Previously, the number of RR types for a single owner name was limited
only by the maximum number of the types (64k). As the data structure
that holds the RR types for the database node is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through the whole list (again and
again), adding a large number of RR types for a single owner named with
would slow down processing of such name (database node).
Add a configurable limit to cap the number of the RR types for a single
owner. This is enforced at the database (rbtdb, qpzone, qpcache) level
and configured with new max-types-per-name configuration option that
can be configured globally, per-view and per-zone.
Previously, the number of RRs in the RRSets were internally unlimited.
As the data structure that holds the RRs is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through all of the RRs, adding an
RRSet with huge number of RRs inside would slow down processing of said
RRSets.
Add a configurable limit to cap the number of the RRs in a single RRSet.
This is enforced at the database (rbtdb, qpzone, qpcache) level and
configured with new max-records-per-type configuration option that can
be configured globally, per-view and per-zone.
Changed the default value for 'allow-transfer' to 'none'; zone
transfers now require explicit authorization.
Updated all system tests to specify an allow-transfer ACL when needed.
Revised the ARM to specify that the default is 'none'.
The mechanism was published as RFC 8509. I've briefly looked at diff
between versions -08 and the RFC and did not find significant protocol
change. Quick manual check confirms what we seem to comply with the
published protocol.
Draft was eventually published as RFC 9276 but we did not update our
docs. Also add couple mentions in relevant places in the ARM and
dnssec-signzone man page, mainly around "do not touch" places.
Introduce a new DNSSEC tool, dnssec-ksr, for creating signed key
response (SKR) files, given one or more key signing requests (KSRs).
For now it is just a dummy tool, but the future purpose of this utility
is to pregenerate ZSKs and signed RRsets for DNSKEY, CDNSKEY, and CDS
for a given period that a KSK is to be offline.
This commit improves the documentation on the ephemeral TLS
configuration and describes in more detail what is happening with TLS
configurations on reconfiguration in general.
Using the 'dnssec-validation yes' option now requires an explicitly
confgiured 'trust-anchors' statement (or 'managed-keys' or
'trusted-keys', both deprecated).
"A parental agent is the entity that is allowed to change a zone's
delegation information" is untrue, because it is possible to use some
hidden server or a validating resolver.
Also the new text makes it more clear that named sends DS queries to
these servers.
Instead of running all the cryptographic validation in a tight loop,
spread it out into multiple event loop "ticks", but moving every single
validation into own isc_async_run() asynchronous event. Move the
cryptographic operations - both verification and DNSKEY selection - to
the offloaded threads (isc_work_enqueue), this further limits the time
we spend doing expensive operations on the event loops that should be
fast.
Limit the impact of invalid or malicious RRSets that contain crafted
records causing the dns_validator to do many validations per single
fetch by adding a cap on the maximum number of validations and maximum
number of validation failures that can happen before the resolving
fails.
Support for FreeBSD 12.4, the last FreeBSD 12.x release, ended on
December 31, 2023.
Link: https://www.freebsd.org/security/unsupported/
Move the --with-readline=editline ./configure option to FreeBSD 14.
Update the minimum required version of pkcs11-provider that contains the
fixes needed in order to make it work with dnssec-policy.
Update documentation to not recommend using engine_pkcs11 in conjunction
with dnssec-policy.
The name "uri" was considered to be too generic and could potentially
clash with a future URI configuration option. Renamed to "pkcs11-uri".
Note that this option name was also preferred over "pkcs11uri", the
dash is considered to be the more clearer form.
these options control default timing of retries in the resolver
for experimental purposes; they are not known to useful in production
environments. they will be removed in the future; for now, we
only log a warning if they are used.
The main intention of PROXY protocol is to pass endpoints information
to a back-end server (in our case - BIND). That means that it is a
valid way to spoof endpoints information, as the addresses and ports
extracted from PROXYv2 headers, from the point of view of BIND, are
used instead of the real connection addresses.
Of course, an ability to easily spoof endpoints information can be
considered a security issue when used uncontrollably. To resolve that,
we introduce 'allow-proxy' and 'allow-proxy-on' ACL options. These are
the only ACL options in BIND that work with real PROXY connections
addresses, allowing a DNS server operator to specify from what clients
and on which interfaces he or she is willing to accept PROXY
headers. By default, for security reasons we do not allow to accept
them.
