Update dns_dnssec_keyactive to differentiate between the roles ZSK
and KSK. A key is active if it is signing but that differs per role.
A ZSK is signing if its ZRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT,
a KSK is signing if its KRRSIG state is in RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT.
This means that a key can be actively signing for one role but not
the other. Add checks in inline signing (zone.c and update.c) to
cover the case where a CSK is active in its KSK role but not the ZSK
role.
Add more tests for kasp:
- Add tests for different algorithms.
- Add a test to ensure that an edit in an unsigned zone is
picked up and properly signed.
- Add two tests that ensures that a zone gets signed when it is
configured as so-called 'inline-signing'. In other words, a
secondary zone that is configured with a 'dnssec-policy'. A zone
that is transferred over AXFR or IXFR will get signed.
- Add a test to ensure signatures are reused if they are still
fresh enough.
- Adds two more tests to verify that expired and unfresh signatures
will be regenerated.
- Add tests for various cases with keys already available in the
key-directory.
A significant refactor of the kasp system test in an attempt to
make the test script somewhat brief. When writing a test case,
you can/should use the functions 'zone_properties',
'key_properties', and 'key_timings' to set the expected values
when checking a key with 'check_key'. All these four functions
can be used to set environment variables that come in handy when
testing output.
Update the signing code in lib/dns/zone.c and lib/dns/update.c to
use kasp logic if a dnssec-policy is enabled.
This means zones with dnssec-policy should no longer follow
'update-check-ksk' and 'dnssec-dnskey-kskonly' logic, instead the
KASP keys configured dictate which RRset gets signed with what key.
Also use the next rekey event from the key manager rather than
setting it to one hour.
Mark the zone dynamic, as otherwise a zone with dnssec-policy is
not eligble for automatic DNSSEC maintenance.
Update dns_dnssec_get_hints and dns_dnssec_keyactive to use dst_key
functions and thus if dnssec-policy/KASP is used the key states are
being considered.
Add a new variable to 'struct dns_dnsseckey' to signal whether this
key is a zone-signing key (it is no longer true that ksk == !zsk).
Also introduce a hint for revoke.
Update 'dns_dnssec_findzonekeys' and 'dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys'
to also read the key state file, if available.
Remove 'allzsk' from 'dns_dnssec_updatekeys' as this was only a
hint for logging.
Also make get_hints() (now dns_dnssec_get_hints()) public so that
we can use it in the key manager.
If a zone has a dnssec-policy set, use signature validity,
dnskey signature validity, and signature refresh from
dnssec-policy.
Zones configured with 'dnssec-policy' will allow 'named' to create
DNSSEC keys (similar to dnssec-keymgr) if not available.
Add a key manager to named. If a 'dnssec-policy' is set, 'named'
will run a key manager on the matching keys. This will do a couple
of things:
1. Create keys when needed (in case of rollover for example)
according to the set policy.
2. Retire keys that are in excess of the policy.
3. Maintain key states according to "Flexible and Robust Key
Rollover" [1]. After key manager ran, key files will be saved to
disk.
[1] https://matthijsmekking.nl/static/pdf/satin2012-Schaeffer.pdf
KEY GENERATION
Create keys according to DNSSEC policy. Zones configured with
'dnssec-policy' will allow 'named' to create DNSSEC keys (similar
to dnssec-keymgr) if not available.
KEY ROLLOVER
Rather than determining the desired state from timing metadata,
add a key state goal. Any keys that are created or picked from the
key ring and selected to be a successor has its key state goal set
to OMNIPRESENT (this key wants to be signing!). At the same time,
a key that is being retired has its key state goal set to HIDDEN.
The keymgr state machine with the three rules will make sure no
introduction or withdrawal of DNSSEC records happens too soon.
KEY TIMINGS
All timings are based on RFC 7583.
The keymgr will return when the next action is happening so
that the zone can set the proper rekey event. Prior to this change
the rekey event will run every hour by default (configurable),
but with kasp we can determine exactly when we need to run again.
The prepublication time is derived from policy.
Add a couple of dst_key functions for determining hints that
consider key states if they are available.
- dst_key_is_unused:
A key has no timing metadata set other than Created.
- dst_key_is_published:
A key has publish timing metadata <= now, DNSKEY state in
RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT.
- dst_key_is_active:
A key has active timing metadata <= now, RRSIG state in
RUMOURED or OMNIPRESENT.
- dst_key_is_signing:
KSK is_signing and is_active means different things than
for a ZSK. A ZSK is active means it is also signing, but
a KSK always signs its DNSKEY RRset but is considered
active if its DS is present (rumoured or omnipresent).
- dst_key_is_revoked:
A key has revoke timing metadata <= now.
- dst_key_is_removed:
A key has delete timing metadata <= now, DNSKEY state in
UNRETENTIVE or HIDDEN.
When doing rollover in a timely manner we need to have access to the
relevant kasp configured durations.
Most of these are simple get functions, but 'dns_kasp_signdelay'
will calculate the maximum time that is needed with this policy to
resign the complete zone (taking into account the refresh interval
and signature validity).
Introduce parent-propagation-delay, parent-registration-delay,
parent-ds-ttl, zone-max-ttl, zone-propagation-delay.
When signing a zone with dnssec-policy, we don't mind DNSSEC records.
This is useful for testing purposes, and perhaps it is better to
signal this behavior with a different configuration option.
Introduce a new option '-s' for dnssec-settime that when manipulating
timing metadata, it also updates the key state file.
For testing purposes, add options to dnssec-settime to set key
states and when they last changed.
The dst code adds ways to write and read the new key states and
timing metadata. It updates the parsing code for private key files
to not parse the newly introduced metadata (these are for state
files only).
Introduce key goal (the state the key wants to be in).
When reading a key from file, you can set the DST_TYPE_STATE option
to also read the key state.
This expects the Algorithm and Length fields go above the metadata,
so update the write functionality to do so accordingly.
Introduce new DST metadata types for KSK, ZSK, Lifetime and the
timing metadata used in state files.
This commit adds code for generating keys with dnssec-keygen given
a specific dnssec-policy.
The dnssec-policy can be set with a new option '-k'. The '-l'
option can be used to set a configuration file that contains a
specific dnssec-policy.
Because the dnssec-policy dictates how the keys should look like,
many of the existing dnssec-keygen options cannot be used together
with '-k'.
If the dnssec-policy lists multiple keys, dnssec-keygen has now the
possibility to generate multiple keys at one run.
Add two tests for creating keys with '-k': One with the default
policy, one with multiple keys from the configuration.
Write functions to access various elements of the kasp structure,
and the kasp keys. This in preparation of code in dnssec-keygen,
dnssec-settime, named...
Add a number of metadata variables (lifetime, ksk and zsk role).
For the roles we add a new type of metadata (booleans).
Add a function to write the state of the key to a separate file.
Only write out known metadata to private file. With the
introduction of the numeric metadata "Lifetime", adjust the write
private key file functionality to only write out metadata it knows
about.
Code and documentation were not in line:
- Remove -z option from code
- Remove -k option from docbook
- Add -d option to docbook
- Add -T option to docbook
This stores the dnssec-policy configuration and adds methods to
create, destroy, and attach/detach, as well as find a policy with
the same name in a list.
Also, add structures and functions for creating and destroying
kasp keys.
This commit introduces the initial `dnssec-policy` configuration
statement. It has an initial set of options to deal with signature
and key maintenance.
Add some checks to ensure that dnssec-policy is configured at the
right locations, and that policies referenced to in zone statements
actually exist.
Add some checks that when a user adds the new `dnssec-policy`
configuration, it will no longer contain existing DNSSEC
configuration options. Specifically: `inline-signing`,
`auto-dnssec`, `dnssec-dnskey-kskonly`, `dnssec-secure-to-insecure`,
`update-check-ksk`, `dnssec-update-mode`, `dnskey-sig-validity`,
and `sig-validity-interval`.
Test a good kasp configuration, and some bad configurations.
The ttlval configuration types are replaced by duration configuration
types. The duration is an ISO 8601 duration that is going to be used
for DNSSEC key timings such as key lifetimes, signature resign
intervals and refresh periods, etc. But it is also still allowed to
use the BIND ttlval ways of configuring intervals (number plus
optional unit).
A duration is stored as an array of 7 different time parts.
A duration can either be expressed in weeks, or in a combination of
the other datetime indicators.
Add several unit tests to ensure the correct value is parsed given
different string values.
This commit does not change anything significant, it just makes
the file more readable in preparation for upcoming changes related
to the `dnssec-policy` configuration option.
glibc 2.30 deprecated the <sys/sysctl.h> header [1]. However, that
header is still used on other Unix-like systems, so only prevent it from
being used on Linux, in order to prevent compiler warnings from being
triggered.
[1] https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-08/msg00029.html
Add a shell function which is used in the "tcp" system test, but has
been accidentally omitted from !2425. Make sure the function does not
change the value of "ret" itself, so that the caller can decide what to
do with the function's return value.
When doing regular signing expiry time is jittered to make sure
that the re-signing times are not clumped together. This expands
this behaviour to expiry times of dynamically added records.
When incrementally re-signing a zone use the full jitter range if
the server appears to have been offline for greater than 5 minutes
otherwise use a small jitter range of 3600 seconds. This will stop
the signatures becoming more clustered if the server has been off
line for a significant period of time (> 5 minutes).
