[[0]]; \
+                        sys.stdout.write("%s\n" % (ver == $1))"`
                 if test "$ac_supports_python_ver" = "True"; then
                    AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
                 else
@@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
         # Check for Python include path
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Python include path])
+        if type $PYTHON-config; then
+                PYTHON_CPPFLAGS=`$PYTHON-config --includes`
+        fi
         if test -z "$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"; then
-                python_path=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils.sysconfig; \
-                        print distutils.sysconfig.get_python_inc();"`
+                python_path=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig;\
+sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % distutils.sysconfig.get_python_inc());"`
                 if test -n "${python_path}"; then
                         python_path="-I$python_path"
                 fi
@@ -94,25 +97,26 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
         # Check for Python library path
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Python library path])
+        if type $PYTHON-config; then
+                PYTHON_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON-config --ldflags`
+        fi
         if test -z "$PYTHON_LDFLAGS"; then
                 # (makes two attempts to ensure we've got a version number
                 # from the interpreter)
-                py_version=`$PYTHON -c "from distutils.sysconfig import *; \
-                        from string import join; \
-                        print join(get_config_vars('VERSION'))"`
+                py_version=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; from distutils.sysconfig import *; \
+sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % ''.join(get_config_vars('VERSION')))"`
                 if test "$py_version" == "[None]"; then
                         if test -n "$PYTHON_VERSION"; then
                                 py_version=$PYTHON_VERSION
                         else
                                 py_version=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; \
-                                        print sys.version[[:3]]"`
+sys.stdout.write("%s\n" % sys.version[[:3]])"`
                         fi
                 fi
 
-                PYTHON_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON -c "from distutils.sysconfig import *; \
-                        from string import join; \
-                        print '-L' + get_python_lib(0,1), \
-                        '-lpython';"`$py_version
+                PYTHON_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; from distutils.sysconfig import *; \
+sys.stdout.write('-L' + get_python_lib(0,1) + ' -lpython\n')"`$py_version`$PYTHON -c \
+"import sys; sys.stdout.write('%s' % getattr(sys,'abiflags',''))"`
         fi
         AC_MSG_RESULT([$PYTHON_LDFLAGS])
         AC_SUBST([PYTHON_LDFLAGS])
@@ -122,8 +126,8 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Python site-packages path])
         if test -z "$PYTHON_SITE_PKG"; then
-                PYTHON_SITE_PKG=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils.sysconfig; \
-                        print distutils.sysconfig.get_python_lib(0,0);"`
+                PYTHON_SITE_PKG=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig; \
+sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % distutils.sysconfig.get_python_lib(0,0));"`
         fi
         AC_MSG_RESULT([$PYTHON_SITE_PKG])
         AC_SUBST([PYTHON_SITE_PKG])
@@ -133,9 +137,9 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING(python extra libraries)
         if test -z "$PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS"; then
-           PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils.sysconfig; \
-                conf = distutils.sysconfig.get_config_var; \
-                print conf('LOCALMODLIBS'), conf('LIBS')"`
+           PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig; \
+conf = distutils.sysconfig.get_config_var; \
+sys.stdout.write('%s %s\n' % (conf('LOCALMODLIBS'), conf('LIBS')))"`
         fi
         AC_MSG_RESULT([$PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS])
         AC_SUBST(PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS)
@@ -145,9 +149,9 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING(python extra linking flags)
         if test -z "$PYTHON_EXTRA_LDFLAGS"; then
-                PYTHON_EXTRA_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils.sysconfig; \
-                        conf = distutils.sysconfig.get_config_var; \
-                        print conf('LINKFORSHARED')"`
+                PYTHON_EXTRA_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig; \
+conf = distutils.sysconfig.get_config_var; \
+sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % conf('LINKFORSHARED'))"`
         fi
         AC_MSG_RESULT([$PYTHON_EXTRA_LDFLAGS])
         AC_SUBST(PYTHON_EXTRA_LDFLAGS)

libraries/libapparmor/src/Makefile.am

@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
 INCLUDES = $(all_includes)
 
+# variables to set the library versions used by libtool
+# Use these rules to update the library version.
+# 1. Update the version information only immediately before a public release
+#    of your software. More frequent updates are unnecessary, and only
+#    guarantee that the current interface number gets larger faster.
+# 2. If the library source code has changed at all since the last update,
+#    then
+#    - increment AA_LIB_REVISION
+# 3. If any interfaces have been added, removed, or changed since the last
+#    update,
+#    - increment AA_LIB_CURRENT
+#    - set AA_LIB_REVISION to 0.
+# 4. If any interfaces have been added since the last public release, then
+#    - increment AA_LIB_AGE.
+# 5. If any interfaces have been removed or changed since the last public
+#    release, then
+#    - set AA_LIB_AGE to 0.
+#
+AA_LIB_CURRENT = 1
+AA_LIB_REVISION = 7
+AA_LIB_AGE = 0
+
+SUFFIXES = .pc.in .pc
+
 BUILT_SOURCES = grammar.h scanner.h af_protos.h
 AM_LFLAGS = -v
 AM_YFLAGS = -d -p aalogparse_
@@ -23,15 +47,24 @@ lib_LTLIBRARIES = libapparmor.la libimmunix.la
 noinst_HEADERS = grammar.h parser.h scanner.h af_protos.h
 
 libapparmor_la_SOURCES = grammar.y libaalogparse.c kernel_interface.c scanner.c
-libapparmor_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:2:0 -XCClinker -dynamic \
+libapparmor_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info $(AA_LIB_CURRENT):$(AA_LIB_REVISION):$(AA_LIB_AGE) -XCClinker -dynamic \
 	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/src/libapparmor.map -Wl,-soname=libapparmor.so.1
 
 libimmunix_la_SOURCES = kernel_interface.c libimmunix_warning.c
-libimmunix_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:2:0 -Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/src/libapparmor.map -Wl,-soname=libimmunix.so.1
+libimmunix_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info $(AA_LIB_CURRENT):$(AA_LIB_REVISION):$(AA_LIB_AGE) -Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/src/libapparmor.map -Wl,-soname=libimmunix.so.1
+
+pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
+pkgconfig_DATA = libapparmor.pc
+
+CLEANFILES = libapparmor.pc
+
+%.pc: %.pc.in $(top_builddir)/config.status
+	$(AM_V_GEN)cd "$(top_builddir)" && \
+	$(SHELL) ./config.status --file="src/$@"
 
 tst_aalogmisc_SOURCES = tst_aalogmisc.c
 tst_aalogmisc_LDADD = .libs/libapparmor.a
 check_PROGRAMS = tst_aalogmisc
 TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS)
 
-EXTRA_DIST = grammar.y scanner.l libapparmor.map
+EXTRA_DIST = grammar.y scanner.l libapparmor.map libapparmor.pc

libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.y

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ aa_record_event_type lookup_aa_event(unsigned int type)
 %type <t_str> safe_string protocol
 %token <t_long> TOK_DIGITS TOK_TYPE_UNKNOWN
 %token <t_str> TOK_QUOTED_STRING TOK_ID TOK_MODE TOK_DMESG_STAMP
-%token <t_str> TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_DATE_MONTH TOK_DATE_TIME
+%token <t_str> TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_DATE_MONTH TOK_DATE TOK_TIME
 %token <t_str> TOK_HEXSTRING TOK_TYPE_OTHER TOK_MSG_REST
 %token <t_str> TOK_IP_ADDR
 
@@ -175,13 +175,17 @@ other_audit: TOK_TYPE_OTHER audit_msg TOK_MSG_REST
 
 syslog_type:
 	  syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL audit_id key_list
-	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; }
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL key_type audit_id key_list
-	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; }
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP audit_id key_list
-	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; }
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP key_type audit_id key_list
-	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; }
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
+	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id key_list
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
+	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id key_list
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); }
 	;
 
 /* when audit dispatches a message it doesn't prepend the audit type string */
@@ -203,7 +207,10 @@ audit_id: TOK_AUDIT TOK_OPEN_PAREN TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_PERIOD TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS
 		free($7);
 	} ;
 
-syslog_date: TOK_DATE_MONTH TOK_DIGITS TOK_DATE_TIME { /* do nothing? */ }
+syslog_date: TOK_DATE_MONTH TOK_DIGITS TOK_TIME
+		{ free($1); free($3); /* do nothing? */ }
+	| TOK_DATE TOK_TIME
+		{ free($1); free($2); /* do nothing */ }
 	;
 
 key_list: key

libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel_interface.c

@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ int aa_getprocattr(pid_t tid, const char *attr, char **buf, char **mode)
 	if (rc == -1) {
 		free(buffer);
 		*buf = NULL;
-		*mode = NULL;
+		if (mode)
+			*mode = NULL;
 	} else
 		*buf = buffer;
 
@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *subprofile, unsigned long token)
 	int rc = -1;
 	int len = 0;
 	char *buf = NULL;
-	const char *fmt = "changehat %016x^%s";
+	const char *fmt = "changehat %016lx^%s";
 
 	/* both may not be null */
 	if (!(token || subprofile)) {

libraries/libapparmor/src/libaalogparse.c

@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ void free_record(aa_log_record *record)
 			free(record->net_protocol);
 		if (record->net_sock_type != NULL)
 			free(record->net_sock_type);
+		if (record->net_local_addr != NULL)
+			free(record->net_local_addr);
+		if (record->net_foreign_addr != NULL)
+			free(record->net_foreign_addr);
 
 		free(record);
 	}

libraries/libapparmor/src/libapparmor.map

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+#If you update this file please update the library version in Makefile.am
+
 IMMUNIX_1.0 {
   global:
         change_hat;

libraries/libapparmor/src/libapparmor.pc.in

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+libdir=@libdir@
+includedir=@includedir@
+
+Name: libapparmor
+Description: AppArmor library for for utility functions
+Version: @VERSION@
+Cflags: -I${includedir}
+Libs: -L${libdir} -lapparmor

libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.l

@@ -75,10 +75,12 @@ void string_buf_append(unsigned int length, char *text)
 ws		[ \t\r\n]
 
 equals		"="
-digits		[0-9]+
+digit		[[:digit:]]
+digits		{digit}+
 hex		[A-F0-9]
 colon		":"
 minus		"-"
+plus		"+"
 open_paren	"("
 close_paren	")"
 ID		[^ \t\n\(\)="'!]
@@ -144,8 +146,12 @@ ip_addr			[a-f[:digit:].:]{3,}
 
 /* syslog tokens */
 syslog_kernel		kernel{colon}
+syslog_yyyymmdd		{digit}{4}{minus}{digit}{2}{minus}{digit}{2}
+syslog_date		{syslog_yyyymmdd}
 syslog_month 		Jan(uary)?|Feb(ruary)?|Mar(ch)?|Apr(il)?|May|Jun(e)?|Jul(y)?|Aug(ust)?|Sep(tember)?|Oct(ober)?|Nov(ember)?|Dec(ember)?
-syslog_time 		{digits}{digits}{colon}{digits}{digits}{colon}{digits}{digits}
+hhmmss			{digit}{2}{colon}{digit}{2}{colon}{digit}{2}
+timezone		({plus}|{minus}){digit}{2}{colon}{digit}{2}
+syslog_time 		{hhmmss}({period}{digits})?{timezone}?
 syslog_hostname		[[:alnum:]_-]+
 dmesg_timestamp		\[[[:digit:] ]{5,}\.[[:digit:]]{6,}\]
 
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ yy_flex_debug = 0;
 
 <audit_id>{
 	{digits}		{ yylval->t_str = strdup(yytext); return(TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS);}
+	{colon}{ws}		{ yy_pop_state(yyscanner); return(TOK_COLON); }
 	{colon}			{ return(TOK_COLON); }
 	{period}		{ return(TOK_PERIOD); }
 	{open_paren}		{ return(TOK_OPEN_PAREN); }
@@ -291,7 +298,9 @@ yy_flex_debug = 0;
 
 {syslog_kernel}		{ BEGIN(dmesg_timestamp); return(TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL); }
 {syslog_month}		{ yylval->t_str = strdup(yytext); return(TOK_DATE_MONTH); }
-{syslog_time}		{ yylval->t_str = strdup(yytext); BEGIN(hostname); return(TOK_DATE_TIME); }
+{syslog_date}		{ yylval->t_str = strdup(yytext); return(TOK_DATE); }
+{syslog_date}T/{syslog_time}	{ yylval->t_str = strndup(yytext, strlen(yytext)-1); return(TOK_DATE); }
+{syslog_time}		{ yylval->t_str = strdup(yytext); BEGIN(hostname); return(TOK_TIME); }
 
 {audit}			{ yy_push_state(audit_id, yyscanner); return(TOK_AUDIT); }
 

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_audit_01.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Sep  2 11:53:23 utopic-amd64 kernel: [182243.243324] audit: type=1400 audit(1409684003.960:273342): apparmor="DENIED" operation="mkdir" profile="/home/ubuntu/bzr/apparmor/tests/regression/apparmor/mkdir" name="/tmp/sdtest.7283-14445-r31VAP/tmpdir/" pid=7314 comm="mkdir" requested_mask="c" denied_mask="c" fsuid=0 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_audit_01.out

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_audit_01.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_DENIED
+Audit ID: 1409684003.960:273342
+Operation: mkdir
+Mask: c
+Denied Mask: c
+fsuid: 0
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /home/ubuntu/bzr/apparmor/tests/regression/apparmor/mkdir
+Name: /tmp/sdtest.7283-14445-r31VAP/tmpdir/
+Command: mkdir
+PID: 7314
+Epoch: 1409684003
+Audit subid: 273342

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_audit_02.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Dec  7 13:18:59 rosa kernel: audit: type=1400 audit(1417954745.397:82): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" profile="/home/simi/bin/aa-test" name="/usr/bin/" pid=3231 comm="ls" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_audit_02.out

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_audit_02.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1417954745.397:82
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /home/simi/bin/aa-test
+Name: /usr/bin/
+Command: ls
+PID: 3231
+Epoch: 1417954745
+Audit subid: 82

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_01.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_01.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_01.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_02.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_02.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_02.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_03.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04.562575 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_03.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_03.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_04.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04.562575+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_04.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_04.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_05.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_05.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_05.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_06.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Jan  1 15:09:04.562575-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_06.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_06.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_07.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_07.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_07.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_08.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_08.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_08.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_09.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04.562575 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_09.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_09.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_10.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04.562575+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_10.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_10.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_11.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_11.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_11.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_12.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01 15:09:04.562575-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_12.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_12.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_13.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_13.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_13.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_14.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_14.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_14.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_15.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04.562575 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_15.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_15.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_16.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04.562575+08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_16.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_16.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_17.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_17.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_17.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_18.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2013-01-01T15:09:04.562575-08:00 localhost kernel: [ 1911.569682] type=1400 audit(1357024144.556:6368): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open" parent=5390 profile="/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d" name="/sys/class/power_supply/" pid=5457 comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/syslog_datetime_18.out

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+START
+File: test_multi/syslog_datetime_18.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_ALLOWED
+Audit ID: 1357024144.556:6368
+Operation: open
+Mask: r
+Denied Mask: r
+fsuid: 1000
+ouid: 0
+Profile: /usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxSVC//null-2d
+Name: /sys/class/power_supply/
+Command: ACPI Poller
+Parent: 5390
+PID: 5457
+Epoch: 1357024144
+Audit subid: 6368

parser/apparmor.vim.pod

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ but it may help you understand your profiles better.
 
 B<apparmor.vim> does not properly detect dark versus light backgrounds.
 Patches accepted. If you find any bugs, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

parser/apparmor_parser.pod

@@ -28,22 +28,99 @@ apparmor_parser - loads AppArmor profiles into the kernel
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
-B<apparmor_parser [-adrR] [--add] [--debug]  [--replace] [--remove]
-                  [--preprocess] [--Include n] [--base n] [ --Complain ]>
+B<apparmor_parser [options] E<lt>commandE<gt> [profile]...>
+
+B<apparmor_parser [options] E<lt>commandE<gt>>
 
 B<apparmor_parser [-hv] [--help] [--version]>
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-B<apparmor_parser> is used to import new apparmor.d(5) profiles
-into the Linux kernel. The profiles restrict the operations available
-to processes by executable name.
+B<apparmor_parser> is used as a general tool to compile, and manage AppArmor
+policy, including loading new apparmor.d(5) profiles into the Linux kernel.
+
+AppArmor profiles restrict the operations available to processes.
 
 The profiles are loaded into the Linux kernel by the B<apparmor_parser>
-program, which takes its input from standard input. The input supplied to
-B<apparmor_parser> should be in the format described in apparmor.d(5).
+program, which by default takes its input from standard input. The input
+supplied to B<apparmor_parser> should be in the format described in
+apparmor.d(5).
 
-=head1 OPTIONS
+=head1 COMMANDS
+
+The command set is broken into four subcategories.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item unprivileged commands
+
+Commands that don't require any privilege and don't operate on profiles.
+
+=item unprivileged profile commands
+
+Commands that operate on a profile either specified on the command line or
+read from stdin if no profile was specified.
+
+=item privileged commands
+
+Commands that require the MAC_ADMIN capability within the affected AppArmor
+namespace to load policy into the kernel or filesystem write permissions to
+update the affected privileged files (cache etc).
+
+=item privileged profile commands
+
+Commands that require privilege and operate on profiles.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 Unprivileged commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item -V, --version
+
+Print the version number and exit.
+
+=item -h, --help
+
+Give a quick reference guide.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 Unprivileged profile commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item -N, --names
+
+Produce a list of policies from a given set of profiles (implies -K).
+
+=item -p, --preprocess
+
+Apply preprocessing to the input profile(s) by flattening includes into
+the output profile and dump to stdout.
+
+=item -S, --stdout
+
+Writes a binary (cached) profile to stdout (implies -K and -T).
+
+=item -o file, --ofile file
+
+Writes a binary (cached) profile to the specified file (implies -K and -T)
+
+=back
+
+=head1 Privileged commands
+
+=over 4
+
+=item --purge-cache
+
+Unconditionally clear out cached profiles.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 Privileged profile commands
 
 =over 4
 
@@ -67,25 +144,22 @@ Note that it still requires a complete AppArmor definition as described
 in apparmor.d(5) even though the contents of the definition aren't
 used.
 
-=item -C, --Complain
+=back
 
-For the profile to load in complain mode.
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
 
 =item -B, --binary
 
-Load a binary (cached) profile, as produced with the -S option.
+Treat the profile files specified on the command line (or stdin if none
+specified) as binary cache files, produced with the -S or -o options,
+and load to the kernel as specified by -a, -r, and -R (implies -K
+and -T).
 
-=item -N, --names
+=item -C, --Complain
 
-Produce a list of policies from a given set of profiles (implies -K).
-
-=item -S, --stdout
-
-Writes a binary (cached) profile to stdout (implies -K and -T).
-
-=item -o file, --ofile file
-
-Writes a binary (cached) profile to the specified file (implies -K and -T)
+Force the profile to load in complain mode.
 
 =item -b n, --base n
 
@@ -138,6 +212,11 @@ by default. In cases where abstractions have been changed, and the parser
 is running with "--replace", it may make sense to also use
 "--skip-read-cache" with the "--write-cache" option.
 
+=item --skip-bad-cache
+
+Skip updating the cache if it contains cached profiles in a bad or
+inconsistent state
+
 =item -L, --cache-loc
 
 Set the location of the cache directory.  If not specified the cache location
@@ -149,6 +228,9 @@ Perform all actions except the actual loading of a profile into the kernel.
 This is useful for testing profile generation, caching, etc, without making
 changes to the running kernel profiles.
 
+This also removes the need for privilege to execute the commands that
+manage policy in the kernel
+
 =item -q, --quiet
 
 Do not report on the profiles as they are loaded, and not show warnings.
@@ -157,15 +239,6 @@ Do not report on the profiles as they are loaded, and not show warnings.
 
 Report on the profiles as they are loaded, and show warnings.
 
-=item -V, --version
-
-Print the version number and exit.
-
-=item -p, --preprocess
-
-Dump the input profile to stdout out applying preprocessing flattening
-includes into the output profile.
-
 =item -d, --debug
 
 Given once, only checks the profiles to ensure syntactic correctness.
@@ -198,10 +271,6 @@ of time to complete.
 Use --help=optimize to see a full list of which optimization flags are
 supported.
 
-=item -h, --help
-
-Give a quick reference guide.
-
 =back
 
 =head1 CONFIG FILE
@@ -239,7 +308,7 @@ All other options override previously set values.
 =head1 BUGS
 
 If you find any bugs, please report them at
-L<http://https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
+L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 

parser/libapparmor_re/aare_rules.cc

@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ extern "C" void aare_delete_ruleset(aare_ruleset_t *rules)
 		if (rules->root)
 			rules->root->release();
 		free(rules);
+
+		aare_reset_matchflags();
 	}
 }
 

parser/libapparmor_re/chfa.cc

@@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ CHFA::CHFA(DFA &dfa, map<uchar, uchar> &eq, dfaflags_t flags): eq(eq)
 	default_base.push_back(make_pair(dfa.nonmatching, 0));
 	num.insert(make_pair(dfa.nonmatching, num.size()));
 
-	accept.resize(dfa.states.size());
-	accept2.resize(dfa.states.size());
-	next_check.resize(optimal);
-	free_list.resize(optimal);
+	accept.resize(max(dfa.states.size(), (size_t) 2));
+	accept2.resize(max(dfa.states.size(), (size_t) 2));
+	next_check.resize(max(optimal, (size_t) 256));
+	free_list.resize(next_check.size());
 
 	accept[0] = 0;
 	accept2[0] = 0;

parser/libapparmor_re/parse.y

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static inline Chars* insert_char_range(Chars* cset, uchar a, uchar b)
 
 %pure-parser
 /* %error-verbose */
+%lex-param {YYLEX_PARAM}
 %parse-param {Node **root}
 %parse-param {const char *text}
 %name-prefix = "regex_"

parser/parser.h

@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ extern int regex_type;
 extern int perms_create;
 extern int net_af_max_override;
 extern int kernel_load;
+extern int kernel_supports_setload;
 extern int kernel_supports_network;
 extern int kernel_supports_mount;
 extern int flag_changehat_version;

parser/parser_common.c

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int regex_type = AARE_DFA;
 int perms_create = 0;                   /* perms contain create flag */
 int net_af_max_override = -1;           /* use kernel to determine af_max */
 int kernel_load = 1;
+int kernel_supports_setload = 0;	/* kernel supports atomic set loads */
 int kernel_supports_network = 1;        /* kernel supports network rules */
 int kernel_supports_mount = 0;	        /* kernel supports mount rules */
 int flag_changehat_version = FLAG_CHANGEHAT_1_5;