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IETF DNSOPS working group T. Hardie IETF DNSOPS working group T. Hardie
Internet draft Nominum, Inc Internet draft Nominum, Inc
Category: Work-in-progress November, 2001 Category: Work-in-progress January, 2002
draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-06.txt draft-ietf-dnsop-hardie-shared-root-server-07.txt
Distributing Authoritative Name Servers via Shared Unicast Addresses Distributing Authoritative Name Servers via Shared Unicast Addresses
@@ -48,13 +50,11 @@ Abstract
named authoritative servers and administrative entities (operators). named authoritative servers and administrative entities (operators).
This document contains no guidelines or recommendations for caching This document contains no guidelines or recommendations for caching
name servers. The shared unicast system described here is specific name servers. The shared unicast system described here is specific
to IPv4; IPv6 uses anycast differently from IPv4 and those to IPv4; applicability to IPv6 is an area for further study. It
differences prevent this system from being used in IPv6 should also be noted that the system described here is related to
environments. It should also be noted that the system described that described in [ANYCAST], but it does not require dedicated
here is related to that describe in [ANYCAST], but it does not address space, routing changes, or the other elements of a full
require dedicated address space, routing changes, or the other anycast infrastructure which that document describes.
elements of a full anycast infrastructure which that document
describes.
1. Architecture 1. Architecture
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Abstract
files should be delivered to the administrative interface of the files should be delivered to the administrative interface of the
servers participating in the mesh. Secure file transfer methods and servers participating in the mesh. Secure file transfer methods and
strong authentication should be used for all transfers. If the hosts strong authentication should be used for all transfers. If the hosts
in the mesh make their zones available for zone transer, the administrative in the mesh make their zones available for zone transfer, the administrative
interfaces should be used for those transfers as well, in order to avoid interfaces should be used for those transfers as well, in order to avoid
the problems with potential routing changes for TCP traffic the problems with potential routing changes for TCP traffic
noted in section 1.5 below. noted in section 1.5 below.
@@ -156,14 +156,15 @@ Abstract
One potential problem with using shared unicast addresses is that One potential problem with using shared unicast addresses is that
routers forwarding traffic to them may have more than one available routers forwarding traffic to them may have more than one available
route, and those routes may, in fact, reach different instances of route, and those routes may, in fact, reach different instances of
the shared unicast address. Because UDP is self-contained, UDP the shared unicast address. Applications like the DNS, whose
traffic from a single source reaching different instances presents communication typically consists of independent request-response
no problem. TCP traffic, in contrast, may fail or present messages each fitting in a single UDP packet presents no problem.
unworkable performance characteristics in a limited set of Other applications, in which multiple packets must reach the same
circumstances. For split-destination failures to occur, the router endpoint (e.g., TCP) may fail or present unworkable performance
forwarding the traffic must both have equal cost routes to the two characteristics in some circumstances. Split-destination failures
different instances and use a load sharing algorithm which does may occur when a router does per-packet (or round-robin) load
per-packet rather than per-destination load sharing. sharing, a topology change occurs that changes the relative metrics
of two paths to the same anycast destination, etc.
Four things mitigate the severity of this problem. The first is Four things mitigate the severity of this problem. The first is
that UDP is a fairly high proportion of the query traffic to name that UDP is a fairly high proportion of the query traffic to name
@@ -178,32 +179,38 @@ Abstract
Lastly, in the case where the traffic is TCP, per packet load Lastly, in the case where the traffic is TCP, per packet load
sharing is used, and equal cost routes to different instances of a sharing is used, and equal cost routes to different instances of a
name server are available, any implementation which measures the name server are available, any DNS implementation which measures the
performance of servers to select a preferred server will quickly performance of servers to select a preferred server will quickly
prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For prefer a server for which this problem does not occur. For the DNS
authoritative servers, care must be taken that all of the servers failover mechanisms to reliably avoid this problem, however, those
for a specific zone are not participants in the same shared-unicast using shared unicast distribution mechanisms must take care that all
mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple meshes have a of the servers for a specific zone are not participants in the same
set of users affected by per packet load sharing along equal cost shared-unicast mesh. To guard even against the case where multiple
routes, organizations implementing these practices should always meshes have a set of users affected by per packet load sharing along
provide at least one authoritative server which is not a participant equal cost routes, organizations implementing these practices should
in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying shared-unicast meshes always provide at least one authoritative server which is not a
should note that any specific host may become unreachable to a participant in any shared unicast mesh. Those deploying
client should a server fail, a path fail, or the route to that host shared-unicast meshes should note that any specific host may become
be withdrawn. These error conditions are, however, not specific to unreachable to a client should a server fail, a path fail, or the
shared-unicast distributions, but would occur for standard unicast route to that host be withdrawn. These error conditions are,
hosts. however, not specific to shared-unicast distributions, but would
occur for standard unicast hosts.
Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a simple implementation of Since ICMP response packets might go to a different member of the
this system. In it, the odd numbered routers deliver traffic to the mesh than that sending a packet, packets sent with a shared unicast
shared-unicast interface network and filter traffic from the source address should also avoid using path MTU discovery.
administrative network; the even numbered routers deliver traffic to
the administrative network and filter traffic from the shared-unicast Appendix A. contains an ASCII diagram of a example of a simple
network. These are depicted as separate routers for the ease this implementation of this system. In it, the odd numbered routers
gives in explanation, but they could easily be separate interfaces deliver traffic to the shared-unicast interface network and filter
on the same router. Similarly, a local NTP source is depicted for traffic from the administrative network; the even numbered routers
synchronization, but the level of synchronization needed would not deliver traffic to the administrative network and filter traffic
require that source to be either local or a stratum one NTP server. from the shared-unicast network. These are depicted as separate
routers for the ease this gives in explanation, but they could
easily be separate interfaces on the same router. Similarly, a
local NTP source is depicted for synchronization, but the level of
synchronization needed would not require that source to be either
local or a stratum one NTP server.
2. Administration 2. Administration
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3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
As a core piece of internet infrastructure, authoritative name As a core piece of Internet infrastructure, authoritative name
servers are common targets of attack. The practices outlined here servers are common targets of attack. The practices outlined here
increase the risk of certain kinds of attack and reduce the risk of increase the risk of certain kinds of attack and reduce the risk of
others. others.
@@ -310,7 +317,7 @@ Abstract
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
5. Acknowledgements 5. Acknowledgments
Masataka Ohta, Bill Manning, Randy Bush, Chris Yarnell, Ray Plzak, Masataka Ohta, Bill Manning, Randy Bush, Chris Yarnell, Ray Plzak,
Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Geoff Houston, Bill Norton, Akira Kato, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Geoff Houston, Bill Norton, Akira Kato,
@@ -421,6 +428,3 @@ etc | |--|Router7|---|----|--------------|Router8|---WAN-|