Prepare for AppArmor 2.13.7 release

- update version file

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

.gitignore

@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@
 apparmor-*
+cscope.*
+binutils/aa-enabled
+binutils/aa-enabled.1
+binutils/aa-exec
+binutils/aa-exec.1
+binutils/po/*.mo
 parser/po/*.mo
 parser/af_names.h
 parser/cap_names.h
+parser/generated_cap_names.h
+parser/tst_lib
 parser/tst_misc
 parser/tst_regex
 parser/tst_symtab
@@ -12,6 +20,37 @@ parser/parser_version.h
 parser/parser_yacc.c
 parser/parser_yacc.h
 parser/pod2htm*.tmp
+parser/af_rule.o
+parser/af_unix.o
+parser/common_optarg.o
+parser/dbus.o
+parser/lib.o
+parser/libapparmor_re/aare_rules.o
+parser/libapparmor_re/chfa.o
+parser/libapparmor_re/expr-tree.o
+parser/libapparmor_re/hfa.o
+parser/libapparmor_re/libapparmor_re.a
+parser/libapparmor_re/parse.o
+parser/mount.o
+parser/network.o
+parser/parser_alias.o
+parser/parser_common.o
+parser/parser_include.o
+parser/parser_interface.o
+parser/parser_lex.o
+parser/parser_main.o
+parser/parser_merge.o
+parser/parser_misc.o
+parser/parser_policy.o
+parser/parser_regex.o
+parser/parser_symtab.o
+parser/parser_variable.o
+parser/parser_yacc.o
+parser/policy_cache.o
+parser/profile.o
+parser/ptrace.o
+parser/rule.o
+parser/signal.o
 parser/*.7
 parser/*.5
 parser/*.8
@@ -19,12 +58,14 @@ parser/*.7.html
 parser/*.5.html
 parser/*.8.html
 parser/apparmor_parser
+parser/libapparmor_re/parse.cc
 parser/libapparmor_re/regexp.cc
 parser/techdoc.aux
 parser/techdoc.log
 parser/techdoc.pdf
 parser/techdoc.toc
-profiles/apparmor.d/local/*.*
+profiles/apparmor.d/local/*
+!profiles/apparmor.d/local/README
 libraries/libapparmor/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/Makefile.in
 libraries/libapparmor/aclocal.m4
@@ -55,17 +96,27 @@ libraries/libapparmor/src/.deps
 libraries/libapparmor/src/.libs
 libraries/libapparmor/src/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/src/Makefile.in
+libraries/libapparmor/src/PMurHash.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/PMurHash.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/af_protos.h
 libraries/libapparmor/src/change_hat.lo
 libraries/libapparmor/src/features.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/features.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel_interface.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel_interface.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/libaalogparse.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/libaalogparse.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/libimmunix_warning.lo
 libraries/libapparmor/src/policy_cache.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/policy_cache.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/private.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/private.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.lo
+libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.o
 libraries/libapparmor/src/libapparmor.pc
 libraries/libapparmor/src/libapparmor.la
 libraries/libapparmor/src/libimmunix.la
@@ -73,7 +124,19 @@ libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.c
 libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.h
 libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.c
 libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.h
+libraries/libapparmor/src/test-suite.log
 libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_aalogmisc
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_aalogmisc.log
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_aalogmisc.o
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_aalogmisc.trs
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_features
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_features.log
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_features.o
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_features.trs
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_kernel
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_kernel.log
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_kernel.o
+libraries/libapparmor/src/tst_kernel.trs
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/Makefile.in
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/LibAppArmor.bs
@@ -87,6 +150,7 @@ libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/MYMETA.json
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/MYMETA.yml
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/blib
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/libapparmor_wrap.c
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/libapparmor_wrap.o
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/pm_to_blib
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/LibAppArmor.py
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/build/
@@ -96,8 +160,18 @@ libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/Makefile.in
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/setup.py
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/Makefile.in
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/test-suite.log
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/test_python.py
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/test_python.py.log
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/test_python.py.trs
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/LibAppArmor.so
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/LibAppArmor_wrap.c
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/LibAppArmor_wrap.o
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/Makefile.in
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/Makefile.new
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/Makefile.ruby
+libraries/libapparmor/swig/ruby/mkmf.log
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/.deps
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/.libs
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/Makefile
@@ -113,6 +187,7 @@ libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/lib/Makefile.in
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/libaalogparse.test/Makefile
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/libaalogparse.test/Makefile.in
 libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/out
+libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi_multi-test_multi.o
 changehat/mod_apparmor/.libs
 utils/*.8
 utils/*.8.html
@@ -120,6 +195,15 @@ utils/*.5
 utils/*.5.html
 utils/*.tmp
 utils/po/*.mo
+utils/apparmor/*.pyc
+utils/apparmor/rule/*.pyc
+utils/test/common_test.pyc
+utils/test/.coverage
+utils/test/htmlcov/
+utils/vim/apparmor.vim
+utils/vim/apparmor.vim.5
+utils/vim/apparmor.vim.5.html
+utils/vim/pod2htmd.tmp
 tests/regression/apparmor/access
 tests/regression/apparmor/changehat
 tests/regression/apparmor/changehat_fail

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+image: ubuntu:latest
+before_script:
+  - export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive && apt-get update -qq && apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y build-essential apache2-dev autoconf automake bison dejagnu flex libpam-dev libtool perl liblocale-gettext-perl pkg-config python-all-dev python3-all-dev pyflakes3 ruby-dev swig lsb-release python3-notify2 python3-psutil python3-setuptools zlib1g-dev
+  - lsb_release -a
+  - uname -a
+
+# XXX - add a deploy stage to publish man pages, docs, and coverage
+# reports
+
+stages:
+  - build
+  - test
+
+build-all:
+  stage: build
+  artifacts:
+    name: ${CI_COMMIT_REF_NAME}-${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
+    expire_in: 30 days
+    untracked: true
+    paths:
+        - libraries/libapparmor/
+        - parser/
+        - binutils/
+        - utils/
+        - changehat/mod_apparmor/
+        - changehat/pam_apparmor/
+        - profiles/
+  script:
+      - cd libraries/libapparmor && ./autogen.sh && PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3 ./configure --with-perl --with-python --prefix=/usr && make PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3 && cd ../.. || { cat config.log ; exit 1 ; }
+      - make -C parser
+      - make -C binutils
+      - make -C utils
+      - make -C changehat/mod_apparmor
+      - make -C changehat/pam_apparmor
+      - make -C profiles
+
+test-all:
+  stage: test
+  script:
+      - make -C libraries/libapparmor check PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3
+      - make -C parser check
+      - make -C binutils check
+      - make -C utils check PYFLAKES=/usr/bin/pyflakes3 PYTHON_VERSIONS=/usr/bin/python3
+      - make -C changehat/mod_apparmor check
+      - make -C profiles check-parser
+
+# Disabled due to aa-logprof dependency on /sbin/apparmor_parser existing
+#      - make -C profiles check-profiles
+
+# test-pam_apparmor:
+#  - stage: test
+#  - script:
+#    - cd changehat/pam_apparmor && make check

Makefile

@@ -17,12 +17,9 @@ DIRS=libraries/libapparmor \
      profiles \
      tests
 
-#REPO_URL?=lp:apparmor
-# --per-file-timestamps is failing over SSH, https://bugs.launchpad.net/bzr/+bug/1257078
-REPO_URL?=https://code.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/apparmor/master
-# alternate possibilities to export from
-#REPO_URL=.
-#REPO_URL="bzr+ssh://bazaar.launchpad.net/~sbeattie/+junk/apparmor-dev/"
+# with conversion to git, we don't export from the remote
+REPO_URL?=git@gitlab.com:apparmor/apparmor.git
+REPO_BRANCH?=apparmor-2.13
 
 COVERITY_DIR=cov-int
 RELEASE_DIR=apparmor-${VERSION}
@@ -31,7 +28,9 @@ __SETUP_DIR?=.
 # We create a separate version for tags because git can't handle tags
 # with embedded ~s in them. No spaces around '-' or they'll get
 # embedded in ${VERSION}
-TAG_VERSION=$(subst ~,-,${VERSION})
+# apparmor version tag format 'vX.Y.ZZ'
+# apparmor branch name format 'apparmor-X.Y'
+TAG_VERSION="v$(subst ~,-,${VERSION})"
 
 # Add exclusion entries arguments for tar here, of the form:
 #   --exclude dir_to_exclude --exclude other_dir
@@ -40,49 +39,52 @@ TAR_EXCLUSIONS=
 .PHONY: tarball
 tarball: clean
 	REPO_VERSION=`$(value REPO_VERSION_CMD)` && \
-	make export_dir __EXPORT_DIR=${RELEASE_DIR} __REPO_VERSION=$${REPO_VERSION} && \
-	make setup __SETUP_DIR=${RELEASE_DIR} && \
+	$(MAKE) export_dir __EXPORT_DIR=${RELEASE_DIR} __REPO_VERSION=$${REPO_VERSION} && \
+	$(MAKE) setup __SETUP_DIR=${RELEASE_DIR} && \
 	tar ${TAR_EXCLUSIONS} -cvzf ${RELEASE_DIR}.tar.gz ${RELEASE_DIR}
 
 .PHONY: snapshot
 snapshot: clean
 	$(eval REPO_VERSION:=$(shell $(value REPO_VERSION_CMD)))
-	$(eval SNAPSHOT_NAME=apparmor-$(VERSION)~$(REPO_VERSION))
-	make export_dir __EXPORT_DIR=${SNAPSHOT_NAME} __REPO_VERSION=${REPO_VERSION} && \
-	make setup __SETUP_DIR=${SNAPSHOT_NAME} && \
+	$(eval SNAPSHOT_NAME=apparmor-$(VERSION)~$(shell echo $(REPO_VERSION) | cut -d '-' -f 2-))
+	$(MAKE) export_dir __EXPORT_DIR=${SNAPSHOT_NAME} __REPO_VERSION=${REPO_VERSION} && \
+	$(MAKE) setup __SETUP_DIR=${SNAPSHOT_NAME} && \
 	tar ${TAR_EXCLUSIONS} -cvzf ${SNAPSHOT_NAME}.tar.gz ${SNAPSHOT_NAME}
 
 .PHONY: coverity
 coverity: snapshot
 	cd $(SNAPSHOT_NAME)/libraries/libapparmor && ./configure --with-python
 	$(foreach dir, $(filter-out utils profiles tests, $(DIRS)), \
-		cov-build --dir $(COVERITY_DIR) -- make -C $(SNAPSHOT_NAME)/$(dir);)
+		cov-build --dir $(COVERITY_DIR) -- $(MAKE) -C $(SNAPSHOT_NAME)/$(dir); \
+		mv $(COVERITY_DIR)/build-log.txt $(COVERITY_DIR)/build-log-$(subst /,.,$(dir)).txt ;)
+	$(foreach dir, libraries/libapparmor utils, \
+		cov-build --dir $(COVERITY_DIR) --no-command --fs-capture-search $(SNAPSHOT_NAME)/$(dir); \
+		mv $(COVERITY_DIR)/build-log.txt $(COVERITY_DIR)/build-log-python-$(subst /,.,$(dir)).txt ;)
 	tar -cvzf $(SNAPSHOT_NAME)-$(COVERITY_DIR).tar.gz $(COVERITY_DIR)
 
 .PHONY: export_dir
 export_dir:
 	mkdir $(__EXPORT_DIR)
-	/usr/bin/bzr export --per-file-timestamps -r $(__REPO_VERSION) $(__EXPORT_DIR) $(REPO_URL)
-	echo "$(REPO_URL) $(__REPO_VERSION)" > $(__EXPORT_DIR)/common/.stamp_rev
+	/usr/bin/git archive --prefix=$(__EXPORT_DIR)/ --format tar $(__REPO_VERSION) | tar xv
+	echo "$(REPO_URL) $(REPO_BRANCH) $(__REPO_VERSION)" > $(__EXPORT_DIR)/common/.stamp_rev
 
 .PHONY: clean
 clean:
 	-rm -rf ${RELEASE_DIR} ./apparmor-${VERSION}~* ${COVERITY_DIR}
 	for dir in $(DIRS); do \
-		make -C $$dir clean; \
+		$(MAKE) -C $$dir clean; \
 	done
 
 .PHONY: setup
 setup:
 	cd $(__SETUP_DIR)/libraries/libapparmor && ./autogen.sh
 	# parser has an extra doc to build
-	make -C $(__SETUP_DIR)/parser extra_docs
+	$(MAKE) -C $(__SETUP_DIR)/parser extra_docs
 	# libraries/libapparmor needs configure to have run before
 	# building docs
 	$(foreach dir, $(filter-out libraries/libapparmor tests, $(DIRS)), \
-		make -C $(__SETUP_DIR)/$(dir) docs;)
+		$(MAKE) -C $(__SETUP_DIR)/$(dir) docs;)
 
 .PHONY: tag
 tag:
-	bzr tag apparmor_${TAG_VERSION}
-
+	git tag -m 'AppArmor $(VERSION)' -s $(TAG_VERSION)

README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+# AppArmor
+
+[![Build status](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/badges/master/build.svg)](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/commits/master)
+[![Overall test coverage](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/badges/master/coverage.svg)](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/pipelines)
+[![Core Infrastructure Initiative Best Practices](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/1699/badge)](https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/1699)
+
 ------------
 Introduction
 ------------
@@ -17,9 +23,45 @@ library, available under the LGPL license, which allows change_hat(2)
 and change_profile(2) to be used by non-GPL binaries).
 
 For more information, you can read the techdoc.pdf (available after
-building the parser) and by visiting the http://apparmor.net/ web
+building the parser) and by visiting the https://apparmor.net/ web
 site.
 
+----------------
+Getting in Touch
+----------------
+
+Please send all complaints, feature requests, rants about the software,
+and questions to the
+[AppArmor mailing list](https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/apparmor).
+
+Bug reports can be filed against the AppArmor project on
+[launchpad](https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor) or reported to the mailing
+list directly for those who wish not to register for an account on
+launchpad. See the
+[wiki page](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/home#reporting-bugs)
+for more information.
+
+Security issues can be filed as security bugs on launchpad
+or directed to `security@apparmor.net`. Additional details can be found
+in the [wiki](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/home#reporting-security-vulnerabilities).
+
+
+--------------
+Privacy Policy
+--------------
+
+The AppArmor security project respects users privacy and data and does not collect data from or on its users beyond what is required for a given component to function.
+
+The AppArmor kernel security module will log violations to the audit subsystem, and those will be logged/forwarded/recorded on the user's system(s) according to how the administrator has logging configured. Again this is not forwarded to or collected by the AppArmor project.
+
+The AppArmor userspace tools do not collect information on the system user beyond the logs and information needed to interact with the user. This is not forwarded to, nor collected by the AppArmor project.
+
+Users may submit information as part of an email, bug report or merge request, etc. and that will be recorded as part of the mailing list, bug/issue tracker, or code repository but only as part of a user initiated action.
+
+The AppArmor project does not collect information from contributors beyond their interactions with the AppArmor project, code, and community. However contributors are subject to the terms and conditions and privacy policy of the individual platforms (currently GitLab and LaunchPad) should they choose to contribute through those platforms. And those platforms may collect data on the user that the AppArmor project does not.
+
+Currently both GitLab an LaunchPad require a user account to submit patches or report bugs and issues. If a contributor does not wish to create an account for these platforms the mailing list is available. Membership in the list is not required. Content from non-list members will be sent to moderation, to ensure that it is on topic, so there may be a delay in choosing to interact in this way.
+
 
 -------------
 Source Layout
@@ -27,6 +69,7 @@ Source Layout
 
 AppArmor consists of several different parts:
 
+```
 binutils/	source for basic utilities written in compiled languages
 changehat/	source for using changehat with Apache, PAM and Tomcat
 common/		common makefile rules
@@ -37,6 +80,7 @@ parser/		source for parser/loader and corresponding documentation
 profiles/	configuration files, reference profiles and abstractions
 tests/		regression and stress testsuites
 utils/		high-level utilities for working with AppArmor
+```
 
 --------------------------------------
 Important note on AppArmor kernel code
@@ -57,60 +101,86 @@ Building and Installing AppArmor Userspace
 ------------------------------------------
 
 To build and install AppArmor userspace on your system, build and install in
-the following order.
+the following order. Some systems may need to export various python-related
+environment variables to complete the build. For example, before building
+anything on these systems, use something along the lines of:
 
+```
+$ export PYTHONPATH=$(realpath libraries/libapparmor/swig/python)
+$ export PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3
+$ export PYTHON_VERSION=3
+$ export PYTHON_VERSIONS=python3
+```
 
 libapparmor:
+
+```
 $ cd ./libraries/libapparmor
 $ sh ./autogen.sh
 $ sh ./configure --prefix=/usr --with-perl --with-python # see below
 $ make
 $ make check
 $ make install
+```
 
 [an additional optional argument to libapparmor's configure is --with-ruby, to
 generate Ruby bindings to libapparmor.]
 
 
 Binary Utilities:
+
+```
 $ cd binutils
 $ make
 $ make check
 $ make install
-
-
-Utilities:
-$ cd utils
-$ make
-$ make check
-$ make install
-
+```
 
 parser:
+
+```
 $ cd parser
 $ make		# depends on libapparmor having been built first
 $ make check
 $ make install
+```
 
 
+Utilities:
+
+```
+$ cd utils
+$ make
+$ make check PYFLAKES=/usr/bin/pyflakes3
+$ make install
+```
+
 Apache mod_apparmor:
+
+```
 $ cd changehat/mod_apparmor
 $ make		# depends on libapparmor having been built first
 $ make install
+```
 
 
 PAM AppArmor:
+
+```
 $ cd changehat/pam_apparmor
 $ make		# depends on libapparmor having been built first
 $ make install
+```
 
 
 Profiles:
+
+```
 $ cd profiles
 $ make
 $ make check	# depends on the parser having been built first
 $ make install
-
+```
 
 [Note that for the parser, binutils, and utils, if you only wish to build/use
  some of the locale languages, you can override the default by passing
@@ -131,38 +201,50 @@ For details on structure and adding tests, see
 tests/regression/apparmor/README.
 
 To run:
+
+```
 $ cd tests/regression/apparmor (requires root)
 $ make
 $ sudo make tests
 $ sudo bash open.sh -r	 # runs and saves the last testcase from open.sh
-
+```
 
 Parser tests
 ------------
 For details on structure and adding tests, see parser/tst/README.
 
 To run:
+
+```
 $ cd parser/tst
 $ make
 $ make tests
-
+```
 
 Libapparmor
 -----------
 For details on structure and adding tests, see libraries/libapparmor/README.
+
+```
 $ cd libraries/libapparmor
 $ make check
+```
 
 Utils
 -----
 Tests for the Python utilities exist in the test/ subdirectory.
+
+```
 $ cd utils
 $ make check
+```
 
 The aa-decode utility to be tested can be overridden by
 setting up environment variable APPARMOR_DECODE; e.g.:
 
+```
 $ APPARMOR_DECODE=/usr/bin/aa-decode make check
+```
 
 Profile checks
 --------------
@@ -170,29 +252,44 @@ A basic consistency check to ensure that the parser and aa-logprof parse
 successfully the current set of shipped profiles. The system or other
 parser and logprof can be passed in by overriding the PARSER and LOGPROF
 variables.
+
+```
 $ cd profiles
 $ make && make check
+```
 
 Stress Tests
 ------------
 To run AppArmor stress tests:
+
+```
 $ make all
+```
 
 Use these:
+
+```
 $ ./change_hat
 $ ./child
 $ ./kill.sh
 $ ./open
 $ ./s.sh
+```
 
 Or run all at once:
+
+```
 $ ./stress.sh
+```
 
 Please note that the above will stress the system so much it may end up
 invoking the OOM killer.
 
 To run parser stress tests (requires /usr/bin/ruby):
+
+```
 $ ./stress.sh
+```
 
 (see stress.sh -h for options)
 
@@ -207,7 +304,10 @@ https://scan.coverity.com/download?tab=cxx to obtain a pre-built copy of
 cov-build.
 
 To generate a compressed tarball of an intermediate Coverity directory:
+
+```
 $ make coverity
+```
 
 The compressed tarball is written to
 apparmor-<SNAPSHOT_VERSION>-cov-int.tar.gz, where <SNAPSHOT_VERSION>

binutils/Makefile

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ CFLAGS = -g -pg -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 endif
 endif #CFLAGS
 
-EXTRA_CFLAGS = ${EXTRA_CXXFLAGS} ${CPP_WARNINGS}
+EXTRA_CFLAGS = ${CFLAGS} ${CPPFLAGS} ${EXTRA_CXXFLAGS} ${CPP_WARNINGS}
 
 #INCLUDEDIR = /usr/src/linux/include
 INCLUDEDIR =
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ TOOLS = aa-enabled aa-exec
 
 AALIB = -Wl,-Bstatic -lapparmor  -Wl,-Bdynamic -lpthread
 
+ifdef WITH_LIBINTL
+	AALIB += -lintl
+endif
+
 ifdef USE_SYSTEM
   # Using the system libapparmor so Makefile dependencies can't be used
   LIBAPPARMOR_A =
@@ -114,7 +118,7 @@ $(LIBAPPARMOR_A):
 		echo "error: $@ is missing. Pick one of these possible solutions:" 1>&2; \
 		echo "  1) Build against the in-tree libapparmor by building it first and then trying again. See the top-level README for help." 1>&2; \
 		echo "  2) Build against the system libapparmor by adding USE_SYSTEM=1 to your make command." 1>&2;\
-		return 1; \
+		exit 1; \
 	fi
 endif
 

binutils/aa-enabled.pod

@@ -56,27 +56,27 @@ Upon exiting, B<aa-enabled> will set its exit status to the following values:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0:
+=item B<0>
 
 if AppArmor is enabled.
 
-=item 1:
+=item B<1>
 
 if AppArmor is not enabled/loaded.
 
-=item 2:
+=item B<2>
 
 intentionally not used as an B<aa-enabled> exit status.
 
-=item 3:
+=item B<3>
 
 if the AppArmor control files aren't available under /sys/kernel/security/.
 
-=item 4:
+=item B<4>
 
 if B<aa-enabled> doesn't have enough privileges to read the apparmor control files.
 
-=item 64:
+=item B<64>
 
 if any unexpected error or condition is encountered.
 
@@ -89,6 +89,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), aa_is_enabled(2), and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), aa_is_enabled(2), and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

binutils/aa-exec.pod

@@ -88,6 +88,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 aa-stack(8), aa-namespace(8), apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), aa_change_profile(3),
-aa_change_onexec(3) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+aa_change_onexec(3) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

binutils/po/aa_enabled.pot

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR Canonical Ltd
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
+#
+#, fuzzy
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-10-14 03:36-0700\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
+"Language: \n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=CHARSET\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:21
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"%s: [options]\n"
+"  options:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Don't print out any messages\n"
+"  -h | --help         Print help\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:38
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - not available on this system.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:42
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - disabled at boot.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:46
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - policy interface not available.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:51
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - insufficient permissions to determine availability.\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:56
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error - %s\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:70
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown or incompatible options\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:80
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown option '%s'\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:90
+#, c-format
+msgid "Yes\n"
+msgstr ""

binutils/po/aa_exec.pot

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR Canonical Ltd
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
+#
+#, fuzzy
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-10-14 03:37-0700\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
+"Language: \n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=CHARSET\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+
+#: ../aa_exec.c:48
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"USAGE: %s [OPTIONS] <prog> <args>\n"
+"\n"
+"Confine <prog> with the specified PROFILE.\n"
+"\n"
+"OPTIONS:\n"
+"  -p PROFILE, --profile=PROFILE\t\tPROFILE to confine <prog> with\n"
+"  -n NAMESPACE, --namespace=NAMESPACE\tNAMESPACE to confine <prog> in\n"
+"  -d, --debug\t\t\t\tshow messages with debugging information\n"
+"  -i, --immediate\t\t\tchange profile immediately instead of at exec\n"
+"  -v, --verbose\t\t\t\tshow messages with stats\n"
+"  -h, --help\t\t\t\tdisplay this help\n"
+"\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_exec.c:63
+msgid "aa-exec: ERROR: "
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_exec.c:74
+msgid "aa-exec: DEBUG: "
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_exec.c:87
+msgid "\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#: ../aa_exec.c:105
+#, c-format
+msgid "exec"
+msgstr ""

binutils/po/de.po

@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: apparmor\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: AppArmor list <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>\n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-28 10:23-0800\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-03-20 01:58+0000\n"
-"Last-Translator: Tobias Bannert <Unknown>\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2018-02-09 23:55+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Tobias Bannert <tobannert@gmail.com>\n"
 "Language-Team: German <de@li.org>\n"
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2016-03-21 05:15+0000\n"
-"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 17947)\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
 "Language: de\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:26
@@ -26,16 +26,20 @@ msgid ""
 "  -q | --quiet        Don't print out any messages\n"
 "  -h | --help         Print help\n"
 msgstr ""
+"%s: [Optionen]\n"
+"  Optionen:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Keine Nachrichten anzeigen\n"
+"  -h | --help         Hilfetext anzeigen\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:45
 #, c-format
 msgid "unknown or incompatible options\n"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "unbekannte oder nicht kompatible Optionen\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:55
 #, c-format
 msgid "unknown option '%s'\n"
-msgstr "Unbekannte Option »%s«\n"
+msgstr "unbekannte Option »%s«\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:64
 #, c-format
@@ -55,14 +59,15 @@ msgstr "Nein – beim Start deaktiviert.\n"
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:77
 #, c-format
 msgid "Maybe - policy interface not available.\n"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Vielleicht – Richtlinienschnittstelle nicht verfügbar.\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:81
 #, c-format
 msgid "Maybe - insufficient permissions to determine availability.\n"
 msgstr ""
+"Vielleicht – ungenügende Berechtigungen, um die Verfügbarkeit zu prüfen\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:84
 #, c-format
 msgid "Error - '%s'\n"
-msgstr "Fehler - »%s«\n"
+msgstr "Fehler – »%s«\n"

binutils/po/en_GB.po

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ msgstr ""
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2016-02-19 05:10+0000\n"
-"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 17925)\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
 "Language: en_GB\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:26

binutils/po/es.po

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# Spanish translation for apparmor
+# Copyright (c) 2019 Rosetta Contributors and Canonical Ltd 2019
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the apparmor package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2019.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: apparmor\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-28 10:23-0800\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-06-09 14:01+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Adolfo Jayme <fitoschido@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Spanish <es@li.org>\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-06-10 04:32+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18978)\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:26
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"%s: [options]\n"
+"  options:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Don't print out any messages\n"
+"  -h | --help         Print help\n"
+msgstr ""
+"%s: [opciones]\n"
+"  opciones:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        No emitir ningún mensaje\n"
+"  -h | --help         Mostrar la ayuda\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:45
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown or incompatible options\n"
+msgstr "opciones desconocidas o incompatibles\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:55
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown option '%s'\n"
+msgstr "se desconoce la opción «%s»\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:64
+#, c-format
+msgid "Yes\n"
+msgstr "Sí\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:71
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - not available on this system.\n"
+msgstr "No; no disponible en este sistema.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - disabled at boot.\n"
+msgstr "No; desactivado durante el arranque.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:77
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - policy interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Quizá; interfaz de directiva no disponible.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:81
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - insufficient permissions to determine availability.\n"
+msgstr "Quizá; permisos insuficientes para determinar disponibilidad.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error - '%s'\n"
+msgstr "Error: «%s»\n"

binutils/po/id.po

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ msgstr ""
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2016-02-02 05:11+0000\n"
-"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 17908)\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
 "Language: id\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:26

binutils/po/pt.po

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ msgstr ""
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2016-03-04 04:35+0000\n"
-"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 17936)\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
 "Language: pt\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:26

binutils/po/ru.po

@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ msgstr ""
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: AppArmor list <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>\n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-28 10:23-0800\n"
 "PO-Revision-Date: 2016-03-29 14:46+0000\n"
-"Last-Translator: Eugene Marshal <Unknown>\n"
+"Last-Translator: Eugene Roskin <Unknown>\n"
 "Language-Team: Russian <ru@li.org>\n"
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2016-03-30 05:13+0000\n"
-"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 17967)\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
 "Language: ru\n"
 
 #: ../aa_enabled.c:26

binutils/po/sv.po

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Swedish translation for apparmor
+# Copyright (c) 2018 Rosetta Contributors and Canonical Ltd 2018
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the apparmor package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2018.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: apparmor\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-28 10:23-0800\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2018-09-08 03:51+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Jonatan Nyberg <Unknown>\n"
+"Language-Team: Swedish <sv@li.org>\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:26
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"%s: [options]\n"
+"  options:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Don't print out any messages\n"
+"  -h | --help         Print help\n"
+msgstr ""
+"%s: [options]\n"
+"  flaggor:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Skriv inte ut några meddelanden\n"
+"  -h | --help         Skriv ut hjälp\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:45
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown or incompatible options\n"
+msgstr "okända eller inkompatibla flaggor\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:55
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown option '%s'\n"
+msgstr "okänd flagga '%s'\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:64
+#, c-format
+msgid "Yes\n"
+msgstr "Ja\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:71
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - not available on this system.\n"
+msgstr "Nej - inte tillgänglig på detta system.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - disabled at boot.\n"
+msgstr "Nej - inaktiverad vid uppstart.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:77
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - policy interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Kanske - policy gränssnitt inte tillgängliga.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:81
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - insufficient permissions to determine availability.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Kanske - otillräckliga behörigheter för att bestämma tillgängligheten.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error - '%s'\n"
+msgstr "Fel - '%s'\n"

binutils/po/tr.po

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Turkish translation for apparmor
+# Copyright (c) 2018 Rosetta Contributors and Canonical Ltd 2018
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the apparmor package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2018.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: apparmor\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-28 10:23-0800\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2018-05-19 23:10+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Kudret EMRE <kudretemre@hotmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Turkish <tr@li.org>\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Launchpad-Export-Date: 2019-04-18 05:33+0000\n"
+"X-Generator: Launchpad (build 18928)\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:26
+#, c-format
+msgid ""
+"%s: [options]\n"
+"  options:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Don't print out any messages\n"
+"  -h | --help         Print help\n"
+msgstr ""
+"%s: [seçenekler]\n"
+"  seçenekler:\n"
+"  -q | --quiet        Hiçbir mesajı gösterme\n"
+"  -h | --help         Yardımı görüntüler\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:45
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown or incompatible options\n"
+msgstr "bilinmeyen veya uyumsuz seçenekler\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:55
+#, c-format
+msgid "unknown option '%s'\n"
+msgstr "bilinmeyen seçenek '%s'\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:64
+#, c-format
+msgid "Yes\n"
+msgstr "Evet\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:71
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - not available on this system.\n"
+msgstr "Hayır - Bu sistemde kullanılabilir değil.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:74
+#, c-format
+msgid "No - disabled at boot.\n"
+msgstr "Hayır - önyüklemede devredışı bırakıldı.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:77
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - policy interface not available.\n"
+msgstr "Belki - policy arayüzü kullanılabilir değil.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:81
+#, c-format
+msgid "Maybe - insufficient permissions to determine availability.\n"
+msgstr ""
+"Belki - kullanılabilir olup olmadığını denetlemek için yetersiz yetki.\n"
+
+#: ../aa_enabled.c:84
+#, c-format
+msgid "Error - '%s'\n"
+msgstr "Hata - '%s'\n"

changehat/mod_apparmor/Makefile

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ docs: ${MANPAGES} ${HTMLMANPAGES}
 install: ${TARGET} ${MANPAGES}
 	mkdir -p ${DESTDIR}/${APXS_INSTALL_DIR}
 	install -m 755 $< ${DESTDIR}/${APXS_INSTALL_DIR}
-	make install_manpages DESTDIR=${DESTDIR}
+	$(MAKE) install_manpages DESTDIR=${DESTDIR}
 
 .PHONY: clean
 clean: pod_clean

changehat/mod_apparmor/mod_apparmor.pod

@@ -140,6 +140,6 @@ them at L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), subdomain.conf(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_hat(2) and
-L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

changehat/pam_apparmor/Makefile

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ SECDIR ?= ${DESTDIR}/lib/security
 .PHONY: install
 install: $(NAME).so
 	install -m 755 -d $(SECDIR)
-	install -m 555 $(NAME).so $(SECDIR)/
+	install -m 755 $(NAME).so $(SECDIR)/
 	
 .PHONY: clean
 clean:

common/Make.rules

@@ -42,10 +42,9 @@ endif
 
 define nl
 
-
 endef
 
-REPO_VERSION_CMD=[ -x /usr/bin/bzr ] && /usr/bin/bzr version-info --custom --template="{revno}" . 2> /dev/null || awk '{ print $2 }' common/.stamp_rev
+REPO_VERSION_CMD=[ -x /usr/bin/git ] && /usr/bin/git describe --tags --long --abbrev=16 --match 'v*' 2> /dev/null || awk '{ print $2 }' common/.stamp_rev
 
 ifndef PYTHON_VERSIONS
 PYTHON_VERSIONS = $(call map, pathsearch, python2 python3)
@@ -75,40 +74,6 @@ endif
 pod_clean:
 	-rm -f ${MANPAGES} *.[0-9].gz ${HTMLMANPAGES} pod2htm*.tmp
 
-# =====================
-# generate list of capabilities based on
-# /usr/include/linux/capabilities.h for use in multiple locations in
-# the source tree
-# =====================
-
-# emits defined capabilities in a simple list, e.g. "CAP_NAME CAP_NAME2"
-CAPABILITIES=$(shell echo "\#include <linux/capability.h>" | cpp -dM | LC_ALL=C sed -n -e '/CAP_EMPTY_SET/d' -e 's/^\#define[ \t]\+CAP_\([A-Z0-9_]\+\)[ \t]\+\([0-9xa-f]\+\)\(.*\)$$/CAP_\1/p' | LC_ALL=C sort)
-
-.PHONY: list_capabilities
-list_capabilities: /usr/include/linux/capability.h
-	@echo "$(CAPABILITIES)"
-
-# =====================
-# generate list of network protocols based on
-# sys/socket.h for use in multiple locations in
-# the source tree
-# =====================
-
-# These are the families that it doesn't make sense for apparmor
-# to mediate. We use PF_ here since that is what is required in
-# bits/socket.h, but we will rewrite these as AF_.
-
-FILTER_FAMILIES=PF_UNIX
-
-__FILTER=$(shell echo $(strip $(FILTER_FAMILIES)) | sed -e 's/ /\\\|/g')
-
-# emits the AF names in a "AF_NAME NUMBER," pattern
-AF_NAMES=$(shell echo "\#include <sys/socket.h>" | cpp -dM | LC_ALL=C sed -n -e '/$(__FILTER)/d' -e 's/PF_LOCAL/PF_UNIX/' -e 's/^\#define[ \t]\+PF_\([A-Z0-9_]\+\)[ \t]\+\([0-9]\+\).*$$/AF_\1 \2,/p' | sort -n -k2)
-
-.PHONY: list_af_names
-list_af_names:
-	@echo "$(AF_NAMES)"
-
 # =====================
 # manpages
 # =====================

common/Version

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.11.0
+2.13.7

common/list_af_names.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/bash -e
+
+# =====================
+# generate list of network protocols based on
+# sys/socket.h for use in multiple locations in
+# the source tree
+# =====================
+
+# It doesn't make sence for AppArmor to mediate PF_UNIX, filter it out. Search
+# for "PF_" constants since that is what is required in bits/socket.h, but
+# rewrite as "AF_".
+
+echo "#include <sys/socket.h>" | \
+  cpp -dM | \
+  LC_ALL=C sed -n \
+    -e '/PF_UNIX/d' \
+    -e 's/PF_LOCAL/PF_UNIX/' \
+    -e 's/^#define[ \t]\+PF_\([A-Z0-9_]\+\)[ \t]\+\([0-9]\+\).*$/AF_\1 \2,/p' | \
+  sort -n -k2

common/list_capabilities.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/bin/bash -e
+
+# =====================
+# generate list of capabilities based on
+# /usr/include/linux/capabilities.h for use in multiple locations in
+# the source tree
+# =====================
+
+echo "#include <linux/capability.h>" | \
+  cpp -dM | \
+  LC_ALL=C sed -n \
+    -e '/CAP_EMPTY_SET/d' \
+    -e 's/^\#define[ \t]\+CAP_\([A-Z0-9_]\+\)[ \t]\+\([0-9xa-f]\+\)\(.*\)$/CAP_\1/p' | \
+  LC_ALL=C sort

deprecated/utils/aa-genprof

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ my $ratelimit_saved = sysctl_read($ratelimit_sysctl);
 END { sysctl_write($ratelimit_sysctl, $ratelimit_saved); }
 sysctl_write($ratelimit_sysctl, 0);
 
-UI_Info(gettext("\nBefore you begin, you may wish to check if a\nprofile already exists for the application you\nwish to confine. See the following wiki page for\nmore information:\nhttp://wiki.apparmor.net/index.php/Profiles"));
+UI_Info(gettext("\nBefore you begin, you may wish to check if a\nprofile already exists for the application you\nwish to confine. See the following wiki page for\nmore information:\nhttps://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/Profiles"));
 
 UI_Important(gettext("Please start the application to be profiled in \nanother window and exercise its functionality now.\n\nOnce completed, select the \"Scan\" button below in \norder to scan the system logs for AppArmor events.  \n\nFor each AppArmor event, you will be given the  \nopportunity to choose whether the access should be  \nallowed or denied."));
 
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ for my $p (sort keys %helpers) {
 }
 
 UI_Info(gettext("Reloaded AppArmor profiles in enforce mode."));
-UI_Info(gettext("\nPlease consider contributing your new profile! See\nthe following wiki page for more information:\nhttp://wiki.apparmor.net/index.php/Profiles\n"));
+UI_Info(gettext("\nPlease consider contributing your new profile! See\nthe following wiki page for more information:\nhttps://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/Profiles\n"));
 UI_Info(sprintf(gettext('Finished generating profile for %s.'), $fqdbin));
 exit 0;
 

kernel-patches/v4.11/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+From 97b3200925ba627346432edf521d49de8bb018a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+Base support for network mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/.gitignore       |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/Makefile         |  42 ++++++++++-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |   4 +
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h    |  59 +++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/include/policy.h |   3 +
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c            | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c            | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/policy.c         |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |  47 +++++++++++-
+ 10 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index ad369a7aac24..a7dc10be232d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o
++              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ 	    -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+ 	     tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    [1] = "local",
++#    [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
++# to
++#    [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ 			    $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ 		      $(src)/Makefile
+ 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++		     $(src)/Makefile
++	$(call cmd,make-af)
++	$(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 41073f70eb41..4d236736cfb8 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("policy",			aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
++	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index fdc4774318ba..0df708e8748b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			int rlim;
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
++		struct {
++			int type, protocol;
++			struct sock *sk;
++		} net;
+ 	};
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..55da1dad8720
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
++
++#include <net/sock.h>
++
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
++
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
++
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
++
++#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
++	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
++						  .family = (F)};	  \
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
++			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
++						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
++			  OP);						  \
++	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
++	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
++	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
++
++#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
++			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
++
++extern int aa_net_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(const char *op, struct sock *sk);
++
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
++{
++	/* NOP */
++}
++
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index 67bc96afe541..a3d18ea8d730 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "lib.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+ 
+@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct aa_data {
+  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+  *
+  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+@@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ 	struct aa_policydb policy;
+ 	struct aa_file_rules file;
+ 	struct aa_caps caps;
++	struct aa_net net;
+ 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ 
+ 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 709eacd23909..e3017129a404 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/policy_ns.h"
+@@ -587,6 +588,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (kern)
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++				    NULL);
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SHUTDOWN, sk);
++}
++
+ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+@@ -616,6 +715,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..b9c8cd0e882e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++#include "net_names.h"
++
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u16 family,
++		     int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, sk, family, type, protocol);
++
++	aad(&sa)->error = error;
++
++	if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
++		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++			   !(1 << aad(&sa)->net.type & audit_mask)))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++		u16 kill_mask = 0;
++		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++
++		if (denied & kill_mask)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
++	}
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	u16 family_mask;
++	int error;
++
++	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++		return 0;
++
++	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
++
++	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
++
++	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_revalidate_sk(const char *op, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++	 */
++	if (in_interrupt())
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++	return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index def1fbd6bdfd..9fe7b9d4500f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+ 
+ 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 2e37c9c26bbd..bc23a5b3b113 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -217,6 +217,19 @@ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
++{
++	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++			return 0;
++		if (data)
++			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -519,7 +532,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
+-	size_t ns_len;
++	size_t ns_len, size = 0;
+ 	struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
+ 	char *key = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_data *data;
+@@ -635,6 +648,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++	if (size) {
++
++		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++			 * never request
++			 */
++			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++				u16 tmp;
++				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++					goto fail;
++				continue;
++			}
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++		}
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++			goto fail;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++	 * by IPC
++	 */
++	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.11/0002-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From b866a43c2897f5469c9d787426144074a3713f6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
+ mediation
+
+If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/net.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index b9c8cd0e882e..5ba19ad1d65c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u16 family,
+ 	} else {
+ 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+-		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type);
+ 
+ 		if (denied & kill_mask)
+ 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.11/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,938 @@
+From 4429c3f9522b608300cfe1ae148dc6cdadf3d76c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+
+Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+The basic form of the rules are.
+
+  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+  where [conds] can be
+    fstype=<expr>
+    options=<expr>
+
+Example mount commands
+  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
+
+  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+  umount,
+
+  umount /m*,
+
+See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Makefile           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |  13 +
+ security/apparmor/domain.c           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |   3 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |  11 +
+ security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |   2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |  54 +++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c              |  60 ++++
+ security/apparmor/mount.c            | 616 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 9 files changed, 760 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index a7dc10be232d..01368441f230 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o
++              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o mount.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 4d236736cfb8..2e8d09e2368b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -1205,11 +1205,24 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
++	{ }
++};
++
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("policy",			aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
++	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
++	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index 001e133a3c8c..708b7e22b9b5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+  *
+  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+  */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 1750cc0721c1..3383dc66f30f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -27,8 +27,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+ 
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+ 
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 0df708e8748b..41374ad89547 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ enum audit_type {
+ #define OP_FMMAP "file_mmap"
+ #define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
+ 
++#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot"
++#define OP_MOUNT "mount"
++#define OP_UMOUNT "umount"
++
+ #define OP_CREATE "create"
+ #define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
+ #define OP_BIND "bind"
+@@ -127,6 +131,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			int rlim;
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
++ 		struct {
++			const char *src_name;
++			const char *type;
++			const char *trans;
++			const char *data;
++			unsigned long flags;
++		} mnt;
+ 		struct {
+ 			int type, protocol;
+ 			struct sock *sk;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index 30544729878a..7bd21d20a2bd 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ 	char **table;
+ };
+ 
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..a43b1d62e428
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
++
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
++
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
++
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
++
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags);
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name);
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data);
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path);
++
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index e3017129a404..ee58a2cca74f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/policy_ns.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+@@ -479,6 +480,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
++			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* Discard magic */
++	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
++			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++		else
++			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++					     flags, data);
++	}
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
++				 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ 				char **value)
+ {
+@@ -692,6 +748,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..9e95a41c015c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++	if (flags & MS_BIND)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++				 ", unbindable");
++	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++				 ", private");
++	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++				 ", slave");
++	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++				 ", shared");
++	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++		audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags);
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, const char *op,
++		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
++		       const char *type, const char *trans,
++		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op);
++
++	if (likely(!error)) {
++		u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++			mask = 0xffff;
++
++		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++		request &= mask;
++
++		if (likely(!request))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		/* only report permissions that were denied */
++		request = request & ~perms->allow;
++
++		if (request & perms->kill)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++		if (!request)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++				complain_error(error) : error;
++	}
++
++	aad(&sa)->name = name;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags;
++	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++		aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data;
++	aad(&sa)->info = info;
++	aad(&sa)->error = error;
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
++ *
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
++ */
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++				    unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++		if ((1 << i) & flags)
++			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
++	}
++
++	return state;
++}
++
++/**
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
++ *
++ * Returns: mount permissions
++ */
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++					   unsigned int state)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms;
++
++	perms.kill = 0;
++	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
++
++	return perms;
++}
++
++static const char *mnt_info_table[] = {
++	"match succeeded",
++	"failed mntpnt match",
++	"failed srcname match",
++	"failed type match",
++	"failed flags match",
++	"failed data match"
++};
++
++/*
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
++ */
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (devname)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 2;
++
++	if (type)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 3;
++
++	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++	if (!state)
++		return 4;
++	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++		if (!state)
++			return 4;
++
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++		if (!state)
++			return 5;
++		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* failed at end of flags match */
++	return 4;
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++		     const char *devname, const char *type,
++		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++	int pos;
++
++	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++	if (pos) {
++		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
++{
++	return profile->path_flags |
++		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	int binary, error;
++
++	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++			  &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *orig_name)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int binary = 1;
++	int error;
++
++	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++	if (type) {
++		int requires_dev;
++		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++		if (!fstype)
++			return -ENODEV;
++
++		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++		put_filesystem(fstype);
++
++		if (requires_dev) {
++			struct path dev_path;
++
++			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++				error = -ENOENT;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++
++			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++			path_put(&dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++		}
++	}
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
++			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++	return error;
++
++}
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     new_name);
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++			if (!target)
++				error = -ENOENT;
++			else
++				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
++		}
++	} else
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++	aa_put_profile(target);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++	kfree(new_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.12/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+From adbeb027cbafd78a76d5786e082d7c7abb19a591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+Base support for network mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/.gitignore       |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/Makefile         |  42 ++++++++++-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |   4 +
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h    |  59 +++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/include/policy.h |   3 +
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c            | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c            | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/policy.c         |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |  47 +++++++++++-
+ 10 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index ad369a7aac24..a7dc10be232d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o
++              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ 	    -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+ 	     tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    [1] = "local",
++#    [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
++# to
++#    [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ 			    $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ 		      $(src)/Makefile
+ 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++		     $(src)/Makefile
++	$(call cmd,make-af)
++	$(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 4f6ac9dbc65d..4b121211e5e7 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("policy",			aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
++	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index fdc4774318ba..0df708e8748b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			int rlim;
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
++		struct {
++			int type, protocol;
++			struct sock *sk;
++		} net;
+ 	};
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..55da1dad8720
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
++
++#include <net/sock.h>
++
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
++
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
++
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
++
++#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
++	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
++						  .family = (F)};	  \
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
++			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
++						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
++			  OP);						  \
++	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
++	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
++	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
++
++#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
++			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
++
++extern int aa_net_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(const char *op, struct sock *sk);
++
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
++{
++	/* NOP */
++}
++
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index 67bc96afe541..a3d18ea8d730 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "lib.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+ 
+@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct aa_data {
+  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+  *
+  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+@@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ 	struct aa_policydb policy;
+ 	struct aa_file_rules file;
+ 	struct aa_caps caps;
++	struct aa_net net;
+ 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ 
+ 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 8f3c0f7aca5a..758ddf4a0791 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/policy_ns.h"
+@@ -587,6 +588,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (kern)
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++				    NULL);
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SHUTDOWN, sk);
++}
++
+ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+@@ -616,6 +715,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..b9c8cd0e882e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++#include "net_names.h"
++
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u16 family,
++		     int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, sk, family, type, protocol);
++
++	aad(&sa)->error = error;
++
++	if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
++		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++			   !(1 << aad(&sa)->net.type & audit_mask)))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++		u16 kill_mask = 0;
++		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++
++		if (denied & kill_mask)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
++	}
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	u16 family_mask;
++	int error;
++
++	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++		return 0;
++
++	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
++
++	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
++
++	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_revalidate_sk(const char *op, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++	 */
++	if (in_interrupt())
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++	return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index cf9d670dca94..0eea92aeb02d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+ 
+ 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index f3422a91353c..89a1bd78f765 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -217,6 +217,19 @@ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
++{
++	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++			return 0;
++		if (data)
++			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -519,7 +532,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
+-	size_t ns_len;
++	size_t ns_len, size = 0;
+ 	struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
+ 	char *key = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_data *data;
+@@ -635,6 +648,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++	if (size) {
++
++		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++			 * never request
++			 */
++			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++				u16 tmp;
++				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++					goto fail;
++				continue;
++			}
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++		}
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++			goto fail;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++	 * by IPC
++	 */
++	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.12/0002-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 7ed04b256a6313a83a2d9c94f7295d81acf11848 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
+ mediation
+
+If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/net.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index b9c8cd0e882e..5ba19ad1d65c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, u16 family,
+ 	} else {
+ 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+-		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++		u16 denied = (1 << aad(&sa)->net.type);
+ 
+ 		if (denied & kill_mask)
+ 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.12/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,938 @@
+From 13765e11a34d38ce04b3c28f21fe94d420746a90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+
+Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+The basic form of the rules are.
+
+  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+  where [conds] can be
+    fstype=<expr>
+    options=<expr>
+
+Example mount commands
+  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
+
+  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+  umount,
+
+  umount /m*,
+
+See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Makefile           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |  13 +
+ security/apparmor/domain.c           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |   3 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |  11 +
+ security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |   2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |  54 +++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c              |  60 ++++
+ security/apparmor/mount.c            | 616 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 9 files changed, 760 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index a7dc10be232d..01368441f230 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o
++              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o net.o mount.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 4b121211e5e7..8e1c18b23d75 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -1205,11 +1205,24 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
++	{ }
++};
++
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("policy",			aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
++	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
++	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index 001e133a3c8c..708b7e22b9b5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+  *
+  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+  */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 1750cc0721c1..3383dc66f30f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -27,8 +27,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+ 
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+ 
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 0df708e8748b..41374ad89547 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ enum audit_type {
+ #define OP_FMMAP "file_mmap"
+ #define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
+ 
++#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot"
++#define OP_MOUNT "mount"
++#define OP_UMOUNT "umount"
++
+ #define OP_CREATE "create"
+ #define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
+ #define OP_BIND "bind"
+@@ -127,6 +131,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			int rlim;
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
++ 		struct {
++			const char *src_name;
++			const char *type;
++			const char *trans;
++			const char *data;
++			unsigned long flags;
++		} mnt;
+ 		struct {
+ 			int type, protocol;
+ 			struct sock *sk;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index 30544729878a..7bd21d20a2bd 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ 	char **table;
+ };
+ 
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..a43b1d62e428
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
++
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
++
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
++
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
++
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags);
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name);
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data);
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path);
++
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 758ddf4a0791..b57f24045c0d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/policy_ns.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized;
+@@ -479,6 +480,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
++			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* Discard magic */
++	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
++			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++		else
++			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++					     flags, data);
++	}
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
++				 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ 				char **value)
+ {
+@@ -692,6 +748,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..9e95a41c015c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++	if (flags & MS_BIND)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++				 ", unbindable");
++	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++				 ", private");
++	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++				 ", slave");
++	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++				 ", shared");
++	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans);
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++		audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags);
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, const char *op,
++		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
++		       const char *type, const char *trans,
++		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op);
++
++	if (likely(!error)) {
++		u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++			mask = 0xffff;
++
++		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++		request &= mask;
++
++		if (likely(!request))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		/* only report permissions that were denied */
++		request = request & ~perms->allow;
++
++		if (request & perms->kill)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++		if (!request)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++				complain_error(error) : error;
++	}
++
++	aad(&sa)->name = name;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans;
++	aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags;
++	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++		aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data;
++	aad(&sa)->info = info;
++	aad(&sa)->error = error;
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
++ *
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
++ */
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++				    unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++		if ((1 << i) & flags)
++			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
++	}
++
++	return state;
++}
++
++/**
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
++ *
++ * Returns: mount permissions
++ */
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++					   unsigned int state)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms;
++
++	perms.kill = 0;
++	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
++
++	return perms;
++}
++
++static const char *mnt_info_table[] = {
++	"match succeeded",
++	"failed mntpnt match",
++	"failed srcname match",
++	"failed type match",
++	"failed flags match",
++	"failed data match"
++};
++
++/*
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
++ */
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (devname)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 2;
++
++	if (type)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 3;
++
++	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++	if (!state)
++		return 4;
++	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++		if (!state)
++			return 4;
++
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++		if (!state)
++			return 5;
++		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* failed at end of flags match */
++	return 4;
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++		     const char *devname, const char *type,
++		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++	int pos;
++
++	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++	if (pos) {
++		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
++{
++	return profile->path_flags |
++		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	int binary, error;
++
++	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++			  &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *orig_name)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int binary = 1;
++	int error;
++
++	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++	if (type) {
++		int requires_dev;
++		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++		if (!fstype)
++			return -ENODEV;
++
++		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++		put_filesystem(fstype);
++
++		if (requires_dev) {
++			struct path dev_path;
++
++			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++				error = -ENOENT;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++
++			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++			path_put(&dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++		}
++	}
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
++			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++	return error;
++
++}
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     new_name);
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++			if (!target)
++				error = -ENOENT;
++			else
++				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
++		}
++	} else
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++	aa_put_profile(target);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++	kfree(new_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-efi-lockdown-MODSIGN-Fix-module-signatu.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 00c72bc198aa85e5da02de2c0c4cc423c82a54f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Fedora Kernel Team <kernel-team@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 13:46:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 01/17] UBUNTU: SAUCE: (efi-lockdown) MODSIGN: Fix module
+ signature verification
+
+BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1712168
+
+Currently mod_verify_sig() calls verify_pkcs_7_signature() with
+trusted_keys=NULL, which causes only the builtin keys to be used
+to verify the signature. This breaks self-signing of modules with
+a MOK, as the MOK is loaded into the secondary trusted keyring.
+Fix this by passing the spacial value trusted_keys=(void *)1UL,
+which tells verify_pkcs_7_signature() to use the secondary
+keyring instead.
+
+(cherry picked from commit cff4523d65b848f9c41c9e998a735ae2a820da2d
+ git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jwboyer/fedora.git)
+[ saf: Taken from fedora commit without authorship information or much
+  of a commit message; modified so that commit will describe the
+  problem being fixed. ]
+Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
+---
+ kernel/module_signing.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
+index 937c844bee4a..d3d6f95a96b4 100644
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -81,6 +81,6 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+-				      NULL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
++				      (void *)1UL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
+ }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0002-apparmor-Fix-shadowed-local-variable-in-unpack_trans.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From c6cad5e65a23dcafa1821ca381901297664d9c64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 10:56:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/17] apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in
+ unpack_trans_table()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+with W=2:
+
+    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function ‘unpack_trans_table’:
+    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:469: warning: declaration of ‘pos’ shadows a previous local
+    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:451: warning: shadowed declaration is here
+
+Rename the old "pos" to "saved_pos" to fix this.
+
+Fixes: 5379a3312024a8be ("apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse")
+Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
+Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 966d631935a578fadb5770f17a957ee1a969d868)
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index c600f4dd1783..2d5a1a007b06 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e)
+  */
+ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+ {
+-	void *pos = e->pos;
++	void *saved_pos = e->pos;
+ 
+ 	/* exec table is optional */
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) {
+@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ fail:
+ 	aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans);
+-	e->pos = pos;
++	e->pos = saved_pos;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0003-apparmor-Fix-logical-error-in-verify_header.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 9934296cba701d429a0fc0cf071a40c8c3a1587e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 20:50:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 03/17] apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
+
+verify_header() is currently checking whether interface version is less
+than 5 *and* greater than 7, which always evaluates to false. Instead it
+should check whether it is less than 5 *or* greater than 7.
+
+Signed-off-by: Christos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c54a2175e3a6bf6c697d249bba1aa729e06c7ba8)
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 2d5a1a007b06..bda0dce3b582 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns)
+ 	 * if not specified use previous version
+ 	 * Mask off everything that is not kernel abi version
+ 	 */
+-	if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) && VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) {
++	if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) {
+ 		audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version",
+ 			    e, error);
+ 		return error;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0004-apparmor-Fix-an-error-code-in-aafs_create.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 8b3851c7b83f32f2be9d4b48371ddf033afedf62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 10:39:20 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 04/17] apparmor: Fix an error code in aafs_create()
+
+We accidentally forgot to set the error code on this path.  It means we
+return NULL instead of an error pointer.  I looked through a bunch of
+callers and I don't think it really causes a big issue, but the
+documentation says we're supposed to return error pointers here.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit aee58bf341db52a3a3563c6b972bfd4fc2d41e46)
+---
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 853c2ec8e0c9..2caeb748070c 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -248,8 +248,10 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mode,
+ 
+ 	inode_lock(dir);
+ 	dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
+-	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
++	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 		goto fail_lock;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) {
+ 		error = -EEXIST;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0005-apparmor-Redundant-condition-prev_ns.-in-label.c-149.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 4b56e146905bbad2c79ea92e3f49e210ca527572 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 23:44:37 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 05/17] apparmor: Redundant condition: prev_ns. in
+ [label.c:1498]
+
+Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d323d2c17cfcc54b6845bfc1d13bca5cef210fc7)
+---
+ security/apparmor/label.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
+index e052eaba1cf6..e324f4df3e34 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
+@@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ static int aa_profile_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view,
+ 		view = profiles_ns(profile);
+ 
+ 	if (view != profile->ns &&
+-	    (!prev_ns || (prev_ns && *prev_ns != profile->ns))) {
++	    (!prev_ns || (*prev_ns != profile->ns))) {
+ 		if (prev_ns)
+ 			*prev_ns = profile->ns;
+ 		ns_name = aa_ns_name(view, profile->ns,
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0006-apparmor-add-the-ability-to-mediate-signals.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+From f9e20353a6c5726775867db81b6085e8ab425a36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 22:56:22 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 06/17] apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
+
+Add signal mediation where the signal can be mediated based on the
+signal, direction, or the label or the peer/target. The signal perms
+are verified on a cross check to ensure policy consistency in the case
+of incremental policy load/replacement.
+
+The optimization of skipping the cross check when policy is guaranteed
+to be consistent (single compile unit) remains to be done.
+
+policy rules have the form of
+  SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]
+                [ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]
+
+  SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST
+
+  SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL
+                           ACCESS ')'
+
+  SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' |
+                    'receive' )
+
+  SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'
+
+  SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALS
+
+  SIGNALS = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' |
+              'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' |
+	      'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' |
+	      'stop' | 'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' |
+	      'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' |
+	      'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32'
+            )
+
+  SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE
+
+eg.
+  signal,                                 # allow all signals
+  signal send set=(hup, kill) peer=foo,
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c6bf1adaecaa719d7c56338cc43b2982214f2f44)
+---
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c        |  7 +++
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h  |  1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h     |  2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/ipc.h       |  6 +++
+ security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/ipc.c               | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c               | 21 ++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 231 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 2caeb748070c..a5f9e1aa51f7 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "include/audit.h"
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/crypto.h"
++#include "include/ipc.h"
+ #include "include/policy_ns.h"
+ #include "include/label.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+@@ -2129,6 +2130,11 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ptrace[] = {
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
++static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = {
++	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_SIG_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
+ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
+ 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",	1),
+ 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",	1),
+@@ -2179,6 +2185,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_SFS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_sfs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_SFS_DIR("caps",			aa_sfs_entry_caps),
+ 	AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace",			aa_sfs_entry_ptrace),
++	AA_SFS_DIR("signal",			aa_sfs_entry_signal),
+ 	AA_SFS_DIR("query",			aa_sfs_entry_query),
+ 	{ }
+ };
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index aaf893f4e4f5..962a20a75e01 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
+ #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE		9
++#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL		10
+ #define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
+ 
+ #define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_LABEL
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index c68839a44351..d9a156ae11b9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ enum audit_type {
+ #define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown"
+ 
+ #define OP_PTRACE "ptrace"
++#define OP_SIGNAL "signal"
+ 
+ #define OP_EXEC "exec"
+ 
+@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			long pos;
+ 			const char *ns;
+ 		} iface;
++		int signal;
+ 		struct {
+ 			int rlim;
+ 			unsigned long max;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+index 656fdb81c8a0..5ffc218d1e74 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+@@ -27,8 +27,14 @@ struct aa_profile;
+ 
+ #define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+ 			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
++#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
++
++#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
++	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
++	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+ 
+ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+ 		  u32 request);
++int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
+ 
+ #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..0d4395f231ca
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++#include <linux/signal.h>
++
++#define SIGUNKNOWN 0
++#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
++/* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
++ * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
++ * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry
++ */
++static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = {
++	[0] = MAXMAPPED_SIG,	/* existence test */
++	[SIGHUP] = 1,
++	[SIGINT] = 2,
++	[SIGQUIT] = 3,
++	[SIGILL] = 4,
++	[SIGTRAP] = 5,		/* -, 5, - */
++	[SIGABRT] = 6,		/*  SIGIOT: -, 6, - */
++	[SIGBUS] = 7,		/* 10, 7, 10 */
++	[SIGFPE] = 8,
++	[SIGKILL] = 9,
++	[SIGUSR1] = 10,		/* 30, 10, 16 */
++	[SIGSEGV] = 11,
++	[SIGUSR2] = 12,		/* 31, 12, 17 */
++	[SIGPIPE] = 13,
++	[SIGALRM] = 14,
++	[SIGTERM] = 15,
++	[SIGSTKFLT] = 16,	/* -, 16, - */
++	[SIGCHLD] = 17,		/* 20, 17, 18.  SIGCHLD -, -, 18 */
++	[SIGCONT] = 18,		/* 19, 18, 25 */
++	[SIGSTOP] = 19,		/* 17, 19, 23 */
++	[SIGTSTP] = 20,		/* 18, 20, 24 */
++	[SIGTTIN] = 21,		/* 21, 21, 26 */
++	[SIGTTOU] = 22,		/* 22, 22, 27 */
++	[SIGURG] = 23,		/* 16, 23, 21 */
++	[SIGXCPU] = 24,		/* 24, 24, 30 */
++	[SIGXFSZ] = 25,		/* 25, 25, 31 */
++	[SIGVTALRM] = 26,	/* 26, 26, 28 */
++	[SIGPROF] = 27,		/* 27, 27, 29 */
++	[SIGWINCH] = 28,	/* 28, 28, 20 */
++	[SIGIO] = 29,		/* SIGPOLL: 23, 29, 22 */
++	[SIGPWR] = 30,		/* 29, 30, 19.  SIGINFO 29, -, - */
++#ifdef SIGSYS
++	[SIGSYS] = 31,		/* 12, 31, 12. often SIG LOST/UNUSED */
++#endif
++#ifdef SIGEMT
++	[SIGEMT] = 32,		/* 7, - , 7 */
++#endif
++#if defined(SIGLOST) && SIGPWR != SIGLOST		/* sparc */
++	[SIGLOST] = 33,		/* unused on Linux */
++#endif
++#if defined(SIGLOST) && defined(SIGSYS) && SIGLOST != SIGSYS
++	[SIGUNUSED] = 34,	/* -, 31, - */
++#endif
++};
++
++/* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */
++static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = {
++	"unknown",
++	"hup",
++	"int",
++	"quit",
++	"ill",
++	"trap",
++	"abrt",
++	"bus",
++	"fpe",
++	"kill",
++	"usr1",
++	"segv",
++	"usr2",
++	"pipe",
++	"alrm",
++	"term",
++	"stkflt",
++	"chld",
++	"cont",
++	"stop",
++	"stp",
++	"ttin",
++	"ttou",
++	"urg",
++	"xcpu",
++	"xfsz",
++	"vtalrm",
++	"prof",
++	"winch",
++	"io",
++	"pwr",
++	"sys",
++	"emt",
++	"lost",
++	"unused",
++
++	"exists",	/* always last existence test mapped to MAXMAPPED_SIG */
++};
++
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+index 11e66b5bbc42..66fb9ede9447 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/sig_names.h"
+ 
+ /**
+  * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+@@ -121,3 +122,101 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
++{
++	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
++		return SIGUNKNOWN;
++	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
++		return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128;	/* rt sigs mapped to 128 */
++	else if (sig <= MAXMAPPED_SIG)
++		return sig_map[sig];
++	return SIGUNKNOWN;
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
++ * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
++ * @mask: permission mask to convert
++ */
++static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
++{
++	if (mask & MAY_READ)
++		audit_log_string(ab, "receive");
++	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
++		audit_log_string(ab, "send");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
++		audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
++		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
++			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
++			audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
++		}
++	}
++	if (aad(sa)->signal <= MAXMAPPED_SIG)
++		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
++				 aad(sa)->signal - 128);
++	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
++	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
++			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
++}
++
++/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */
++static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label,
++				 int signal, struct aa_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
++	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
++			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
++			    signal);
++	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label);
++	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms);
++}
++
++static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
++			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
++			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
++{
++	struct aa_perms perms;
++
++	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
++	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
++		return 0;
++
++	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
++	profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal,
++			     &perms);
++	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
++	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
++}
++
++static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender,
++				struct aa_profile *target,
++				struct common_audit_data *sa)
++{
++	return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa),
++		      profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa));
++}
++
++int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
++{
++	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
++
++	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
++	return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm,
++				      &sa);
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 867bcd154c7e..af22f3dfbcce 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,26 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
++			      int sig, u32 secid)
++{
++	struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
++	int error;
++
++	if (secid)
++		/* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
++		 *  Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
++		 */
++		return 0;
++	cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
++	tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
++	error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
++	aa_put_label(tl);
++	__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+@@ -697,6 +717,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
+ 
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0008-apparmor-cleanup-conditional-check-for-label-in-labe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 763d17c9a18b0df7dbec2740f10dc40d378e3cc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 05:36:40 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 08/17] apparmor: cleanup conditional check for label in
+ label_print
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7e57939b9d67dcfc2c8348fd0e2c76a2f0349c75)
+---
+ security/apparmor/label.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
+index e324f4df3e34..38be7a89cc31 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
+@@ -1450,9 +1450,11 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
+  * cached label name is present and visible
+  * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical
+  */
+-static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label)
++static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
++				   int flags)
+ {
+-	if (label->hname && labels_ns(label) == ns)
++	if (label->hname && (!ns || labels_ns(label) == ns) &&
++	    !(flags & ~FLAG_SHOW_MODE))
+ 		return true;
+ 
+ 	return false;
+@@ -1710,10 +1712,8 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns,
+ 	AA_BUG(!ab);
+ 	AA_BUG(!label);
+ 
+-	if (!ns)
+-		ns = labels_ns(label);
+-
+-	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label) || display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
++	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) ||
++	    display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
+ 		len  = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp);
+ 		if (len == -1) {
+ 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
+@@ -1738,10 +1738,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns,
+ 	AA_BUG(!f);
+ 	AA_BUG(!label);
+ 
+-	if (!ns)
+-		ns = labels_ns(label);
+-
+-	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) {
++	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) {
+ 		char *str;
+ 		int len;
+ 
+@@ -1764,10 +1761,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags,
+ {
+ 	AA_BUG(!label);
+ 
+-	if (!ns)
+-		ns = labels_ns(label);
+-
+-	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) {
++	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) {
+ 		char *str;
+ 		int len;
+ 
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0009-apparmor-add-support-for-absolute-root-view-based-la.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 6b092bbbf9e17b10f709d11b3bc2d7e493617934 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2017 05:39:08 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 09/17] apparmor: add support for absolute root view based
+ labels
+
+With apparmor policy virtualization based on policy namespace View's
+we don't generally want/need absolute root based views, however there
+are cases like debugging and some secid based conversions where
+using a root based view is important.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit eadfbf0898eda94cee0d982626aa24a3146db48b)
+---
+ security/apparmor/include/label.h |  1 +
+ security/apparmor/label.c         | 10 +++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+index 9a283b722755..af22dcbbcb8a 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
+ #define FLAG_SHOW_MODE 1
+ #define FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS 2
+ #define FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED 4
++#define FLAG_ABS_ROOT 8
+ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view,
+ 		      struct aa_label *label, int flags);
+ int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
+index 38be7a89cc31..52b4ef14840d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
+@@ -1607,8 +1607,13 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
+ 	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
+ 	AA_BUG(!label);
+ 
+-	if (!ns)
++	if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) {
++		ns = root_ns;
++		len = snprintf(str, size, "=");
++		update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
++	} else if (!ns) {
+ 		ns = labels_ns(label);
++	}
+ 
+ 	label_for_each(i, label, profile) {
+ 		if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) {
+@@ -1868,6 +1873,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+ 		if (*str == '&')
+ 			str++;
+ 	}
++	if (*str == '=')
++		base = &root_ns->unconfined->label;
++
+ 	error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return ERR_PTR(error);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0010-apparmor-make-policy_unpack-able-to-audit-different-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+From aa4b6bded85552bc5f9f22d2e18ce86c5c17947c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 23:37:18 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 10/17] apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different
+ info messages
+
+Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
+struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
+why an unpack failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1489d896c5649e9ce1b6000b4857f8baa7a6ab63)
+---
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h |  4 +--
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index c3fe1c5ef3bc..620e81169659 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			} fs;
+ 		};
+ 		struct {
+-			const char *name;
+-			long pos;
++			struct aa_profile *profile;
+ 			const char *ns;
++			long pos;
+ 		} iface;
+ 		int signal;
+ 		struct {
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index bda0dce3b582..4ede87c30f8b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+ 		audit_log_format(ab, " ns=");
+ 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns);
+ 	}
+-	if (aad(sa)->iface.name) {
++	if (aad(sa)->name) {
+ 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.name);
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name);
+ 	}
+ 	if (aad(sa)->iface.pos)
+ 		audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos);
+@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name,
+ 		aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+ 	aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name;
+ 	if (new)
+-		aad(&sa)->iface.name = new->base.hname;
++		aad(&sa)->name = new->base.hname;
+ 	else
+-		aad(&sa)->iface.name = name;
++		aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ 	aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ 	aad(&sa)->error = error;
+ 
+@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
++	const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
+ 	size_t ns_len;
+ 	struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
+ 	char *key = NULL;
+@@ -604,8 +605,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len);
+ 	if (tmpns) {
+ 		*ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+-		if (!*ns_name)
++		if (!*ns_name) {
++			info = "out of memory";
+ 			goto fail;
++		}
+ 		name = tmpname;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -624,12 +627,15 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) {
+ 		error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch);
+ 		profile->xmatch = NULL;
++		info = "bad xmatch";
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 	/* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */
+ 	if (profile->xmatch) {
+-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
++		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) {
++			info = "missing xmatch len";
+ 			goto fail;
++		}
+ 		profile->xmatch_len = tmp;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -637,8 +643,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	(void) unpack_str(e, &profile->disconnected, "disconnected");
+ 
+ 	/* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */
+-	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags"))
++	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) {
++		info = "profile missing flags";
+ 		goto fail;
++	}
++	info = "failed to unpack profile flags";
+ 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT)
+@@ -667,6 +676,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 		/* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */
+ 		profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+ 
++	info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities";
+ 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
+@@ -676,6 +686,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities";
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
+ 		/* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
+ 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
+@@ -690,6 +701,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 			goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
++	info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities";
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
+ 		/* optional extended caps mediation mask */
+ 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
+@@ -700,11 +712,14 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 			goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
++	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) {
++		info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits";
+ 		goto fail;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
++		info = "failed to unpack policydb";
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+ 		if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) {
+ 			error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
+@@ -734,6 +749,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
+ 		error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa);
+ 		profile->file.dfa = NULL;
++		info = "failed to unpack profile file rules";
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	} else if (profile->file.dfa) {
+ 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start"))
+@@ -746,10 +762,13 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 	} else
+ 		profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+ 
+-	if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile))
++	if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) {
++		info = "failed to unpack profile transition table";
+ 		goto fail;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) {
++		info = "out of memory";
+ 		profile->data = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile->data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 		if (!profile->data)
+ 			goto fail;
+@@ -761,8 +780,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 		params.hashfn = strhash;
+ 		params.obj_cmpfn = datacmp;
+ 
+-		if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, &params))
++		if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, &params)) {
++			info = "failed to init key, value hash table";
+ 			goto fail;
++		}
+ 
+ 		while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) {
+ 			data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+@@ -784,12 +805,16 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 					       profile->data->p);
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) {
++			info = "failed to unpack end of key, value data table";
+ 			goto fail;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
++	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) {
++		info = "failed to unpack end of profile";
+ 		goto fail;
++	}
+ 
+ 	return profile;
+ 
+@@ -798,8 +823,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
+ 		name = NULL;
+ 	else if (!name)
+ 		name = "unknown";
+-	audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, "failed to unpack profile", e,
+-		    error);
++	audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, info, e, error);
+ 	aa_free_profile(profile);
+ 
+ 	return ERR_PTR(error);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0011-apparmor-add-more-debug-asserts-to-apparmorfs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From ba3f778a2ef31454032c2ca9c99d9212feb4dcf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 23:41:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 11/17] apparmor: add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 52c9542126fb04df1f12c605b6c22719c9096794)
+---
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 8fa6c898c44b..7acea14c850b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -1446,6 +1446,10 @@ void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
++	AA_BUG(!old);
++	AA_BUG(!new);
++	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(old)->lock));
++
+ 	for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
+ 		new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
+ 		if (new->dents[i])
+@@ -1509,6 +1513,9 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
+ 	struct dentry *dent = NULL, *dir;
+ 	int error;
+ 
++	AA_BUG(!profile);
++	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(profile)->lock));
++
+ 	if (!parent) {
+ 		struct aa_profile *p;
+ 		p = aa_deref_parent(profile);
+@@ -1734,6 +1741,7 @@ void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns)
+ 
+ 	if (!ns)
+ 		return;
++	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
+ 
+ 	list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+ 		__aafs_profile_rmdir(child);
+@@ -1906,6 +1914,10 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_ns *parent, *next;
+ 
++	AA_BUG(!root);
++	AA_BUG(!ns);
++	AA_BUG(ns != root && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->parent->lock));
++
+ 	/* is next namespace a child */
+ 	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+ 		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+@@ -1940,6 +1952,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns)
+ static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_ns *root,
+ 					  struct aa_ns *ns)
+ {
++	AA_BUG(!root);
++	AA_BUG(ns && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock));
++
+ 	for (; ns; ns = __next_ns(root, ns)) {
+ 		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+ 			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+@@ -1962,6 +1977,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+ 	struct aa_profile *parent;
+ 	struct aa_ns *ns = p->ns;
+ 
++	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(p)->lock));
++
+ 	/* is next profile a child */
+ 	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+ 		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0013-apparmor-move-new_null_profile-to-after-profile-look.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+From 50d30adbef98a0b6cc531a9413d05f564eb633ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 08:59:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 13/17] apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup
+ fns()
+
+new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns()
+so move instead of doing forward fn declarations.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit cf1e50dfc6f627bc2989b57076b129c330fb3f0a)
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 244ea4a4a8f0..a81a384a63b1 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -289,85 +289,6 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy,
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile
+- * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+- * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+- * @base: name to base the null profile off of
+- * @gfp: type of allocation
+- *
+- * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The
+- * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX.
+- * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied
+- * a unique number
+- *
+- * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+- * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+- * not in use.
+- *
+- * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+- */
+-struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+-				       const char *base, gfp_t gfp)
+-{
+-	struct aa_profile *profile;
+-	char *name;
+-
+-	AA_BUG(!parent);
+-
+-	if (base) {
+-		name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base),
+-			       gfp);
+-		if (name) {
+-			sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base);
+-			goto name;
+-		}
+-		/* fall through to try shorter uniq */
+-	}
+-
+-	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp);
+-	if (!name)
+-		return NULL;
+-	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname,
+-		atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null));
+-
+-name:
+-	/* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */
+-	profile = aa_find_child(parent, basename(name));
+-	if (profile)
+-		goto out;
+-
+-	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp);
+-	if (!profile)
+-		goto fail;
+-
+-	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+-	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL;
+-	if (hat)
+-		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT;
+-	profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags;
+-
+-	/* released on free_profile */
+-	rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
+-	profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns);
+-	profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+-	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+-
+-	mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+-	__add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+-	mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+-
+-	/* refcount released by caller */
+-out:
+-	kfree(name);
+-
+-	return profile;
+-
+-fail:
+-	aa_free_profile(profile);
+-	return NULL;
+-}
+-
+ /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -559,6 +480,85 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
+ }
+ 
+ /**
++ * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile
++ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
++ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
++ * @base: name to base the null profile off of
++ * @gfp: type of allocation
++ *
++ * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The
++ * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX.
++ * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied
++ * a unique number
++ *
++ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
++ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
++ * not in use.
++ *
++ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
++ */
++struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
++				       const char *base, gfp_t gfp)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	char *name;
++
++	AA_BUG(!parent);
++
++	if (base) {
++		name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base),
++			       gfp);
++		if (name) {
++			sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base);
++			goto name;
++		}
++		/* fall through to try shorter uniq */
++	}
++
++	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp);
++	if (!name)
++		return NULL;
++	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname,
++		atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null));
++
++name:
++	/* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */
++	profile = aa_find_child(parent, basename(name));
++	if (profile)
++		goto out;
++
++	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp);
++	if (!profile)
++		goto fail;
++
++	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
++	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL;
++	if (hat)
++		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT;
++	profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags;
++
++	/* released on free_profile */
++	rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
++	profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns);
++	profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
++	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
++
++	mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
++	__add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
++	mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
++
++	/* refcount released by caller */
++out:
++	kfree(name);
++
++	return profile;
++
++fail:
++	aa_free_profile(profile);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/**
+  * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed
+  * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced  (MAYBE NULL)
+  * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0014-apparmor-fix-race-condition-in-null-profile-creation.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From ab3b869791b6122c7be7e68ca4c08e2c2e8815ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 05:40:49 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 14/17] apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation
+
+There is a race when null- profile is being created between the
+initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the
+profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being
+added to the list which need to be removed/replaced.
+
+Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3aa3de2a4fb8f33ec62b00998bc6b6c6850d41b1)
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index a81a384a63b1..4243b0c3f0e4 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -500,7 +500,8 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
+ struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+ 				       const char *base, gfp_t gfp)
+ {
+-	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	struct aa_profile *p, *profile;
++	const char *bname;
+ 	char *name;
+ 
+ 	AA_BUG(!parent);
+@@ -523,7 +524,8 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+ 
+ name:
+ 	/* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */
+-	profile = aa_find_child(parent, basename(name));
++	bname = basename(name);
++	profile = aa_find_child(parent, bname);
+ 	if (profile)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -544,7 +546,13 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
+ 	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+-	__add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
++	p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname);
++	if (p) {
++		aa_free_profile(profile);
++		profile = aa_get_profile(p);
++	} else {
++		__add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
++	}
+ 	mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+ 
+ 	/* refcount released by caller */
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0015-apparmor-ensure-unconfined-profiles-have-dfas-initia.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 7f2cdd6453518ff76c3855255c91306a2b928c9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 05:48:06 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 15/17] apparmor: ensure unconfined profiles have dfas
+ initialized
+
+Generally unconfined has early bailout tests and does not need the
+dfas initialized, however if an early bailout test is ever missed
+it will result in an oops.
+
+Be defensive and initialize the unconfined profile to have null dfas
+(no permission) so if an early bailout test is missed we fail
+closed (no perms granted) instead of oopsing.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 034ad2d248927722bdcd1aedb62634cdc2049113)
+---
+ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+index 351d3bab3a3d..62a3589c62ab 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name)
+ 	ns->unconfined->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
+ 		FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+ 	ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
++	ns->unconfined->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
++	ns->unconfined->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+ 
+ 	/* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */
+ 	ns->unconfined->ns = ns;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/0016-apparmor-fix-incorrect-type-assignment-when-freeing-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 8daf877473653c06a28c86bf72d63ce7e5c1d542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 09:33:48 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 16/17] apparmor: fix incorrect type assignment when freeing
+ proxies
+
+sparse reports
+
+poisoning the proxy->label before freeing the struct is resulting in
+a sparse build warning.
+../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
+../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30:    expected struct aa_label [noderef] <asn:4>*label
+../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30:    got struct aa_label *<noident>
+
+fix with RCU_INIT_POINTER as this is one of those cases where
+rcu_assign_pointer() is not needed.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 76e22e212a850bbd16cf49f9c586d4635507e0b5)
+---
+ security/apparmor/label.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
+index 52b4ef14840d..c5b99b954580 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void free_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy)
+ 		/* p->label will not updated any more as p is dead */
+ 		aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(proxy->label, true));
+ 		memset(proxy, 0, sizeof(*proxy));
+-		proxy->label = (struct aa_label *) PROXY_POISON;
++		RCU_INIT_POINTER(proxy->label, (struct aa_label *)PROXY_POISON);
+ 		kfree(proxy);
+ 	}
+ }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.13/README

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+The old out of tree patches have been dropped.
+
+This series is a backport of the patches currently in security-next
+scheduled for 4.14, with the exception of the last patch for af_unix
+mediation.

kernel-patches/v4.14/README

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+This is based on v4.14 final
+
+base socket mediation and af_unix-mediation are the last two remaining
+patches that are out of tree

kernel-patches/v4.8/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+From 269384ead6a3c82ac31fd3778e899ccc6a54358e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+Base support for network mediation.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/.gitignore       |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/Makefile         |  42 +++++++++-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |   4 +
+ security/apparmor/include/net.h    |  44 ++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/include/policy.h |   3 +
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c            | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/net.c            | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ security/apparmor/policy.c         |   1 +
+ security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |  46 +++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index d693df874818..5dbb72f46452 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+ 
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ 	    -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+ 	     tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    [1] = "local",
++#    [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
++# to
++#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
++# to
++#    [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++	echo "};" >> $@
+ 
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+ 
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ 			    $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ 		      $(src)/Makefile
+ 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++		     $(src)/Makefile
++	$(call cmd,make-af)
++	$(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 729e595119ed..181d961e6d58 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("policy",			aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
++	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index ba3dfd17f23f..5d3c419b17d9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			u32 denied;
+ 			kuid_t ouid;
+ 		} fs;
++		struct {
++			int type, protocol;
++			struct sock *sk;
++		} net;
+ 	};
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..cb8a12109b7a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
++
++#include <net/sock.h>
++
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
++
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
++
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
++
++extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
++
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
++{
++	/* NOP */
++}
++
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index 52275f040a5f..4fc4dacc1101 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+ 
+ extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
+@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ struct aa_replacedby {
+  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+  *
+  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+@@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ 	struct aa_policydb policy;
+ 	struct aa_file_rules file;
+ 	struct aa_caps caps;
++	struct aa_net net;
+ 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ 
+ 	unsigned char *hash;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 41b8cb115801..d96b5f7c1912 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
+@@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (kern)
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++				    NULL);
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++				      int optname)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
++}
++
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++
++	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
++}
++
+ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+@@ -613,6 +712,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..003dd18c61a5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++#include "net_names.h"
++
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++	{ }
++};
++
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
++		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
++	} else {
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
++	}
++	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
++		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa;
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
++	if (sk) {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
++	} else {
++		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	}
++	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.u.net = &net;
++	sa.aad->op = op,
++	sa.u.net->family = family;
++	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
++	sa.aad->net.type = type;
++	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
++		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++		u16 kill_mask = 0;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++
++		if (denied & kill_mask)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
++	}
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type:   network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
++		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	u16 family_mask;
++	int error;
++
++	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++		return 0;
++
++	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
++
++	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
++
++	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++	 */
++	if (in_interrupt())
++		return 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++	return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 179e68d7dc5f..f1a8541760e8 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+ 
+ 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+ 
+ 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 138120698f83..7dc15ff91299 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
++{
++	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++			return 0;
++		if (data)
++			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ 	const char *name = NULL;
++	size_t size = 0;
+ 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
+ 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+ 	u32 tmp;
+@@ -576,6 +590,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
++	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++	if (size) {
++
++		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++			 * never request
++			 */
++			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++				u16 tmp;
++				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++					goto fail;
++				continue;
++			}
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++				goto fail;
++		}
++		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++			goto fail;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++	 * by IPC
++	 */
++	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.8/0002-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 88ba6f37ed824ca24901fca7e399168db5e46f12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
+ mediation
+
+If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/net.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 003dd18c61a5..6e6e5c981006 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ 	} else {
+ 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+-		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
+ 
+ 		if (denied & kill_mask)
+ 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

kernel-patches/v4.8/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,962 @@
+From 6556d6523f74e90a801503d28e7b8dcc5caa6a1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+
+Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+The basic form of the rules are.
+
+  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+  where [conds] can be
+    fstype=<expr>
+    options=<expr>
+
+Example mount commands
+  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
+
+  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+  umount,
+
+  umount /m*,
+
+See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ security/apparmor/Makefile           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |  15 +-
+ security/apparmor/audit.c            |   4 +
+ security/apparmor/domain.c           |   2 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |   3 +-
+ security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |  11 +
+ security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |   2 +
+ security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |  54 +++
+ security/apparmor/lsm.c              |  60 ++++
+ security/apparmor/mount.c            | 620 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 10 files changed, 769 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+ create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 5dbb72f46452..89b344541868 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+ 
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+-              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
++              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+ 
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 181d961e6d58..5fb67f60bace 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -800,7 +800,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ 
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",          1),
+-	{}
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++	{ }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
++	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
++	{ }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+@@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
++	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
++	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ 	AA_FS_DIR("caps",			aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+index 3a7f1da1425e..c2a8b8ac38a7 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
+ 	"file_mmap",
+ 	"file_mprotect",
+ 
++	"pivotroot",
++	"mount",
++	"umount",
++
+ 	"create",
+ 	"post_create",
+ 	"bind",
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index fc3036b34e51..f2a83b4430db 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+  *
+  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+  */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 5d721e990876..b57da7b9f8bd 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
+ 
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+ 
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 5d3c419b17d9..b9f1d57984ca 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
+ 	OP_FMMAP,
+ 	OP_FMPROT,
+ 
++	OP_PIVOTROOT,
++	OP_MOUNT,
++	OP_UMOUNT,
++
+ 	OP_CREATE,
+ 	OP_POST_CREATE,
+ 	OP_BIND,
+@@ -120,6 +124,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ 			unsigned long max;
+ 		} rlim;
+ 		struct {
++			const char *src_name;
++			const char *type;
++			const char *trans;
++			const char *data;
++			unsigned long flags;
++		} mnt;
++		struct {
+ 			const char *target;
+ 			u32 request;
+ 			u32 denied;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index de04464f0a3f..a3f70c58ef3d 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ 	char **table;
+ };
+ 
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..a43b1d62e428
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
++
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
++
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
++
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
++
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags);
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *old_name);
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data);
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path);
++
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index d96b5f7c1912..5ff9984cba5a 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+@@ -469,6 +470,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+ 
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
++			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	/* Discard magic */
++	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
++			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++		else
++			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++					     flags, data);
++	}
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
++				 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct aa_profile *profile;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	profile = __aa_current_profile();
++	if (!unconfined(profile))
++		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ 				char **value)
+ {
+@@ -689,6 +745,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ 
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
++	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
++
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+ 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..9cf9170b4976
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
++/*
++ * AppArmor security module
++ *
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
++#include "include/policy.h"
++
++
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++	else
++		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++	if (flags & MS_BIND)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++				 ", unbindable");
++	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++				 ", private");
++	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++				 ", slave");
++	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++				 ", shared");
++	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
++{
++	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
++
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
++		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++	}
++	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
++		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
++		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
++		       const char *type, const char *trans,
++		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++	struct common_audit_data sa = { };
++	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++
++	if (likely(!error)) {
++		u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++			mask = 0xffff;
++
++		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++		request &= mask;
++
++		if (likely(!request))
++			return 0;
++		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++	} else {
++		/* only report permissions that were denied */
++		request = request & ~perms->allow;
++
++		if (request & perms->kill)
++			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
++
++		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++			request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++		if (!request)
++			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++				complain_error(error) : error;
++	}
++
++	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++	sa.aad = &aad;
++	sa.aad->op = op;
++	sa.aad->name = name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
++	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
++	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
++	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
++	sa.aad->info = info;
++	sa.aad->error = error;
++
++	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
++ *
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
++ */
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++				    unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++		if ((1 << i) & flags)
++			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
++	}
++
++	return state;
++}
++
++/**
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
++ *
++ * Returns: mount permissions
++ */
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++					   unsigned int state)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms;
++
++	perms.kill = 0;
++	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
++
++	return perms;
++}
++
++static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
++	"match succeeded",
++	"failed mntpnt match",
++	"failed srcname match",
++	"failed type match",
++	"failed flags match",
++	"failed data match"
++};
++
++/*
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
++ */
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
++{
++	unsigned int state;
++
++	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (devname)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 2;
++
++	if (type)
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++	if (!state)
++		return 3;
++
++	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++	if (!state)
++		return 4;
++	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++		if (!state)
++			return 4;
++
++		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++		if (!state)
++			return 5;
++		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* failed at end of flags match */
++	return 4;
++}
++
++/**
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++		     const char *devname, const char *type,
++		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++	int pos;
++
++	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++	if (pos) {
++		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
++{
++	return profile->path_flags |
++		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
++
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	int binary, error;
++
++	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++			 unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++			  &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++		  const char *orig_name)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	struct path old_path;
++	int error;
++
++	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	path_put(&old_path);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++			    info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++		 void *data)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int binary = 1;
++	int error;
++
++	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++	if (type) {
++		int requires_dev;
++		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++		if (!fstype)
++			return -ENODEV;
++
++		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++		put_filesystem(fstype);
++
++		if (requires_dev) {
++			struct path dev_path;
++
++			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++				error = -ENOENT;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++
++			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++			path_put(&dev_path);
++			if (error)
++				goto audit;
++		}
++	}
++
++	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++			  &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
++			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++			    error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++	kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++	return error;
++
++}
++
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	char *buffer = NULL;
++	const char *name, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++			     &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++	kfree(buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++		 const struct path *new_path)
++{
++	struct file_perms perms = { };
++	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++	int error;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++	if (error)
++		goto audit;
++
++	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++		unsigned int state;
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++				     new_name);
++		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++	}
++
++	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++			if (!target)
++				error = -ENOENT;
++			else
++				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
++		}
++	} else
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++audit:
++	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++	aa_put_profile(target);
++	kfree(old_buffer);
++	kfree(new_buffer);
++
++	return error;
++}
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

libraries/libapparmor/configure.ac

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ if test "$with_perl" = "yes"; then
    AC_PATH_PROG(PERL, perl)
    test -z "$PERL" && AC_MSG_ERROR([perl is required when enabling perl bindings])
    perl_includedir="`$PERL -e 'use Config; print $Config{archlib}'`/CORE"
-   AC_CHECK_FILE($perl_includedir/perl.h, enable_perl=yes, enable_perl=no)
+   AS_IF([test -e "$perl_includedir/perl.h"], enable_perl=yes, enable_perl=no)
 fi
 
 
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_RUBY, test x$with_ruby = xyes)
 AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(unistd.h stdint.h syslog.h)
 
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([asprintf __secure_getenv secure_getenv])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([asprintf __secure_getenv secure_getenv reallocarray])
 
 AM_PROG_CC_C_O
 AC_C_CONST

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_change_hat.pod

@@ -257,6 +257,6 @@ should be used.
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_profile(2),
 aa_getcon(2) and
-L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_change_profile.pod

@@ -204,6 +204,6 @@ separate processes should be used.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_hat(2) and
-L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_features.pod

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ aa_features_is_equal - equality test for two aa_features objects
 
 aa_features_supports - provides aa_features object support status
 
+aa_features_id - provides unique identifier for an aa_features object
+
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
 B<#include E<lt>sys/apparmor.hE<gt>>
@@ -62,6 +64,8 @@ B<bool aa_features_is_equal(aa_features *features1, aa_features *features2);>
 
 B<bool aa_features_supports(aa_features *features, const char *str);>
 
+B<char *aa_features_id(aa_features *features);>
+
 Link with B<-lapparmor> when compiling.
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -108,6 +112,12 @@ the path, relative to the "apparmor/features/" directory of securityfs, of the
 feature to query. For example, to test if policy version 6 is supported, I<str>
 would be "policy/versions/v6".
 
+The aa_features_id() function returns a string representation of an
+identifier that can be used to uniquely identify an I<aa_features> object.
+The mechanism for generating the string representation is internal to
+libapparmor and subject to change but an example implementation is
+applying a hash function to the features string.
+
 =head1 RETURN VALUE
 
 The aa_features_new() family of functions return 0 on success and I<*features>
@@ -126,15 +136,23 @@ and false if they are not equal.
 aa_features_supports() returns true if the feature represented by I<str> is
 supported and false if it is not supported.
 
+aa_features_id() returns a string identifying I<features> which must be
+freed by the caller. NULL is returned on error, with errno set
+appropriately.
+
 =head1 ERRORS
 
 The errno value will be set according to the underlying error in the
-I<aa_features> family of functions that return -1 on error.
+I<aa_features> family of functions that return -1 or NULL on error.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
-All aa_features functions described above are present in libapparmor version
-2.10 and newer.
+The aa_features_id() function can be found in libapparmor version
+2.13. All the other aa_feature functions described above are present
+in libapparmor version 2.10.
+
+aa_features_unref() saves the value of errno when called and restores errno
+before exiting in libapparmor version 2.12 and newer.
 
 =head1 BUGS
 
@@ -143,6 +161,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-openat(2) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+openat(2) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_find_mountpoint.pod

@@ -115,6 +115,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), and
-L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_getcon.pod

@@ -132,6 +132,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_profile(2),
-aa_splitcon(3) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+aa_splitcon(3) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_kernel_interface.pod

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ I<*kernel_interface> will point to an I<aa_kernel_interface> object that must
 be freed by aa_kernel_interface_unref(). -1 is returned on error, with errno
 set appropriately, and I<*kernel_interface> will be set to NULL.
 
-aa_kernel_features_ref() returns the value of I<kernel_features>.
+aa_kernel_interface_ref() returns the value of I<kernel_interface>.
 
 The aa_kernel_interface_load() family of functions, the
 aa_kernel_interface_replace() family of functions,
@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ I<aa_kernel_interface> family of functions that return -1 on error.
 All aa_kernel_interface functions described above are present in libapparmor
 version 2.10 and newer.
 
+aa_kernel_interface_unref() saves the value of errno when called and restores
+errno before exiting in libapparmor version 2.12 and newer.
+
 =head1 BUGS
 
 None known. If you find any, please report them at
@@ -157,6 +160,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-aa_features(3), openat(2) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+aa_features(3), openat(2) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_policy_cache.pod

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ aa_policy_cache_remove - removes all policy cache files under a path
 
 aa_policy_cache_replace_all - performs a kernel policy replacement of all cached policies
 
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path - returns the path to the aa_policy_cache directory
+
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview - returns a preview of the path to the aa_policy_cache directory without an existing aa_policy_cache object
+
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
 B<#include E<lt>sys/apparmor.hE<gt>>
@@ -42,6 +46,8 @@ B<typedef struct aa_policy_cache aa_policy_cache;>
 
 B<int aa_policy_cache_new(aa_policy_cache **policy_cache, aa_features *kernel_features, int dirfd, const char *path, uint16_t max_caches);>
 
+B<int aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dirfd, const char *path);>
+
 B<aa_policy_cache *aa_policy_cache_ref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache);>
 
 B<void aa_policy_cache_unref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache);>
@@ -50,6 +56,10 @@ B<int aa_policy_cache_remove(int dirfd, const char *path);>
 
 B<int aa_policy_cache_replace_all(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interface);>
 
+B<char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int level);>
+
+B<char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview(aa_features *kernel_features, int dirfd, const char *path);>
+
 Link with B<-lapparmor> when compiling.
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -59,19 +69,35 @@ policy cache files. The policy cache files are the binary representation of a
 human-readable AppArmor profile. The binary representation is the form that is
 loaded into the kernel.
 
-The aa_policy_cache_new() function creates an I<aa_policy_cache> object based
-upon a directory file descriptor and path. The I<path> must point to a
-directory. See the openat(2) man page for examples of I<dirfd> and I<path>. If
-I<kernel_features> is NULL, then the features of the current kernel are used.
-When specifying a valid I<kernel_features> object, it must be the compatible
-with the features of the kernel of interest. The value of I<max_caches> should
-be equal to the number of caches that should be allowed before old caches are
-automatically reaped. The definition of what is considered to be an old cache
-is private to libapparmor. Specifying 0 means that no new caches should be
-created and only existing, valid caches may be used. Specifying UINT16_MAX
-means that a new cache may be created and that the reaping of old caches is
-disabled. The allocated I<aa_policy_cache> object must be freed using
-aa_policy_cache_unref().
+The aa_policy_cache_new() function creates an I<aa_policy_cache>
+object based upon a directory file descriptor and path. See the
+openat(2) man page for examples of I<dirfd> and I<path>. The I<path>
+must point to a directory and it will be used as the basis for the
+location of policy cache files. See I<aa_policy_cache_dir_path> to
+find out which directory will be used to store the binary policy cache
+files. If additional overlay cache directories are used (see
+I<aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir>) the directory specified in
+I<aa_policy_cache_new> is the first directory searched and is the
+writable overlay. If I<kernel_features> is NULL, then the features of
+the current kernel are used. When specifying a valid
+I<kernel_features> object, it must be compatible with the features
+of the kernel of interest.  The value of I<max_caches> should be equal
+to the number of caches that should be allowed before old caches are
+automatically reaped. The definition of what is considered to be an
+old cache is private to libapparmor. Specifying 0 means that no new
+caches should be created and only existing, valid caches may be used.
+Specifying UINT16_MAX means that a new cache may be created and that
+the reaping of old caches is disabled. The allocated
+I<aa_policy_cache> object must be freed using aa_policy_cache_unref().
+
+The aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir() function adds an existing cache directory
+to the policy cache, as a readonly layer under the primary directory
+the cache was created with. When the cache is searched for an existing
+cache file the primary directory will be searched and then the readonly
+directories in the order that they were added to the policy cache.
+This allows the policy cache to be seeded with precompiled policy
+that can be updated by overlaying the read only cache file with one
+written to the primary cache dir.
 
 aa_policy_cache_ref() increments the reference count on the I<policy_cache>
 object.
@@ -90,6 +116,18 @@ the I<policy_cache> object. If I<kernel_interface> is NULL, then the current
 kernel interface is used. When specifying a valid I<kernel_interface> object,
 it must be the interface of the currently running kernel.
 
+The aa_policy_cache_dir_path() function provides the path to the cache
+directory for a I<policy_cache> object at I<level> in the policy cache
+overlay of cache directories. A I<level> of 0 will always be present
+and is the first directory to search in an overlay of cache
+directories, and will also be the writable cache directory
+layer. Binary policy cache files will be located in the directory
+returned by this function.
+
+The aa_policy_cache_dir_levels() function provides access to the number
+of directories that are being overlayed to create the policy cache.
+
+
 =head1 RETURN VALUE
 
 The aa_policy_cache_new() function returns 0 on success and I<*policy_cache>
@@ -102,15 +140,32 @@ aa_policy_cache_ref() returns the value of I<policy_cache>.
 aa_policy_cache_remove() and aa_policy_cache_replace_all() return 0 on success.
 -1 is returned on error, with errno set appropriately.
 
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path() returns a path string which must be freed by the
+caller. NULL is returned on error, with errno set appropriately.
+
+aa_policy_cache_dir_levels() returns a number indicating the number of
+directory levels there are associated with the I<policy_cache>.
+
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview() is the same as
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path() except that it doesn't require an existing
+I<aa_policy_cache> object. This is useful if the calling program cannot
+create an I<aa_policy_cache> object due to lack of privileges needed to
+create the cache directory.
+
 =head1 ERRORS
 
 The errno value will be set according to the underlying error in the
-I<aa_policy_cache> family of functions that return -1 on error.
+I<aa_policy_cache> family of functions that return -1 or NULL on error.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
-All aa_policy_cache functions described above are present in libapparmor
-version 2.10 and newer.
+All aa_policy_cache functions described above, except for the
+aa_policy_cache_dir_path() function was added in libapparmor version
+2.13. All the other aa_policy_cache functions described above are
+present in libapparmor version 2.10.
+
+aa_policy_cache_unref() saves the value of errno when called and restores errno
+before exiting in libapparmor version 2.12 and newer.
 
 =head1 BUGS
 
@@ -120,6 +175,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 aa_features(3), aa_kernel_interface(3), openat(2) and
-L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_query_label.pod

@@ -128,6 +128,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_getcon(2), aa_splitcon(3)
-and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_splitcon.pod

@@ -67,6 +67,6 @@ L<https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+filebug>.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-aa_getcon(2) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+aa_getcon(2) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/doc/aa_stack_profile.pod

@@ -216,6 +216,6 @@ separate processes should be used.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_profile(2),
-aa_getcon(2) and L<http://wiki.apparmor.net>.
+aa_getcon(2) and L<https://wiki.apparmor.net>.
 
 =cut

libraries/libapparmor/include/sys/apparmor.h

@@ -20,9 +20,12 @@
 
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
-__BEGIN_DECLS
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Class of public mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
@@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ extern int aa_is_enabled(void);
 extern int aa_find_mountpoint(char **mnt);
 
 /* Prototypes for self directed domain transitions
- * see <http://apparmor.net>
+ * see <https://apparmor.net>
  * Please see the change_hat(2) manpage for information.
  */
 
@@ -152,6 +155,7 @@ extern int aa_features_write_to_file(aa_features *features,
 extern bool aa_features_is_equal(aa_features *features1,
 				 aa_features *features2);
 extern bool aa_features_supports(aa_features *features, const char *str);
+extern char *aa_features_id(aa_features *features);
 
 typedef struct aa_kernel_interface aa_kernel_interface;
 extern int aa_kernel_interface_new(aa_kernel_interface **kernel_interface,
@@ -184,13 +188,25 @@ extern int aa_policy_cache_new(aa_policy_cache **policy_cache,
 			       aa_features *kernel_features,
 			       int dirfd, const char *path,
 			       uint16_t max_caches);
+extern int aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dirfd,
+				      const char *path);
 extern aa_policy_cache *aa_policy_cache_ref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache);
 extern void aa_policy_cache_unref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache);
 
 extern int aa_policy_cache_remove(int dirfd, const char *path);
 extern int aa_policy_cache_replace_all(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache,
 				       aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interface);
+extern int aa_policy_cache_no_dirs(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache);
+extern char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int n);
+extern int aa_policy_cache_dirfd(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dir);
+extern int aa_policy_cache_open(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, const char *name,
+				int flags);
+extern char *aa_policy_cache_filename(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, const char *name);
+extern char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview(aa_features *kernel_features,
+					      int dirfd, const char *path);
 
-__END_DECLS
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 
 #endif	/* sys/apparmor.h */

libraries/libapparmor/include/sys/apparmor_private.h

@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 
-__BEGIN_DECLS
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 
 int _aa_is_blacklisted(const char *name);
 
@@ -32,7 +34,11 @@ int _aa_asprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, ...);
 
 int _aa_dirat_for_each(int dirfd, const char *name, void *data,
 		       int (* cb)(int, const char *, struct stat *, void *));
+int _aa_overlaydirat_for_each(int dirfd[], int n, void *data,
+			int (* cb)(int, const char *, struct stat *, void *));
 
-__END_DECLS
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 
 #endif	/* sys/apparmor_private.h */

libraries/libapparmor/m4/ac_python_devel.m4

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ variable to configure. See ``configure --help'' for reference.
         # Check if you have distutils, else fail
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for the distutils Python package])
-        ac_distutils_result=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils" 2>&1`
+        ac_distutils_result=`$PYTHON -c "import distutils" 2>&1 | grep -v DeprecationWarning`
         if test -z "$ac_distutils_result"; then
                 AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
         else
@@ -75,12 +75,14 @@ $ac_distutils_result])
                 PYTHON_VERSION=""
         fi
 
+        AC_PATH_TOOL([PYTHON_CONFIG],[`basename $PYTHON`-config])
+
         #
         # Check for Python include path
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Python include path])
-        if type $PYTHON-config; then
-                PYTHON_CPPFLAGS=`$PYTHON-config --includes`
+        if test -n "$PYTHON_CONFIG"; then
+                PYTHON_CPPFLAGS=`$PYTHON_CONFIG --includes`
         fi
         if test -z "$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"; then
                 python_path=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig;\
@@ -97,8 +99,8 @@ sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % distutils.sysconfig.get_python_inc());"`
         # Check for Python library path
         #
         AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Python library path])
-        if type $PYTHON-config; then
-                PYTHON_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON-config --ldflags`
+        if test -n "$PYTHON_CONFIG"; then
+                PYTHON_LDFLAGS=`$PYTHON_CONFIG --ldflags`
         fi
         if test -z "$PYTHON_LDFLAGS"; then
                 # (makes two attempts to ensure we've got a version number
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % distutils.sysconfig.get_python_lib(0,0));"`
         if test -z "$PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS"; then
            PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS=`$PYTHON -c "import sys; import distutils.sysconfig; \
 conf = distutils.sysconfig.get_config_var; \
-sys.stdout.write('%s %s\n' % (conf('LOCALMODLIBS'), conf('LIBS')))"`
+sys.stdout.write('%s %s %s\n' % (conf('BLDLIBRARY'), conf('LOCALMODLIBS'), conf('LIBS')))"`
         fi
         AC_MSG_RESULT([$PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS])
         AC_SUBST(PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS)
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ sys.stdout.write('%s\n' % conf('LINKFORSHARED'))"`
         # save current global flags
         ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS"
         ac_save_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
-        LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS $PYTHON_LDFLAGS"
+        LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS $PYTHON_LDFLAGS $PYTHON_EXTRA_LIBS"
         CPPFLAGS="$ac_save_CPPFLAGS $PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"
         AC_TRY_LINK([
                 #include <Python.h>

libraries/libapparmor/src/Makefile.am

@@ -26,29 +26,29 @@ INCLUDES = $(all_includes)
 # For more information, see:
 # http://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Libtool-versioning.html
 #
-AA_LIB_CURRENT = 5
-AA_LIB_REVISION = 0
-AA_LIB_AGE = 4
+AA_LIB_CURRENT = 7
+AA_LIB_REVISION = 3
+AA_LIB_AGE = 6
 
 SUFFIXES = .pc.in .pc
 
 BUILT_SOURCES = grammar.h scanner.h af_protos.h
 AM_LFLAGS = -v
 AM_YFLAGS = -d -p aalogparse_
-AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
+AM_CFLAGS = -Wall -flto-partition=none
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -I$(top_srcdir)/include/
 scanner.h: scanner.l
 	$(LEX) -v $<
 
 scanner.c: scanner.l
 
-af_protos.h: /usr/include/netinet/in.h
-	 LC_ALL=C  sed  -n -e "/IPPROTO_MAX/d"  -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+IPPROTO_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)$$/AA_GEN_PROTO_ENT(\\UIPPROTO_\\1, \"\\L\\1\")/p" $< > $@
+af_protos.h:
+	 echo '#include <netinet/in.h>' | $(CC) -E -dM - | LC_ALL=C  sed  -n -e "/IPPROTO_MAX/d"  -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+IPPROTO_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)$$/AA_GEN_PROTO_ENT(\\UIPPROTO_\\1, \"\\L\\1\")/p" > $@
 
 lib_LTLIBRARIES = libapparmor.la
-noinst_HEADERS = grammar.h parser.h scanner.h af_protos.h private.h
+noinst_HEADERS = grammar.h parser.h scanner.h af_protos.h private.h PMurHash.h
 
-libapparmor_la_SOURCES = grammar.y libaalogparse.c kernel.c scanner.c private.c features.c kernel_interface.c policy_cache.c
+libapparmor_la_SOURCES = grammar.y libaalogparse.c kernel.c scanner.c private.c features.c kernel_interface.c policy_cache.c PMurHash.c
 libapparmor_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info $(AA_LIB_CURRENT):$(AA_LIB_REVISION):$(AA_LIB_AGE) -XCClinker -dynamic -pthread \
 	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/src/libapparmor.map
 

libraries/libapparmor/src/PMurHash.c

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * MurmurHash3 was written by Austin Appleby, and is placed in the public
+ * domain.
+ *
+ * This implementation was written by Shane Day, and is also public domain.
+ *
+ * This is a portable ANSI C implementation of MurmurHash3_x86_32 (Murmur3A)
+ * with support for progressive processing.
+ */
+
+/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ 
+If you want to understand the MurmurHash algorithm you would be much better
+off reading the original source. Just point your browser at:
+http://code.google.com/p/smhasher/source/browse/trunk/MurmurHash3.cpp
+
+
+What this version provides?
+
+1. Progressive data feeding. Useful when the entire payload to be hashed
+does not fit in memory or when the data is streamed through the application.
+Also useful when hashing a number of strings with a common prefix. A partial
+hash of a prefix string can be generated and reused for each suffix string.
+
+2. Portability. Plain old C so that it should compile on any old compiler.
+Both CPU endian and access-alignment neutral, but avoiding inefficient code
+when possible depending on CPU capabilities.
+
+3. Drop in. I personally like nice self contained public domain code, making it
+easy to pilfer without loads of refactoring to work properly in the existing
+application code & makefile structure and mucking around with licence files.
+Just copy PMurHash.h and PMurHash.c and you're ready to go.
+
+
+How does it work?
+
+We can only process entire 32 bit chunks of input, except for the very end
+that may be shorter. So along with the partial hash we need to give back to
+the caller a carry containing up to 3 bytes that we were unable to process.
+This carry also needs to record the number of bytes the carry holds. I use
+the low 2 bits as a count (0..3) and the carry bytes are shifted into the
+high byte in stream order.
+
+To handle endianess I simply use a macro that reads a uint32_t and define
+that macro to be a direct read on little endian machines, a read and swap
+on big endian machines, or a byte-by-byte read if the endianess is unknown.
+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+
+#include "PMurHash.h"
+
+/* I used ugly type names in the header to avoid potential conflicts with
+ * application or system typedefs & defines. Since I'm not including any more
+ * headers below here I can rename these so that the code reads like C99 */
+#undef uint32_t
+#define uint32_t MH_UINT32
+#undef uint8_t
+#define uint8_t  MH_UINT8
+
+/* MSVC warnings we choose to ignore */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+  #pragma warning(disable: 4127) /* conditional expression is constant */
+#endif
+
+/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Endianess, misalignment capabilities and util macros
+ *
+ * The following 3 macros are defined in this section. The other macros defined
+ * are only needed to help derive these 3.
+ *
+ * READ_UINT32(x)   Read a little endian unsigned 32-bit int
+ * UNALIGNED_SAFE   Defined if READ_UINT32 works on non-word boundaries
+ * ROTL32(x,r)      Rotate x left by r bits
+ */
+
+/* Convention is to define __BYTE_ORDER == to one of these values */
+#if !defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
+  #define __BIG_ENDIAN 4321
+#endif
+#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+  #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+#endif
+
+/* I386 */
+#if defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__i386) || defined(i386)
+  #define __BYTE_ORDER __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+  #define UNALIGNED_SAFE
+#endif
+
+/* gcc 'may' define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ or __BIG_ENDIAN__ to 1 (Note the trailing __),
+ * or even _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (Note the single _ prefix) */
+#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER)
+  #if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __LITTLE_ENDIAN__==1 || defined(_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && _LITTLE_ENDIAN==1
+    #define __BYTE_ORDER __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+  #elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BIG_ENDIAN__==1 || defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) && _BIG_ENDIAN==1
+    #define __BYTE_ORDER __BIG_ENDIAN
+  #endif
+#endif
+
+/* gcc (usually) defines xEL/EB macros for ARM and MIPS endianess */
+#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER)
+  #if defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL__)
+    #define __BYTE_ORDER __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+  #endif
+  #if defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB__)
+    #define __BYTE_ORDER __BIG_ENDIAN
+  #endif
+#endif
+
+/* Now find best way we can to READ_UINT32 */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER==__LITTLE_ENDIAN
+  /* CPU endian matches murmurhash algorithm, so read 32-bit word directly */
+  #define READ_UINT32(ptr)   (*((uint32_t*)(ptr)))
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER==__BIG_ENDIAN
+  /* TODO: Add additional cases below where a compiler provided bswap32 is available */
+  #if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__==4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=3))
+    #define READ_UINT32(ptr)   (__builtin_bswap32(*((uint32_t*)(ptr))))
+  #else
+    /* Without a known fast bswap32 we're just as well off doing this */
+    #define READ_UINT32(ptr)   (ptr[0]|ptr[1]<<8|ptr[2]<<16|ptr[3]<<24)
+    #define UNALIGNED_SAFE
+  #endif
+#else
+  /* Unknown endianess so last resort is to read individual bytes */
+  #define READ_UINT32(ptr)   (ptr[0]|ptr[1]<<8|ptr[2]<<16|ptr[3]<<24)
+
+  /* Since we're not doing word-reads we can skip the messing about with realignment */
+  #define UNALIGNED_SAFE
+#endif
+
+/* Find best way to ROTL32 */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+  #include <stdlib.h>  /* Microsoft put _rotl declaration in here */
+  #define ROTL32(x,r)  _rotl(x,r)
+#else
+  /* gcc recognises this code and generates a rotate instruction for CPUs with one */
+  #define ROTL32(x,r)  (((uint32_t)x << r) | ((uint32_t)x >> (32 - r)))
+#endif
+
+
+/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Core murmurhash algorithm macros */
+
+#define C1  (0xcc9e2d51)
+#define C2  (0x1b873593)
+
+/* This is the main processing body of the algorithm. It operates
+ * on each full 32-bits of input. */
+#define DOBLOCK(h1, k1) do{ \
+        k1 *= C1; \
+        k1 = ROTL32(k1,15); \
+        k1 *= C2; \
+        \
+        h1 ^= k1; \
+        h1 = ROTL32(h1,13); \
+        h1 = h1*5+0xe6546b64; \
+    }while(0)
+
+
+/* Append unaligned bytes to carry, forcing hash churn if we have 4 bytes */
+/* cnt=bytes to process, h1=name of h1 var, c=carry, n=bytes in c, ptr/len=payload */
+#define DOBYTES(cnt, h1, c, n, ptr, len) do{ \
+    int _i = cnt; \
+    while(_i--) { \
+        c = c>>8 | *ptr++<<24; \
+        n++; len--; \
+        if(n==4) { \
+            DOBLOCK(h1, c); \
+            n = 0; \
+        } \
+    } }while(0)
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Main hashing function. Initialise carry to 0 and h1 to 0 or an initial seed
+ * if wanted. Both ph1 and pcarry are required arguments. */
+void PMurHash32_Process(uint32_t *ph1, uint32_t *pcarry, const void *key, int len)
+{
+  uint32_t h1 = *ph1;
+  uint32_t c = *pcarry;
+
+  const uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t*)key;
+  const uint8_t *end;
+
+  /* Extract carry count from low 2 bits of c value */
+  int n = c & 3;
+
+#if defined(UNALIGNED_SAFE)
+  /* This CPU handles unaligned word access */
+
+  /* Consume any carry bytes */
+  int i = (4-n) & 3;
+  if(i && i <= len) {
+    DOBYTES(i, h1, c, n, ptr, len);
+  }
+
+  /* Process 32-bit chunks */
+  end = ptr + len/4*4;
+  for( ; ptr < end ; ptr+=4) {
+    uint32_t k1 = READ_UINT32(ptr);
+    DOBLOCK(h1, k1);
+  }
+
+#else /*UNALIGNED_SAFE*/
+  /* This CPU does not handle unaligned word access */
+
+  /* Consume enough so that the next data byte is word aligned */
+  int i = -(long)ptr & 3;
+  if(i && i <= len) {
+      DOBYTES(i, h1, c, n, ptr, len);
+  }
+
+  /* We're now aligned. Process in aligned blocks. Specialise for each possible carry count */
+  end = ptr + len/4*4;
+  switch(n) { /* how many bytes in c */
+  case 0: /* c=[----]  w=[3210]  b=[3210]=w            c'=[----] */
+    for( ; ptr < end ; ptr+=4) {
+      uint32_t k1 = READ_UINT32(ptr);
+      DOBLOCK(h1, k1);
+    }
+    break;
+  case 1: /* c=[0---]  w=[4321]  b=[3210]=c>>24|w<<8   c'=[4---] */
+    for( ; ptr < end ; ptr+=4) {
+      uint32_t k1 = c>>24;
+      c = READ_UINT32(ptr);
+      k1 |= c<<8;
+      DOBLOCK(h1, k1);
+    }
+    break;
+  case 2: /* c=[10--]  w=[5432]  b=[3210]=c>>16|w<<16  c'=[54--] */
+    for( ; ptr < end ; ptr+=4) {
+      uint32_t k1 = c>>16;
+      c = READ_UINT32(ptr);
+      k1 |= c<<16;
+      DOBLOCK(h1, k1);
+    }
+    break;
+  case 3: /* c=[210-]  w=[6543]  b=[3210]=c>>8|w<<24   c'=[654-] */
+    for( ; ptr < end ; ptr+=4) {
+      uint32_t k1 = c>>8;
+      c = READ_UINT32(ptr);
+      k1 |= c<<24;
+      DOBLOCK(h1, k1);
+    }
+  }
+#endif /*UNALIGNED_SAFE*/
+
+  /* Advance over whole 32-bit chunks, possibly leaving 1..3 bytes */
+  len -= len/4*4;
+
+  /* Append any remaining bytes into carry */
+  DOBYTES(len, h1, c, n, ptr, len);
+
+  /* Copy out new running hash and carry */
+  *ph1 = h1;
+  *pcarry = (c & ~0xff) | n;
+} 
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Finalize a hash. To match the original Murmur3A the total_length must be provided */
+uint32_t PMurHash32_Result(uint32_t h, uint32_t carry, uint32_t total_length)
+{
+  uint32_t k1;
+  int n = carry & 3;
+  if(n) {
+    k1 = carry >> (4-n)*8;
+    k1 *= C1; k1 = ROTL32(k1,15); k1 *= C2; h ^= k1;
+  }
+  h ^= total_length;
+
+  /* fmix */
+  h ^= h >> 16;
+  h *= 0x85ebca6b;
+  h ^= h >> 13;
+  h *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+  h ^= h >> 16;
+
+  return h;
+}
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Murmur3A compatable all-at-once */
+uint32_t PMurHash32(uint32_t seed, const void *key, int len)
+{
+  uint32_t h1=seed, carry=0;
+  PMurHash32_Process(&h1, &carry, key, len);
+  return PMurHash32_Result(h1, carry, len);
+}
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+/* Provide an API suitable for smhasher */
+void PMurHash32_test(const void *key, int len, uint32_t seed, void *out)
+{
+  uint32_t h1=seed, carry=0;
+  const uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t*)key;
+  const uint8_t *end = ptr + len;
+
+#if 0 /* Exercise the progressive processing */
+  while(ptr < end) {
+    //const uint8_t *mid = ptr + rand()%(end-ptr)+1;
+    const uint8_t *mid = ptr + (rand()&0xF);
+    mid = mid<end?mid:end;
+    PMurHash32_Process(&h1, &carry, ptr, mid-ptr);
+    ptr = mid;
+  }
+#else
+  PMurHash32_Process(&h1, &carry, ptr, (int)(end-ptr));
+#endif
+  h1 = PMurHash32_Result(h1, carry, len);
+  *(uint32_t*)out = h1;
+}
+
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/

libraries/libapparmor/src/PMurHash.h

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * MurmurHash3 was written by Austin Appleby, and is placed in the public
+ * domain.
+ *
+ * This implementation was written by Shane Day, and is also public domain.
+ *
+ * This is a portable ANSI C implementation of MurmurHash3_x86_32 (Murmur3A)
+ * with support for progressive processing.
+ */
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Determine what native type to use for uint32_t */
+
+/* We can't use the name 'uint32_t' here because it will conflict with
+ * any version provided by the system headers or application. */
+
+/* First look for special cases */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+  #define MH_UINT32 unsigned long
+#endif
+
+/* If the compiler says it's C99 then take its word for it */
+#if !defined(MH_UINT32) && ( \
+     defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L )
+  #include <stdint.h>
+  #define MH_UINT32 uint32_t
+#endif
+
+/* Otherwise try testing against max value macros from limit.h */
+#if !defined(MH_UINT32)
+  #include  <limits.h>
+  #if   (USHRT_MAX == 0xffffffffUL)
+    #define MH_UINT32 unsigned short
+  #elif (UINT_MAX == 0xffffffffUL)
+    #define MH_UINT32 unsigned int
+  #elif (ULONG_MAX == 0xffffffffUL)
+    #define MH_UINT32 unsigned long
+  #endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MH_UINT32)
+  #error Unable to determine type name for unsigned 32-bit int
+#endif
+
+/* I'm yet to work on a platform where 'unsigned char' is not 8 bits */
+#define MH_UINT8  unsigned char
+
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Prototypes */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+void PMurHash32_Process(MH_UINT32 *ph1, MH_UINT32 *pcarry, const void *key, int len);
+MH_UINT32 PMurHash32_Result(MH_UINT32 h1, MH_UINT32 carry, MH_UINT32 total_length);
+MH_UINT32 PMurHash32(MH_UINT32 seed, const void *key, int len);
+
+void PMurHash32_test(const void *key, int len, MH_UINT32 seed, void *out);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif

libraries/libapparmor/src/features.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *   Copyright (c) 2014
+ *   Copyright (c) 2014-2017
  *   Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
  *
  *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -31,13 +32,16 @@
 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
 
 #include "private.h"
+#include "PMurHash.h"
 
 #define FEATURES_FILE "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features"
 
+#define HASH_SIZE (8 + 1) /* 32 bits binary to hex + NUL terminator */
 #define STRING_SIZE 8192
 
 struct aa_features {
 	unsigned int ref_count;
+	char hash[HASH_SIZE];
 	char string[STRING_SIZE];
 };
 
@@ -205,6 +209,29 @@ static ssize_t load_features_dir(int dirfd, const char *path,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int init_features_hash(aa_features *features)
+{
+	const char *string = features->string;
+	uint32_t seed = 5381;
+	uint32_t hash = seed, carry = 0;
+	size_t len = strlen(string);
+
+	/* portable murmur3 hash
+	 * https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher/wiki/MurmurHash3
+	 */
+	PMurHash32_Process(&hash, &carry, string, len);
+	hash = PMurHash32_Result(hash, carry, len);
+
+	if (snprintf(features->hash, HASH_SIZE,
+		     "%08" PRIx32, hash) >= HASH_SIZE) {
+		errno = ENOBUFS;
+		PERROR("Hash buffer full.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool islbrace(int c)
 {
 	return c == '{';
@@ -404,6 +431,11 @@ int aa_features_new(aa_features **features, int dirfd, const char *path)
 		 load_features_dir(dirfd, path, f->string, STRING_SIZE) :
 		 load_features_file(dirfd, path, f->string, STRING_SIZE);
 	if (retval == -1) {
+		aa_features_unref(f);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (init_features_hash(f) == -1) {
 		int save = errno;
 
 		aa_features_unref(f);
@@ -446,6 +478,15 @@ int aa_features_new_from_string(aa_features **features,
 
 	memcpy(f->string, string, size);
 	f->string[size] = '\0';
+
+	if (init_features_hash(f) == -1) {
+		int save = errno;
+
+		aa_features_unref(f);
+		errno = save;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	*features = f;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -482,8 +523,12 @@ aa_features *aa_features_ref(aa_features *features)
  */
 void aa_features_unref(aa_features *features)
 {
+	int save = errno;
+
 	if (features && atomic_dec_and_test(&features->ref_count))
 		free(features);
+
+	errno = save;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -576,3 +621,21 @@ bool aa_features_supports(aa_features *features, const char *str)
 
 	return true;
 }
+
+/**
+ * aa_features_id - provides unique identifier for an aa_features object
+ * @features: the features
+ *
+ * Allocates and returns a string representation of an identifier that can
+ * be used to uniquely identify an aa_features object. The mechanism for
+ * generating the string representation is internal to libapparmor and
+ * subject to change but an example implementation is applying a hash
+ * function to the features string.
+ *
+ * Returns: a string identifying @features which must be freed by the
+ * caller or NULL, with errno set, upon error
+ */
+char *aa_features_id(aa_features *features)
+{
+	return strdup(features->hash);
+}

libraries/libapparmor/src/grammar.y

@@ -19,7 +19,12 @@
 %{
 
 /* set the following to non-zero to get bison to emit debugging
- * information about tokens given and rules matched. */
+ * information about tokens given and rules matched.
+ * Also:
+ *   Uncomment the %defines
+ *   parse.error
+ *   parse.trace
+ */
 #define YYDEBUG 0
 #include <string.h>
 #include <aalogparse.h>
@@ -34,7 +39,9 @@ aa_log_record *ret_record;
  * emit messages when asked for. */
 void aalogparse_error(void *scanner, char const *s)
 {
-        //printf("ERROR: %s\n", s);
+#if (YYDEBUG != 0)
+	printf("ERROR: %s\n", s);
+#endif
 	ret_record->event = AA_RECORD_INVALID;
 }
 
@@ -68,6 +75,11 @@ aa_record_event_type lookup_aa_event(unsigned int type)
 %}
 
 %defines
+/* uncomment for debugging
+%define parse.error verbose
+%define parse.trace
+*/
+
 %define api.pure
 %lex-param{void *scanner}
 %parse-param{void *scanner}
@@ -128,6 +140,8 @@ aa_record_event_type lookup_aa_event(unsigned int type)
 %token TOK_KEY_PEER_PID
 %token TOK_KEY_PROFILE
 %token TOK_KEY_PEER_PROFILE
+%token TOK_KEY_LABEL
+%token TOK_KEY_PEER_LABEL
 %token TOK_KEY_PEER
 %token TOK_AUDIT
 %token TOK_KEY_FAMILY
@@ -194,7 +208,7 @@ new_syntax:
 	| TOK_TYPE_AA_ERROR audit_msg key_list { ret_record->event = AA_RECORD_ERROR; }
 	| TOK_TYPE_UNKNOWN audit_msg key_list { ret_record->event = lookup_aa_event($1); }
 	| TOK_TYPE_LSM_AVC audit_msg key_list
-	| TOK_TYPE_USER_AVC audit_user_msg TOK_SINGLE_QUOTE key_list TOK_SINGLE_QUOTE
+	| TOK_TYPE_USER_AVC audit_user_msg
 	;
 
 other_audit: TOK_TYPE_OTHER audit_msg TOK_MSG_REST
@@ -218,6 +232,11 @@ syslog_type:
 	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP key_type audit_id key_list
 	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
+	/* needs update: hard newline in handling mutiline log messages */
+	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id audit_user_msg_partial_tail
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); }
+	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id audit_user_msg_tail
+	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_DMESG_STAMP TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id key_list
 	  { ret_record->version = AA_RECORD_SYNTAX_V2; free($2); free($4); }
 	| syslog_date TOK_ID TOK_SYSLOG_KERNEL TOK_AUDIT TOK_COLON key_type audit_id key_list
@@ -234,7 +253,13 @@ audit_dispatch:
 audit_msg: TOK_KEY_MSG TOK_EQUALS audit_id
 	;
 
-audit_user_msg: TOK_KEY_MSG TOK_EQUALS audit_id ignored_pid ignored_uid ignored_auid ignored_ses TOK_KEY_MSG TOK_EQUALS
+audit_user_msg_partial_tail: ignored_pid ignored_uid ignored_auid ignored_ses TOK_KEY_MSG TOK_EQUALS TOK_SINGLE_QUOTE key_list
+	;
+
+audit_user_msg_tail: audit_user_msg_partial_tail TOK_SINGLE_QUOTE
+	;
+
+audit_user_msg: TOK_KEY_MSG TOK_EQUALS audit_id audit_user_msg_tail
 	;
 
 audit_id: TOK_AUDIT TOK_OPEN_PAREN TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_PERIOD TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_COLON TOK_AUDIT_DIGITS TOK_CLOSE_PAREN TOK_COLON
@@ -292,6 +317,10 @@ key: TOK_KEY_OPERATION TOK_EQUALS TOK_QUOTED_STRING
 	{ ret_record->profile = $3;}
 	| TOK_KEY_PEER_PROFILE TOK_EQUALS safe_string
 	{ ret_record->peer_profile = $3;}
+	| TOK_KEY_LABEL TOK_EQUALS safe_string
+	{ ret_record->profile = $3;}
+	| TOK_KEY_PEER_LABEL TOK_EQUALS safe_string
+	{ ret_record->peer_profile = $3;}
 	| TOK_KEY_FAMILY TOK_EQUALS TOK_QUOTED_STRING
 	{ ret_record->net_family = $3;}
 	| TOK_KEY_SOCK_TYPE TOK_EQUALS TOK_QUOTED_STRING

libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel.c

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 		__asm__ (".symver " #real "," #name "@" #version)
 #define default_symbol_version(real, name, version) \
 		__asm__ (".symver " #real "," #name "@@" #version)
+#define DLLEXPORT __attribute__((visibility("default"),externally_visible))
 
 #define UNCONFINED		"unconfined"
 #define UNCONFINED_SIZE		strlen(UNCONFINED)
@@ -500,7 +501,7 @@ int aa_change_onexec(const char *profile)
 }
 
 /* create an alias for the old change_hat@IMMUNIX_1.0 symbol */
-extern typeof((__change_hat)) __old_change_hat __attribute__((alias ("__change_hat")));
+DLLEXPORT extern typeof((__change_hat)) __old_change_hat __attribute__((alias ("__change_hat")));
 symbol_version(__old_change_hat, change_hat, IMMUNIX_1.0);
 default_symbol_version(__change_hat, change_hat, APPARMOR_1.0);
 
@@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ int query_label(uint32_t mask, char *query, size_t size, int *allowed,
 
 /* export multiple aa_query_label symbols to compensate for downstream
  * releases with differing symbol versions. */
-extern typeof((query_label)) __aa_query_label __attribute__((alias ("query_label")));
+DLLEXPORT extern typeof((query_label)) __aa_query_label __attribute__((alias ("query_label")));
 symbol_version(__aa_query_label, aa_query_label, APPARMOR_1.1);
 default_symbol_version(query_label, aa_query_label, APPARMOR_2.9);
 

libraries/libapparmor/src/kernel_interface.c

@@ -229,10 +229,7 @@ int aa_kernel_interface_new(aa_kernel_interface **kernel_interface,
 	if (kernel_features) {
 		aa_features_ref(kernel_features);
 	} else if (aa_features_new_from_kernel(&kernel_features) == -1) {
-		int save = errno;
-
 		aa_kernel_interface_unref(ki);
-		errno = save;
 		return -1;
 	}
 	ki->supports_setload = aa_features_supports(kernel_features, set_load);
@@ -240,11 +237,8 @@ int aa_kernel_interface_new(aa_kernel_interface **kernel_interface,
 
 	if (!apparmorfs) {
 		if (find_iface_dir(&alloced_apparmorfs) == -1) {
-			int save = errno;
-
 			alloced_apparmorfs = NULL;
 			aa_kernel_interface_unref(ki);
-			errno = save;
 			return -1;
 		}
 		/* alloced_apparmorfs will be autofree'ed */
@@ -253,10 +247,7 @@ int aa_kernel_interface_new(aa_kernel_interface **kernel_interface,
 
 	ki->dirfd = open(apparmorfs, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
 	if (ki->dirfd < 0) {
-		int save = errno;
-
 		aa_kernel_interface_unref(ki);
-		errno = save;
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -283,12 +274,16 @@ aa_kernel_interface *aa_kernel_interface_ref(aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interfa
  */
 void aa_kernel_interface_unref(aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interface)
 {
+	int save = errno;
+
 	if (kernel_interface &&
 	    atomic_dec_and_test(&kernel_interface->ref_count)) {
 		if (kernel_interface->dirfd >= 0)
 			close(kernel_interface->dirfd);
 		free(kernel_interface);
 	}
+
+	errno = save;
 }
 
 /**

libraries/libapparmor/src/libapparmor.map

@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@
 
 IMMUNIX_1.0 {
   global:
-        change_hat;
+        change_hat; __old_change_hat;
   local:
         *;
 };
 
 APPARMOR_1.0 {
   global:
-        change_hat;
+        change_hat; __change_hat;
         parse_record;
         free_record;
   local:
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ APPARMOR_1.1 {
   global:
         aa_is_enabled;
         aa_find_mountpoint;
-        aa_change_hat;
+        aa_change_hat; __old_change_hat;
         aa_change_hatv;
         aa_change_hat_vargs;
         aa_change_profile;
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ APPARMOR_1.1 {
         free_record;
         aa_getprocattr_raw;
         aa_getprocattr;
-        aa_query_label;
+        aa_query_label; __aa_query_label;
 
 	# no more symbols here, please
 
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ APPARMOR_1.1 {
 
 APPARMOR_2.9 {
   global:
-	aa_query_label;
+	aa_query_label; query_label;
   local:
 	*;
 } APPARMOR_1.1;
@@ -95,9 +95,30 @@ APPARMOR_2.11 {
         *;
 } APPARMOR_2.10;
 
+APPARMOR_2.13 {
+  global:
+        aa_policy_cache_dir_path;
+        aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview;
+	aa_policy_cache_no_dirs;
+	aa_policy_cache_dirfd;
+	aa_policy_cache_open;
+	aa_policy_cache_filename;
+        aa_features_id;
+  local:
+        *;
+} APPARMOR_2.11;
+
+APPARMOR_2.13.1 {
+  global:
+        aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir;
+  local:
+        *;
+} APPARMOR_2.13;
+
 PRIVATE {
 	global:
 		_aa_is_blacklisted;
+		_aa_asprintf;
 		_aa_autofree;
 		_aa_autoclose;
 		_aa_autofclose;

libraries/libapparmor/src/policy_cache.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *   Copyright (c) 2014
+ *   Copyright (c) 2014-2017
  *   Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
  *
  *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@
  *   Ltd.
  */
 
+#include <dirent.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -29,31 +32,155 @@
 #include "private.h"
 
 #define CACHE_FEATURES_FILE	".features"
+#define MAX_POLICY_CACHE_OVERLAY_DIRS	4
 
 struct aa_policy_cache {
 	unsigned int ref_count;
 	aa_features *features;
 	aa_features *kernel_features;
-	int dirfd;
+	int n;
+	int dirfd[MAX_POLICY_CACHE_OVERLAY_DIRS];
 };
 
 static int clear_cache_cb(int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *st,
 			  void *data unused)
 {
-	/* remove regular files */
-	if (S_ISREG(st->st_mode))
+	if (S_ISREG(st->st_mode)) {
+		/* remove regular files */
 		return unlinkat(dirfd, path, 0);
+	} else if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+		int retval;
+
+		retval = _aa_dirat_for_each(dirfd, path, NULL, clear_cache_cb);
+		if (retval)
+			return retval;
+
+		return unlinkat(dirfd, path, AT_REMOVEDIR);
+	}
 
 	/* do nothing with other file types */
 	return 0;
 }
 
+struct replace_all_cb_data {
+	aa_policy_cache *policy_cache;
+	aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interface;
+};
+
+static int replace_all_cb(int dirfd, const char *name, struct stat *st,
+			 void *cb_data)
+{
+	int retval = 0;
+
+	if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) {
+		/*
+		 * symlinks in that cache are used to track file merging.
+		 * In the scanned overlay situation they can be skipped
+		 * as the combined entry will be one of none skipped
+		 * entries
+		 */
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st->st_mode) && st->st_size == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * empty file in the cache dir is used as a whiteout
+		 * to hide files in a lower layer. skip
+		 */
+	} else if (!S_ISDIR(st->st_mode) && !_aa_is_blacklisted(name)) {
+		struct replace_all_cb_data *data;
+
+		data = (struct replace_all_cb_data *) cb_data;
+		retval = aa_kernel_interface_replace_policy_from_file(data->kernel_interface,
+								      dirfd,
+								      name);
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static char *path_from_fd(int fd)
+{
+	autofree char *proc_path = NULL;
+	autoclose int proc_fd = -1;
+	struct stat proc_stat;
+	char *path;
+	ssize_t size, path_len;
+
+	if (asprintf(&proc_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd) == -1) {
+		proc_path = NULL;
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	proc_fd = open(proc_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);
+	if (proc_fd == -1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (fstat(proc_fd, &proc_stat) == -1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!S_ISLNK(proc_stat.st_mode)) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	size = proc_stat.st_size;
+repeat:
+	path = malloc(size + 1);
+	if (!path)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/**
+	 * Since 2.6.39, symlink file descriptors opened with
+	 * (O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW) can be used as the dirfd with an empty string
+	 * as the path. readlinkat() will operate on the symlink inode.
+	 */
+	path_len = readlinkat(proc_fd, "", path, size);
+	if (path_len == -1)
+		return NULL;
+	if (path_len == size) {
+		free(path);
+		size = size * 2;
+		goto repeat;
+	}
+	path[path_len] = '\0';
+	return path;
+}
+
+static int cache_check_features(int dirfd, const char *cache_name,
+				aa_features *features)
+{
+	aa_features *local_features = NULL;
+	autofree char *name = NULL;
+	bool rc;
+	int len;
+
+	len = asprintf(&name, "%s/%s", cache_name, CACHE_FEATURES_FILE);
+	if (len == -1) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* verify that cache dir .features matches */
+	if (aa_features_new(&local_features, dirfd, name)) {
+		PDEBUG("could not setup new features object for dirfd '%d' '%s'\n", dirfd, name);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rc = aa_features_is_equal(local_features, features);
+	aa_features_unref(local_features);
+	if (!rc) {
+		errno = EEXIST;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int create_cache(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, aa_features *features)
 {
-	if (aa_policy_cache_remove(policy_cache->dirfd, "."))
+	if (aa_policy_cache_remove(policy_cache->dirfd[0], "."))
 		return -1;
 
-	if (aa_features_write_to_file(features, policy_cache->dirfd,
+	if (aa_features_write_to_file(features, policy_cache->dirfd[0],
 				      CACHE_FEATURES_FILE) == -1)
 		return -1;
 
@@ -65,51 +192,176 @@ static int create_cache(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, aa_features *features)
 static int init_cache_features(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache,
 			       aa_features *kernel_features, bool create)
 {
-	bool call_create_cache = false;
-
-	if (aa_features_new(&policy_cache->features, policy_cache->dirfd,
-			    CACHE_FEATURES_FILE)) {
-		policy_cache->features = NULL;
-		if (!create || errno != ENOENT)
+	if (cache_check_features(policy_cache->dirfd[0], ".",
+				 kernel_features)) {
+		/* EEXIST must come before ENOENT for short circuit eval */
+		if (!create || errno == EEXIST || errno != ENOENT)
 			return -1;
+	} else
+		return 0;
 
-		/* The cache directory needs to be created */
-		call_create_cache = true;
-	} else if (!aa_features_is_equal(policy_cache->features,
-					 kernel_features)) {
-		if (!create) {
-			errno = EEXIST;
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-		/* The cache directory needs to be refreshed */
-		call_create_cache = true;
-	}
-
-	return call_create_cache ?
-		create_cache(policy_cache, kernel_features) : 0;
+	return create_cache(policy_cache, kernel_features);
 }
 
-struct replace_all_cb_data {
-	aa_policy_cache *policy_cache;
-	aa_kernel_interface *kernel_interface;
+struct miss_cb_data {
+	aa_features *features;
+	const char *path;
+	char *pattern;
+	char *cache_name;	/* return */
+	long n;
 };
 
-static int replace_all_cb(int dirfd unused, const char *name, struct stat *st,
-			 void *cb_data)
+/* called on cache collision or miss where cache isn't present */
+static int cache_miss_cb(int dirfd, const struct dirent *ent, void *arg)
 {
-	int retval = 0;
+	struct miss_cb_data *data = arg;
+	char *cache_name, *pos, *tmp;
+	long n;
+	int len;
 
-	if (!S_ISDIR(st->st_mode) && !_aa_is_blacklisted(name)) {
-		struct replace_all_cb_data *data;
+	/* TODO: update to tighter pattern match of just trailing #s */
+	if (fnmatch(data->pattern, ent->d_name, 0))
+		return 0;
 
-		data = (struct replace_all_cb_data *) cb_data;
-		retval = aa_kernel_interface_replace_policy_from_file(data->kernel_interface,
-								      data->policy_cache->dirfd,
-								      name);
+	/* entry matches <feature_id>.<n> pattern */
+	len = asprintf(&cache_name, "%s/%s", data->path, ent->d_name);
+	if (len == -1) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (!cache_check_features(dirfd, cache_name, data->features) || errno == ENOENT) {
+		/* found cache dir matching pattern */
+		data->cache_name = cache_name;
+		/* return 1 to stop iteration and signal dir found */
+		return 1;
+	}  else if (errno != EEXIST) {
+		PDEBUG("cache_check_features() failed for dirfd '%d' '%s'\n", dirfd, cache_name);
+		free(cache_name);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	free(cache_name);
+
+	/* check the cache dir # */
+	pos = strchr(ent->d_name, '.');
+	n = strtol(pos+1, &tmp, 10);
+	if (n == LONG_MIN || n == LONG_MAX || tmp == pos + 1)
+		return -1;
+	if (n > data->n)
+		data->n = n;
+
+	/* continue processing */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* will return cache_path on error if there is a collision */
+static int cache_dir_from_path_and_features(char **cache_path,
+					    int dirfd, const char *path,
+					    aa_features *features)
+{
+	autofree const char *features_id = NULL;
+	char *cache_dir;
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	features_id = aa_features_id(features);
+	if (!features_id)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = asprintf(&cache_dir, "%s/%s.0", path, features_id);
+	if (len == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!cache_check_features(dirfd, cache_dir, features) || errno == ENOENT) {
+		PDEBUG("cache_dir_from_path_and_features() found '%s'\n", cache_dir);
+		*cache_path = cache_dir;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (errno != EEXIST) {
+		PDEBUG("cache_check_features() failed for dirfd '%d' %s\n", dirfd, cache_dir);
+		free(cache_dir);
+		return -1;
 	}
 
-	return retval;
+	PDEBUG("Cache collision '%s' falling back to next dir on fd '%d' path %s", cache_dir, dirfd, path);
+	free(cache_dir);
+
+	struct miss_cb_data data = {
+		.features = features,
+		.path = path,
+		.cache_name = NULL,
+		.n = -1,
+	};
+
+	if (asprintf(&data.pattern, "%s.*", features_id) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	rc = _aa_dirat_for_each2(dirfd, path, &data, cache_miss_cb);
+	free(data.pattern);
+	if (rc == 1) {
+		/* found matching feature dir */
+		PDEBUG("cache_dir_from_path_and_features() callback found '%s'\n", data.cache_name);
+		*cache_path = data.cache_name;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (rc) {
+		PDEBUG("cache_dir_from_path_and_features() callback returned an error'%m'\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* no dir found use 1 higher than highest dir n searched */
+	len = asprintf(&cache_dir, "%s/%s.%d", path, features_id, data.n + 1);
+	if (len == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	PDEBUG("Cache collision no dir found using %d + 1 = %s\n", data.n + 1, cache_dir);
+	*cache_path = cache_dir;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* will return the cache_dir or NULL */
+static int open_or_create_cache_dir(aa_features *features, int dirfd,
+				    const char *path, bool create,
+				    char **cache_dir)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	*cache_dir = NULL;
+	if (cache_dir_from_path_and_features(cache_dir, dirfd, path,
+					     features))
+		return -1;
+
+open:
+	fd = openat(dirfd, *cache_dir, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		/* does the dir exist? */
+		if (create && errno == ENOENT) {
+			/**
+			 * 1) Attempt to create the cache location, such as
+			 *    /etc/apparmor.d/cache.d/
+			 * 2) Attempt to create the cache directory, for the
+			 *    passed in aa_features, such as
+			 *    /etc/apparmor.d/cache.d/<features_id>/
+			 * 3) Try to reopen the cache directory
+			 */
+			if (mkdirat(dirfd, path, 0700) == -1 &&
+			    errno != EEXIST) {
+				PERROR("Can't create cache location '%s': %m\n",
+				       path);
+			} else if (mkdirat(dirfd, *cache_dir, 0700) == -1 &&
+				   errno != EEXIST) {
+				PERROR("Can't create cache directory '%s': %m\n",
+				       *cache_dir);
+			} else {
+				goto open;
+			}
+		} else if (create) {
+			PERROR("Can't update cache directory '%s': %m\n", *cache_dir);
+		} else {
+			PDEBUG("Cache directory '%s' does not exist\n", *cache_dir);
+		}
+
+		PDEBUG("Could not open cache_dir: %m");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return fd;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -133,8 +385,11 @@ int aa_policy_cache_new(aa_policy_cache **policy_cache,
 			aa_features *kernel_features,
 			int dirfd, const char *path, uint16_t max_caches)
 {
+	autofree char *cache_dir = NULL;
 	aa_policy_cache *pc;
 	bool create = max_caches > 0;
+	autofree const char *features_id = NULL;
+	int i, fd;
 
 	*policy_cache = NULL;
 
@@ -143,65 +398,79 @@ int aa_policy_cache_new(aa_policy_cache **policy_cache,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (max_caches > 1) {
-		errno = ENOTSUP;
-		return -1;
-	}
-
+	/* TODO: currently no reaping of caches in excess of max_caches */
 	pc = calloc(1, sizeof(*pc));
 	if (!pc) {
 		errno = ENOMEM;
 		return -1;
 	}
-	pc->dirfd = -1;
+	pc->n = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_POLICY_CACHE_OVERLAY_DIRS; i++)
+		pc->dirfd[i] = -1;
 	aa_policy_cache_ref(pc);
 
-open:
-	pc->dirfd = openat(dirfd, path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
-	if (pc->dirfd < 0) {
-		int save;
-
-		/* does the dir exist? */
-		if (create && errno == ENOENT) {
-			if (mkdirat(dirfd, path, 0700) == 0)
-				goto open;
-			PERROR("Can't create cache directory '%s': %m\n", path);
-		} else if (create) {
-			PERROR("Can't update cache directory '%s': %m\n", path);
-		} else {
-			PDEBUG("Cache directory '%s' does not exist\n", path);
-		}
-
-		save = errno;
-		aa_policy_cache_unref(pc);
-		errno = save;
-		return -1;
-	}
-
 	if (kernel_features) {
 		aa_features_ref(kernel_features);
 	} else if (aa_features_new_from_kernel(&kernel_features) == -1) {
-		int save = errno;
-
 		aa_policy_cache_unref(pc);
-		errno = save;
+		PDEBUG("%s: Failed to obtain features %m\n", __FUNCTION__);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	pc->kernel_features = kernel_features;
+	pc->features = kernel_features;
+
+	fd = open_or_create_cache_dir(kernel_features, dirfd, path, create,
+				      &cache_dir);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		aa_policy_cache_unref(pc);
+		PDEBUG("%s: Failed to open_or_create_dir %m\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	pc->dirfd[0] = fd;
+	pc->n = 1;
 
 	if (init_cache_features(pc, kernel_features, create)) {
-		int save = errno;
-
+		PDEBUG("%s: failed init_cache_features for dirfd '%d' name '%s' opened as pc->dirfd '%d'\n", __FUNCTION__, dirfd, cache_dir, pc->dirfd);
 		aa_policy_cache_unref(pc);
-		errno = save;
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	PDEBUG("%s: created policy_cache for dirfd '%d' name '%s' opened as pc->dirfd '%d'\n", __FUNCTION__, dirfd, cache_dir, pc->dirfd);
 	*policy_cache = pc;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir - add an readonly dir layer to the policy cache
+ * @policy_cache: policy_cache to add the readonly dir to
+ * @dirfd: directory file descriptor or AT_FDCWD (see openat(2))
+ * @path: path to the readonly policy cache
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error with errno set
+ */
+
+int aa_policy_cache_add_ro_dir(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dirfd,
+			       const char *path)
+{
+	autofree char *cache_dir = NULL;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (policy_cache->n >= MAX_POLICY_CACHE_OVERLAY_DIRS) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		PDEBUG("%s: exceeded number of supported cache overlays\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	fd = open_or_create_cache_dir(policy_cache->features, dirfd, path,
+				      false, &cache_dir);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		PDEBUG("%s: failed to open_or_create_cache_dir %m\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	policy_cache->dirfd[policy_cache->n++] = fd;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_policy_cache_ref - increments the ref count of an aa_policy_cache object
  * @policy_cache: the policy_cache
@@ -220,13 +489,18 @@ aa_policy_cache *aa_policy_cache_ref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache)
  */
 void aa_policy_cache_unref(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache)
 {
+	int i, save = errno;
+
 	if (policy_cache && atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_cache->ref_count)) {
 		aa_features_unref(policy_cache->features);
-		aa_features_unref(policy_cache->kernel_features);
-		if (policy_cache->dirfd != -1)
-			close(policy_cache->dirfd);
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_POLICY_CACHE_OVERLAY_DIRS; i++) {
+			if (policy_cache->dirfd[i] != -1)
+				close(policy_cache->dirfd[i]);
+		}
 		free(policy_cache);
 	}
+
+	errno = save;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -260,7 +534,7 @@ int aa_policy_cache_replace_all(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache,
 	if (kernel_interface) {
 		aa_kernel_interface_ref(kernel_interface);
 	} else if (aa_kernel_interface_new(&kernel_interface,
-					   policy_cache->kernel_features,
+					   policy_cache->features,
 					   NULL) == -1) {
 		kernel_interface = NULL;
 		return -1;
@@ -268,10 +542,158 @@ int aa_policy_cache_replace_all(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache,
 
 	cb_data.policy_cache = policy_cache;
 	cb_data.kernel_interface = kernel_interface;
-	retval = _aa_dirat_for_each(policy_cache->dirfd, ".", &cb_data,
-				    replace_all_cb);
+	retval = _aa_overlaydirat_for_each(policy_cache->dirfd, policy_cache->n,
+					   &cb_data, replace_all_cb);
 
 	aa_kernel_interface_unref(kernel_interface);
 
 	return retval;
 }
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_cache_no_dirs - return the number of dirs making up the cache
+ * @policy_cache: the policy_cache
+ *
+ * Returns: The number of directories that the policy cache is composed of
+ */
+int aa_policy_cache_no_dirs(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache)
+{
+	return policy_cache->n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_cache_dir_path - returns the path to the aa_policy_cache directory
+ * @policy_cache: the policy_cache
+ * @dir: which dir in the policy cache to return the name of
+ *
+ * Returns: The path to the policy cache directory on success, NULL on
+ * error with errno set.
+ */
+char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dir)
+{
+	char *path = NULL;
+
+	if (dir < 0 || dir >= policy_cache->n) {
+		PERROR("aa_policy_cache directory: %d does not exist\n", dir);
+		errno = ERANGE;
+	} else {
+		path = path_from_fd(policy_cache->dirfd[dir]);
+	}
+
+	if (!path)
+		PERROR("Can't return the path to the aa_policy_cache directory: %m\n");
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_cache_dirfd - returns the dirfd for a aa_policy_cache directory
+ * @policy_cache: the policy_cache
+ * @dir: which dir in the policy cache to return the dirfd of
+ *
+ * Returns: The dirfd to the @dir policy cache directory on success, -1 on
+ * error with errno set.
+ *
+ * caller is responsible for closing the returned dirfd
+ */
+int aa_policy_cache_dirfd(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, int dir)
+{
+	if (dir < 0 || dir >= policy_cache->n) {
+		PERROR("aa_policy_cache directory: %d does not exist\n", dir);
+		errno = ERANGE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return dup(policy_cache->dirfd[dir]);
+}
+
+/* open cache file corresponding to name */
+int aa_policy_cache_open(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, const char *name,
+			 int flags)
+{
+	int i, fd;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < policy_cache->n; i++) {
+		fd = openat(policy_cache->dirfd[i], name, flags);
+		if (fd != -1)
+			return fd;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+char *aa_policy_cache_filename(aa_policy_cache *policy_cache, const char *name)
+{
+	char *path;
+	autoclose int fd = aa_policy_cache_open(policy_cache, name, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return NULL;
+	path = path_from_fd(fd);
+	if (!path)
+		PERROR("Can't return the path to the aa_policy_cache cachename: %m\n");
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview - returns the path to the aa_policy_cache directory
+ * @kernel_features: features representing a kernel (may be NULL if you want to
+ *                   use the features of the currently running kernel)
+ * @dirfd: directory file descriptor or AT_FDCWD (see openat(2))
+ * @path: path to the policy cache
+ *
+ * Returns: The path to the policy cache directory on success, NULL on
+ * error with errno set.
+ */
+char *aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview(aa_features *kernel_features,
+				       int dirfd, const char *path)
+{
+	autofree char *cache_loc = NULL;
+	autofree char *cache_dir = NULL;
+	char *dir_path;
+
+	if (kernel_features) {
+		aa_features_ref(kernel_features);
+	} else if (aa_features_new_from_kernel(&kernel_features) == -1) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Leave cache_loc set to NULL if dirfd is AT_FDCWD and handle a
+	 * NULL cache_loc in the asprintf() below
+	 */
+	if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) {
+		cache_loc = path_from_fd(dirfd);
+		if (!cache_loc) {
+			int save = errno;
+
+			PERROR("Can't return the path to the aa_policy_cache cache location: %m\n");
+			aa_features_unref(kernel_features);
+			errno = save;
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	PDEBUG("Looking up cachedir path for AT_FDCWD\n");
+	if (cache_dir_from_path_and_features(&cache_dir, dirfd, path,
+					     kernel_features)) {
+		int save = errno;
+
+		PERROR("Can't return the path to the aa_policy_cache directory: %m\n");
+		aa_features_unref(kernel_features);
+		errno = save;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	aa_features_unref(kernel_features);
+
+	if (asprintf(&dir_path, "%s%s%s",
+		     cache_loc ? : "", cache_loc ? "/" : "", cache_dir) == -1) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	PDEBUG("aa_policy_cache_dir_path_preview() returning '%s'\n", dir_path);
+	return dir_path;
+}

libraries/libapparmor/src/private.c

@@ -38,11 +38,24 @@
 #ifndef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
  #ifdef HAVE___SECURE_GETENV
   #define secure_getenv __secure_getenv
+ #elif ENABLE_DEBUG_OUTPUT
+  #error Debug output is not possible without a secure_getenv() implementation.
  #else
-  #error neither secure_getenv nor __secure_getenv is available
+  #define secure_getenv(env) NULL
  #endif
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * Allow libapparmor to build on older glibcs and other libcs that do
+ * not support reallocarray.
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRY
+void *reallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	return realloc(ptr, nmemb * size);
+}
+#endif
+
 struct ignored_suffix_t {
 	const char * text;
 	int len;
@@ -56,6 +69,10 @@ static struct ignored_suffix_t ignored_suffixes[] = {
 	{ ".dpkg-old", 9, 1 },
 	{ ".dpkg-dist", 10, 1 },
 	{ ".dpkg-bak", 9, 1 },
+	{ ".dpkg-remove", 12, 1 },
+	/* Archlinux packaging files */
+	{ ".pacsave", 8, 1 },
+	{ ".pacnew", 7, 1 },
 	/* RPM packaging files have traditionally not been silently
            ignored */
 	{ ".rpmnew", 7, 0 },
@@ -169,13 +186,252 @@ int _aa_asprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, ...)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int dot_or_dot_dot_filter(const struct dirent *ent)
+/* stops on first error, can use errno or return value to communicate
+ * the goal is to use this to replace _aa_dirat_for_each, but that will
+ * be a different patch.
+ */
+int _aa_dirat_for_each2(int dirfd, const char *name, void *data,
+			int (* cb)(int, const struct dirent *, void *))
 {
-	if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
-		return 0;
+	autoclose int cb_dirfd = -1;
+	int fd_for_dir = -1;
+	const struct dirent *ent;
+	DIR *dir;
+	int save, rc;
 
-	return 1;
+	if (!cb || !name) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	save = errno;
+
+	cb_dirfd = openat(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
+	if (cb_dirfd == -1) {
+		PDEBUG("could not open directory fd '%d' '%s': %m\n", dirfd, name);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* dup cd_dirfd because fdopendir has claimed the fd passed to it */
+	fd_for_dir = dup(cb_dirfd);
+	if (fd_for_dir == -1) {
+		PDEBUG("could not dup directory fd '%s': %m\n", name);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	dir = fdopendir(fd_for_dir);
+	if (!dir) {
+		PDEBUG("could not open directory '%s' from fd '%d': %m\n", name, fd_for_dir);
+		close(fd_for_dir);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	while ((ent = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (cb) {
+			rc = (*cb)(cb_dirfd, ent, data);
+			if (rc) {
+				PDEBUG("dir_for_each callback failed for '%s'\n",
+				       ent->d_name);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	errno = save;
+
+out:
+	closedir(dir);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+#define max(a, b) \
+   ({ __typeof__ (a) _a = (a); \
+       __typeof__ (b) _b = (b); \
+     _a > _b ? _a : _b; })
+#define CHUNK 32
+struct overlaydir {
+	int dirfd;
+	struct dirent *dent;
+};
+
+static int insert(struct overlaydir **overlayptr, int *max_size, int *size,
+		  int pos, int remaining, int dirfd, struct dirent *ent)
+{
+	struct overlaydir *overlay = *overlayptr;
+	int i, chunk = max(remaining, CHUNK);
+
+	if (size + 1 >= max_size) {
+		struct overlaydir *tmp = reallocarray(overlay,
+						      *max_size + chunk,
+						      sizeof(*overlay));
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		overlay = tmp;
+	}
+	*max_size += chunk;
+	(*size)++;
+	for (i = *size; i > pos; i--)
+		overlay[i] = overlay[i - 1];
+	overlay[pos].dirfd = dirfd;
+	overlay[pos].dent = ent;
+
+	*overlayptr = overlay;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define merge(overlay, n_overlay, max_size, list, n_list, dirfd)	\
+({									\
+	int y, z;							\
+	int rc = 0;							\
+									\
+	for (y = 0, z = 0; y < n_overlay && z < n_list; ) {		\
+		int res = strcmp(overlay[y].dent->d_name, list[z]->d_name);\
+		if (res < 0) {						\
+			y++;						\
+			continue;					\
+		} else if (res == 0) {					\
+			free(list[z]);					\
+			list[z] = NULL;					\
+			y++;						\
+			z++;						\
+		} else {						\
+			if ((rc = insert(&overlay, &max_size, &n_overlay, y,\
+					 n_list - z, dirfd, list[z])))	\
+				goto fail;				\
+			y++;						\
+			list[z++] = NULL;				\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	while (z < n_list) {						\
+		if ((rc = insert(&overlay, &max_size, &n_overlay, y,	\
+				 n_list - z, dirfd,list[z])))		\
+			goto fail;					\
+		y++;							\
+		list[z++] = NULL;					\
+	}								\
+									\
+fail:									\
+	rc;								\
+})
+
+static ssize_t readdirfd(int dirfd, struct dirent ***out,
+			  int (*dircmp)(const struct dirent **, const struct dirent **))
+{
+	struct dirent **dents = NULL, *dent;
+	ssize_t n = 0;
+	size_t i;
+	int save;
+	DIR *dir;
+
+	*out = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * closedir(dir) will close the underlying fd, so we need
+	 * to dup first
+	 */
+	if ((dirfd = dup(dirfd)) < 0) {
+		PDEBUG("dup of dirfd failed: %m\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((dir = fdopendir(dirfd)) == NULL) {
+		PDEBUG("fdopendir of dirfd failed: %m\n");
+		close(dirfd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Get number of directory entries */
+	while ((dent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+		if (!strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dent->d_name, ".."))
+			continue;
+		n++;
+	}
+	rewinddir(dir);
+
+	dents = calloc(n, sizeof(struct dirent *));
+	if (!dents)
+		goto fail;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ) {
+		if ((dent = readdir(dir)) == NULL) {
+			PDEBUG("readdir of entry[%d] failed: %m\n", i);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		if (!strcmp(dent->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dent->d_name, ".."))
+			continue;
+
+		dents[i] = malloc(sizeof(*dents[i]));
+		if (!dents[i])
+			goto fail;
+		memcpy(dents[i], dent, sizeof(*dent));
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	if (dircmp)
+		qsort(dents, n, sizeof(struct dirent *), (int (*)(const void *, const void *))dircmp);
+
+	*out = dents;
+	closedir(dir);
+	return n;
+
+fail:
+	save = errno;
+	if (dents) {
+		for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+			free(dents[i]);
+	}
+	free(dents);
+	closedir(dir);
+	errno = save;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int _aa_overlaydirat_for_each(int dirfd[], int n, void *data,
+			int (* cb)(int, const char *, struct stat *, void *))
+{
+	autofree struct dirent **list = NULL;
+	autofree struct overlaydir *overlay = NULL;
+	int i, k;
+	int n_list, size = 0, max_size = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		n_list = readdirfd(dirfd[i], &list, alphasort);
+		if (n_list == -1) {
+			PDEBUG("scandirat of dirfd[%d] failed: %m\n", i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (merge(overlay, size, max_size, list, n_list, dirfd[i])) {
+			for (k = 0; k < n_list; k++)
+				free(list[k]);
+			for (k = 0; k < size; k++)
+				free(overlay[k].dent);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (rc = 0, i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		/* Must cycle through all dirs so that each one is autofreed */
+		autofree struct dirent *dent = overlay[i].dent;
+		struct stat my_stat;
+
+		if (rc)
+			continue;
+
+		if (fstatat(overlay[i].dirfd, dent->d_name, &my_stat,
+			    AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
+			PDEBUG("stat failed for '%s': %m\n", dent->d_name);
+			rc = -1;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (cb(overlay[i].dirfd, dent->d_name, &my_stat, data)) {
+			PDEBUG("dir_for_each callback failed for '%s'\n",
+			       dent->d_name);
+			rc = -1;
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -219,8 +475,7 @@ int _aa_dirat_for_each(int dirfd, const char *name, void *data,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	num_dirs = scandirat(cb_dirfd, ".", &namelist,
-			     dot_or_dot_dot_filter, NULL);
+	num_dirs = readdirfd(cb_dirfd, &namelist, NULL);
 	if (num_dirs == -1) {
 		PDEBUG("scandirat of directory '%s' failed: %m\n", name);
 		return -1;

libraries/libapparmor/src/private.h

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #ifndef _AA_PRIVATE_H
 #define _AA_PRIVATE_H 1
 
+#include <dirent.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <sys/apparmor_private.h>
 
@@ -51,4 +52,7 @@ void print_debug(const char *fmt, ...);
 void atomic_inc(unsigned int *v);
 bool atomic_dec_and_test(unsigned int *v);
 
+int _aa_dirat_for_each2(int dirfd, const char *name, void *data,
+			int (* cb)(int, const struct dirent *, void *));
+
 #endif /* _AA_PRIVATE_H */

libraries/libapparmor/src/scanner.l

@@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ key_pid			"pid"
 key_peer_pid		"peer_pid"
 key_profile		"profile"
 key_peer_profile	"peer_profile"
+key_label		"label"
+key_peer_label		"peer_label"
 key_family		"family"
 key_sock_type		"sock_type"
 key_protocol		"protocol"
@@ -314,6 +316,8 @@ yy_flex_debug = 0;
 {key_peer_pid}		{ return(TOK_KEY_PEER_PID); }
 {key_profile}		{ BEGIN(safe_string); return(TOK_KEY_PROFILE); }
 {key_peer_profile}	{ BEGIN(safe_string); return(TOK_KEY_PEER_PROFILE); }
+{key_label}		{ BEGIN(safe_string); return(TOK_KEY_LABEL); }
+{key_peer_label}	{ BEGIN(safe_string); return(TOK_KEY_PEER_LABEL); }
 {key_family}		{ return(TOK_KEY_FAMILY); }
 {key_sock_type}		{ return(TOK_KEY_SOCK_TYPE); }
 {key_protocol}		{ return(TOK_KEY_PROTOCOL); }

libraries/libapparmor/swig/perl/Makefile.am

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ LibAppArmor.pm: libapparmor_wrap.c
 
 Makefile.perl: Makefile.PL LibAppArmor.pm
 	$(PERL) $< PREFIX=$(prefix) MAKEFILE=$@
+	sed -ie 's/LD_RUN_PATH="\x24(LD_RUN_PATH)"//g' Makefile.perl
 	sed -ie 's/^LD_RUN_PATH.*//g' Makefile.perl
 
 LibAppArmor.so: libapparmor_wrap.c Makefile.perl

libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/setup.py.in

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ setup(name          = 'LibAppArmor',
       version       = '@VERSION@',
       author        = 'AppArmor Dev Team',
       author_email  = 'apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com',
-      url           = 'http://wiki.apparmor.net',
+      url           = 'https://wiki.apparmor.net',
       description   = 'AppArmor python bindings',
       download_url  = 'https://launchpad.net/apparmor/+download',
       package_dir   = {'LibAppArmor': '@srcdir@'},

libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/Makefile.am

@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ test_python.py: test_python.py.in $(top_builddir)/config.status
 
 CLEANFILES = test_python.py
 
-# bah, how brittle is this?
-PYTHON_DIST_BUILD_PATH = '$(builddir)/../build/$$($(PYTHON) -c "import distutils.util; import platform; print(\"lib.%s-%s\" %(distutils.util.get_platform(), platform.python_version()[:3]))")'
+PYTHON_DIST_BUILD_PATH = '$(builddir)/../build/$$($(PYTHON) buildpath.py)'
 
 TESTS	= test_python.py
 TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = \

libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/buildpath.py

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+# the build path has changed in setuptools 62.1:
+# https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/1c23f5e1e4b18b50081cbabb2dea22bf345f5894
+import sys
+import sysconfig
+import setuptools
+
+
+if tuple(map(int, setuptools.__version__.split("."))) >= (62, 1):
+    identifier = sys.implementation.cache_tag
+else:
+    identifier = "%d.%d" % sys.version_info[:2]
+print("lib.%s-%s" % (sysconfig.get_platform(), identifier))

libraries/libapparmor/swig/python/test/test_python.py.in

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ class AAPythonBindingsTests(unittest.TestCase):
         libapparmor.free_record(swig_record)
 
         expected = self.parse_output_file(outfile)
-        self.assertEquals(expected, record,
+        self.assertEqual(expected, record,
                           "expected records did not match\n" +
                           "expected = %s\nactual = %s" % (expected, record))
 
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class AAPythonBindingsTests(unittest.TestCase):
             line = l.rstrip('\n')
             count += 1
             if line == "START":
-                self.assertEquals(count, 1,
+                self.assertEqual(count, 1,
                                   "Unexpected output format in %s" % (outfile))
                 continue
             else:
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ class AAPythonBindingsTests(unittest.TestCase):
 
         new_record = dict()
         for key in [x for x in dir(record) if not (x.startswith('_') or x == 'this')]:
-            value = record.__getattr__(key)
+            value = getattr(record, key)
             if key == "event" and value in EVENT_MAP:
                 new_record[key] = EVENT_MAP[value]
             elif key == "version":
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ class AAPythonBindingsTests(unittest.TestCase):
                     continue
                 else:
                     new_record[key] = str(value)
-            elif record.__getattr__(key):
+            elif value or value == '':
                 new_record[key] = str(value)
 
         return new_record

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/Makefile.am

@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ clean-local:
 	rm -rf tmp.err.* tmp.out.* site.exp site.bak test_multi/out
 	rm -f libaalogparse.log libaalogparse.sum
 
-check-local:
-	if ! test -f libaalogparse.log ; then echo '*** libaalogparse.log not found - is dejagnu installed? ***'; exit 1; fi
-	if grep ERROR libaalogparse.log ; then exit 1 ; fi
+check-local: check-DEJAGNU
+	@if ! test -f libaalogparse.log ; then echo '*** libaalogparse.log not found - is dejagnu installed? ***'; exit 1; fi
+	@if grep ERROR libaalogparse.log ; then exit 1 ; fi
 
 EXTRA_DIST = test_multi/*.in test_multi/*.out test_multi/*.err

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi.c

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	FILE *testcase;
 	char log_line[1024];
 	aa_log_record *test = NULL;
+	size_t size;
 	int ret = -1;
 
 	if (argc != 2)
@@ -32,14 +33,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		return(1);
 	}
 
-	if (fgets(log_line, 1023, testcase) == NULL)
-	{
+	size = fread(log_line, 1, 1023, testcase);
+	if (ferror(testcase)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Could not read testcase.\n");
 		fclose(testcase);
 		return(1);
 	}
-
 	fclose(testcase);
+	log_line[size] = 0;
 
 	test = parse_record(log_line);
 

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/avc_syslog_01.profile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 /usr/sbin/cupsd {
-  /boot/ r,
+  owner /boot/ r,
 
 }

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_1.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type=AVC msg=audit(1494272099.261:3455): apparmor="DENIED" operation="ptrace" profile="/bin/netstat" pid=1962 comm="netstat" target=""

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_1.out

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+START
+File: ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_1.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_DENIED
+Audit ID: 1494272099.261:3455
+Operation: ptrace
+Profile: /bin/netstat
+Command: netstat
+Name2: 
+PID: 1962
+Epoch: 1494272099
+Audit subid: 3455

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_1.profile

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+/bin/netstat {
+}

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_2.in

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type=AVC msg=audit(1494272099.261:3455): apparmor="DENIED" operation="ptrace" profile="/bin/netstat" pid=1962 comm="netstat" target=8022C0FF81A0FFFF8022C0FF81A0FFFF1080CBFF81A0FFFF1080CBFF81A0FFFF2080CBFF81A0FFFF2080CBFF81A0FFFF9E03

libraries/libapparmor/testsuite/test_multi/ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_2.out

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+START
+File: ptrace_garbage_lp1689667_2.in
+Event type: AA_RECORD_INVALID
+Audit ID: 1494272099.261:3455
+Operation: ptrace
+Profile: /bin/netstat
+Command: netstat
+PID: 1962
+Epoch: 1494272099
+Audit subid: 3455