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Mark Andrews
2002-01-09 23:21:57 +00:00
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IETF DNSOPS working group T. Hardie
Internet draft Nominum, Inc
Category: Work-in-progress November, 2001
Category: Work-in-progress January, 2002
draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-06.txt
draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-07.txt
Distributing Authoritative Name Servers via Shared Unicast Addresses
@@ -48,13 +50,11 @@ Abstract
named authoritative servers and administrative entities (operators).
This document contains no guidelines or recommendations for caching
name servers. The shared unicast system described here is specific
to IPv4; IPv6 uses anycast differently from IPv4 and those
differences prevent this system from being used in IPv6
environments. It should also be noted that the system described
here is related to that describe in [ANYCAST], but it does not
require dedicated address space, routing changes, or the other
elements of a full anycast infrastructure which that document
describes.
to IPv4; applicability to IPv6 is an area for further study. It
should also be noted that the system described here is related to
that described in [ANYCAST], but it does not require dedicated
address space, routing changes, or the other elements of a full
anycast infrastructure which that document describes.
1. Architecture
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Abstract
files should be delivered to the administrative interface of the
servers participating in the mesh. Secure file transfer methods and
strong authentication should be used for all transfers. If the hosts
in the mesh make their zones available for zone transer, the administrative
in the mesh make their zones available for zone transfer, the administrative
interfaces should be used for those transfers as well, in order to avoid
the problems with potential routing changes for TCP traffic
noted in section 1.5 below.
@@ -156,14 +156,15 @@ Abstract
One potential problem with using shared unicast addresses is that
routers forwarding traffic to them may have more than one available
route, and those routes may, in fact, reach different instances of
the shared unicast address. Because UDP is self-contained, UDP
traffic from a single source reaching different instances presents
no problem. TCP traffic, in contrast, may fail or present
unworkable performance characteristics in a limited set of
circumstances. For split-destination failures to occur, the router
forwarding the traffic must both have equal cost routes to the two
different instances and use a load sharing algorithm which does
per-packet rather than per-destination load sharing.
the shared unicast address. Applications like the DNS, whose
communication typically consists of independent request-response
messages each fitting in a single UDP packet presents no problem.
Other applications, in which multiple packets must reach the same
endpoint (e.g., TCP) may fail or present unworkable performance
characteristics in some circumstances. Split-destination failures
may occur when a router does per-packet (or round-robin) load
sharing, a topology change occurs that changes the relative metrics
of two paths to the same anycast destination, etc.
Four things mitigate the severity of this problem. The first is
that UDP is a fairly high proportion of the query traffic to name
@@ -178,32 +179,38 @@ Abstract
Lastly, in the case where the traffic is TCP, per packet load
sharing is used, and equal cost routes to different instances of a
name server are available, any implementation which measures the
name server are available, any DNS implementation which measures the
performance of servers to select a preferred server will quickly
prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For
authoritative servers, care must be taken that all of the servers
for a specific zone are not participants in the same shared-unicast
mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple meshes have a
set of users affected by per packet load sharing along equal cost
routes, organizations implementing these practices should always
provide at least one authoritative server which is not a participant
in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying shared-unicast meshes
should note that any specific host may become unreachable to a
client should a server fail, a path fail, or the route to that host
be withdrawn. These error conditions are, however, not specific to
shared-unicast distributions, but would occur for standard unicast
hosts.
prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For the DNS
failover mechanisms to reliably avoid this problem, however, those
using shared unicast distribution mechanisms must take care that all
of the servers for a specific zone are not participants in the same
shared-unicast mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple
meshes have a set of users affected by per packet load sharing along
equal cost routes, organizations implementing these practices should
always provide at least one authoritative server which is not a
participant in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying
shared-unicast meshes should note that any specific host may become
unreachable to a client should a server fail, a path fail, or the
route to that host be withdrawn. These error conditions are,
however, not specific to shared-unicast distributions, but would
occur for standard unicast hosts.
Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a simple implementation of
this system. In it, the odd numbered routers deliver traffic to the
shared-unicast interface network and filter traffic from the
administrative network; the even numbered routers deliver traffic to
the administrative network and filter traffic from the shared-unicast
network. These are depicted as separate routers for the ease this
gives in explanation, but they could easily be separate interfaces
on the same router. Similarly, a local NTP source is depicted for
synchronization, but the level of synchronization needed would not
require that source to be either local or a stratum one NTP server.
Since ICMP response packets might go to a different member of the
mesh than that sending a packet, packets sent with a shared unicast
source address should also avoid using path MTU discovery.
Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a example of a simple
implementation of this system. In it, the odd numbered routers
deliver traffic to the shared-unicast interface network and filter
traffic from the administrative network; the even numbered routers
deliver traffic to the administrative network and filter traffic
from the shared-unicast network. These are depicted as separate
routers for the ease this gives in explanation, but they could
easily be separate interfaces on the same router. Similarly, a
local NTP source is depicted for synchronization, but the level of
synchronization needed would not require that source to be either
local or a stratum one NTP server.
2. Administration
@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ Abstract
3. Security Considerations
As a core piece of internet infrastructure, authoritative name
As a core piece of Internet infrastructure, authoritative name
servers are common targets of attack. The practices outlined here
increase the risk of certain kinds of attack and reduce the risk of
others.
@@ -310,7 +317,7 @@ Abstract
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
5. Acknowledgements
5. Acknowledgments
Masataka Ohta, Bill Manning, Randy Bush, Chris Yarnell, Ray Plzak,
Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Geoff Houston, Bill Norton, Akira Kato,
@@ -421,6 +428,3 @@ etc | |--|Router7|---|----|--------------|Router8|---WAN-|