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criu/criu/cr-restore.c

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#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include "types.h"
#include <compel/ptrace.h>
#include "common/compiler.h"
#include "linux/mount.h"
#include "clone-noasan.h"
#include "cr_options.h"
#include "servicefd.h"
#include "image.h"
#include "img-streamer.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "util-pie.h"
#include "criu-log.h"
#include "restorer.h"
Unix sockets initial support Currently it can only work with stream sockets, which have no skbs in queues (listening or established -- both work OK). The cpt part uses the sock_diag engine that was merged to Dave recently to collect sockets. Then it dumps sockets by checking the filesystem ID of a failed-to-open through /proc/pid/fd descriptors (sockets do not allow for such tricks with opens through proc) against SOCKFS_TYPE. The rst part is more tricky. Listen sockets are just restored, this is simple. Connected sockets are restored like this: 1. One end establishes a listening anon socket at the desired descriptor; 2. The other end just creates a socket at the desired descriptor; 3. All sockets, that are to be connect()-ed call connect. Unix sockets do not block connect() till the accept() time and thus we continue with... 4. ... all listening sockets call accept() and ... dup2 the new fd into the accepting end. There's a problem with this approach -- socket names are not preserved, but looking into our OpenVZ implementation I think this is OK for existing apps. What should be done next is: 1. Need to merge the file IDs patches in our tree and make Andrey to support files sharing. This will solve the sk = socket(); fork(); case. Currently it simply doesn't work :( 2. Need to add support for DGRAM sockets -- I wrote comment how to do it in the can_dump_unix_sk() 3. Need to add support for in-flight connections 4. Implement support for UDP sockets (quite simple) 5. Implement support for listening TCP sockets (also not very complex) 6. Implement support for connected TCP scokets (hard one, Tejun's patches are not very good for this from my POV) Cyrill, plz, apply this patch and put the above descriptions onto wiki docs (do we have the plans page yet?). Andrey, plz, take care of unix sockets tests in zdtm. Most likely it won't work till you do the shared files support for sockets. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
2011-12-26 22:12:03 +04:00
#include "sockets.h"
#include "sk-packet.h"
#include "common/lock.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "pipes.h"
#include "fifo.h"
#include "sk-inet.h"
#include "eventfd.h"
#include "eventpoll.h"
#include "signalfd.h"
#include "proc_parse.h"
#include "pie/restorer-blob.h"
#include "crtools.h"
Try to include userfaultfd with criu (part 2) This is a first try to include userfaultfd with criu. Right now it still requires a "normal" checkpoint. After checkpointing the application it can be restored with the help of userfaultfd. All restored pages with MAP_ANONYMOUS and MAP_PRIVATE set are marked as being handled by userfaultfd. As soon as the process is restored it blocks on the first memory access and waits for pages being transferred by userfaultfd. To handle the required pages a new criu command has been added. For a userfaultfd supported restore the first step is to start the 'lazy-pages' server: criu lazy-pages -v4 -D /tmp/3/ --address /tmp/userfault.socket This waits on a unix domain socket (defined using the --address option) to receive a userfaultfd file descriptor from a '--lazy-pages' enabled 'criu restore': criu restore -D /tmp/3 -j -v4 --lazy-pages \ --address /tmp/userfault.socket In the first step the VDSO pages are pushed from the lazy-pages server into the restored process. After that the lazy-pages server waits on the UFFD FD for a UFFD requested page. If there are no requests received during a period of 5 seconds the lazy-pages server switches into a mode where the remaining, non-transferred pages are copied into the destination process. After all remaining pages have been copied the lazy-pages server exits. The first page that usually is requested is a VDSO page. The process currently used for restoring has two VDSO pages, but only one is requested via userfaultfd. In the second part where the remaining pages are copied into the process, the second VDSO page is also copied into the process as it has not been requested previously. Unfortunately, even as this page has not been requested before, it is not accepted by userfaultfd. EINVAL is returned. The reason for EINVAL is not understood and therefore the VDSO pages are copied first into the process, then switching to request mode and copying the pages which are requested via userfaultfd. To decide at which point the VDSO pages can be copied into the process, the lazy-pages server is currently waiting for the first page requested via userfaultfd. This is one of the VDSO pages. To not copy a page a second time, which is unnecessary and not possible, there is now a check to see if the page has been transferred previously. The use case to use usefaultfd with a checkpointed process on a remote machine will probably benefit from the current work related to image-cache and image-proxy. For the final implementation it would be nice to have a restore running in uffd mode on one system which requests the memory pages over the network from another system which is running 'criu checkpoint' also in uffd mode. This way the pages need to be copied only 'once' from the checkpoint process to the uffd restore process. TODO: * Contains still many debug outputs which need to be cleaned up. * Maybe transfer the dump directory FD also via unix domain sockets so that the 'uffd'/'lazy-pages' server can keep running without the need to specify the dump directory with '-D' * Keep the lazy-pages server running after all pages have been transferred and start waiting for new connections to serve. * Resurrect the non-cooperative patch set, as once the restored task fork()'s or calls mremap() the whole thing becomes broken. * Figure out if current VDSO handling is correct. * Figure out when and how zero pages need to be inserted via uffd. v2: * provide option '--lazy-pages' to enable uffd style restore * use send_fd()/recv_fd() provided by criu (instead of own implementation) * do not install the uffd as service_fd * use named constants for MAP_ANONYMOUS * do not restore memory pages and then later mark them as uffd handled * remove function find_pages() to search in pages-<id>.img; now using criu functions to find the necessary pages; for each new page search the pages-<id>.img file is opened * only check the UFFDIO_API once * trying to protect uffd code by CONFIG_UFFD; use make UFFD=1 to compile criu with this patch v3: * renamed the server mode from 'uffd' -> 'lazy-pages' * switched client and server roles transferring the UFFD FD * the criu part running in lazy-pages server mode is now waiting for connections * the criu restore process connects to the lazy-pages server to pass the UFFD FD * before UFFD copying anything else the VDSO pages are copied as it fails to copy unused VDSO pages once the process is running. this was necessary to be able to copy all pages. * if there are no more UFFD messages for 5 seconds the lazy-pages server switches in copy mode to copy all remaining pages, which have not been requested yet, into the restored process * check the UFFDIO_API at the correct place * close UFFD FD in the restorer to remove open UFFD FD in the restored process v4: * removed unnecessary madvise() calls ; it seemed necessary when first running tests with uffd; it actually is not necessary * auto-detect if build-system provides linux/userfaultfd.h header. * simplify unix domain socket setup and communication. * use --address to specify the location of the used unix domain socket. v5: * split the userfaultfd patch in multiple smaller patches * introduced vma_can_be_lazy() function to check if a page can be handled by uffd * moved uffd related code from cr-restore.c to uffd.c * handle failure to register a memory page of the restored process with userfaultfd v6: * get PID of to be restored process from the 'criu restore' process; first the PID is transferred and then the UFFD Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
2016-03-15 13:21:13 +00:00
#include "uffd.h"
#include "namespaces.h"
#include "mem.h"
#include "mount.h"
#include "fsnotify.h"
#include "pstree.h"
#include "net.h"
tty: Add checkpoint/restore for unix terminals v6 Usually the PTYs represent a pair of links -- master peer and slave peer. Master peer must be opened before slave. Internally, when kernel creates master peer it also generates a slave interface in a form of /dev/pts/N, where N is that named pty "index". Master/slave connection unambiguously identified by this index. Still, one master can carry multiple slaves -- for example a user opens one master via /dev/ptmx and appropriate /dev/pts/N in sequence. The result will be the following master `- slave 1 `- slave 2 both slave will have same master index but different file descriptors. Still inside the kernel pty parameters are same for both slaves. Thus only one slave parameters should be restored, there is no need to carry all parameters for every slave peer we've found. Not yet addressed problems: - At moment of restore the master peer might be already closed for any reason so to resolve such problem we need to open a fake master peer with proper index and hook a slave on it, then we close master peer. - Need to figure out how to deal with ttys which have some data in buffers not yet flushed, at moment this data will be simply lost during c/r - Need to restore control terminals - Need to fetch tty flags such as exclusive/packet-mode, this can't be done without kernel patching [ avagin@: - ideas on contol terminals restore - overall code redesign and simplification ] v4: - drop redundant pid from dump_chrdev - make sure optional fown is passed on regular ptys - add a comments about zeroifying termios - get rid of redundant empty line in files.c v5 (by avagin@): - complete rework of tty image format, now we have two files -- tty.img and tty-info.img. The idea behind to reduce data being stored. v6 (by xemul@): - packet mode should be set to true in image, until properly fetched from the kernel - verify image data on retrieval Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> CC: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
2012-09-12 20:00:54 +04:00
#include "tty.h"
#include "cpu.h"
#include "file-lock.h"
#include "vdso.h"
#include "stats.h"
#include "tun.h"
#include "vma.h"
#include "kerndat.h"
#include "rst-malloc.h"
#include "plugin.h"
#include "cgroup.h"
#include "timerfd.h"
#include "action-scripts.h"
#include "shmem.h"
#include "aio.h"
#include "lsm.h"
#include "seccomp.h"
#include "fault-injection.h"
#include "sk-queue.h"
#include "sigframe.h"
#include "fdstore.h"
#include "string.h"
#include "memfd.h"
#include "timens.h"
#include "bpfmap.h"
#include "parasite-syscall.h"
#include "files-reg.h"
#include <compel/plugins/std/syscall-codes.h>
#include "compel/include/asm/syscall.h"
#include "protobuf.h"
#include "images/sa.pb-c.h"
#include "images/timer.pb-c.h"
#include "images/vma.pb-c.h"
#include "images/rlimit.pb-c.h"
#include "images/pagemap.pb-c.h"
#include "images/siginfo.pb-c.h"
#include "restore.h"
#include "cr-errno.h"
#ifndef arch_export_restore_thread
#define arch_export_restore_thread __export_restore_thread
#endif
#ifndef arch_export_restore_task
#define arch_export_restore_task __export_restore_task
#endif
#ifndef arch_export_unmap
#define arch_export_unmap __export_unmap
#define arch_export_unmap_compat __export_unmap_compat
#endif
struct pstree_item *current;
static int restore_task_with_children(void *);
static int sigreturn_restore(pid_t pid, struct task_restore_args *ta, unsigned long alen, CoreEntry *core);
static int prepare_restorer_blob(void);
static int prepare_rlimits(int pid, struct task_restore_args *, CoreEntry *core);
static int prepare_posix_timers(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta, CoreEntry *core);
static int prepare_signals(int pid, struct task_restore_args *, CoreEntry *core);
/*
* Architectures can overwrite this function to restore registers that are not
* present in the sigreturn signal frame.
*/
int __attribute__((weak)) arch_set_thread_regs_nosigrt(struct pid *pid)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int stage_participants(int next_stage)
{
switch (next_stage) {
case CR_STATE_FAIL:
return 0;
case CR_STATE_ROOT_TASK:
case CR_STATE_PREPARE_NAMESPACES:
return 1;
case CR_STATE_FORKING:
return task_entries->nr_tasks + task_entries->nr_helpers;
case CR_STATE_RESTORE:
return task_entries->nr_threads + task_entries->nr_helpers;
case CR_STATE_RESTORE_SIGCHLD:
case CR_STATE_RESTORE_CREDS:
return task_entries->nr_threads;
}
BUG();
return -1;
}
static inline int stage_current_participants(int next_stage)
{
switch (next_stage) {
case CR_STATE_FORKING:
return 1;
case CR_STATE_RESTORE:
/*
* Each thread has to be reported about this stage,
* so if we want to wait all other tasks, we have to
* exclude all threads of the current process.
* It is supposed that we will wait other tasks,
* before creating threads of the current task.
*/
return current->nr_threads;
}
BUG();
return -1;
}
static int __restore_wait_inprogress_tasks(int participants)
{
int ret;
futex_t *np = &task_entries->nr_in_progress;
futex_wait_while_gt(np, participants);
ret = (int)futex_get(np);
if (ret < 0) {
set_cr_errno(get_task_cr_err());
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int restore_wait_inprogress_tasks(void)
{
return __restore_wait_inprogress_tasks(0);
}
/* Wait all tasks except the current one */
static int restore_wait_other_tasks(void)
{
int participants, stage;
stage = futex_get(&task_entries->start);
participants = stage_current_participants(stage);
return __restore_wait_inprogress_tasks(participants);
}
static inline void __restore_switch_stage_nw(int next_stage)
{
futex_set(&task_entries->nr_in_progress,
stage_participants(next_stage));
futex_set(&task_entries->start, next_stage);
}
static inline void __restore_switch_stage(int next_stage)
{
if (next_stage != CR_STATE_COMPLETE)
futex_set(&task_entries->nr_in_progress,
stage_participants(next_stage));
futex_set_and_wake(&task_entries->start, next_stage);
}
static int restore_switch_stage(int next_stage)
{
__restore_switch_stage(next_stage);
return restore_wait_inprogress_tasks();
}
static int restore_finish_ns_stage(int from, int to)
{
if (root_ns_mask)
return restore_finish_stage(task_entries, from);
/* Nobody waits for this stage change, just go ahead */
__restore_switch_stage_nw(to);
return 0;
}
static int crtools_prepare_shared(void)
{
if (prepare_memfd_inodes())
return -1;
if (prepare_files())
return -1;
/* We might want to remove ghost files on failed restore */
if (collect_remaps_and_regfiles())
return -1;
/* Connections are unlocked from criu */
if (!files_collected() && collect_image(&inet_sk_cinfo))
return -1;
if (collect_binfmt_misc())
return -1;
if (tty_prep_fds())
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Collect order information:
* - reg_file should be before remap, as the latter needs
* to find file_desc objects
* - per-pid collects (mm and fd) should be after remap and
* reg_file since both per-pid ones need to get fdesc-s
* and bump counters on remaps if they exist
*/
static struct collect_image_info *cinfos[] = {
&file_locks_cinfo,
&pipe_data_cinfo,
&fifo_data_cinfo,
&sk_queues_cinfo,
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_LIBBPF
&bpfmap_data_cinfo,
#endif
};
static struct collect_image_info *cinfos_files[] = {
&unix_sk_cinfo,
&fifo_cinfo,
&pipe_cinfo,
&nsfile_cinfo,
&packet_sk_cinfo,
&netlink_sk_cinfo,
&eventfd_cinfo,
&epoll_cinfo,
&epoll_tfd_cinfo,
&signalfd_cinfo,
&tunfile_cinfo,
&timerfd_cinfo,
&inotify_cinfo,
&inotify_mark_cinfo,
&fanotify_cinfo,
&fanotify_mark_cinfo,
&ext_file_cinfo,
&memfd_cinfo,
};
/* These images are required to restore namespaces */
static struct collect_image_info *before_ns_cinfos[] = {
&tty_info_cinfo, /* Restore devpts content */
&tty_cdata,
};
static struct pprep_head *post_prepare_heads = NULL;
void add_post_prepare_cb(struct pprep_head *ph)
{
ph->next = post_prepare_heads;
post_prepare_heads = ph;
}
static int run_post_prepare(void)
{
struct pprep_head *ph;
for (ph = post_prepare_heads; ph != NULL; ph = ph->next)
if (ph->actor(ph))
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int root_prepare_shared(void)
{
int ret = 0;
struct pstree_item *pi;
pr_info("Preparing info about shared resources\n");
if (prepare_remaps())
return -1;
seccomp: Add engine to restore per-thread seccomp chains At now we pretend that all threads are sharing seccomp chains and at checkpoint moment we test seccomp modes to make sure if this assumption is valid refusing to dump otherwise. Still the kernel tacks seccomp filter chains per each thread and now we've faced applications (such as java) where per-thread chains are actively used. Thus we need to bring support of handling filters via per-thread basis. In this a bit intrusive patch the restore engine is lifted up to treat each thread separately. Here what is done: - Image core file is modified to keep seccomp filters inside thread_core_entry. For backward compatibility former seccomp_mode and seccomp_filter members in task_core_entry are renamed to have old_ prefix and on restore we test if we're dealing with old images. Since per-thread dump is not yet implemeneted the dumping procedure continue operating with old_ members. - In pie restorer code memory containing filters are addressed from inside thread_restore_args structure which now contains seccomp mode itself and chain attributes (number of filters and etc). Reading of per-thread data is done in seccomp_prepare_threads helper -- we take one pstree_item and walks over every thread inside to allocate pie memory and pin data there. Because of PIE specific, before jumping into pie code we have to relocate this memory into new place and for this seccomp_rst_reloc is served. In restorer itself we check if thread_restore_args provides us enabled seccomp mode (strict or filter passed) and call for restore_seccomp_filter if needed. - To unify names we start using seccomp_ prefix for all related stuff involved into this change (prepare_seccomp_filters renamed to seccomp_read_image because it only reads image and nothing more, image handler is renamed to seccomp_img_entry instead of too short 'se'. With this change we're now allowed to start collecting and dumping seccomp filters per each thread, which will be done in next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-05-07 11:42:45 +03:00
if (seccomp_read_image())
return -1;
if (collect_images(cinfos, ARRAY_SIZE(cinfos)))
return -1;
if (!files_collected() &&
collect_images(cinfos_files, ARRAY_SIZE(cinfos_files)))
return -1;
for_each_pstree_item(pi) {
if (pi->pid->state == TASK_HELPER)
continue;
ret = prepare_mm_pid(pi);
if (ret < 0)
break;
ret = prepare_fd_pid(pi);
if (ret < 0)
break;
ret = prepare_fs_pid(pi);
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
prepare_cow_vmas();
ret = prepare_restorer_blob();
if (ret)
goto err;
SCM: Dump and restore SCM_RIGHTs Most of the pieces has already been described in the previous patches :) so here's the summary. * Dump: When receiving a message, also receive any SCM-s (already there) and when SCM_RIGHTs one is met -- go ahead and just dump received descriptors using regular code, but taking current as the victim task. Few words about file paths resolution -- since we do dump path-ed files by receiving them from victim's parasite, such files sent via sockets should still work OK, as we still receive them, just from another socket. Several problems here: 1. Unix sockets sent via unix sockets form knots. Not supported. 2. Eventpolls sent via unix might themseves poll unix sockets. Knots again. Not supported either. * Restore: On restore we need to make unix socket wait for the soon-to-be-scm-sent descriptors to get restored, so we need to find them, then put a dependency. After that, the fake fdinfo entry is attached to the respective file descs, when sent the respective descriptors are closed. https://github.com/xemul/criu/issues/251 v2: Addressed comments from Kirill * Moved prepare_scms before adding fake fles (with comment) * Add scm-only fles as fake, thus removing close_scm_fds * Try hard finding any suitable fle to use as scm one when queuing them for unix socket scm list, only allocate a new one if really needed Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2017-07-13 14:24:29 +03:00
/*
* This should be called with all packets collected AND all
* fdescs and fles prepared BUT post-prep-s not run.
*/
ret = prepare_scms();
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = run_post_prepare();
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = unix_prepare_root_shared();
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = add_fake_unix_queuers();
if (ret)
goto err;
show_saved_files();
tty: Add checkpoint/restore for unix terminals v6 Usually the PTYs represent a pair of links -- master peer and slave peer. Master peer must be opened before slave. Internally, when kernel creates master peer it also generates a slave interface in a form of /dev/pts/N, where N is that named pty "index". Master/slave connection unambiguously identified by this index. Still, one master can carry multiple slaves -- for example a user opens one master via /dev/ptmx and appropriate /dev/pts/N in sequence. The result will be the following master `- slave 1 `- slave 2 both slave will have same master index but different file descriptors. Still inside the kernel pty parameters are same for both slaves. Thus only one slave parameters should be restored, there is no need to carry all parameters for every slave peer we've found. Not yet addressed problems: - At moment of restore the master peer might be already closed for any reason so to resolve such problem we need to open a fake master peer with proper index and hook a slave on it, then we close master peer. - Need to figure out how to deal with ttys which have some data in buffers not yet flushed, at moment this data will be simply lost during c/r - Need to restore control terminals - Need to fetch tty flags such as exclusive/packet-mode, this can't be done without kernel patching [ avagin@: - ideas on contol terminals restore - overall code redesign and simplification ] v4: - drop redundant pid from dump_chrdev - make sure optional fown is passed on regular ptys - add a comments about zeroifying termios - get rid of redundant empty line in files.c v5 (by avagin@): - complete rework of tty image format, now we have two files -- tty.img and tty-info.img. The idea behind to reduce data being stored. v6 (by xemul@): - packet mode should be set to true in image, until properly fetched from the kernel - verify image data on retrieval Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> CC: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
2012-09-12 20:00:54 +04:00
err:
return ret;
}
/* This actually populates and occupies ROOT_FD_OFF sfd */
static int populate_root_fd_off(void)
{
struct ns_id *mntns = NULL;
int ret;
if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWNS) {
mntns = lookup_ns_by_id(root_item->ids->mnt_ns_id, &mnt_ns_desc);
BUG_ON(!mntns);
}
ret = mntns_get_root_fd(mntns);
if (ret < 0)
pr_err("Can't get root fd\n");
return ret >= 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int populate_pid_proc(void)
{
if (open_pid_proc(vpid(current)) < 0) {
pr_err("Can't open PROC_SELF\n");
return -1;
}
if (open_pid_proc(PROC_SELF) < 0) {
pr_err("Can't open PROC_SELF\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static rt_sigaction_t sigchld_act;
/*
* If parent's sigaction has blocked SIGKILL (which is non-sense),
* this parent action is non-valid and shouldn't be inherited.
* Used to mark parent_act* no more valid.
*/
static rt_sigaction_t parent_act[SIGMAX];
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static rt_sigaction_t_compat parent_act_compat[SIGMAX];
#endif
static bool sa_inherited(int sig, rt_sigaction_t *sa)
{
rt_sigaction_t *pa;
int i;
if (current == root_item)
return false; /* XXX -- inherit from CRIU? */
pa = &parent_act[sig];
/* Omitting non-valid sigaction */
if (pa->rt_sa_mask.sig[0] & (1 << SIGKILL))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < _KNSIG_WORDS; i++)
if (pa->rt_sa_mask.sig[i] != sa->rt_sa_mask.sig[i])
return false;
return pa->rt_sa_handler == sa->rt_sa_handler &&
pa->rt_sa_flags == sa->rt_sa_flags &&
pa->rt_sa_restorer == sa->rt_sa_restorer;
}
static int restore_native_sigaction(int sig, SaEntry *e)
{
rt_sigaction_t act;
int ret;
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_handler, decode_pointer(e->sigaction));
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_flags, e->flags);
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_restorer, decode_pointer(e->restorer));
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
e->has_mask_extended = 1;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(e->mask)* 2 != sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig));
memcpy(&(act.rt_sa_mask.sig[0]), &e->mask, sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig[0]));
memcpy(&(act.rt_sa_mask.sig[1]), &e->mask_extended, sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig[1]));
#else
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(e->mask) != sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig));
memcpy(act.rt_sa_mask.sig, &e->mask, sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig));
#endif
if (sig == SIGCHLD) {
sigchld_act = act;
return 0;
}
if (sa_inherited(sig - 1, &act))
return 1;
/*
* A pure syscall is used, because glibc
* sigaction overwrites se_restorer.
*/
ret = syscall(SYS_rt_sigaction, sig, &act, NULL, sizeof(k_rtsigset_t));
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("Can't restore sigaction");
return ret;
}
parent_act[sig - 1] = act;
/* Mark SIGKILL blocked which makes compat sigaction non-valid */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
parent_act_compat[sig - 1].rt_sa_mask.sig[0] |= 1 << SIGKILL;
#endif
return 1;
}
static void *stack32;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static bool sa_compat_inherited(int sig, rt_sigaction_t_compat *sa)
{
rt_sigaction_t_compat *pa;
int i;
if (current == root_item)
return false;
pa = &parent_act_compat[sig];
/* Omitting non-valid sigaction */
if (pa->rt_sa_mask.sig[0] & (1 << SIGKILL))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < _KNSIG_WORDS; i++)
if (pa->rt_sa_mask.sig[i] != sa->rt_sa_mask.sig[i])
return false;
return pa->rt_sa_handler == sa->rt_sa_handler &&
pa->rt_sa_flags == sa->rt_sa_flags &&
pa->rt_sa_restorer == sa->rt_sa_restorer;
}
static int restore_compat_sigaction(int sig, SaEntry *e)
{
rt_sigaction_t_compat act;
int ret;
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_handler, (u32)e->sigaction);
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_flags, e->flags);
ASSIGN_TYPED(act.rt_sa_restorer, (u32)e->restorer);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(e->mask) != sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig));
memcpy(act.rt_sa_mask.sig, &e->mask, sizeof(act.rt_sa_mask.sig));
if (sig == SIGCHLD) {
memcpy(&sigchld_act, &act, sizeof(rt_sigaction_t_compat));
return 0;
}
if (sa_compat_inherited(sig - 1, &act))
return 1;
if (!stack32) {
stack32 = alloc_compat_syscall_stack();
if (!stack32)
return -1;
}
ret = arch_compat_rt_sigaction(stack32, sig, &act);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't restore compat sigaction: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
parent_act_compat[sig - 1] = act;
/* Mark SIGKILL blocked which makes native sigaction non-valid */
parent_act[sig - 1].rt_sa_mask.sig[0] |= 1 << SIGKILL;
return 1;
}
#else
static int restore_compat_sigaction(int sig, SaEntry *e)
{
return -1;
}
#endif
static int prepare_sigactions_from_core(TaskCoreEntry *tc)
{
int sig, i;
if (tc->n_sigactions != SIGMAX - 2) {
pr_err("Bad number of sigactions in the image (%d, want %d)\n",
(int)tc->n_sigactions, SIGMAX - 2);
return -1;
}
pr_info("Restore on-core sigactions for %d\n", vpid(current));
for (sig = 1, i = 0; sig <= SIGMAX; sig++) {
int ret;
SaEntry *e;
bool sigaction_is_compat;
if (sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP)
continue;
e = tc->sigactions[i++];
sigaction_is_compat = e->has_compat_sigaction && e->compat_sigaction;
if (sigaction_is_compat)
ret = restore_compat_sigaction(sig, e);
else
ret = restore_native_sigaction(sig, e);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/* Returns number of restored signals, -1 or negative errno on fail */
static int restore_one_sigaction(int sig, struct cr_img *img, int pid)
{
bool sigaction_is_compat;
SaEntry *e;
int ret = 0;
BUG_ON(sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP);
ret = pb_read_one_eof(img, &e, PB_SIGACT);
if (ret == 0) {
if (sig != SIGMAX_OLD + 1) { /* backward compatibility */
pr_err("Unexpected EOF %d\n", sig);
return -1;
}
pr_warn("This format of sigacts-%d.img is deprecated\n", pid);
return -1;
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
sigaction_is_compat = e->has_compat_sigaction && e->compat_sigaction;
if (sigaction_is_compat)
ret = restore_compat_sigaction(sig, e);
else
ret = restore_native_sigaction(sig, e);
sa_entry__free_unpacked(e, NULL);
return ret;
}
static int prepare_sigactions_from_image(void)
{
int pid = vpid(current);
struct cr_img *img;
int sig, rst = 0;
int ret = 0;
pr_info("Restore sigacts for %d\n", pid);
img = open_image(CR_FD_SIGACT, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -1;
for (sig = 1; sig <= SIGMAX; sig++) {
if (sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP)
continue;
ret = restore_one_sigaction(sig, img, pid);
if (ret < 0)
break;
if (ret)
rst++;
}
pr_info("Restored %d/%d sigacts\n", rst,
SIGMAX - 3 /* KILL, STOP and CHLD */);
close_image(img);
return ret;
}
static int prepare_sigactions(CoreEntry *core)
{
int ret;
if (!task_alive(current))
return 0;
if (core->tc->n_sigactions != 0)
ret = prepare_sigactions_from_core(core->tc);
else
ret = prepare_sigactions_from_image();
if (stack32) {
free_compat_syscall_stack(stack32);
stack32 = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int __collect_child_pids(struct pstree_item *p, int state, unsigned int *n)
{
struct pstree_item *pi;
list_for_each_entry(pi, &p->children, sibling) {
pid_t *child;
if (pi->pid->state != state)
continue;
child = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*child), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!child)
return -1;
(*n)++;
*child = vpid(pi);
}
return 0;
}
static int collect_child_pids(int state, unsigned int *n)
{
struct pstree_item *pi;
*n = 0;
/*
* All children of helpers and zombies will be reparented to the init
* process and they have to be collected too.
*/
if (current == root_item) {
for_each_pstree_item(pi) {
if (pi->pid->state != TASK_HELPER &&
pi->pid->state != TASK_DEAD)
continue;
if (__collect_child_pids(pi, state, n))
return -1;
}
}
return __collect_child_pids(current, state, n);
}
static int collect_helper_pids(struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
ta->helpers = (pid_t *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
return collect_child_pids(TASK_HELPER, &ta->helpers_n);
}
static int collect_zombie_pids(struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
ta->zombies = (pid_t *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
return collect_child_pids(TASK_DEAD, &ta->zombies_n);
}
inotify: cleanup auxiliary events from queue I've mentioned the problem that after c/r each inotify receives one or more unexpected events. This happens because our algorithm mixes setting up an inotify watch on the file with opening and closing it. We mix inotify creation and watched file open/close because we need to create the inotify watch on the file from another mntns (generally). And we do a trick opening the file so that it can be referenced in current mntns by /proc/<pid>/fd/<id> path. Moreover if we have several inotifies on the same file, than queue gets even more events than just one which happens in a simple case. note: For now we don't have a way to c/r events in queue but we need to at least leave the queue clean from events generated by our own. These, still, looks harder to rewrite wd creation without this proc-fd trick than to remove unexpected events from queues. So just cleanup these events for each fdt-restorer process, for each of its inotify fds _after_ restore stage (at CR_STATE_RESTORE_SIGCHLD). These is a closest place where for an _alive_ process we know that all prepare_fds() are done by all processes. These means we need to do the cleanup in PIE code, so need to add sys_ppoll definitions for PIE and divide process in two phases: first collect and transfer fds, second do real cleanup. note: We still do prepare_fds() for zombies. But zombies have no fds in /proc/pid/fd so we will collect no in collect_fds() and therefore we have no in prepare_fds(), thus there is no need to cleanup inotifies for zombies. v2: adopt to multiple unexpected events v3: do not cleanup from fdt-receivers, done from fdt-restorer v4: do without additional fds restore stage v5: replace sys_poll with sys_ppoll and fix minor nits Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> use ppoll always and remove poll
2019-06-26 11:55:19 +03:00
static int collect_inotify_fds(struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
struct list_head *list = &rsti(current)->fds;
struct fdt *fdt = rsti(current)->fdt;
struct fdinfo_list_entry *fle;
/* Check we are an fdt-restorer */
if (fdt && fdt->pid != vpid(current))
return 0;
ta->inotify_fds = (int *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
list_for_each_entry(fle, list, ps_list) {
struct file_desc *d = fle->desc;
int *inotify_fd;
if (d->ops->type != FD_TYPES__INOTIFY)
continue;
if (fle != file_master(d))
continue;
inotify_fd = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*inotify_fd), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!inotify_fd)
return -1;
ta->inotify_fds_n++;
*inotify_fd = fle->fe->fd;
pr_debug("Collect inotify fd %d to cleanup later\n", *inotify_fd);
}
return 0;
}
static int open_core(int pid, CoreEntry **pcore)
{
int ret;
struct cr_img *img;
img = open_image(CR_FD_CORE, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img) {
pr_err("Can't open core data for %d\n", pid);
return -1;
}
ret = pb_read_one(img, pcore, PB_CORE);
close_image(img);
return ret <= 0 ? -1 : 0;
}
static int open_cores(int pid, CoreEntry *leader_core)
{
int i, tpid;
CoreEntry **cores = NULL;
cores = xmalloc(sizeof(*cores)*current->nr_threads);
if (!cores)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < current->nr_threads; i++) {
tpid = current->threads[i].ns[0].virt;
if (tpid == pid)
cores[i] = leader_core;
else if (open_core(tpid, &cores[i]))
goto err;
}
current->core = cores;
/*
* Walk over all threads and if one them is having
* active seccomp mode we will suspend filtering
* on the whole group until restore complete.
*
* Otherwise any criu code which might use same syscall
* if present inside a filter chain would take filter
* action and might break restore procedure.
*/
for (i = 0; i < current->nr_threads; i++) {
ThreadCoreEntry *thread_core = cores[i]->thread_core;
if (thread_core->seccomp_mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
rsti(current)->has_seccomp = true;
break;
}
}
return 0;
err:
xfree(cores);
return -1;
}
static int prepare_oom_score_adj(int value)
{
int fd, ret = 0;
char buf[11];
fd = open_proc_rw(PROC_SELF, "oom_score_adj");
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
snprintf(buf, 11, "%d", value);
if (write(fd, buf, 11) < 0) {
pr_perror("Write %s to /proc/self/oom_score_adj failed", buf);
ret = -1;
}
close(fd);
return ret;
}
static int prepare_proc_misc(pid_t pid, TaskCoreEntry *tc, struct task_restore_args *args)
{
int ret;
if (tc->has_child_subreaper)
args->child_subreaper = tc->child_subreaper;
/* loginuid value is critical to restore */
if (kdat.luid == LUID_FULL && tc->has_loginuid &&
tc->loginuid != INVALID_UID) {
ret = prepare_loginuid(tc->loginuid);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Setting loginuid for %d task failed\n", pid);
return ret;
}
}
/* oom_score_adj is not critical: only log errors */
if (tc->has_oom_score_adj && tc->oom_score_adj != 0)
prepare_oom_score_adj(tc->oom_score_adj);
return 0;
}
static int prepare_itimers(int pid, struct task_restore_args *args, CoreEntry *core);
static int prepare_mm(pid_t pid, struct task_restore_args *args);
static int restore_one_alive_task(int pid, CoreEntry *core)
{
unsigned args_len;
struct task_restore_args *ta;
pr_info("Restoring resources\n");
rst_mem_switch_to_private();
args_len = round_up(sizeof(*ta) + sizeof(struct thread_restore_args) *
current->nr_threads, page_size());
ta = mmap(NULL, args_len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
if (!ta)
return -1;
memzero(ta, args_len);
if (prepare_fds(current))
return -1;
if (prepare_file_locks(pid))
return -1;
if (open_vmas(current))
return -1;
if (prepare_aios(current, ta))
return -1;
if (fixup_sysv_shmems())
return -1;
if (open_cores(pid, core))
return -1;
if (prepare_signals(pid, ta, core))
return -1;
if (prepare_posix_timers(pid, ta, core))
return -1;
if (prepare_rlimits(pid, ta, core) < 0)
return -1;
if (collect_helper_pids(ta) < 0)
return -1;
if (collect_zombie_pids(ta) < 0)
return -1;
inotify: cleanup auxiliary events from queue I've mentioned the problem that after c/r each inotify receives one or more unexpected events. This happens because our algorithm mixes setting up an inotify watch on the file with opening and closing it. We mix inotify creation and watched file open/close because we need to create the inotify watch on the file from another mntns (generally). And we do a trick opening the file so that it can be referenced in current mntns by /proc/<pid>/fd/<id> path. Moreover if we have several inotifies on the same file, than queue gets even more events than just one which happens in a simple case. note: For now we don't have a way to c/r events in queue but we need to at least leave the queue clean from events generated by our own. These, still, looks harder to rewrite wd creation without this proc-fd trick than to remove unexpected events from queues. So just cleanup these events for each fdt-restorer process, for each of its inotify fds _after_ restore stage (at CR_STATE_RESTORE_SIGCHLD). These is a closest place where for an _alive_ process we know that all prepare_fds() are done by all processes. These means we need to do the cleanup in PIE code, so need to add sys_ppoll definitions for PIE and divide process in two phases: first collect and transfer fds, second do real cleanup. note: We still do prepare_fds() for zombies. But zombies have no fds in /proc/pid/fd so we will collect no in collect_fds() and therefore we have no in prepare_fds(), thus there is no need to cleanup inotifies for zombies. v2: adopt to multiple unexpected events v3: do not cleanup from fdt-receivers, done from fdt-restorer v4: do without additional fds restore stage v5: replace sys_poll with sys_ppoll and fix minor nits Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> use ppoll always and remove poll
2019-06-26 11:55:19 +03:00
if (collect_inotify_fds(ta) < 0)
return -1;
if (prepare_proc_misc(pid, core->tc, ta))
return -1;
/*
* Get all the tcp sockets fds into rst memory -- restorer
* will turn repair off before going sigreturn
*/
if (prepare_tcp_socks(ta))
return -1;
/*
* Copy timerfd params for restorer args, we need to proceed
* timer setting at the very late.
*/
if (prepare_timerfds(ta))
return -1;
seccomp: Add engine to restore per-thread seccomp chains At now we pretend that all threads are sharing seccomp chains and at checkpoint moment we test seccomp modes to make sure if this assumption is valid refusing to dump otherwise. Still the kernel tacks seccomp filter chains per each thread and now we've faced applications (such as java) where per-thread chains are actively used. Thus we need to bring support of handling filters via per-thread basis. In this a bit intrusive patch the restore engine is lifted up to treat each thread separately. Here what is done: - Image core file is modified to keep seccomp filters inside thread_core_entry. For backward compatibility former seccomp_mode and seccomp_filter members in task_core_entry are renamed to have old_ prefix and on restore we test if we're dealing with old images. Since per-thread dump is not yet implemeneted the dumping procedure continue operating with old_ members. - In pie restorer code memory containing filters are addressed from inside thread_restore_args structure which now contains seccomp mode itself and chain attributes (number of filters and etc). Reading of per-thread data is done in seccomp_prepare_threads helper -- we take one pstree_item and walks over every thread inside to allocate pie memory and pin data there. Because of PIE specific, before jumping into pie code we have to relocate this memory into new place and for this seccomp_rst_reloc is served. In restorer itself we check if thread_restore_args provides us enabled seccomp mode (strict or filter passed) and call for restore_seccomp_filter if needed. - To unify names we start using seccomp_ prefix for all related stuff involved into this change (prepare_seccomp_filters renamed to seccomp_read_image because it only reads image and nothing more, image handler is renamed to seccomp_img_entry instead of too short 'se'. With this change we're now allowed to start collecting and dumping seccomp filters per each thread, which will be done in next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-05-07 11:42:45 +03:00
if (seccomp_prepare_threads(current, ta) < 0)
return -1;
if (prepare_itimers(pid, ta, core) < 0)
return -1;
if (prepare_mm(pid, ta))
return -1;
if (prepare_vmas(current, ta))
return -1;
/*
* Sockets have to be restored in their network namespaces,
* so a task namespace has to be restored after sockets.
*/
if (restore_task_net_ns(current))
return -1;
if (setup_uffd(pid, ta))
return -1;
return sigreturn_restore(pid, ta, args_len, core);
}
static void zombie_prepare_signals(void)
{
sigset_t blockmask;
int sig;
struct sigaction act;
sigfillset(&blockmask);
sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &blockmask, NULL);
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
act.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
for (sig = 1; sig <= SIGMAX; sig++)
sigaction(sig, &act, NULL);
}
#define SIG_FATAL_MASK ( \
(1 << SIGHUP) |\
(1 << SIGINT) |\
(1 << SIGQUIT) |\
(1 << SIGILL) |\
(1 << SIGTRAP) |\
(1 << SIGABRT) |\
(1 << SIGIOT) |\
(1 << SIGBUS) |\
(1 << SIGFPE) |\
(1 << SIGKILL) |\
(1 << SIGUSR1) |\
(1 << SIGSEGV) |\
(1 << SIGUSR2) |\
(1 << SIGPIPE) |\
(1 << SIGALRM) |\
(1 << SIGTERM) |\
(1 << SIGXCPU) |\
(1 << SIGXFSZ) |\
(1 << SIGVTALRM)|\
(1 << SIGPROF) |\
(1 << SIGPOLL) |\
(1 << SIGIO) |\
(1 << SIGSYS) |\
(1 << SIGSTKFLT)|\
(1 << SIGPWR) \
)
static inline int sig_fatal(int sig)
{
return (sig > 0) && (sig < SIGMAX) && (SIG_FATAL_MASK & (1UL << sig));
}
struct task_entries *task_entries;
static unsigned long task_entries_pos;
static int wait_on_helpers_zombies(void)
{
struct pstree_item *pi;
list_for_each_entry(pi, &current->children, sibling) {
pid_t pid = vpid(pi);
int status;
switch (pi->pid->state) {
case TASK_DEAD:
if (waitid(P_PID, pid, NULL, WNOWAIT | WEXITED) < 0) {
pr_perror("Wait on %d zombie failed", pid);
return -1;
}
break;
case TASK_HELPER:
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
pr_perror("waitpid for helper %d failed", pid);
return -1;
}
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int wait_exiting_children(void);
static int restore_one_zombie(CoreEntry *core)
{
int exit_code = core->tc->exit_code;
pr_info("Restoring zombie with %d code\n", exit_code);
if (prepare_fds(current))
return -1;
if (lazy_pages_setup_zombie(vpid(current)))
return -1;
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (long)(void *)core->tc->comm, 0, 0, 0);
if (task_entries != NULL) {
wait_exiting_children();
zombie_prepare_signals();
}
if (exit_code & 0x7f) {
int signr;
/* prevent generating core files */
if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0))
pr_perror("Can't drop the dumpable flag");
signr = exit_code & 0x7F;
if (!sig_fatal(signr)) {
pr_warn("Exit with non fatal signal ignored\n");
signr = SIGABRT;
}
if (kill(vpid(current), signr) < 0)
pr_perror("Can't kill myself, will just exit");
exit_code = 0;
}
exit((exit_code >> 8) & 0x7f);
/* never reached */
BUG_ON(1);
return -1;
}
static int setup_newborn_fds(struct pstree_item *me)
{
if (clone_service_fd(me))
return -1;
if (!me->parent ||
(rsti(me->parent)->fdt && !(rsti(me)->clone_flags & CLONE_FILES))) {
/*
* When our parent has shared fd table, some of the table owners
* may be already created. Files, they open, will be inherited
* by current process, and here we close them. Also, service fds
* of parent are closed here. And root_item closes the files,
* that were inherited from criu process.
*/
if (close_old_fds())
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int check_core(CoreEntry *core, struct pstree_item *me)
{
int ret = -1;
if (core->mtype != CORE_ENTRY__MARCH) {
pr_err("Core march mismatch %d\n", (int)core->mtype);
goto out;
}
if (!core->tc) {
pr_err("Core task state data missed\n");
goto out;
}
if (core->tc->task_state != TASK_DEAD) {
if (!core->ids && !me->ids) {
pr_err("Core IDS data missed for non-zombie\n");
goto out;
}
if (!CORE_THREAD_ARCH_INFO(core)) {
pr_err("Core info data missed for non-zombie\n");
goto out;
}
seccomp: Add engine to restore per-thread seccomp chains At now we pretend that all threads are sharing seccomp chains and at checkpoint moment we test seccomp modes to make sure if this assumption is valid refusing to dump otherwise. Still the kernel tacks seccomp filter chains per each thread and now we've faced applications (such as java) where per-thread chains are actively used. Thus we need to bring support of handling filters via per-thread basis. In this a bit intrusive patch the restore engine is lifted up to treat each thread separately. Here what is done: - Image core file is modified to keep seccomp filters inside thread_core_entry. For backward compatibility former seccomp_mode and seccomp_filter members in task_core_entry are renamed to have old_ prefix and on restore we test if we're dealing with old images. Since per-thread dump is not yet implemeneted the dumping procedure continue operating with old_ members. - In pie restorer code memory containing filters are addressed from inside thread_restore_args structure which now contains seccomp mode itself and chain attributes (number of filters and etc). Reading of per-thread data is done in seccomp_prepare_threads helper -- we take one pstree_item and walks over every thread inside to allocate pie memory and pin data there. Because of PIE specific, before jumping into pie code we have to relocate this memory into new place and for this seccomp_rst_reloc is served. In restorer itself we check if thread_restore_args provides us enabled seccomp mode (strict or filter passed) and call for restore_seccomp_filter if needed. - To unify names we start using seccomp_ prefix for all related stuff involved into this change (prepare_seccomp_filters renamed to seccomp_read_image because it only reads image and nothing more, image handler is renamed to seccomp_img_entry instead of too short 'se'. With this change we're now allowed to start collecting and dumping seccomp filters per each thread, which will be done in next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-05-07 11:42:45 +03:00
/*
* Seccomp are moved to per-thread origin,
* so for old images we need to move per-task
* data into proper place.
*/
if (core->tc->has_old_seccomp_mode) {
core->thread_core->has_seccomp_mode = core->tc->has_old_seccomp_mode;
core->thread_core->seccomp_mode = core->tc->old_seccomp_mode;
}
if (core->tc->has_old_seccomp_filter) {
core->thread_core->has_seccomp_filter = core->tc->has_old_seccomp_filter;
core->thread_core->seccomp_filter = core->tc->old_seccomp_filter;
rsti(me)->has_old_seccomp_filter = true;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
restore: Fix deadlock when helper's child dies Since commit ced9c529f687 ("restore: fix race with helpers' kids dying too early"), we block SIGCHLD in helper tasks before CR_STATE_RESTORE. This way we avoided default criu sighandler as it doesn't expect that childs may die. This is very racy as we wait on futex for another stage to be started, but the next stage may start only when all the tasks complete previous stage. If some children of helper dies, the helper may already have blocked SIGCHLD and have started sleeping on the futex. Then the next stage never comes and no one reads a pending SIGCHLD for helper. A customer met this situation on the node, where the following (non-related) problem has occured: Unable to send a fin packet: libnet_write_raw_ipv6(): -1 bytes written (Network is unreachable) Then child criu of the helper has exited with error-code and the lockup has happened. While we could fix it by aborting futex in the end of restore_task_with_children() for each (non-root also) tasks, that would be not completely correct: 1. All futex-waiting tasks will wake up after that and they may not expect that some tasks are on the previous stage, so they will spam into logs with unrelated errors and may also die painfully. 2. Child may die and miss aborting of the futex due to: o segfault o OOM killer o User-sended SIGKILL o Other error-path we forgot to cover with abort futex To fix this deadlock in TASK_HELPER, as suggested-by Kirill, let's check if there are children deaths expected - if there isn't any, don't block SIGCHLD, otherwise wait() and check if death was on expected stage of restore (not CR_STATE_RESTORE). Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Conflicts: criu/cr-restore.c
2017-07-20 18:21:21 +03:00
/*
* Find if there are children which are zombies or helpers - processes
* which are expected to die during the restore.
*/
static bool child_death_expected(void)
{
struct pstree_item *pi;
list_for_each_entry(pi, &current->children, sibling) {
switch (pi->pid->state) {
case TASK_DEAD:
case TASK_HELPER:
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static int wait_exiting_children(void)
restore: Fix deadlock when helper's child dies Since commit ced9c529f687 ("restore: fix race with helpers' kids dying too early"), we block SIGCHLD in helper tasks before CR_STATE_RESTORE. This way we avoided default criu sighandler as it doesn't expect that childs may die. This is very racy as we wait on futex for another stage to be started, but the next stage may start only when all the tasks complete previous stage. If some children of helper dies, the helper may already have blocked SIGCHLD and have started sleeping on the futex. Then the next stage never comes and no one reads a pending SIGCHLD for helper. A customer met this situation on the node, where the following (non-related) problem has occured: Unable to send a fin packet: libnet_write_raw_ipv6(): -1 bytes written (Network is unreachable) Then child criu of the helper has exited with error-code and the lockup has happened. While we could fix it by aborting futex in the end of restore_task_with_children() for each (non-root also) tasks, that would be not completely correct: 1. All futex-waiting tasks will wake up after that and they may not expect that some tasks are on the previous stage, so they will spam into logs with unrelated errors and may also die painfully. 2. Child may die and miss aborting of the futex due to: o segfault o OOM killer o User-sended SIGKILL o Other error-path we forgot to cover with abort futex To fix this deadlock in TASK_HELPER, as suggested-by Kirill, let's check if there are children deaths expected - if there isn't any, don't block SIGCHLD, otherwise wait() and check if death was on expected stage of restore (not CR_STATE_RESTORE). Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Conflicts: criu/cr-restore.c
2017-07-20 18:21:21 +03:00
{
siginfo_t info;
if (!child_death_expected()) {
/*
* Restoree has no children that should die, during restore,
* wait for the next stage on futex.
* The default SIGCHLD handler will handle an unexpected
* child's death and abort the restore if someone dies.
*/
restore_finish_stage(task_entries, CR_STATE_RESTORE);
return 0;
}
/*
* The restoree has children which will die - decrement itself from
* nr. of tasks processing the stage and wait for anyone to die.
* Tasks may die only when they're on the following stage.
* If one dies earlier - that's unexpected - treat it as an error
* and abort the restore.
*/
if (block_sigmask(NULL, SIGCHLD))
return -1;
/* Finish CR_STATE_RESTORE, but do not wait for the next stage. */
futex_dec_and_wake(&task_entries->nr_in_progress);
if (waitid(P_ALL, 0, &info, WEXITED | WNOWAIT)) {
pr_perror("Failed to wait");
restore: Fix deadlock when helper's child dies Since commit ced9c529f687 ("restore: fix race with helpers' kids dying too early"), we block SIGCHLD in helper tasks before CR_STATE_RESTORE. This way we avoided default criu sighandler as it doesn't expect that childs may die. This is very racy as we wait on futex for another stage to be started, but the next stage may start only when all the tasks complete previous stage. If some children of helper dies, the helper may already have blocked SIGCHLD and have started sleeping on the futex. Then the next stage never comes and no one reads a pending SIGCHLD for helper. A customer met this situation on the node, where the following (non-related) problem has occured: Unable to send a fin packet: libnet_write_raw_ipv6(): -1 bytes written (Network is unreachable) Then child criu of the helper has exited with error-code and the lockup has happened. While we could fix it by aborting futex in the end of restore_task_with_children() for each (non-root also) tasks, that would be not completely correct: 1. All futex-waiting tasks will wake up after that and they may not expect that some tasks are on the previous stage, so they will spam into logs with unrelated errors and may also die painfully. 2. Child may die and miss aborting of the futex due to: o segfault o OOM killer o User-sended SIGKILL o Other error-path we forgot to cover with abort futex To fix this deadlock in TASK_HELPER, as suggested-by Kirill, let's check if there are children deaths expected - if there isn't any, don't block SIGCHLD, otherwise wait() and check if death was on expected stage of restore (not CR_STATE_RESTORE). Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Conflicts: criu/cr-restore.c
2017-07-20 18:21:21 +03:00
return -1;
}
if (futex_get(&task_entries->start) == CR_STATE_RESTORE) {
pr_err("Child %d died too early\n", info.si_pid);
return -1;
}
if (wait_on_helpers_zombies()) {
pr_err("Failed to wait on helpers and zombies\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Restore a helper process - artificially created by criu
* to restore attributes of process tree.
* - sessions for each leaders are dead
* - process groups with dead leaders
* - dead tasks for which /proc/<pid>/... is opened by restoring task
* - whatnot
*/
static int restore_one_helper(void)
{
int i;
if (prepare_fds(current))
return -1;
if (wait_exiting_children())
return -1;
sfds_protected = false;
close_image_dir();
close_proc();
for (i = SERVICE_FD_MIN + 1; i < SERVICE_FD_MAX; i++)
close_service_fd(i);
return 0;
}
static int restore_one_task(int pid, CoreEntry *core)
{
int ret;
/* No more fork()-s => no more per-pid logs */
if (task_alive(current))
ret = restore_one_alive_task(pid, core);
else if (current->pid->state == TASK_DEAD)
ret = restore_one_zombie(core);
else if (current->pid->state == TASK_HELPER) {
restore: Fix deadlock when helper's child dies Since commit ced9c529f687 ("restore: fix race with helpers' kids dying too early"), we block SIGCHLD in helper tasks before CR_STATE_RESTORE. This way we avoided default criu sighandler as it doesn't expect that childs may die. This is very racy as we wait on futex for another stage to be started, but the next stage may start only when all the tasks complete previous stage. If some children of helper dies, the helper may already have blocked SIGCHLD and have started sleeping on the futex. Then the next stage never comes and no one reads a pending SIGCHLD for helper. A customer met this situation on the node, where the following (non-related) problem has occured: Unable to send a fin packet: libnet_write_raw_ipv6(): -1 bytes written (Network is unreachable) Then child criu of the helper has exited with error-code and the lockup has happened. While we could fix it by aborting futex in the end of restore_task_with_children() for each (non-root also) tasks, that would be not completely correct: 1. All futex-waiting tasks will wake up after that and they may not expect that some tasks are on the previous stage, so they will spam into logs with unrelated errors and may also die painfully. 2. Child may die and miss aborting of the futex due to: o segfault o OOM killer o User-sended SIGKILL o Other error-path we forgot to cover with abort futex To fix this deadlock in TASK_HELPER, as suggested-by Kirill, let's check if there are children deaths expected - if there isn't any, don't block SIGCHLD, otherwise wait() and check if death was on expected stage of restore (not CR_STATE_RESTORE). Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Conflicts: criu/cr-restore.c
2017-07-20 18:21:21 +03:00
ret = restore_one_helper();
} else {
pr_err("Unknown state in code %d\n", (int)core->tc->task_state);
ret = -1;
}
if (core)
core_entry__free_unpacked(core, NULL);
return ret;
}
/* All arguments should be above stack, because it grows down */
struct cr_clone_arg {
struct pstree_item *item;
unsigned long clone_flags;
CoreEntry *core;
};
static void maybe_clone_parent(struct pstree_item *item,
struct cr_clone_arg *ca)
{
/*
* zdtm runs in kernel 3.11, which has the problem described below. We
* avoid this by including the pdeath_sig test. Once users/zdtm migrate
* off of 3.11, this condition can be simplified to just test the
* options and not have the pdeath_sig test.
*/
restore: Introduce the --restore-sibling option We have a slight mess with how criu restores root task. Right now we have the following options. 1) CLI a) Usually task calling criu `- criu `- root restored task b) when --restore-detached AND root has pdeath_sig task calling criu `- criu `- root restored task 2) Library/SWRK task using lib/swrk `- criu `- root restored task 3) Standalone service a) Usually service `- service sub task `- root restored task b) when root has pdeath_sig criu service `- criu sub task `- root restored task It would be better is CRIU always restored the root task as sibling, but we have 3 constraints: First, the case 1.a is kept for zdtm to run tests in pid namespaces on 3.11, which in turn doesn't allow CLONE_PARENT | CLONE_NEWPID. Second, CLI w/o --restore-detach waits for the restored task to die and this behavior can be "expected" already. Third, in case of standalone service tasks shouldn't become service's children. And I have one "plan". The p.haul project while live migrating tasks on destination node starts a service, which uses library/swrk mode. In this case the restored processes become p.haul service's kids which is also not great. That said, here's the option called --restore-child that pairs the --restore-detach like this: * detached AND child: task `- criu restore (exits at the end) `- root task The root task will become task's child. This will be default to library/swrk. This is what LXC needs. * detach AND !child task `- criu restore (exits at the end) `- root task The root task will get re-parented to init. This will be compatible with 1.3. This will be default to standalone service and to my wish with the p.haul case. * !detach AND child task `- criu restore (waits for root task to die) `- root task This should be deprecated, so that criu restore doesn't mess with task <-> root task signalling. * !detach AND !child task `- criu restore (waits for root task to die) `- root task This is how plain criu restore works now. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2014-09-10 15:46:06 +04:00
if (opts.restore_sibling) {
/*
* This means we're called from lib's criu_restore_child().
* In that case create the root task as the child one to+
* the caller. This is the only way to correctly restore the
* pdeath_sig of the root task. But also looks nice.
*
* Alternatively, if we are --restore-detached, a similar trick is
* needed to correctly restore pdeath_sig and prevent processes from
* dying once restored.
*
* There were a problem in kernel 3.11 -- CLONE_PARENT can't be
* set together with CLONE_NEWPID, which has been solved in further
* versions of the kernels, but we treat 3.11 as a base, so at
* least warn a user about potential problems.
*/
rsti(item)->clone_flags |= CLONE_PARENT;
if (rsti(item)->clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
pr_warn("Set CLONE_PARENT | CLONE_NEWPID but it might cause restore problem,"
"because not all kernels support such clone flags combinations!\n");
restore: Introduce the --restore-sibling option We have a slight mess with how criu restores root task. Right now we have the following options. 1) CLI a) Usually task calling criu `- criu `- root restored task b) when --restore-detached AND root has pdeath_sig task calling criu `- criu `- root restored task 2) Library/SWRK task using lib/swrk `- criu `- root restored task 3) Standalone service a) Usually service `- service sub task `- root restored task b) when root has pdeath_sig criu service `- criu sub task `- root restored task It would be better is CRIU always restored the root task as sibling, but we have 3 constraints: First, the case 1.a is kept for zdtm to run tests in pid namespaces on 3.11, which in turn doesn't allow CLONE_PARENT | CLONE_NEWPID. Second, CLI w/o --restore-detach waits for the restored task to die and this behavior can be "expected" already. Third, in case of standalone service tasks shouldn't become service's children. And I have one "plan". The p.haul project while live migrating tasks on destination node starts a service, which uses library/swrk mode. In this case the restored processes become p.haul service's kids which is also not great. That said, here's the option called --restore-child that pairs the --restore-detach like this: * detached AND child: task `- criu restore (exits at the end) `- root task The root task will become task's child. This will be default to library/swrk. This is what LXC needs. * detach AND !child task `- criu restore (exits at the end) `- root task The root task will get re-parented to init. This will be compatible with 1.3. This will be default to standalone service and to my wish with the p.haul case. * !detach AND child task `- criu restore (waits for root task to die) `- root task This should be deprecated, so that criu restore doesn't mess with task <-> root task signalling. * !detach AND !child task `- criu restore (waits for root task to die) `- root task This is how plain criu restore works now. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2014-09-10 15:46:06 +04:00
} else if (opts.restore_detach) {
if (ca->core->thread_core->pdeath_sig)
pr_warn("Root task has pdeath_sig configured, so it will receive one _right_"
"after restore on CRIU exit\n");
}
}
static bool needs_prep_creds(struct pstree_item *item)
{
/*
* Before the 4.13 kernel, it was impossible to set
* an exe_file if uid or gid isn't zero.
*/
return (!item->parent && ((root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWUSER) || getuid()));
}
static int set_next_pid(void *arg)
{
char buf[32];
pid_t *pid = arg;
int len;
int fd;
fd = open_proc_rw(PROC_GEN, LAST_PID_PATH);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", *pid - 1);
if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) {
pr_perror("Failed to write %s to /proc/%s",
buf, LAST_PID_PATH);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
static inline int fork_with_pid(struct pstree_item *item)
{
struct cr_clone_arg ca;
struct ns_id *pid_ns = NULL;
bool external_pidns = false;
int ret = -1;
pid_t pid = vpid(item);
if (item->pid->state != TASK_HELPER) {
if (open_core(pid, &ca.core))
return -1;
if (check_core(ca.core, item))
return -1;
item->pid->state = ca.core->tc->task_state;
rsti(item)->cg_set = ca.core->tc->cg_set;
if (item->pid->state != TASK_DEAD && !task_alive(item)) {
pr_err("Unknown task state %d\n", item->pid->state);
return -1;
}
/*
* By default we assume that seccomp is not
* used at all (especially on dead task). Later
* we will walk over all threads and check in
* details if filter is present setting up
* this flag as appropriate.
*/
rsti(item)->has_seccomp = false;
seccomp: Add engine to restore per-thread seccomp chains At now we pretend that all threads are sharing seccomp chains and at checkpoint moment we test seccomp modes to make sure if this assumption is valid refusing to dump otherwise. Still the kernel tacks seccomp filter chains per each thread and now we've faced applications (such as java) where per-thread chains are actively used. Thus we need to bring support of handling filters via per-thread basis. In this a bit intrusive patch the restore engine is lifted up to treat each thread separately. Here what is done: - Image core file is modified to keep seccomp filters inside thread_core_entry. For backward compatibility former seccomp_mode and seccomp_filter members in task_core_entry are renamed to have old_ prefix and on restore we test if we're dealing with old images. Since per-thread dump is not yet implemeneted the dumping procedure continue operating with old_ members. - In pie restorer code memory containing filters are addressed from inside thread_restore_args structure which now contains seccomp mode itself and chain attributes (number of filters and etc). Reading of per-thread data is done in seccomp_prepare_threads helper -- we take one pstree_item and walks over every thread inside to allocate pie memory and pin data there. Because of PIE specific, before jumping into pie code we have to relocate this memory into new place and for this seccomp_rst_reloc is served. In restorer itself we check if thread_restore_args provides us enabled seccomp mode (strict or filter passed) and call for restore_seccomp_filter if needed. - To unify names we start using seccomp_ prefix for all related stuff involved into this change (prepare_seccomp_filters renamed to seccomp_read_image because it only reads image and nothing more, image handler is renamed to seccomp_img_entry instead of too short 'se'. With this change we're now allowed to start collecting and dumping seccomp filters per each thread, which will be done in next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-05-07 11:42:45 +03:00
if (unlikely(item == root_item))
maybe_clone_parent(item, &ca);
} else {
/*
* Helper entry will not get moved around and thus
* will live in the parent's cgset.
*/
rsti(item)->cg_set = rsti(item->parent)->cg_set;
ca.core = NULL;
}
cr-restore: make CLONE_NEWPID flag in clone_flags more consistent I) Let's make CLONE_NEWPID in rsti(item)->clone_flags always only mean that we need to clone with CLONE_NEWPID to create this task. Only pidns reaper would have this flag because only they can be restored via clone with CLONE_NEWPID flag. If we have non pidns reaper root task but its pidns is different from criu this can be only restored into external pidns. II) Let's remove clone_flags variable from fork_with_pid as it does not actually needed now: clone_flags was introduced to be able to restore into external pidns rsti(item)->clone_flags is determined in prepare_pstree_kobj_ids and before (I) it means 1) parent has different namespace from item or 2) item is root task and criu has different namespace from it. We don't support nested pid namespaces so (1) is always false. And for (2) we have two cases a) pid == INIT_PID - when it is not possible to restore into external pidns b) pid != INIT_PID - when it is only possible to restore into external pidns. For (b) we previousely had CLONE_NEWPID flag in rsti(item)->clone_flags and to workaround it we've added this extra clone_flags variable, but I think it is not needed because we can simply remove CLONE_NEWPID from non-reaper processes initially. Also the code with removing CLONE_NEWPID from clone_flags and adding the same flag to rsti(item)->clone_flags is super strange because I don't see any other place where we later can use rsti(item)->clone_flags. III) Also don't print differen flags in "Forking task with ..." from which we actually use in clone. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2020-10-27 18:26:35 +03:00
if (item->ids)
pid_ns = lookup_ns_by_id(item->ids->pid_ns_id, &pid_ns_desc);
if (!current && pid_ns && pid_ns->ext_key)
external_pidns = true;
if (external_pidns) {
int fd;
/* Not possible to restore into an empty PID namespace. */
if (pid == INIT_PID) {
pr_err("Unable to restore into an empty PID namespace\n");
return -1;
}
fd = inherit_fd_lookup_id(pid_ns->ext_key);
if (fd < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to find an external pidns: %s\n", pid_ns->ext_key);
return -1;
}
ret = switch_ns_by_fd(fd, &pid_ns_desc, NULL);
close(fd);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to enter existing PID namespace\n");
return -1;
}
pr_info("Inheriting external pidns %s for %d\n", pid_ns->ext_key, pid);
}
cr-restore: make CLONE_NEWPID flag in clone_flags more consistent I) Let's make CLONE_NEWPID in rsti(item)->clone_flags always only mean that we need to clone with CLONE_NEWPID to create this task. Only pidns reaper would have this flag because only they can be restored via clone with CLONE_NEWPID flag. If we have non pidns reaper root task but its pidns is different from criu this can be only restored into external pidns. II) Let's remove clone_flags variable from fork_with_pid as it does not actually needed now: clone_flags was introduced to be able to restore into external pidns rsti(item)->clone_flags is determined in prepare_pstree_kobj_ids and before (I) it means 1) parent has different namespace from item or 2) item is root task and criu has different namespace from it. We don't support nested pid namespaces so (1) is always false. And for (2) we have two cases a) pid == INIT_PID - when it is not possible to restore into external pidns b) pid != INIT_PID - when it is only possible to restore into external pidns. For (b) we previousely had CLONE_NEWPID flag in rsti(item)->clone_flags and to workaround it we've added this extra clone_flags variable, but I think it is not needed because we can simply remove CLONE_NEWPID from non-reaper processes initially. Also the code with removing CLONE_NEWPID from clone_flags and adding the same flag to rsti(item)->clone_flags is super strange because I don't see any other place where we later can use rsti(item)->clone_flags. III) Also don't print differen flags in "Forking task with ..." from which we actually use in clone. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2020-10-27 18:26:35 +03:00
ca.item = item;
ca.clone_flags = rsti(item)->clone_flags;
BUG_ON(ca.clone_flags & CLONE_VM);
pr_info("Forking task with %d pid (flags 0x%lx)\n", pid, ca.clone_flags);
if (!(ca.clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)) {
lock_last_pid();
if (!kdat.has_clone3_set_tid) {
if (external_pidns) {
/*
* Restoring into another namespace requires a helper
* to write to LAST_PID_PATH. Using clone3() this is
* so much easier and simpler. As long as CRIU supports
* clone() this is needed.
*/
ret = call_in_child_process(set_next_pid, (void *)&pid);
} else {
ret = set_next_pid((void *)&pid);
}
if (ret != 0) {
pr_err("Setting PID failed\n");
goto err_unlock;
}
}
} else {
if (!external_pidns) {
if (pid != INIT_PID) {
pr_err("First PID in a PID namespace needs to be %d and not %d\n",
pid, INIT_PID);
return -1;
}
}
}
if (kdat.has_clone3_set_tid) {
ret = clone3_with_pid_noasan(restore_task_with_children,
cr-restore: make CLONE_NEWPID flag in clone_flags more consistent I) Let's make CLONE_NEWPID in rsti(item)->clone_flags always only mean that we need to clone with CLONE_NEWPID to create this task. Only pidns reaper would have this flag because only they can be restored via clone with CLONE_NEWPID flag. If we have non pidns reaper root task but its pidns is different from criu this can be only restored into external pidns. II) Let's remove clone_flags variable from fork_with_pid as it does not actually needed now: clone_flags was introduced to be able to restore into external pidns rsti(item)->clone_flags is determined in prepare_pstree_kobj_ids and before (I) it means 1) parent has different namespace from item or 2) item is root task and criu has different namespace from it. We don't support nested pid namespaces so (1) is always false. And for (2) we have two cases a) pid == INIT_PID - when it is not possible to restore into external pidns b) pid != INIT_PID - when it is only possible to restore into external pidns. For (b) we previousely had CLONE_NEWPID flag in rsti(item)->clone_flags and to workaround it we've added this extra clone_flags variable, but I think it is not needed because we can simply remove CLONE_NEWPID from non-reaper processes initially. Also the code with removing CLONE_NEWPID from clone_flags and adding the same flag to rsti(item)->clone_flags is super strange because I don't see any other place where we later can use rsti(item)->clone_flags. III) Also don't print differen flags in "Forking task with ..." from which we actually use in clone. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2020-10-27 18:26:35 +03:00
&ca, (ca.clone_flags &
~(CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWCGROUP | CLONE_NEWTIME)),
SIGCHLD, pid);
} else {
/*
* Some kernel modules, such as network packet generator
* run kernel thread upon net-namespace creation taking
* the @pid we've been requesting via LAST_PID_PATH interface
* so that we can't restore a take with pid needed.
*
* Here is an idea -- unshare net namespace in callee instead.
*/
/*
* The cgroup namespace is also unshared explicitly in the
* move_in_cgroup(), so drop this flag here as well.
*/
close_pid_proc();
ret = clone_noasan(restore_task_with_children,
cr-restore: make CLONE_NEWPID flag in clone_flags more consistent I) Let's make CLONE_NEWPID in rsti(item)->clone_flags always only mean that we need to clone with CLONE_NEWPID to create this task. Only pidns reaper would have this flag because only they can be restored via clone with CLONE_NEWPID flag. If we have non pidns reaper root task but its pidns is different from criu this can be only restored into external pidns. II) Let's remove clone_flags variable from fork_with_pid as it does not actually needed now: clone_flags was introduced to be able to restore into external pidns rsti(item)->clone_flags is determined in prepare_pstree_kobj_ids and before (I) it means 1) parent has different namespace from item or 2) item is root task and criu has different namespace from it. We don't support nested pid namespaces so (1) is always false. And for (2) we have two cases a) pid == INIT_PID - when it is not possible to restore into external pidns b) pid != INIT_PID - when it is only possible to restore into external pidns. For (b) we previousely had CLONE_NEWPID flag in rsti(item)->clone_flags and to workaround it we've added this extra clone_flags variable, but I think it is not needed because we can simply remove CLONE_NEWPID from non-reaper processes initially. Also the code with removing CLONE_NEWPID from clone_flags and adding the same flag to rsti(item)->clone_flags is super strange because I don't see any other place where we later can use rsti(item)->clone_flags. III) Also don't print differen flags in "Forking task with ..." from which we actually use in clone. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2020-10-27 18:26:35 +03:00
(ca.clone_flags &
~(CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWCGROUP | CLONE_NEWTIME)) | SIGCHLD,
&ca);
}
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("Can't fork for %d", pid);
if (errno == EEXIST)
set_cr_errno(EEXIST);
goto err_unlock;
}
if (item == root_item) {
item->pid->real = ret;
pr_debug("PID: real %d virt %d\n",
item->pid->real, vpid(item));
}
err_unlock:
cr-restore: make CLONE_NEWPID flag in clone_flags more consistent I) Let's make CLONE_NEWPID in rsti(item)->clone_flags always only mean that we need to clone with CLONE_NEWPID to create this task. Only pidns reaper would have this flag because only they can be restored via clone with CLONE_NEWPID flag. If we have non pidns reaper root task but its pidns is different from criu this can be only restored into external pidns. II) Let's remove clone_flags variable from fork_with_pid as it does not actually needed now: clone_flags was introduced to be able to restore into external pidns rsti(item)->clone_flags is determined in prepare_pstree_kobj_ids and before (I) it means 1) parent has different namespace from item or 2) item is root task and criu has different namespace from it. We don't support nested pid namespaces so (1) is always false. And for (2) we have two cases a) pid == INIT_PID - when it is not possible to restore into external pidns b) pid != INIT_PID - when it is only possible to restore into external pidns. For (b) we previousely had CLONE_NEWPID flag in rsti(item)->clone_flags and to workaround it we've added this extra clone_flags variable, but I think it is not needed because we can simply remove CLONE_NEWPID from non-reaper processes initially. Also the code with removing CLONE_NEWPID from clone_flags and adding the same flag to rsti(item)->clone_flags is super strange because I don't see any other place where we later can use rsti(item)->clone_flags. III) Also don't print differen flags in "Forking task with ..." from which we actually use in clone. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2020-10-27 18:26:35 +03:00
if (!(ca.clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID))
unlock_last_pid();
if (ca.core)
core_entry__free_unpacked(ca.core, NULL);
return ret;
}
/* Returns 0 if restore can be continued */
static int sigchld_process(int status, pid_t pid)
{
int sig;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
pr_err("%d exited, status=%d\n", pid, WEXITSTATUS(status));
return -1;
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
sig = WTERMSIG(status);
pr_err("%d killed by signal %d: %s\n", pid, sig, strsignal(sig));
return -1;
} else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
sig = WSTOPSIG(status);
/* The root task is ptraced. Allow it to handle SIGCHLD */
if (sig == SIGCHLD && !current) {
if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, SIGCHLD)) {
pr_perror("Unable to resume %d", pid);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
pr_err("%d stopped by signal %d: %s\n", pid, sig, strsignal(sig));
return -1;
} else if (WIFCONTINUED(status)) {
pr_err("%d unexpectedly continued\n", pid);
return -1;
}
pr_err("wait for %d resulted in %x status\n", pid, status);
return -1;
}
static void sigchld_handler(int signal, siginfo_t *siginfo, void *data)
{
while (1) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG);
if (pid <= 0)
return;
if (sigchld_process(status, pid) < 0)
goto err_abort;
}
err_abort:
futex_abort_and_wake(&task_entries->nr_in_progress);
}
static int criu_signals_setup(void)
{
int ret;
struct sigaction act;
sigset_t blockmask;
ret = sigaction(SIGCHLD, NULL, &act);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("sigaction() failed");
return -1;
}
act.sa_flags |= SA_NOCLDSTOP | SA_SIGINFO | SA_RESTART;
act.sa_sigaction = sigchld_handler;
sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
sigaddset(&act.sa_mask, SIGCHLD);
ret = sigaction(SIGCHLD, &act, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("sigaction() failed");
return -1;
}
/*
* The block mask will be restored in sigreturn.
*
* TODO: This code should be removed, when a freezer will be added.
*/
sigfillset(&blockmask);
sigdelset(&blockmask, SIGCHLD);
/*
* Here we use SIG_SETMASK instead of SIG_BLOCK to avoid the case where
* we've been forked from a parent who had blocked SIGCHLD. If SIGCHLD
* is blocked when a task dies (e.g. if the task fails to restore
* somehow), we hang because our SIGCHLD handler is never run. Since we
* depend on SIGCHLD being unblocked, let's set the mask explicitly.
*/
ret = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &blockmask, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("Can't block signals");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void restore_sid(void)
{
pid_t sid;
/*
* SID can only be reset to pid or inherited from parent.
* Thus we restore it right here to let our kids inherit
* one in case they need it.
*
* PGIDs are restored late when all tasks are forked and
* we can call setpgid() on custom values.
*/
if (vpid(current) == current->sid) {
pr_info("Restoring %d to %d sid\n", vpid(current), current->sid);
sid = setsid();
if (sid != current->sid) {
pr_perror("Can't restore sid (%d)", sid);
exit(1);
}
} else {
sid = getsid(0);
if (sid != current->sid) {
/* Skip the root task if it's not init */
if (current == root_item && vpid(root_item) != INIT_PID)
return;
pr_err("Requested sid %d doesn't match inherited %d\n",
current->sid, sid);
exit(1);
}
}
}
static void restore_pgid(void)
{
/*
* Unlike sessions, process groups (a.k.a. pgids) can be joined
* by any task, provided the task with pid == pgid (group leader)
* exists. Thus, in order to restore pgid we must make sure that
* group leader was born and created the group, then join one.
*
* We do this _before_ finishing the forking stage to make sure
* helpers are still with us.
*/
pid_t pgid, my_pgid = current->pgid;
pr_info("Restoring %d to %d pgid\n", vpid(current), my_pgid);
pgid = getpgrp();
if (my_pgid == pgid)
return;
if (my_pgid != vpid(current)) {
struct pstree_item *leader;
/*
* Wait for leader to become such.
* Missing leader means we're going to crtools
* group (-j option).
*/
leader = rsti(current)->pgrp_leader;
if (leader) {
BUG_ON(my_pgid != vpid(leader));
futex_wait_until(&rsti(leader)->pgrp_set, 1);
}
}
pr_info("\twill call setpgid, mine pgid is %d\n", pgid);
if (setpgid(0, my_pgid) != 0) {
pr_perror("Can't restore pgid (%d/%d->%d)", vpid(current), pgid, current->pgid);
exit(1);
}
if (my_pgid == vpid(current))
futex_set_and_wake(&rsti(current)->pgrp_set, 1);
}
static int __legacy_mount_proc(void)
{
char proc_mountpoint[] = "/tmp/crtools-proc.XXXXXX";
int fd;
if (mkdtemp(proc_mountpoint) == NULL) {
pr_perror("mkdtemp failed %s", proc_mountpoint);
return -1;
}
pr_info("Mount procfs in %s\n", proc_mountpoint);
if (mount("proc", proc_mountpoint, "proc", MS_MGC_VAL | MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV, NULL)) {
pr_perror("mount failed");
if (rmdir(proc_mountpoint))
pr_perror("Unable to remove %s", proc_mountpoint);
return -1;
}
fd = open_detach_mount(proc_mountpoint);
return fd;
}
static int mount_proc(void)
{
int fd, ret;
if (root_ns_mask == 0)
fd = ret = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY);
else {
if (kdat.has_fsopen)
fd = ret = mount_detached_fs("proc");
else
fd = ret = __legacy_mount_proc();
}
if (fd >= 0) {
ret = set_proc_fd(fd);
close(fd);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Tasks cannot change sid (session id) arbitrary, but can either
* inherit one from ancestor, or create a new one with id equal to
* their pid. Thus sid-s restore is tied with children creation.
*/
static int create_children_and_session(void)
{
int ret;
struct pstree_item *child;
pr_info("Restoring children in alien sessions:\n");
list_for_each_entry(child, &current->children, sibling) {
if (!restore_before_setsid(child))
continue;
BUG_ON(child->born_sid != -1 && getsid(0) != child->born_sid);
ret = fork_with_pid(child);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (current->parent)
restore_sid();
pr_info("Restoring children in our session:\n");
list_for_each_entry(child, &current->children, sibling) {
if (restore_before_setsid(child))
continue;
ret = fork_with_pid(child);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int restore_task_with_children(void *_arg)
{
struct cr_clone_arg *ca = _arg;
pid_t pid;
int ret;
current = ca->item;
if (current != root_item) {
char buf[12];
int fd;
/* Determine PID in CRIU's namespace */
fd = get_service_fd(CR_PROC_FD_OFF);
if (fd < 0)
goto err;
ret = readlinkat(fd, "self", buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_perror("Unable to read the /proc/self link");
goto err;
}
buf[ret] = '\0';
current->pid->real = atoi(buf);
pr_debug("PID: real %d virt %d\n",
current->pid->real, vpid(current));
}
pid = getpid();
if (vpid(current) != pid) {
pr_err("Pid %d do not match expected %d\n", pid, vpid(current));
set_task_cr_err(EEXIST);
goto err;
}
if (log_init_by_pid(vpid(current)))
return -1;
if (current->parent == NULL) {
/*
* The root task has to be in its namespaces before executing
* ACT_SETUP_NS scripts, so the root netns has to be created here
*/
if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWNET) {
struct ns_id *ns = net_get_root_ns();
if (ns->ext_key)
ret = net_set_ext(ns);
else
ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);
if (ret) {
pr_perror("Can't unshare net-namespace");
goto err;
}
}
if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWTIME) {
if (prepare_timens(current->ids->time_ns_id))
goto err;
} else if (kdat.has_timens) {
if (prepare_timens(0))
goto err;
}
/* Wait prepare_userns */
if (restore_finish_ns_stage(CR_STATE_ROOT_TASK, CR_STATE_PREPARE_NAMESPACES) < 0)
goto err;
}
if (needs_prep_creds(current) && (prepare_userns_creds()))
goto err;
/*
* Call this _before_ forking to optimize cgroups
* restore -- if all tasks live in one set of cgroups
* we will only move the root one there, others will
* just have it inherited.
*/
if (prepare_task_cgroup(current) < 0)
goto err;
/* Restore root task */
if (current->parent == NULL) {
if (join_namespaces()) {
pr_perror("Join namespaces failed");
goto err;
}
pr_info("Calling restore_sid() for init\n");
restore_sid();
/*
* We need non /proc proc mount for restoring pid and mount
* namespaces and do not care for the rest of the cases.
* Thus -- mount proc at custom location for any new namespace
*/
if (mount_proc())
goto err;
if (!files_collected() && collect_image(&tty_cinfo))
goto err;
if (collect_images(before_ns_cinfos, ARRAY_SIZE(before_ns_cinfos)))
goto err;
if (prepare_namespace(current, ca->clone_flags))
goto err;
if (restore_finish_ns_stage(CR_STATE_PREPARE_NAMESPACES, CR_STATE_FORKING) < 0)
mount: restore mounts in the root mount namespace Currently all mounts are restored in a one mount namespace, then this namespace is cloned to restore other mount namespaces and we need another copy of this namespace to clean link remap files. Let's define terms: A - the root mount namespace B - the mount namespace where link remap files are destroyed Currently we restore all mounts in the B namespace and then clone it into the A namespace. But it doesn't work in a case, when we have to open file descriptores to restore mounts (e g to restore bind-mount pty slaves), because a file descriptor has to be opened from a specified mount (which is one of restore mount namespaces). This patch reworks code so, that all mounts is restored in the A mount namespace and then the B mount namespace is created. In this case we can open files from the root mount namespace (A). $ ./zdtm.py run -t zdtm/static/pty-console --iter 5 ====================== Run zdtm/static/pty-console in ns ======================= Start test Test is SUID ./pty-console --pidfile=pty-console.pid --outfile=pty-console.out Run criu dump Run criu restore Run criu dump =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/pty-console/36/2/dump.log ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ (00.106521) Error (criu/files-reg.c:1132): Can't lookup mount=563 for fd=4 path=/ptmx (00.106585) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1325): Dump files (pid: 70) failed with -1 (00.129041) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1674): Dumping FAILED. ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2017-02-22 09:39:45 +03:00
goto err;
if (root_prepare_shared())
goto err;
if (populate_root_fd_off())
goto err;
}
if (setup_newborn_fds(current))
goto err;
if (restore_task_mnt_ns(current))
goto err;
if (prepare_mappings(current))
goto err;
if (prepare_sigactions(ca->core) < 0)
goto err;
if (fault_injected(FI_RESTORE_ROOT_ONLY)) {
pr_info("fault: Restore root task failure!\n");
kill(getpid(), SIGKILL);
}
if (open_transport_socket())
goto err;
timing_start(TIME_FORK);
if (create_children_and_session())
goto err;
timing_stop(TIME_FORK);
if (populate_pid_proc())
goto err;
sfds_protected = true;
if (unmap_guard_pages(current))
goto err;
restore_pgid();
if (current->parent == NULL) {
/*
* Wait when all tasks passed the CR_STATE_FORKING stage.
* The stage was started by criu, but now it waits for
* the CR_STATE_RESTORE to finish. See comment near the
* CR_STATE_FORKING macro for details.
*
* It means that all tasks entered into their namespaces.
*/
if (restore_wait_other_tasks())
goto err;
fini_restore_mntns();
__restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_RESTORE);
} else {
if (restore_finish_stage(task_entries, CR_STATE_FORKING) < 0)
goto err;
}
if (restore_one_task(vpid(current), ca->core))
goto err;
return 0;
err:
if (current->parent == NULL)
futex_abort_and_wake(&task_entries->nr_in_progress);
exit(1);
}
static int attach_to_tasks(bool root_seized)
{
struct pstree_item *item;
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
int status, i;
if (!task_alive(item))
continue;
if (item->nr_threads == 1) {
item->threads[0].real = item->pid->real;
} else {
if (parse_threads(item->pid->real, &item->threads, &item->nr_threads))
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < item->nr_threads; i++) {
pid_t pid = item->threads[i].real;
if (item != root_item || !root_seized || i != 0) {
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, pid, 0, 0)) {
pr_perror("Can't attach to %d", pid);
return -1;
}
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, pid, 0, 0)) {
pr_perror("Can't interrupt the %d task", pid);
return -1;
}
if (wait4(pid, &status, __WALL, NULL) != pid) {
pr_perror("waitpid(%d) failed", pid);
return -1;
}
/*
* Suspend seccomp if necessary. We need to do this because
* although seccomp is restored at the very end of the
* restorer blob (and the final sigreturn is ok), here we're
* doing an munmap in the process, which may be blocked by
* seccomp and cause the task to be killed.
*/
if (rsti(item)->has_seccomp && ptrace_suspend_seccomp(pid) < 0)
pr_err("failed to suspend seccomp, restore will probably fail...\n");
if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, NULL) ) {
pr_perror("Unable to resume %d", pid);
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
static int catch_tasks(bool root_seized, enum trace_flags *flag)
{
struct pstree_item *item;
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
int status, i, ret;
if (!task_alive(item))
continue;
if (item->nr_threads == 1) {
item->threads[0].real = item->pid->real;
} else {
if (parse_threads(item->pid->real, &item->threads, &item->nr_threads))
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < item->nr_threads; i++) {
pid_t pid = item->threads[i].real;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, pid, 0, 0)) {
pr_perror("Can't interrupt the %d task", pid);
return -1;
}
if (wait4(pid, &status, __WALL, NULL) != pid) {
pr_perror("waitpid(%d) failed", pid);
return -1;
}
ret = compel_stop_pie(pid, rsti(item)->breakpoint,
flag, fault_injected(FI_NO_BREAKPOINTS));
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int clear_breakpoints(void)
{
struct pstree_item *item;
int ret = 0, i;
if (fault_injected(FI_NO_BREAKPOINTS))
return 0;
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
if (!task_alive(item))
continue;
for (i = 0; i < item->nr_threads; i++)
ret |= ptrace_flush_breakpoints(item->threads[i].real);
}
return ret;
}
static void finalize_restore(void)
{
struct pstree_item *item;
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
pid_t pid = item->pid->real;
struct parasite_ctl *ctl;
unsigned long restorer_addr;
if (!task_alive(item))
continue;
/* Unmap the restorer blob */
ctl = compel_prepare_noctx(pid);
if (ctl == NULL)
continue;
restorer_addr = (unsigned long)rsti(item)->munmap_restorer;
if (compel_unmap(ctl, restorer_addr))
pr_err("Failed to unmap restorer from %d\n", pid);
xfree(ctl);
if ((item->pid->state == TASK_STOPPED) ||
(opts.final_state == TASK_STOPPED))
kill(item->pid->real, SIGSTOP);
}
}
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
static int finalize_restore_detach(void)
{
struct pstree_item *item;
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
pid_t pid;
int i;
if (!task_alive(item))
continue;
for (i = 0; i < item->nr_threads; i++) {
pid = item->threads[i].real;
if (pid < 0) {
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
pr_err("pstree item has unvalid pid %d\n", pid);
continue;
}
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
if (arch_set_thread_regs_nosigrt(&item->threads[i])) {
pr_perror("Restoring regs for %d failed", pid);
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
return -1;
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, NULL, 0)) {
pr_perror("Unable to detach %d", pid);
return -1;
}
}
}
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
return 0;
}
static void ignore_kids(void)
{
struct sigaction sa = { .sa_handler = SIG_DFL };
if (sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL) < 0)
pr_perror("Restoring CHLD sigaction failed");
}
static unsigned int saved_loginuid;
static int prepare_userns_hook(void)
{
int ret;
if (kdat.luid != LUID_FULL)
return 0;
/*
* Save old loginuid and set it to INVALID_UID:
* this value means that loginuid is unset and it will be inherited.
* After you set some value to /proc/<>/loginuid it can't be changed
* inside container due to permissions.
* But you still can set this value if it was unset.
*/
saved_loginuid = parse_pid_loginuid(getpid(), &ret, false);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
if (prepare_loginuid(INVALID_UID) < 0) {
pr_err("Setting loginuid for CT init task failed, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL?\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void restore_origin_ns_hook(void)
{
if (kdat.luid != LUID_FULL)
return;
/* not critical: it does not affect CT in any way */
if (prepare_loginuid(saved_loginuid) < 0)
pr_err("Restore original /proc/self/loginuid failed\n");
}
static int write_restored_pid(void)
{
int pid;
if (!opts.pidfile)
return 0;
pid = root_item->pid->real;
if (write_pidfile(pid) < 0) {
pr_perror("Can't write pidfile");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void reap_zombies(void)
{
while (1) {
pid_t pid = wait(NULL);
if (pid == -1) {
if (errno != ECHILD)
pr_perror("Error while waiting for pids");
return;
}
}
}
static int restore_root_task(struct pstree_item *init)
{
enum trace_flags flag = TRACE_ALL;
int ret, fd, mnt_ns_fd = -1;
int root_seized = 0;
struct pstree_item *item;
ret = run_scripts(ACT_PRE_RESTORE);
if (ret != 0) {
pr_err("Aborting restore due to pre-restore script ret code %d\n", ret);
return -1;
}
fd = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
pr_perror("Unable to open /proc");
return -1;
}
ret = install_service_fd(CR_PROC_FD_OFF, fd);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
/*
* FIXME -- currently we assume that all the tasks live
* in the same set of namespaces. This is done to debug
* the ns contents dumping/restoring. Need to revisit
* this later.
*/
if (prepare_userns_hook())
return -1;
if (prepare_namespace_before_tasks())
return -1;
if (vpid(init) == INIT_PID) {
if (!(root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWPID)) {
pr_err("This process tree can only be restored "
"in a new pid namespace.\n"
"criu should be re-executed with the "
"\"--namespace pid\" option.\n");
return -1;
}
} else if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWPID) {
struct ns_id *ns;
/*
* Restoring into an existing PID namespace. This disables
* the check to require a PID 1 when restoring a process
* which used to be in a PID namespace.
*/
ns = lookup_ns_by_id(init->ids->pid_ns_id, &pid_ns_desc);
if (!ns || !ns->ext_key) {
pr_err("Can't restore pid namespace without the process init\n");
return -1;
}
}
__restore_switch_stage_nw(CR_STATE_ROOT_TASK);
ret = fork_with_pid(init);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
restore_origin_ns_hook();
if (rsti(init)->clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) {
struct sigaction act;
root_seized = 1;
/*
* Root task will be our sibling. This means, that
* we will not notice when (if) it dies in SIGCHLD
* handler, but we should. To do this -- attach to
* the guy with ptrace (below) and (!) make the kernel
* deliver us the signal when it will get stopped.
* It will in case of e.g. segfault before handling
* the signal.
*/
sigaction(SIGCHLD, NULL, &act);
act.sa_flags &= ~SA_NOCLDSTOP;
sigaction(SIGCHLD, &act, NULL);
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, init->pid->real, 0, 0)) {
pr_perror("Can't attach to init");
goto out_kill;
}
}
if (!root_ns_mask)
goto skip_ns_bouncing;
/*
* uid_map and gid_map must be filled from a parent user namespace.
* prepare_userns_creds() must be called after filling mappings.
*/
if ((root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWUSER) && prepare_userns(init))
goto out_kill;
pr_info("Wait until namespaces are created\n");
ret = restore_wait_inprogress_tasks();
if (ret)
goto out_kill;
mount: restore mounts in the root mount namespace Currently all mounts are restored in a one mount namespace, then this namespace is cloned to restore other mount namespaces and we need another copy of this namespace to clean link remap files. Let's define terms: A - the root mount namespace B - the mount namespace where link remap files are destroyed Currently we restore all mounts in the B namespace and then clone it into the A namespace. But it doesn't work in a case, when we have to open file descriptores to restore mounts (e g to restore bind-mount pty slaves), because a file descriptor has to be opened from a specified mount (which is one of restore mount namespaces). This patch reworks code so, that all mounts is restored in the A mount namespace and then the B mount namespace is created. In this case we can open files from the root mount namespace (A). $ ./zdtm.py run -t zdtm/static/pty-console --iter 5 ====================== Run zdtm/static/pty-console in ns ======================= Start test Test is SUID ./pty-console --pidfile=pty-console.pid --outfile=pty-console.out Run criu dump Run criu restore Run criu dump =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/pty-console/36/2/dump.log ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ (00.106521) Error (criu/files-reg.c:1132): Can't lookup mount=563 for fd=4 path=/ptmx (00.106585) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1325): Dump files (pid: 70) failed with -1 (00.129041) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1674): Dumping FAILED. ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2017-02-22 09:39:45 +03:00
ret = run_scripts(ACT_SETUP_NS);
if (ret)
goto out_kill;
ret = restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_PREPARE_NAMESPACES);
mount: restore mounts in the root mount namespace Currently all mounts are restored in a one mount namespace, then this namespace is cloned to restore other mount namespaces and we need another copy of this namespace to clean link remap files. Let's define terms: A - the root mount namespace B - the mount namespace where link remap files are destroyed Currently we restore all mounts in the B namespace and then clone it into the A namespace. But it doesn't work in a case, when we have to open file descriptores to restore mounts (e g to restore bind-mount pty slaves), because a file descriptor has to be opened from a specified mount (which is one of restore mount namespaces). This patch reworks code so, that all mounts is restored in the A mount namespace and then the B mount namespace is created. In this case we can open files from the root mount namespace (A). $ ./zdtm.py run -t zdtm/static/pty-console --iter 5 ====================== Run zdtm/static/pty-console in ns ======================= Start test Test is SUID ./pty-console --pidfile=pty-console.pid --outfile=pty-console.out Run criu dump Run criu restore Run criu dump =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/pty-console/36/2/dump.log ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ (00.106521) Error (criu/files-reg.c:1132): Can't lookup mount=563 for fd=4 path=/ptmx (00.106585) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1325): Dump files (pid: 70) failed with -1 (00.129041) Error (criu/cr-dump.c:1674): Dumping FAILED. ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2017-02-22 09:39:45 +03:00
if (ret)
goto out_kill;
if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWNS) {
mnt_ns_fd = open_proc(init->pid->real, "ns/mnt");
if (mnt_ns_fd < 0)
goto out_kill;
}
if (root_ns_mask & opts.empty_ns & CLONE_NEWNET) {
/*
* Local TCP connections were locked by network_lock_internal()
* on dump and normally should have been C/R-ed by respectively
* dump_iptables() and restore_iptables() in net.c. However in
* the '--empty-ns net' mode no iptables C/R is done and we
* need to return these rules by hands.
*/
ret = network_lock_internal();
if (ret)
goto out_kill;
}
ret = run_scripts(ACT_POST_SETUP_NS);
if (ret)
goto out_kill;
__restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_FORKING);
skip_ns_bouncing:
ret = restore_wait_inprogress_tasks();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
ret = apply_memfd_seals();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
/*
* Zombies die after CR_STATE_RESTORE which is switched
* by root task, not by us. See comment before CR_STATE_FORKING
* in the header for details.
*/
for_each_pstree_item(item) {
if (item->pid->state == TASK_DEAD)
task_entries->nr_threads--;
}
ret = restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_RESTORE_SIGCHLD);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
usernsd: The way to restore priviledged stuff in userns We have collected a good set of calls that cannot be done inside user namespaces, but we need to [1]. Some of them has already being addressed, like prctl mm bits restore, but some are not. I'm pretty sceptical about the ability to relax the security checks on quite a lot of them (e.g. open-by-handle is indeed a very dangerous operation if allowed to unpriviledged user), so we need some way to call those things even in user namespaces. The good news about it its that all the calls I've found operate on file descriptors this way or another. So if we had a process, that lived outside of user namespace, we could ask one to do the high priority operation we need and exchange the affected file descriptor via unix socket. So the usernsd is the one doing exactly this. It starts before we create the user namespace and accepts requests via unix socket. Clients (the processes we restore) send him the functions they want to call, the descriptor they want to operate on and the arguments blob. Optionally, they can request some file descriptor back after the call. In non usernamespace case the daemon is not started and the calls are done right in the requestor's process environment. In the next patch there's an example of how to use this daemon to do the priviledged SO_SNDBUFFORCE/_RCVBUFFORCE sockopt on a socket. [1] http://criu.org/UserNamespace Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2015-02-13 16:05:24 +04:00
ret = stop_usernsd();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
ret = move_veth_to_bridge();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
ret = prepare_cgroup_properties();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_kill;
if (fault_injected(FI_POST_RESTORE))
goto out_kill;
ret = run_scripts(ACT_POST_RESTORE);
if (ret != 0) {
pr_err("Aborting restore due to post-restore script ret code %d\n", ret);
timing_stop(TIME_RESTORE);
write_stats(RESTORE_STATS);
goto out_kill;
}
/*
* There is no need to call try_clean_remaps() after this point,
* as restore went OK and all ghosts were removed by the openers.
*/
if (depopulate_roots_yard(mnt_ns_fd, false))
goto out_kill;
close_safe(&mnt_ns_fd);
if (write_restored_pid())
goto out_kill;
/* Unlock network before disabling repair mode on sockets */
network_unlock();
/*
* Stop getting sigchld, after we resume the tasks they
* may start to exit poking criu in vain.
*/
ignore_kids();
/*
* -------------------------------------------------------------
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
* Network is unlocked. If something fails below - we lose data
* or a connection.
*/
attach_to_tasks(root_seized);
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
if (restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_RESTORE_CREDS))
goto out_kill_network_unlocked;
timing_stop(TIME_RESTORE);
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
if (catch_tasks(root_seized, &flag)) {
pr_err("Can't catch all tasks\n");
goto out_kill_network_unlocked;
}
if (lazy_pages_finish_restore())
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
goto out_kill_network_unlocked;
__restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_COMPLETE);
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
ret = compel_stop_on_syscall(task_entries->nr_threads,
__NR(rt_sigreturn, 0), __NR(rt_sigreturn, 1), flag);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Can't stop all tasks on rt_sigreturn\n");
goto out_kill_network_unlocked;
}
if (clear_breakpoints())
pr_err("Unable to flush breakpoints\n");
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
finalize_restore();
ret = run_scripts(ACT_PRE_RESUME);
if (ret)
pr_err("Pre-resume script ret code %d\n", ret);
if (restore_freezer_state())
pr_err("Unable to restore freezer state\n");
/* Detaches from processes and they continue run through sigreturn. */
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
if (finalize_restore_detach())
goto out_kill_network_unlocked;
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
pr_info("Restore finished successfully. Tasks resumed.\n");
write_stats(RESTORE_STATS);
/* This has the effect of dismissing the image streamer */
close_image_dir();
ret = run_scripts(ACT_POST_RESUME);
if (ret != 0)
pr_err("Post-resume script ret code %d\n", ret);
if (!opts.restore_detach && !opts.exec_cmd) {
reap_zombies();
}
return 0;
criu: Kill tasks even when the network is unlocked Currently if anything fails after network has been unlocked tasks aren't killed. Which doesn't work anyway: any stage sets `ret` and nothing later gets called. Which means the tasks aren't resumed properly. Furthermore, functions like catch_tasks() and compel_stop_on_syscall() return failure on the first error. Let's do the cleanup even when the network is unlocked. If we want to keep the mess and ignore failures - a cli option should be introduced for that (and existing code should be reworked with decisions what is critical and what can be ignored). Move "Restore finished successfully" message accordingly where everything is evidently good. While at here, any late failure will result not only in cleanup but in criu returning error code. Which in result makes tests to fail in such case: > ======================= Run zdtm/static/inotify04 in ns ======================== > Start test > ./inotify04 --pidfile=inotify04.pid --outfile=inotify04.out --dirname=inotify04.test > Run criu dump > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/dump.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.119763) fsnotify: openable (inode match) as zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile > (00.119766) fsnotify: Dumping /zdtm/static/inotify04.test/inotify-testfile as path for handle > (00.119769) fsnotify: id 0x00000b flags 0x000800 > (00.119787) 88 fdinfo 5: pos: 0 flags: 4000/0 > (00.119796) Warn (criu/fsnotify.c:336): fsnotify: The 0x00000c inotify events will be dropped > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > Run criu restore > =[log]=> dump/zdtm/static/inotify04/84/1/restore.log > ------------------------ grep Error ------------------------ > (00.391582) 123 was stopped > (00.391667) 106 was trapped > (00.391674) 106 (native) is going to execute the syscall 11, required is 11 > (00.391697) 106 was stopped > (00.391720) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1439): Task 123 is in unexpected state: b7f > (00.391736) Error (compel/src/lib/infect.c:1447): Task stopped with 11: Segmentation fault > ------------------------ ERROR OVER ------------------------ > 5: Old maps lost: set([]) > 5: New maps appeared: set([u'10000-1a000 rwxp', u'1a000-24000 rw-p']) > ############### Test zdtm/static/inotify04 FAIL at maps compare ################ > Send the 9 signal to 106 > Wait for zdtm/static/inotify04(106) to die for 0.100000 > ======================= Test zdtm/static/inotify04 PASS ======================== Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-11-09 22:20:44 +00:00
out_kill_network_unlocked:
pr_err("Killing processes because of failure on restore.\nThe Network was unlocked so some data or a connection may have been lost.\n");
out_kill:
/*
* The processes can be killed only when all of them have been created,
* otherwise an external processes can be killed.
*/
if (vpid(root_item) == INIT_PID) {
int status;
/* Kill init */
if (root_item->pid->real > 0)
kill(root_item->pid->real, SIGKILL);
if (waitpid(root_item->pid->real, &status, 0) < 0)
pr_warn("Unable to wait %d: %s\n",
root_item->pid->real, strerror(errno));
} else {
struct pstree_item *pi;
for_each_pstree_item(pi)
if (pi->pid->real > 0)
kill(pi->pid->real, SIGKILL);
}
out:
depopulate_roots_yard(mnt_ns_fd, true);
usernsd: The way to restore priviledged stuff in userns We have collected a good set of calls that cannot be done inside user namespaces, but we need to [1]. Some of them has already being addressed, like prctl mm bits restore, but some are not. I'm pretty sceptical about the ability to relax the security checks on quite a lot of them (e.g. open-by-handle is indeed a very dangerous operation if allowed to unpriviledged user), so we need some way to call those things even in user namespaces. The good news about it its that all the calls I've found operate on file descriptors this way or another. So if we had a process, that lived outside of user namespace, we could ask one to do the high priority operation we need and exchange the affected file descriptor via unix socket. So the usernsd is the one doing exactly this. It starts before we create the user namespace and accepts requests via unix socket. Clients (the processes we restore) send him the functions they want to call, the descriptor they want to operate on and the arguments blob. Optionally, they can request some file descriptor back after the call. In non usernamespace case the daemon is not started and the calls are done right in the requestor's process environment. In the next patch there's an example of how to use this daemon to do the priviledged SO_SNDBUFFORCE/_RCVBUFFORCE sockopt on a socket. [1] http://criu.org/UserNamespace Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2015-02-13 16:05:24 +04:00
stop_usernsd();
__restore_switch_stage(CR_STATE_FAIL);
pr_err("Restoring FAILED.\n");
return -1;
}
int prepare_task_entries(void)
{
task_entries_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_SHREMAP);
task_entries = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*task_entries), RM_SHREMAP);
if (!task_entries) {
pr_perror("Can't map shmem");
return -1;
}
task_entries->nr_threads = 0;
task_entries->nr_tasks = 0;
task_entries->nr_helpers = 0;
futex_set(&task_entries->start, CR_STATE_FAIL);
usernsd: The way to restore priviledged stuff in userns We have collected a good set of calls that cannot be done inside user namespaces, but we need to [1]. Some of them has already being addressed, like prctl mm bits restore, but some are not. I'm pretty sceptical about the ability to relax the security checks on quite a lot of them (e.g. open-by-handle is indeed a very dangerous operation if allowed to unpriviledged user), so we need some way to call those things even in user namespaces. The good news about it its that all the calls I've found operate on file descriptors this way or another. So if we had a process, that lived outside of user namespace, we could ask one to do the high priority operation we need and exchange the affected file descriptor via unix socket. So the usernsd is the one doing exactly this. It starts before we create the user namespace and accepts requests via unix socket. Clients (the processes we restore) send him the functions they want to call, the descriptor they want to operate on and the arguments blob. Optionally, they can request some file descriptor back after the call. In non usernamespace case the daemon is not started and the calls are done right in the requestor's process environment. In the next patch there's an example of how to use this daemon to do the priviledged SO_SNDBUFFORCE/_RCVBUFFORCE sockopt on a socket. [1] http://criu.org/UserNamespace Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2015-02-13 16:05:24 +04:00
mutex_init(&task_entries->userns_sync_lock);
mutex_init(&task_entries->last_pid_mutex);
return 0;
}
int prepare_dummy_task_state(struct pstree_item *pi)
{
CoreEntry *core;
if (open_core(vpid(pi), &core))
return -1;
pi->pid->state = core->tc->task_state;
core_entry__free_unpacked(core, NULL);
return 0;
}
int cr_restore_tasks(void)
{
int ret = -1;
if (init_service_fd())
return 1;
plugin: Rework plugins API, v2 Here we define new api to be used in plugins. - Plugin should provide a descriptor with help of CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER macro, or in case if plugin require no init/exit functions -- with CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_DUMMY. - Plugin should define a plugin hook with help of CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_HOOK macro. - Now init/exit functions of plugins takes @stage argument which tells plugin which stage of criu it's been called on dump/restore. For exit it also takes @ret which allows plugin to know if something went wrong and it needs to cleanup own resources. The idea behind is to not limit plugins authors with names of functions they might need to use for particular hook. Such new API deprecates olds plugins structure but to keep backward compatibility we will provide a tiny layer of additional code to support old plugins for at least a couple of release cycles. For example a trivial plugin might look like | #include <sys/types.h> | #include <sys/stat.h> | #include <fcntl.h> | #include <libgen.h> | #include <errno.h> | | #include <sys/socket.h> | #include <linux/un.h> | | #include <stdio.h> | #include <stdlib.h> | #include <string.h> | #include <unistd.h> | | #include "criu-plugin.h" | #include "criu-log.h" | | static int dump_ext_file(int fd, int id) | { | pr_info("dump_ext_file: fd %d id %d\n", fd, id); | return 0; | } | | CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_DUMMY("trivial") | CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_HOOK(CR_PLUGIN_HOOK__DUMP_EXT_FILE, dump_ext_file) Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
2014-02-27 20:58:23 +04:00
if (cr_plugin_init(CR_PLUGIN_STAGE__RESTORE))
return -1;
if (check_img_inventory(/* restore = */ true) < 0)
goto err;
if (init_stats(RESTORE_STATS))
goto err;
if (lsm_check_opts())
goto err;
timing_start(TIME_RESTORE);
if (cpu_init() < 0)
goto err;
if (vdso_init_restore())
goto err;
if (tty_init_restore())
goto err;
if (opts.cpu_cap & CPU_CAP_IMAGE) {
2014-10-01 17:53:50 +04:00
if (cpu_validate_cpuinfo())
goto err;
}
if (prepare_task_entries() < 0)
goto err;
if (prepare_pstree() < 0)
goto err;
if (fdstore_init())
goto err;
if (inherit_fd_move_to_fdstore())
goto err;
if (crtools_prepare_shared() < 0)
goto err;
if (prepare_cgroup())
goto clean_cgroup;
if (criu_signals_setup() < 0)
goto clean_cgroup;
if (prepare_lazy_pages_socket() < 0)
goto clean_cgroup;
ret = restore_root_task(root_item);
clean_cgroup:
fini_cgroup();
err:
plugin: Rework plugins API, v2 Here we define new api to be used in plugins. - Plugin should provide a descriptor with help of CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER macro, or in case if plugin require no init/exit functions -- with CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_DUMMY. - Plugin should define a plugin hook with help of CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_HOOK macro. - Now init/exit functions of plugins takes @stage argument which tells plugin which stage of criu it's been called on dump/restore. For exit it also takes @ret which allows plugin to know if something went wrong and it needs to cleanup own resources. The idea behind is to not limit plugins authors with names of functions they might need to use for particular hook. Such new API deprecates olds plugins structure but to keep backward compatibility we will provide a tiny layer of additional code to support old plugins for at least a couple of release cycles. For example a trivial plugin might look like | #include <sys/types.h> | #include <sys/stat.h> | #include <fcntl.h> | #include <libgen.h> | #include <errno.h> | | #include <sys/socket.h> | #include <linux/un.h> | | #include <stdio.h> | #include <stdlib.h> | #include <string.h> | #include <unistd.h> | | #include "criu-plugin.h" | #include "criu-log.h" | | static int dump_ext_file(int fd, int id) | { | pr_info("dump_ext_file: fd %d id %d\n", fd, id); | return 0; | } | | CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_DUMMY("trivial") | CR_PLUGIN_REGISTER_HOOK(CR_PLUGIN_HOOK__DUMP_EXT_FILE, dump_ext_file) Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
2014-02-27 20:58:23 +04:00
cr_plugin_fini(CR_PLUGIN_STAGE__RESTORE, ret);
return ret;
}
static long restorer_get_vma_hint(struct list_head *tgt_vma_list,
struct list_head *self_vma_list, long vma_len)
{
struct vma_area *t_vma, *s_vma;
long prev_vma_end = 0;
struct vma_area end_vma;
VmaEntry end_e;
end_vma.e = &end_e;
end_e.start = end_e.end = kdat.task_size;
prev_vma_end = kdat.mmap_min_addr;
s_vma = list_first_entry(self_vma_list, struct vma_area, list);
t_vma = list_first_entry(tgt_vma_list, struct vma_area, list);
while (1) {
if (prev_vma_end + vma_len > s_vma->e->start) {
if (s_vma->list.next == self_vma_list) {
s_vma = &end_vma;
continue;
}
if (s_vma == &end_vma)
break;
if (prev_vma_end < s_vma->e->end)
prev_vma_end = s_vma->e->end;
s_vma = vma_next(s_vma);
continue;
}
if (prev_vma_end + vma_len > t_vma->e->start) {
if (t_vma->list.next == tgt_vma_list) {
t_vma = &end_vma;
continue;
}
if (t_vma == &end_vma)
break;
if (prev_vma_end < t_vma->e->end)
prev_vma_end = t_vma->e->end;
t_vma = vma_next(t_vma);
continue;
}
return prev_vma_end;
}
return -1;
}
static inline int timeval_valid(struct timeval *tv)
{
return (tv->tv_sec >= 0) && ((unsigned long)tv->tv_usec < USEC_PER_SEC);
}
static inline int decode_itimer(char *n, ItimerEntry *ie, struct itimerval *val)
{
if (ie->isec == 0 && ie->iusec == 0) {
memzero_p(val);
return 0;
}
val->it_interval.tv_sec = ie->isec;
val->it_interval.tv_usec = ie->iusec;
if (!timeval_valid(&val->it_interval)) {
pr_err("Invalid timer interval\n");
return -1;
}
if (ie->vsec == 0 && ie->vusec == 0) {
/*
* Remaining time was too short. Set it to
* interval to make the timer armed and work.
*/
val->it_value.tv_sec = ie->isec;
val->it_value.tv_usec = ie->iusec;
} else {
val->it_value.tv_sec = ie->vsec;
val->it_value.tv_usec = ie->vusec;
}
if (!timeval_valid(&val->it_value)) {
pr_err("Invalid timer value\n");
return -1;
}
pr_info("Restored %s timer to %ld.%ld -> %ld.%ld\n", n,
val->it_value.tv_sec, val->it_value.tv_usec,
val->it_interval.tv_sec, val->it_interval.tv_usec);
return 0;
}
/*
* Legacy itimers restore from CR_FD_ITIMERS
*/
static int prepare_itimers_from_fd(int pid, struct task_restore_args *args)
{
int ret = -1;
struct cr_img *img;
ItimerEntry *ie;
if (!deprecated_ok("Itimers"))
return -1;
img = open_image(CR_FD_ITIMERS, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -1;
ret = pb_read_one(img, &ie, PB_ITIMER);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = decode_itimer("real", ie, &args->itimers[0]);
itimer_entry__free_unpacked(ie, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = pb_read_one(img, &ie, PB_ITIMER);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = decode_itimer("virt", ie, &args->itimers[1]);
itimer_entry__free_unpacked(ie, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = pb_read_one(img, &ie, PB_ITIMER);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = decode_itimer("prof", ie, &args->itimers[2]);
itimer_entry__free_unpacked(ie, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
out:
close_image(img);
return ret;
}
static int prepare_itimers(int pid, struct task_restore_args *args, CoreEntry *core)
{
int ret = 0;
TaskTimersEntry *tte = core->tc->timers;
if (!tte)
return prepare_itimers_from_fd(pid, args);
ret |= decode_itimer("real", tte->real, &args->itimers[0]);
ret |= decode_itimer("virt", tte->virt, &args->itimers[1]);
ret |= decode_itimer("prof", tte->prof, &args->itimers[2]);
return ret;
}
static inline int timespec_valid(struct timespec *ts)
{
return (ts->tv_sec >= 0) && ((unsigned long)ts->tv_nsec < NSEC_PER_SEC);
}
static inline int decode_posix_timer(PosixTimerEntry *pte,
struct restore_posix_timer *pt)
{
pt->val.it_interval.tv_sec = pte->isec;
pt->val.it_interval.tv_nsec = pte->insec;
if (!timespec_valid(&pt->val.it_interval)) {
pr_err("Invalid timer interval(posix)\n");
return -1;
}
if (pte->vsec == 0 && pte->vnsec == 0) {
/*
* Remaining time was too short. Set it to
* interval to make the timer armed and work.
*/
pt->val.it_value.tv_sec = pte->isec;
pt->val.it_value.tv_nsec = pte->insec;
} else {
pt->val.it_value.tv_sec = pte->vsec;
pt->val.it_value.tv_nsec = pte->vnsec;
}
if (!timespec_valid(&pt->val.it_value)) {
pr_err("Invalid timer value(posix)\n");
return -1;
}
pt->spt.it_id = pte->it_id;
pt->spt.clock_id = pte->clock_id;
pt->spt.si_signo = pte->si_signo;
pt->spt.it_sigev_notify = pte->it_sigev_notify;
pt->spt.sival_ptr = decode_pointer(pte->sival_ptr);
pt->spt.notify_thread_id = pte->notify_thread_id;
pt->overrun = pte->overrun;
return 0;
}
static int cmp_posix_timer_proc_id(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
return ((struct restore_posix_timer *)p1)->spt.it_id - ((struct restore_posix_timer *)p2)->spt.it_id;
}
static void sort_posix_timers(struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
void *tmem;
/*
* This is required for restorer's create_posix_timers(),
* it will probe them one-by-one for the desired ID, since
* kernel doesn't provide another API for timer creation
* with given ID.
*/
if (ta->posix_timers_n > 0) {
tmem = rst_mem_remap_ptr((unsigned long)ta->posix_timers, RM_PRIVATE);
qsort(tmem, ta->posix_timers_n,
sizeof(struct restore_posix_timer),
cmp_posix_timer_proc_id);
}
}
/*
* Legacy posix timers restoration from CR_FD_POSIX_TIMERS
*/
static int prepare_posix_timers_from_fd(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
struct cr_img *img;
int ret = -1;
struct restore_posix_timer *t;
if (!deprecated_ok("Posix timers"))
return -1;
img = open_image(CR_FD_POSIX_TIMERS, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -1;
ta->posix_timers_n = 0;
while (1) {
PosixTimerEntry *pte;
ret = pb_read_one_eof(img, &pte, PB_POSIX_TIMER);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
t = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(struct restore_posix_timer), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!t)
break;
ret = decode_posix_timer(pte, t);
if (ret < 0)
break;
posix_timer_entry__free_unpacked(pte, NULL);
ta->posix_timers_n++;
}
close_image(img);
if (!ret)
sort_posix_timers(ta);
return ret;
}
static int prepare_posix_timers(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta, CoreEntry *core)
{
int i, ret = -1;
TaskTimersEntry *tte = core->tc->timers;
struct restore_posix_timer *t;
ta->posix_timers = (struct restore_posix_timer *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
if (!tte)
return prepare_posix_timers_from_fd(pid, ta);
ta->posix_timers_n = tte->n_posix;
for (i = 0; i < ta->posix_timers_n; i++) {
t = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(struct restore_posix_timer), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!t)
goto out;
if (decode_posix_timer(tte->posix[i], t))
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
sort_posix_timers(ta);
out:
return ret;
}
static inline int verify_cap_size(CredsEntry *ce)
{
return ((ce->n_cap_inh == CR_CAP_SIZE) && (ce->n_cap_eff == CR_CAP_SIZE) &&
(ce->n_cap_prm == CR_CAP_SIZE) && (ce->n_cap_bnd == CR_CAP_SIZE));
}
static int prepare_mm(pid_t pid, struct task_restore_args *args)
{
int exe_fd, i, ret = -1;
MmEntry *mm = rsti(current)->mm;
args->mm = *mm;
args->mm.n_mm_saved_auxv = 0;
args->mm.mm_saved_auxv = NULL;
if (mm->n_mm_saved_auxv > AT_VECTOR_SIZE) {
pr_err("Image corrupted on pid %d\n", pid);
goto out;
}
args->mm_saved_auxv_size = mm->n_mm_saved_auxv*sizeof(auxv_t);
for (i = 0; i < mm->n_mm_saved_auxv; ++i) {
args->mm_saved_auxv[i] = (auxv_t)mm->mm_saved_auxv[i];
}
exe_fd = open_reg_by_id(mm->exe_file_id);
if (exe_fd < 0)
goto out;
args->fd_exe_link = exe_fd;
args->has_thp_enabled = rsti(current)->has_thp_enabled;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
static void *restorer;
static unsigned long restorer_len;
static int prepare_restorer_blob(void)
{
/*
* We map anonymous mapping, not mremap the restorer itself later.
* Otherwise the restorer vma would be tied to criu binary which
* in turn will lead to set-exe-file prctl to fail with EBUSY.
*/
struct parasite_blob_desc pbd;
/*
* We pass native=true, which is then used to set the value of
* pbd.parasite_ip_off. We don't use parasite_ip_off, so the value we
* pass as native argument is not relevant.
*/
restorer_setup_c_header_desc(&pbd, true);
/*
* args_off is the offset where the binary blob with its GOT table
* ends. As we don't do RPC, parasite sections after args_off can be
* ignored. See compel_infect() for a description of the parasite
* memory layout.
*/
restorer_len = round_up(pbd.hdr.args_off, page_size());
restorer = mmap(NULL, restorer_len,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
if (restorer == MAP_FAILED) {
pr_perror("Can't map restorer code");
return -1;
}
memcpy(restorer, pbd.hdr.mem, pbd.hdr.bsize);
return 0;
}
static int remap_restorer_blob(void *addr)
{
struct parasite_blob_desc pbd;
void *mem;
mem = mremap(restorer, restorer_len, restorer_len,
MREMAP_FIXED | MREMAP_MAYMOVE, addr);
if (mem != addr) {
pr_perror("Can't remap restorer blob");
return -1;
}
/*
* Pass native=true, which is then used to set the value of
* pbd.parasite_ip_off. parasite_ip_off is unused in restorer
* as compat (ia32) tasks are restored from native (x86_64)
* mode, so the value we pass as native argument is not relevant.
*/
restorer_setup_c_header_desc(&pbd, true);
compel_relocs_apply(addr, addr, &pbd);
return 0;
}
static int validate_sched_parm(struct rst_sched_param *sp)
{
if ((sp->nice < -20) || (sp->nice > 19))
return 0;
switch (sp->policy) {
case SCHED_RR:
case SCHED_FIFO:
return ((sp->prio > 0) && (sp->prio < 100));
case SCHED_IDLE:
case SCHED_OTHER:
case SCHED_BATCH:
return sp->prio == 0;
}
return 0;
}
static int prep_sched_info(struct rst_sched_param *sp, ThreadCoreEntry *tc)
{
if (!tc->has_sched_policy) {
sp->policy = SCHED_OTHER;
sp->nice = 0;
return 0;
}
sp->policy = tc->sched_policy;
sp->nice = tc->sched_nice;
sp->prio = tc->sched_prio;
if (!validate_sched_parm(sp)) {
pr_err("Inconsistent sched params received (%d.%d.%d)\n",
sp->policy, sp->nice, sp->prio);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static rlim_t decode_rlim(rlim_t ival)
{
return ival == -1 ? RLIM_INFINITY : ival;
}
/*
* Legacy rlimits restore from CR_FD_RLIMIT
*/
static int prepare_rlimits_from_fd(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta)
{
struct rlimit *r;
int ret;
struct cr_img *img;
if (!deprecated_ok("Rlimits"))
return -1;
/*
* Old image -- read from the file.
*/
img = open_image(CR_FD_RLIMIT, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -1;
ta->rlims_n = 0;
while (1) {
RlimitEntry *re;
ret = pb_read_one_eof(img, &re, PB_RLIMIT);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
r = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*r), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!r) {
pr_err("Can't allocate memory for resource %d\n",
ta->rlims_n);
return -1;
}
r->rlim_cur = decode_rlim(re->cur);
r->rlim_max = decode_rlim(re->max);
if (r->rlim_cur > r->rlim_max) {
pr_err("Can't restore cur > max for %d.%d\n",
pid, ta->rlims_n);
r->rlim_cur = r->rlim_max;
}
rlimit_entry__free_unpacked(re, NULL);
ta->rlims_n++;
}
close_image(img);
return 0;
}
static int prepare_rlimits(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta, CoreEntry *core)
{
int i;
TaskRlimitsEntry *rls = core->tc->rlimits;
struct rlimit64 *r;
ta->rlims = (struct rlimit64 *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
if (!rls)
return prepare_rlimits_from_fd(pid, ta);
for (i = 0; i < rls->n_rlimits; i++) {
r = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*r), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!r) {
pr_err("Can't allocate memory for resource %d\n", i);
return -1;
}
r->rlim_cur = decode_rlim(rls->rlimits[i]->cur);
r->rlim_max = decode_rlim(rls->rlimits[i]->max);
if (r->rlim_cur > r->rlim_max) {
pr_warn("Can't restore cur > max for %d.%d\n", pid, i);
r->rlim_cur = r->rlim_max;
}
}
ta->rlims_n = rls->n_rlimits;
return 0;
}
static int signal_to_mem(SiginfoEntry *sie)
{
siginfo_t *info, *t;
info = (siginfo_t *) sie->siginfo.data;
t = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(siginfo_t), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!t)
return -1;
memcpy(t, info, sizeof(*info));
return 0;
}
static int open_signal_image(int type, pid_t pid, unsigned int *nr)
{
int ret;
struct cr_img *img;
img = open_image(type, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -1;
*nr = 0;
while (1) {
SiginfoEntry *sie;
ret = pb_read_one_eof(img, &sie, PB_SIGINFO);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
if (sie->siginfo.len != sizeof(siginfo_t)) {
pr_err("Unknown image format\n");
ret = -1;
break;
}
ret = signal_to_mem(sie);
if (ret)
break;
(*nr)++;
siginfo_entry__free_unpacked(sie, NULL);
}
close_image(img);
return ret ? : 0;
}
static int prepare_one_signal_queue(SignalQueueEntry *sqe, unsigned int *nr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sqe->n_signals; i++)
if (signal_to_mem(sqe->signals[i]))
return -1;
*nr = sqe->n_signals;
return 0;
}
static unsigned int *siginfo_priv_nr; /* FIXME -- put directly on thread_args */
static int prepare_signals(int pid, struct task_restore_args *ta, CoreEntry *leader_core)
{
int ret = -1, i;
ta->siginfo = (siginfo_t *)rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
siginfo_priv_nr = xmalloc(sizeof(int) * current->nr_threads);
if (siginfo_priv_nr == NULL)
goto out;
/* Prepare shared signals */
if (!leader_core->tc->signals_s)/*backward compatibility*/
ret = open_signal_image(CR_FD_SIGNAL, pid, &ta->siginfo_n);
else
ret = prepare_one_signal_queue(leader_core->tc->signals_s, &ta->siginfo_n);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < current->nr_threads; i++) {
if (!current->core[i]->thread_core->signals_p)/*backward compatibility*/
ret = open_signal_image(CR_FD_PSIGNAL,
current->threads[i].ns[0].virt, &siginfo_priv_nr[i]);
else
ret = prepare_one_signal_queue(current->core[i]->thread_core->signals_p,
&siginfo_priv_nr[i]);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
out:
return ret;
}
extern void __gcov_flush(void) __attribute__((weak));
void __gcov_flush(void) {}
static void rst_reloc_creds(struct thread_restore_args *thread_args,
unsigned long *creds_pos_next)
{
struct thread_creds_args *args;
if (unlikely(!*creds_pos_next))
return;
args = rst_mem_remap_ptr(*creds_pos_next, RM_PRIVATE);
if (args->lsm_profile)
args->lsm_profile = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_lsm_profile_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
if (args->lsm_sockcreate)
args->lsm_sockcreate = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
if (args->groups)
args->groups = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_groups_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
*creds_pos_next = args->mem_pos_next;
thread_args->creds_args = args;
}
static bool groups_match(gid_t* groups, int n_groups)
{
int n, len;
bool ret;
gid_t* gids;
n = getgroups(0, NULL);
if (n == -1) {
pr_perror("Failed to get number of supplementary groups");
return false;
}
if (n != n_groups)
return false;
if (n == 0)
return true;
len = n * sizeof(gid_t);
gids = xmalloc(len);
if (gids == NULL)
return false;
n = getgroups(n, gids);
if (n == -1) {
pr_perror("Failed to get supplementary groups");
ret = false;
} else {
/* getgroups sorts gids, so it is safe to memcmp gid arrays */
ret = !memcmp(gids, groups, len);
}
xfree(gids);
return ret;
}
static struct thread_creds_args *
rst_prep_creds_args(CredsEntry *ce, unsigned long *prev_pos)
{
unsigned long this_pos;
struct thread_creds_args *args;
if (!verify_cap_size(ce)) {
pr_err("Caps size mismatch %d %d %d %d\n",
(int)ce->n_cap_inh, (int)ce->n_cap_eff,
(int)ce->n_cap_prm, (int)ce->n_cap_bnd);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
this_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
args = rst_mem_alloc(sizeof(*args), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!args)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
args->cap_last_cap = kdat.last_cap;
memcpy(&args->creds, ce, sizeof(args->creds));
if (ce->lsm_profile || opts.lsm_supplied) {
char *rendered = NULL, *profile;
profile = ce->lsm_profile;
if (opts.lsm_supplied)
profile = opts.lsm_profile;
if (validate_lsm(profile) < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (profile && render_lsm_profile(profile, &rendered)) {
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (rendered) {
size_t lsm_profile_len;
char *lsm_profile;
args->mem_lsm_profile_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
lsm_profile_len = strlen(rendered);
lsm_profile = rst_mem_alloc(lsm_profile_len + 1, RM_PRIVATE);
if (!lsm_profile) {
xfree(rendered);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
args = rst_mem_remap_ptr(this_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
args->lsm_profile = lsm_profile;
strlcpy(args->lsm_profile, rendered, lsm_profile_len + 1);
xfree(rendered);
}
} else {
args->lsm_profile = NULL;
args->mem_lsm_profile_pos = 0;
}
if (ce->lsm_sockcreate) {
char *rendered = NULL;
char *profile;
profile = ce->lsm_sockcreate;
if (validate_lsm(profile) < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (profile && render_lsm_profile(profile, &rendered)) {
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (rendered) {
size_t lsm_sockcreate_len;
char *lsm_sockcreate;
args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
lsm_sockcreate_len = strlen(rendered);
lsm_sockcreate = rst_mem_alloc(lsm_sockcreate_len + 1, RM_PRIVATE);
if (!lsm_sockcreate) {
xfree(rendered);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
args = rst_mem_remap_ptr(this_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
args->lsm_sockcreate = lsm_sockcreate;
strlcpy(args->lsm_sockcreate, rendered, lsm_sockcreate_len + 1);
xfree(rendered);
}
} else {
args->lsm_sockcreate = NULL;
args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos = 0;
}
/*
* Zap fields which we can't use.
*/
args->creds.cap_inh = NULL;
args->creds.cap_eff = NULL;
args->creds.cap_prm = NULL;
args->creds.cap_bnd = NULL;
args->creds.groups = NULL;
args->creds.lsm_profile = NULL;
memcpy(args->cap_inh, ce->cap_inh, sizeof(args->cap_inh));
memcpy(args->cap_eff, ce->cap_eff, sizeof(args->cap_eff));
memcpy(args->cap_prm, ce->cap_prm, sizeof(args->cap_prm));
memcpy(args->cap_bnd, ce->cap_bnd, sizeof(args->cap_bnd));
if (ce->n_groups && !groups_match(ce->groups, ce->n_groups)) {
unsigned int *groups;
args->mem_groups_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
groups = rst_mem_alloc(ce->n_groups * sizeof(u32), RM_PRIVATE);
if (!groups)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
args = rst_mem_remap_ptr(this_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
args->groups = groups;
memcpy(args->groups, ce->groups, ce->n_groups * sizeof(u32));
} else {
args->groups = NULL;
args->mem_groups_pos = 0;
}
args->mem_pos_next = 0;
if (prev_pos) {
if (*prev_pos) {
struct thread_creds_args *prev;
prev = rst_mem_remap_ptr(*prev_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
prev->mem_pos_next = this_pos;
}
*prev_pos = this_pos;
}
return args;
}
static int rst_prep_creds_from_img(pid_t pid)
{
CredsEntry *ce = NULL;
struct cr_img *img;
int ret;
img = open_image(CR_FD_CREDS, O_RSTR, pid);
if (!img)
return -ENOENT;
ret = pb_read_one(img, &ce, PB_CREDS);
close_image(img);
if (ret > 0) {
struct thread_creds_args *args;
args = rst_prep_creds_args(ce, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(args))
ret = PTR_ERR(args);
else
ret = 0;
}
creds_entry__free_unpacked(ce, NULL);
return ret;
}
static int rst_prep_creds(pid_t pid, CoreEntry *core, unsigned long *creds_pos)
{
struct thread_creds_args *args = NULL;
unsigned long this_pos = 0;
size_t i;
/*
* This is _really_ very old image
* format where @thread_core were not
* present. It means we don't have
* creds either, just ignore and exit
* early.
*/
if (unlikely(!core->thread_core)) {
*creds_pos = 0;
return 0;
}
*creds_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
/*
* Old format: one Creds per task carried in own image file.
*/
if (!core->thread_core->creds)
return rst_prep_creds_from_img(pid);
for (i = 0; i < current->nr_threads; i++) {
CredsEntry *ce = current->core[i]->thread_core->creds;
args = rst_prep_creds_args(ce, &this_pos);
if (IS_ERR(args))
return PTR_ERR(args);
}
return 0;
}
static void *restorer_munmap_addr(CoreEntry *core, void *restorer_blob)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (core_is_compat(core))
return restorer_sym(restorer_blob, arch_export_unmap_compat);
#endif
return restorer_sym(restorer_blob, arch_export_unmap);
}
static int sigreturn_restore(pid_t pid, struct task_restore_args *task_args, unsigned long alen, CoreEntry *core)
{
void *mem = MAP_FAILED;
void *restore_task_exec_start;
long new_sp;
long ret;
long rst_mem_size;
long memzone_size;
struct thread_restore_args *thread_args;
struct restore_mem_zone *mz;
struct vdso_maps vdso_maps_rt;
unsigned long vdso_rt_size = 0;
struct vm_area_list self_vmas;
struct vm_area_list *vmas = &rsti(current)->vmas;
int i, siginfo_n;
unsigned long creds_pos = 0;
unsigned long creds_pos_next;
sigset_t blockmask;
pr_info("Restore via sigreturn\n");
/* pr_info_vma_list(&self_vma_list); */
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct task_restore_args) & 1);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct thread_restore_args) & 1);
/*
* Read creds info for every thread and allocate memory
* needed so we can use this data inside restorer.
*/
if (rst_prep_creds(pid, core, &creds_pos))
goto err_nv;
if (current->parent == NULL) {
/* Wait when all tasks restored all files */
if (restore_wait_other_tasks())
goto err_nv;
mount: remount ro mounts writable before ghost-file restore We can have ghost-files on readonly mounts, for them we will need to recreate the file on restore, and we can't do that if mount is readonly, so the idea is to remount the mount we want to operate on to be writable, and later after all ghost-files restored return mounts to their proper state if needed. There are three exceptions, where we don't remount: a) Overmounted mounts can't be easily remounted writable, as their mountpoints are invisible for us. b) If the mount has readonly superblock - there can be no ghost-files on such a mount. c) When we are in host mntns, we should not remount mounts in it, else if we face errors in between we'll forget to remount back. We have 3 places where we need to add these remount: 1) create_ghost() 2) clean_one_remap() 3) rfi_remap() For (1) and (2) we can just remount the mount writable without remounting it back as they are called in service mntns (the one we save in mnt_ns_fd), which will be destroyed with all it's mounts at the end. We mark such mounts as remounted in service mntns - REMOUNTED_RW_SERVICE. For (3) we need to remount these mounts back to readonly so we mark them with REMOUNTED_RW and later in remount_readonly_mounts all such mounts are re-remounted back. For (3) we also need to enter proper mntns of tmi before remounting. These solution v3 is better than v2 as for v2 we added additional remount for all bind-readonly mounts, now we do remounts only for those having ghost-files restore operations on them. These should be quiet a rare thing, so ~3 remounts added for each suitable mount is a relatively small price. note: Also I thought and tried to implement the complete remove of the step of remounting back to readonly, but it requires quiet a tricky playing with usernsd and only removes one remount (of ~3) for already a rare case so I don't thing it worth the effort. v2: minor commit message cleanup and remove warn v4: don't delay, only remount the mounts we explicitly want to write to just before operating, rename patch accordingly, reuse do_restore_task_mnt_ns, optimize inefficient ns_remount_readonly_mounts, and also add another exception. v5: simplify child status check, fix log messages and brackets, do not drop all flags but only the readonly flag Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
2019-01-14 15:59:17 +03:00
if (root_ns_mask & CLONE_NEWNS &&
remount_readonly_mounts())
goto err_nv;
}
/*
* We're about to search for free VM area and inject the restorer blob
* into it. No irrelevant mmaps/mremaps beyond this point, otherwise
* this unwanted mapping might get overlapped by the restorer.
*/
ret = parse_self_maps_lite(&self_vmas);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
rst_mem_size = rst_mem_lock();
memzone_size = round_up(sizeof(struct restore_mem_zone) * current->nr_threads, page_size());
task_args->bootstrap_len = restorer_len + memzone_size + alen + rst_mem_size;
BUG_ON(task_args->bootstrap_len & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
pr_info("%d threads require %ldK of memory\n",
current->nr_threads, KBYTES(task_args->bootstrap_len));
if (core_is_compat(core))
vdso_maps_rt = vdso_maps_compat;
else
vdso_maps_rt = vdso_maps;
/*
vdso: x86 -- Add handling of vvar zones New kernel 3.16 will have old vDSO zone splitted into the two vmas: one for vdso code itself and second that named vvar for data been referenced from vdso code. Because I can't do 'dump' and 'restore' parts of the code separately (otherwise test would fail) the commit is pretty big one and hard to read so here is detailed explanation what's going on. 1) When start dumping we detect vvar zone by reading /proc/pid/smap and looking up for "[vvar]" token. Note the vvar zone is mapped by a kernel with PF/IO flags so we should not fail here. Also it's assumed that at least for now kernel won't be changed much and [vvar] zone always follows the [vdso] zone, otherwise criu will print error. 2) In previous commits we disabled dumping vvar area contents so the restorer code never try to read vvar data but still we need to map vvar zone thus vma entry remains in image. 3) As with previous vdso format we might have 2 cases a) Dump and restore is happening on same kernel b) Dump and restore are done on different kernels To detect which case we have we parse vdso data from image and find symbols offsets then compare their values with runtime symbols provided us by a kernel. If they match and (!!!) the size of vvar zone is the same -- we simply remap both zones from runtime kernel into the positions dumpee had at checkpoint time. This is that named "inplace" remap (a). If this happens the vdso_proxify() routine drops VMA_AREA_REGULAR from vvar area provided by a caller code and restorer won't try to handle this vma. It looks somehow strange and probably should be reworked but for now I left it as is to minimize the patch. In case of (b) we need to generate a proxy. We do that in same way as we were before just include vvar zone into proxy and save vvar proxy address inside vdso mark injected into vdso area. Thus on subsequent checkpoint we can detect proxy vvar zone and rip it off the list of vmas to handle. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
2014-06-20 19:35:08 +04:00
* Figure out how much memory runtime vdso and vvar will need.
* Check if vDSO or VVAR is not provided by kernel.
*/
if (vdso_maps_rt.sym.vdso_size != VDSO_BAD_SIZE) {
vdso_rt_size = vdso_maps_rt.sym.vdso_size;
if (vdso_maps_rt.sym.vvar_size != VVAR_BAD_SIZE)
vdso_rt_size += vdso_maps_rt.sym.vvar_size;
}
task_args->bootstrap_len += vdso_rt_size;
/*
* Restorer is a blob (code + args) that will get mapped in some
* place, that should _not_ intersect with both -- current mappings
* and mappings of the task we're restoring here. The subsequent
* call finds the start address for the restorer.
*
* After the start address is found we populate it with the restorer
* parts one by one (some are remap-ed, some are mmap-ed and copied
* or inited from scratch).
*/
mem = (void *)restorer_get_vma_hint(&vmas->h, &self_vmas.h,
task_args->bootstrap_len);
if (mem == (void *)-1) {
pr_err("No suitable area for task_restore bootstrap (%ldK)\n",
task_args->bootstrap_len);
goto err;
}
pr_info("Found bootstrap VMA hint at: %p (needs ~%ldK)\n",
mem, KBYTES(task_args->bootstrap_len));
ret = remap_restorer_blob(mem);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
/*
* Prepare a memory map for restorer. Note a thread space
* might be completely unused so it's here just for convenience.
*/
task_args->clone_restore_fn = restorer_sym(mem, arch_export_restore_thread);
restore_task_exec_start = restorer_sym(mem, arch_export_restore_task);
rsti(current)->munmap_restorer = restorer_munmap_addr(core, mem);
task_args->bootstrap_start = mem;
mem += restorer_len;
/* VMA we need for stacks and sigframes for threads */
if (mmap(mem, memzone_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, 0, 0) != mem) {
pr_perror("Can't mmap section for restore code");
goto err;
}
memzero(mem, memzone_size);
mz = mem;
mem += memzone_size;
/* New home for task_restore_args and thread_restore_args */
task_args = mremap(task_args, alen, alen, MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, mem);
if (task_args != mem) {
pr_perror("Can't move task args");
goto err;
}
task_args->rst_mem = mem;
task_args->rst_mem_size = rst_mem_size + alen;
thread_args = (struct thread_restore_args *)(task_args + 1);
/*
* And finally -- the rest arguments referenced by task_ and
* thread_restore_args. Pointers will get remapped below.
*/
mem += alen;
if (rst_mem_remap(mem))
goto err;
/*
* At this point we've found a gap in VM that fits in both -- current
* and target tasks' mappings -- and its structure is
*
* | restorer code | memzone (stacks and sigframes) | arguments |
*
* Arguments is task_restore_args, thread_restore_args-s and all
* the bunch of objects allocated with rst_mem_alloc().
* Note, that the task_args itself is inside the 3rd section and (!)
* it gets unmapped at the very end of __export_restore_task
*/
task_args->proc_fd = dup(get_service_fd(PROC_FD_OFF));
if (task_args->proc_fd < 0) {
pr_perror("can't dup proc fd");
goto err;
}
task_args->breakpoint = &rsti(current)->breakpoint;
task_args->fault_strategy = fi_strategy;
sigemptyset(&blockmask);
sigaddset(&blockmask, SIGCHLD);
if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &blockmask, NULL) == -1) {
pr_perror("Can not set mask of blocked signals");
return -1;
}
task_args->task_entries = rst_mem_remap_ptr(task_entries_pos, RM_SHREMAP);
task_args->premmapped_addr = (unsigned long)rsti(current)->premmapped_addr;
task_args->premmapped_len = rsti(current)->premmapped_len;
task_args->task_size = kdat.task_size;
#ifdef ARCH_HAS_LONG_PAGES
task_args->page_size = PAGE_SIZE;
#endif
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->vmas);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->rings);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->tcp_socks);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->timerfd);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->posix_timers);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->siginfo);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->rlims);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->helpers);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->zombies);
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->vma_ios);
inotify: cleanup auxiliary events from queue I've mentioned the problem that after c/r each inotify receives one or more unexpected events. This happens because our algorithm mixes setting up an inotify watch on the file with opening and closing it. We mix inotify creation and watched file open/close because we need to create the inotify watch on the file from another mntns (generally). And we do a trick opening the file so that it can be referenced in current mntns by /proc/<pid>/fd/<id> path. Moreover if we have several inotifies on the same file, than queue gets even more events than just one which happens in a simple case. note: For now we don't have a way to c/r events in queue but we need to at least leave the queue clean from events generated by our own. These, still, looks harder to rewrite wd creation without this proc-fd trick than to remove unexpected events from queues. So just cleanup these events for each fdt-restorer process, for each of its inotify fds _after_ restore stage (at CR_STATE_RESTORE_SIGCHLD). These is a closest place where for an _alive_ process we know that all prepare_fds() are done by all processes. These means we need to do the cleanup in PIE code, so need to add sys_ppoll definitions for PIE and divide process in two phases: first collect and transfer fds, second do real cleanup. note: We still do prepare_fds() for zombies. But zombies have no fds in /proc/pid/fd so we will collect no in collect_fds() and therefore we have no in prepare_fds(), thus there is no need to cleanup inotifies for zombies. v2: adopt to multiple unexpected events v3: do not cleanup from fdt-receivers, done from fdt-restorer v4: do without additional fds restore stage v5: replace sys_poll with sys_ppoll and fix minor nits Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> use ppoll always and remove poll
2019-06-26 11:55:19 +03:00
RST_MEM_FIXUP_PPTR(task_args->inotify_fds);
task_args->compatible_mode = core_is_compat(core);
/*
* Arguments for task restoration.
*/
BUG_ON(core->mtype != CORE_ENTRY__MARCH);
task_args->logfd = log_get_fd();
task_args->loglevel = log_get_loglevel();
log_get_logstart(&task_args->logstart);
task_args->sigchld_act = sigchld_act;
criu: fix gcc-8 warnings criu/sk-packet.c:443:3: error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 14 bytes from a string of length 15 strncpy(addr_spkt.sa_data, req.ifr_name, sa_data_size); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/img-remote.c:383:3: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 4096 equals destination size strncpy(snapshot_id, li->snapshot_id, PATHLEN); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/img-remote.c:384:3: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 4096 equals destination size strncpy(path, li->name, PATHLEN); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/files.c:288:3: error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 4095 bytes from a string of length 4096 strncpy(buf, link->name, PATH_MAX - 1); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/sk-unix.c:239:36: error: '/' directive output may be truncated writing 1 byte into a region of size between 0 and 4095 snprintf(path, sizeof(path), ".%s/%s", dir, sk->name); ^ criu/sk-unix.c:239:3: note: 'snprintf' output 3 or more bytes (assuming 4098) into a destination of size 4096 snprintf(path, sizeof(path), ".%s/%s", dir, sk->name); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/mount.c:2563:3: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 4096 equals destination size strncpy(path, m->mountpoint, PATH_MAX); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ criu/cr-restore.c:3647:2: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 16 equals destination size strncpy(task_args->comm, core->tc->comm, sizeof(task_args->comm)); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-02-04 08:22:59 +03:00
strncpy(task_args->comm, core->tc->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN - 1);
task_args->comm[TASK_COMM_LEN - 1] = 0;
/*
* Fill up per-thread data.
*/
creds_pos_next = creds_pos;
siginfo_n = task_args->siginfo_n;
for (i = 0; i < current->nr_threads; i++) {
CoreEntry *tcore;
struct rt_sigframe *sigframe;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
k_rtsigset_t mips_blkset;
#else
k_rtsigset_t *blkset = NULL;
#endif
thread_args[i].pid = current->threads[i].ns[0].virt;
thread_args[i].siginfo_n = siginfo_priv_nr[i];
thread_args[i].siginfo = task_args->siginfo;
thread_args[i].siginfo += siginfo_n;
siginfo_n += thread_args[i].siginfo_n;
/* skip self */
if (thread_args[i].pid == pid) {
task_args->t = thread_args + i;
tcore = core;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
mips_blkset.sig[0] = tcore->tc->blk_sigset;
mips_blkset.sig[1] = tcore->tc->blk_sigset_extended;
#else
blkset = (void *)&tcore->tc->blk_sigset;
#endif
} else {
tcore = current->core[i];
if (tcore->thread_core->has_blk_sigset) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
mips_blkset.sig[0] = tcore->thread_core->blk_sigset;
mips_blkset.sig[1] = tcore->thread_core->blk_sigset_extended;
#else
blkset = (void *)&tcore->thread_core->blk_sigset;
#endif
}
}
if ((tcore->tc || tcore->ids) && thread_args[i].pid != pid) {
pr_err("Thread has optional fields present %d\n",
thread_args[i].pid);
ret = -1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't read core data for thread %d\n",
thread_args[i].pid);
goto err;
}
thread_args[i].ta = task_args;
thread_args[i].gpregs = *CORE_THREAD_ARCH_INFO(tcore)->gpregs;
thread_args[i].clear_tid_addr = CORE_THREAD_ARCH_INFO(tcore)->clear_tid_addr;
core_get_tls(tcore, &thread_args[i].tls);
rst_reloc_creds(&thread_args[i], &creds_pos_next);
thread_args[i].futex_rla = tcore->thread_core->futex_rla;
thread_args[i].futex_rla_len = tcore->thread_core->futex_rla_len;
thread_args[i].pdeath_sig = tcore->thread_core->pdeath_sig;
if (tcore->thread_core->pdeath_sig > _KNSIG) {
pr_err("Pdeath signal is too big\n");
goto err;
}
ret = prep_sched_info(&thread_args[i].sp, tcore->thread_core);
if (ret)
goto err;
seccomp: Add engine to restore per-thread seccomp chains At now we pretend that all threads are sharing seccomp chains and at checkpoint moment we test seccomp modes to make sure if this assumption is valid refusing to dump otherwise. Still the kernel tacks seccomp filter chains per each thread and now we've faced applications (such as java) where per-thread chains are actively used. Thus we need to bring support of handling filters via per-thread basis. In this a bit intrusive patch the restore engine is lifted up to treat each thread separately. Here what is done: - Image core file is modified to keep seccomp filters inside thread_core_entry. For backward compatibility former seccomp_mode and seccomp_filter members in task_core_entry are renamed to have old_ prefix and on restore we test if we're dealing with old images. Since per-thread dump is not yet implemeneted the dumping procedure continue operating with old_ members. - In pie restorer code memory containing filters are addressed from inside thread_restore_args structure which now contains seccomp mode itself and chain attributes (number of filters and etc). Reading of per-thread data is done in seccomp_prepare_threads helper -- we take one pstree_item and walks over every thread inside to allocate pie memory and pin data there. Because of PIE specific, before jumping into pie code we have to relocate this memory into new place and for this seccomp_rst_reloc is served. In restorer itself we check if thread_restore_args provides us enabled seccomp mode (strict or filter passed) and call for restore_seccomp_filter if needed. - To unify names we start using seccomp_ prefix for all related stuff involved into this change (prepare_seccomp_filters renamed to seccomp_read_image because it only reads image and nothing more, image handler is renamed to seccomp_img_entry instead of too short 'se'. With this change we're now allowed to start collecting and dumping seccomp filters per each thread, which will be done in next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
2018-05-07 11:42:45 +03:00
seccomp_rst_reloc(&thread_args[i]);
thread_args[i].seccomp_force_tsync = rsti(current)->has_old_seccomp_filter;
thread_args[i].mz = mz + i;
sigframe = (struct rt_sigframe *)&mz[i].rt_sigframe;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
if (construct_sigframe(sigframe, sigframe, &mips_blkset, tcore))
#else
if (construct_sigframe(sigframe, sigframe, blkset, tcore))
#endif
goto err;
if (tcore->thread_core->comm)
strncpy(thread_args[i].comm, tcore->thread_core->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN - 1);
else
strncpy(thread_args[i].comm, core->tc->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN - 1);
thread_args[i].comm[TASK_COMM_LEN - 1] = 0;
if (thread_args[i].pid != pid)
core_entry__free_unpacked(tcore, NULL);
pr_info("Thread %4d stack %8p rt_sigframe %8p\n",
i, mz[i].stack, mz[i].rt_sigframe);
}
/*
* Restorer needs own copy of vdso parameters. Runtime
* vdso must be kept non intersecting with anything else,
* since we need it being accessible even when own
* self-vmas are unmaped.
*/
mem += rst_mem_size;
task_args->vdso_rt_parked_at = (unsigned long)mem;
task_args->vdso_maps_rt = vdso_maps_rt;
task_args->vdso_rt_size = vdso_rt_size;
task_args->can_map_vdso = kdat.can_map_vdso;
task_args->has_clone3_set_tid = kdat.has_clone3_set_tid;
new_sp = restorer_stack(task_args->t->mz);
/* No longer need it */
core_entry__free_unpacked(core, NULL);
xfree(current->core);
/*
* Now prepare run-time data for threads restore.
*/
task_args->nr_threads = current->nr_threads;
task_args->thread_args = thread_args;
task_args->auto_dedup = opts.auto_dedup;
/*
* In the restorer we need to know if it is SELinux or not. For SELinux
* we must change the process context before creating threads. For
* Apparmor we can change each thread after they have been created.
*/
task_args->lsm_type = kdat.lsm;
/*
* Make root and cwd restore _that_ late not to break any
* attempts to open files by paths above (e.g. /proc).
*/
if (restore_fs(current))
goto err;
sfds_protected = false;
close_image_dir();
close_proc();
close_service_fd(TRANSPORT_FD_OFF);
close_service_fd(CR_PROC_FD_OFF);
close_service_fd(ROOT_FD_OFF);
usernsd: The way to restore priviledged stuff in userns We have collected a good set of calls that cannot be done inside user namespaces, but we need to [1]. Some of them has already being addressed, like prctl mm bits restore, but some are not. I'm pretty sceptical about the ability to relax the security checks on quite a lot of them (e.g. open-by-handle is indeed a very dangerous operation if allowed to unpriviledged user), so we need some way to call those things even in user namespaces. The good news about it its that all the calls I've found operate on file descriptors this way or another. So if we had a process, that lived outside of user namespace, we could ask one to do the high priority operation we need and exchange the affected file descriptor via unix socket. So the usernsd is the one doing exactly this. It starts before we create the user namespace and accepts requests via unix socket. Clients (the processes we restore) send him the functions they want to call, the descriptor they want to operate on and the arguments blob. Optionally, they can request some file descriptor back after the call. In non usernamespace case the daemon is not started and the calls are done right in the requestor's process environment. In the next patch there's an example of how to use this daemon to do the priviledged SO_SNDBUFFORCE/_RCVBUFFORCE sockopt on a socket. [1] http://criu.org/UserNamespace Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
2015-02-13 16:05:24 +04:00
close_service_fd(USERNSD_SK);
close_service_fd(FDSTORE_SK_OFF);
close_service_fd(RPC_SK_OFF);
__gcov_flush();
pr_info("task_args: %p\n"
"task_args->pid: %d\n"
"task_args->nr_threads: %d\n"
"task_args->clone_restore_fn: %p\n"
"task_args->thread_args: %p\n",
task_args, task_args->t->pid,
task_args->nr_threads,
task_args->clone_restore_fn,
task_args->thread_args);
/*
* An indirect call to task_restore, note it never returns
* and restoring core is extremely destructive.
*/
JUMP_TO_RESTORER_BLOB(new_sp, restore_task_exec_start, task_args);
err:
free_mappings(&self_vmas);
err_nv:
/* Just to be sure */
exit(1);
return -1;
}