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IETF DNSOPS working group T. Hardie
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Internet draft Nominum, Inc
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Category: Work-in-progress November, 2001
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Category: Work-in-progress January, 2002
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draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-06.txt
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draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-07.txt
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Distributing Authoritative Name Servers via Shared Unicast Addresses
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@@ -48,13 +50,11 @@ Abstract
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named authoritative servers and administrative entities (operators).
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This document contains no guidelines or recommendations for caching
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name servers. The shared unicast system described here is specific
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to IPv4; IPv6 uses anycast differently from IPv4 and those
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differences prevent this system from being used in IPv6
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environments. It should also be noted that the system described
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here is related to that describe in [ANYCAST], but it does not
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require dedicated address space, routing changes, or the other
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elements of a full anycast infrastructure which that document
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describes.
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to IPv4; applicability to IPv6 is an area for further study. It
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should also be noted that the system described here is related to
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that described in [ANYCAST], but it does not require dedicated
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address space, routing changes, or the other elements of a full
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anycast infrastructure which that document describes.
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1. Architecture
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@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Abstract
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files should be delivered to the administrative interface of the
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servers participating in the mesh. Secure file transfer methods and
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strong authentication should be used for all transfers. If the hosts
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in the mesh make their zones available for zone transer, the administrative
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in the mesh make their zones available for zone transfer, the administrative
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interfaces should be used for those transfers as well, in order to avoid
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the problems with potential routing changes for TCP traffic
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noted in section 1.5 below.
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@@ -156,14 +156,15 @@ Abstract
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One potential problem with using shared unicast addresses is that
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routers forwarding traffic to them may have more than one available
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route, and those routes may, in fact, reach different instances of
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the shared unicast address. Because UDP is self-contained, UDP
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traffic from a single source reaching different instances presents
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no problem. TCP traffic, in contrast, may fail or present
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unworkable performance characteristics in a limited set of
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circumstances. For split-destination failures to occur, the router
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forwarding the traffic must both have equal cost routes to the two
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different instances and use a load sharing algorithm which does
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per-packet rather than per-destination load sharing.
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the shared unicast address. Applications like the DNS, whose
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communication typically consists of independent request-response
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messages each fitting in a single UDP packet presents no problem.
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Other applications, in which multiple packets must reach the same
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endpoint (e.g., TCP) may fail or present unworkable performance
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characteristics in some circumstances. Split-destination failures
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may occur when a router does per-packet (or round-robin) load
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sharing, a topology change occurs that changes the relative metrics
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of two paths to the same anycast destination, etc.
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Four things mitigate the severity of this problem. The first is
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that UDP is a fairly high proportion of the query traffic to name
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@@ -178,32 +179,38 @@ Abstract
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Lastly, in the case where the traffic is TCP, per packet load
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sharing is used, and equal cost routes to different instances of a
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name server are available, any implementation which measures the
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name server are available, any DNS implementation which measures the
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performance of servers to select a preferred server will quickly
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prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For
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authoritative servers, care must be taken that all of the servers
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for a specific zone are not participants in the same shared-unicast
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mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple meshes have a
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set of users affected by per packet load sharing along equal cost
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routes, organizations implementing these practices should always
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provide at least one authoritative server which is not a participant
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in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying shared-unicast meshes
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should note that any specific host may become unreachable to a
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client should a server fail, a path fail, or the route to that host
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be withdrawn. These error conditions are, however, not specific to
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shared-unicast distributions, but would occur for standard unicast
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hosts.
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prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For the DNS
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failover mechanisms to reliably avoid this problem, however, those
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using shared unicast distribution mechanisms must take care that all
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of the servers for a specific zone are not participants in the same
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shared-unicast mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple
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meshes have a set of users affected by per packet load sharing along
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equal cost routes, organizations implementing these practices should
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always provide at least one authoritative server which is not a
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participant in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying
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shared-unicast meshes should note that any specific host may become
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unreachable to a client should a server fail, a path fail, or the
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route to that host be withdrawn. These error conditions are,
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however, not specific to shared-unicast distributions, but would
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occur for standard unicast hosts.
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Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a simple implementation of
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this system. In it, the odd numbered routers deliver traffic to the
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shared-unicast interface network and filter traffic from the
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administrative network; the even numbered routers deliver traffic to
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the administrative network and filter traffic from the shared-unicast
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network. These are depicted as separate routers for the ease this
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gives in explanation, but they could easily be separate interfaces
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on the same router. Similarly, a local NTP source is depicted for
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synchronization, but the level of synchronization needed would not
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require that source to be either local or a stratum one NTP server.
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Since ICMP response packets might go to a different member of the
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mesh than that sending a packet, packets sent with a shared unicast
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source address should also avoid using path MTU discovery.
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Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a example of a simple
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implementation of this system. In it, the odd numbered routers
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deliver traffic to the shared-unicast interface network and filter
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traffic from the administrative network; the even numbered routers
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deliver traffic to the administrative network and filter traffic
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from the shared-unicast network. These are depicted as separate
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routers for the ease this gives in explanation, but they could
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easily be separate interfaces on the same router. Similarly, a
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local NTP source is depicted for synchronization, but the level of
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synchronization needed would not require that source to be either
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local or a stratum one NTP server.
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2. Administration
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@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ Abstract
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3. Security Considerations
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As a core piece of internet infrastructure, authoritative name
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As a core piece of Internet infrastructure, authoritative name
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servers are common targets of attack. The practices outlined here
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increase the risk of certain kinds of attack and reduce the risk of
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others.
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@@ -310,7 +317,7 @@ Abstract
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THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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5. Acknowledgements
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5. Acknowledgments
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Masataka Ohta, Bill Manning, Randy Bush, Chris Yarnell, Ray Plzak,
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Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Geoff Houston, Bill Norton, Akira Kato,
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@@ -421,6 +428,3 @@ etc | |--|Router7|---|----|--------------|Router8|---WAN-|
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